BECK, formerly known as David Wayne Vanderbeck, #154970, in and on behalf of all other inmates confined within the Minnesota Department of Corrections for the State of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Gothriel LAFLEUR, sued as Gothriel J. LaFleur, individually, and as the Commissioner of Corrections for the State of Minnesota (MnDOC); David Crist, individually, and as the Warden for the Minnesota Correctional Facility-Stillwater (MCF-STW); Dan Ferrise, individually, and as the Executive Director of Minnesota Correctional Industries (MinnCor), Appellees.
No. 00-1983.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted: Feb. 16, 2001. Filed: July 16, 2001.
257 F.3d 764
Defendant next argues that the district court clearly erred in finding, for purposes of sentencing, that he was accountable for the 454.53 grams of methamphetamine found in the house at 205 E Street. Defendant emphasizes that no drugs were found on his person at the time of his arrest. He further highlights his own testimony that a man named “Gusto” had been living in the house under a sublease while defendant had, at all relevant times, been living in the apartment at 1111 E Street. Thus, defendant argues, there was no basis for the district court to conclude that he had either actual or constructive possession of the methamphetamine found in the house. See Brief for Appellant at 14-19.
We review a sentencing court‘s drug quantity determination for clear error. We will reverse only if, upon review of the entire record, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. See United States v. Moss, 138 F.3d 742, 745 (8th Cir.1998). In the present case, we conclude that the district court had sufficient evidence before it to find defendant accountable for the 454.53 grams of methamphetamine stored in the house at 205 E Street. It was certainly reasonable for the district court to disbelieve defendant‘s claim that a man named “Gusto” was subleasing the house. Moreover, the district court could reasonably conclude, regardless of whether “Gusto” had been living in the house, that defendant had dominion and control over the house at all relevant times and was operating it as a stash house. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not clearly err in determining the quantity of methamphetamine attributable to defendant at sentencing.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Thomas H. Boyd, argued, St Paul, MN, for appellant.
W. Karl Hansen, argued, St Paul, MN, for appellee.
Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, LAY, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.
Beck, a Minnesota state prisoner, appeals the district court‘s1 dismissal of his
We review de novo the district court‘s dismissal of Beck‘s amended complaint. Young v. City of St. Charles, 244 F.3d 623, 627 (8th Cir.2001). When ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court must accept as true all factual allegations contained in the complaint and afford the plaintiff all reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts. Id. “A case is properly dismissed only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Broadus v. O.K. Indus., Inc., 226 F.3d 937, 941 (8th Cir.2000) (internal quotations omitted). “To establish a claim
Beck suggests on appeal that his amended complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a constitutional claim that defendants deprived him of property without due process of law. See Lyon v. Farrier, 730 F.2d 525, 527 (8th Cir.1984) (noting that although prisoners retain protections against the deprivation of property without due process of law, the protection is “subject to reasonable limitation or retraction in light of the legitimate security concerns of the institution” (internal quotations omitted)). Beck failed to allege sufficient personal involvement by any of defendants to support such a claim. See Ellis v. Norris, 179 F.3d 1078, 1079 (8th Cir.1999) (stating that prisoner must allege defendants’ personal involvement or responsibility for the constitutional violations to state a § 1983 claim); see also Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir.1985) (“Although it is to be liberally construed, a pro se complaint must contain specific facts supporting its conclusions.“). The only allegation close to establishing personal involvement by any of the defendants is Beck‘s claim that Commissioner LaFleur and Warden Crist instituted departmental policies that somehow deprived him of personal property. The amended complaint fails, however, to identify the specific policies of which he complains or how the defendants were responsible for taking his property for their own personal gain pursuant to those policies. Beck‘s amended complaint also alleges that defendants altered and falsified inmate wage and tax statements, resulting in various violations of federal law, but fails to allege any personal loss that would support Beck‘s right to recover for those alleged violations. See Martin, 780 F.2d at 1337 (“A prisoner must allege a personal loss.“).
Beck asks us in the alternative to remand the case with instructions to the district court to modify the dismissal to be without prejudice. Because Beck failed to follow the district court‘s detailed and explicit directions on how to cure his initial complaint and because the substance of his allegations in the amended complaint was nearly identical to his initial complaint, we hold that dismissal with prejudice was appropriate. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.