JOSEPH BECK AND OTHERS v. CITY OF ST. PAUL AND ANOTHER.
Nos. 45442, 45485, 45486
Supreme Court of Minnesota
July 3, 1975
231 N.W. 2d 919
As a result, we hold that the check issued by respondent was not voluntary, but was made pursuant to an existing legal commitment. The lien waiver printed on the reverse side of the check, then, was void of the additional consideration necessary to waive future lien rights from and after June 27, 1972, and was unenforceable. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand so that judgment may be entered in conformance with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Pierre N. Regnier, City Attorney, for appellant city.
Firestone, Fink, Krawetz, Miley & Maas, James P. Miley, and William W. Fink, for respondents.
PETERSON, JUSTICE.
These appeals present questions of importance in the law of municipal zoning. The city of St. Paul adopted an ordinance amending its zoning plan. Certain affected citizens challenged the validity of the zoning amendment. The trial court, ruling the new zoning ordinance invalid, enjoined any development of the area in issue that was inconsistent with the former zoning classification.
The property affected by the challenged zoning amendment (hereinafter the “subject area“) is an 8-block area on the southwest edge of the city of St. Paul. The subject area contains approximately 33 1/2 acres and is generally bounded by Benson Avenue on the north, Rankin Street on the east, Youngman Ave-
There are approximately 256 40- by 120-foot lots in the subject area, most of which are vacant. There are only 72 houses containing 79 residence units in the area. Some of the streets in the area are not improved, and there are serious sewer and water problems. Outside of the perimeter of the 8-block area there has been commercial development, industrial development, and apartment use; the predominant zoning classifications adjacent to the subject area are “C Residential,” “Commercial,” and “Industrial.” The subject area is surrounded by well-traveled roads and streets.
The plaintiffs in this suit are all landowners within the subject area. The defendants are the city of St. Paul (hereinafter the city) and The Stuart Corporation, a Minnesota corporation owned by Stuart H. Nolan. The Stuart Corporation has acted, at all times herein, on behalf of and as an agent for Shepard Park, a partnership consisting of Nolan and three others. Shepard Park has proposed a 32 million dollar development within the subject area. At the time of trial, the partnership owned, or was obligated to purchase pursuant to executory contracts, more than 80 percent of the land within the subject area.
A rezoning amendment was formally proposed in August 1973. The proposed amendment rezoned the subject area from “B Residential” to “C Residential” and “Commercial” for the purpose of constructing multiple dwelling units, office buildings, and a recreational center.
The matter was submitted to the board of zoning, and public hearings on the proposal were held for 3 days. The minutes of these public hearings indicate that the views of both proponents and opponents of the rezoning were considered at great length.
On October 18, 1973, the board of zoning unanimously recommended to the planning commission that the proposed rezoning
Roger Ryan, acting head of the planning department of the city of St. Paul, testified that his department had made an “in depth study” of the proposed amendment to the zoning ordinance and, as a result of that study, the planning department favored approval of the amendment. Ryan testified that the factors taken into consideration in deciding upon the recommendation included the comprehensive city zoning plan developed in 1963, the existing land uses within the subject area, the land uses of the surrounding area, street capabilities in the area, the existence of commercial developments in the area adequate to service the proposed development, and the trend of land usage in the area.
On November 20, 1973, the city council held a public hearing to consider the proposed rezoning. Written notice of the council hearing was sent to all persons living within the subject area. Further, the city clerk had published notice of the public hearing in the St. Paul Legal Ledger on November 10, 1973. The council heard both proponents and opponents of the proposed rezoning, including a spokesman for plaintiffs.1 After three readings, Ordinance No. 15521, rezoning the subject area, was adopted by the council on December 19, 1973.
Plaintiffs subsequently filed suit to have the rezoning amendment declared void, and the trial court found that the ordinance
Plaintiffs contend that the initiation of the rezoning amendment was not carried out pursuant to law. As a result, it is argued, the council was without authority to enact the ordinance, and the ordinance is invalid.
The relevant facts are as follows: In June 1973 The Stuart Corporation made formal application for the zoning amendment. This petition was filed by The Stuart Corporation as a property owner affected by the proposed zoning. The Stuart Corporation soon recognized that there were procedural difficulties with its petition for rezoning. Specifically, the St. Paul Legislative Code allows for affected property owners to petition for a rezoning if they own 50 percent or more of the frontage on any street in the area to be rezoned.2 On the date of petition, however, The Stuart Corporation owned no property within the subject area. As a result, The Stuart Corporation withdrew its request for a rezoning.
On this basis, the city attorney advised the city council that the zoning amendment could be initiated by the city council itself. The council subsequently passed a resolution on August 23, 1973, intended to formally initiate the zoning amendment.3
On the basis of these facts, defendants claim that the rezoning was validly initiated by the city council. Plaintiffs, however, argue that the rezoning was initiated by The Stuart Corporation in fact, regardless of the subsequent formalities, and was invalid under the St. Paul Legislative Code. They contend that the only continuing thrust for rezoning came from The Stuart Corporation. Since there was nothing to indicate that the rezoning would have occurred if the corporate application had not been made, the trial court concluded that The Stuart Corporation had, in fact, initiated the rezoning.
We think that conclusion is unwarranted, for it is contrary to the expressed intent of both The Stuart Corporation and the city council itself. The Stuart Corporation specifically withdrew its petition; the city council subsequently passed a resolution to formally initiate the rezoning consideration. To allow a prior private petition to negate a subsequent official city resolution would be to circumvent the clear language and intent of the controlling statutes.
Plaintiffs also assert that the St. Paul City Council lacked jurisdiction to enact the zoning amendment.4 This objection is based on the claim that the requisite number of affected property owners had not filed their consents to the proposed rezoning before the city council acted on it.
We do not question that under the language of
The rezoning issue in LaCourse similarly involved an amendment initiated by the St. Paul City Council, and we there held that the council could not dispense with the jurisdictional requirement of obtaining consents from two-thirds of the affected owners by an unsupported finding that it would be impractical to obtain such consents. We held in O‘Brien that the consent requirement does not unconstitutionally delegate legislative authority to private property owners.
The more important question, rather, is to determine which consents are actually required. The statute provides that the zoning amendment must be consented to by the owners of at least two-thirds of the lots within 100 feet of the area subject to re-
Defendants, relying on Kiges, contend that the only consents necessary are those of property owners in the area between the outer perimeter of the base property and a line drawn 100 feet beyond the perimeter of the base property. Plaintiffs argue that a proper reading of the statute requires the appropriate number of consents among those property owners and the property owners within the area to be rezoned.
Where, as it is here, the language of a statute is ambiguous and two interpretations are possible, our role is to ascertain probable legislative intent and to give the statute a construction consistent with that intent.
A superficial reading of Kiges v. City of St. Paul, 240 Minn. 522, 62 N.W. 2d 363 (1953), may have suggested a different construction, but this point was not there in issue. We held that the ordinance there construed required that consents be obtained from “two-thirds of the owners within 100 feet of the outer perimeter of the entire area of land affected * * *.” 240 Minn. 533, 62 N.W. 2d 371. However, since the rezoning in Kiges had been petitioned for by a majority of the landowners in the target
We hold, then, that the area from which consents must be obtained under § 462.357, subd. 5, includes both the area to be rezoned and the area within a boundary 100 feet from the outer perimeter of the area to be rezoned.
It remains to apply these consent requirements to the instant facts. It is unquestioned that there were on file with the city clerk, prior to the time the city council enacted the zoning amendment, consent petitions from the owners of two-thirds of the lots in the strip surrounding the subject area. There is a subsisting question, however, concerning the existence at that time of valid consents from the requisite number of property owners within the subject area. The Stuart Corporation represents that it had obtained consents from property owners within the subject area as well, representations supported by an exhibit in evidence at the trial. The record affirmatively shows that before the ordinance was enacted, representations were made to the city council that owners of 69 percent of the lots within the subject area had also consented to the proposed rezoning.
We think it proper, however, that any subsisting questions of fact as to the number and validity of these consents be determined by the trial court. We accordingly remand this matter to the district court for that limited purpose. Subject to its finding that the requisite number of consents from the total area, including both the 100-foot strip and the subject area itself, existed at the time the city council enacted the zoning amendment, we hold that the procedural and jurisdictional requirements of the statute were satisfied.6
We are aware that these consents were never filed in the office of the city clerk, as required by
The trial court found that St. Paul Ordinance No. 15521 was invalid because it “has no substantial relation to the health, safety, morals or general welfare, and it is clearly arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, and unreasonable.” We think that the court, in making that finding, exceeded its limited scope of judicial review.
“When judicially reviewing a legislative determination, the scope of review must necessarily be narrow. The rationale behind the limited nature of review in such cases is aptly set out in State ex rel. Howard v. Village of Roseville, 244 Minn. 343, 347, 70 N.W. 2d 404, 407 (1955):
“‘Insofar as zoning ordinances are concerned, it has frequently been held that what best furthers public welfare is a matter primarily for determination of the legislative body concerned * * *.
“‘Even where the reasonableness of a zoning ordinance is debatable, or where there are conflicting opinions as to the desirability of the restrictions it imposes * * *, it is not the function of the courts to interfere with the legislative discretion on such issues.‘”
See, also, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114, 71 L. Ed. 303 (1926); 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3 ed.) §§ 25.55, 25.67; Merriam Park Community Council, Inc. v. McDonough, 297 Minn. 285, 210 N.W. 2d 416 (1973).
A municipality has a right to determine whether changing conditions or the public interest demands an exercise of the power to amend a zoning ordinance and to select the measures that are necessary for that purpose. Thus, the wisdom or good policy of a zoning ordinance is for a municipality to determine, and the court‘s scope of review must necessarily be narrow.
The ordinance here, as the city council implicitly found, bore a significant relation to the health and welfare of the city. The amendment would allow an area to be developed for additional
The trial court was particularly concerned by the possibility that the rezoning would lower plaintiffs’ property values. The exact extent of the effect is unclear in the record, but it does not seem to be great. The simple fact that certain property values may decline is not of itself a sufficient reason to invalidate a proposed rezoning. Values are not, in and of themselves, the test of validity of a zoning regulation. They are factors for a city council to take into consideration in arriving at its conclusions on the total merits in the interest of the community. The general welfare of the public is paramount in importance to the pecuniary stake of the individual. Partain v. City of Brooklyn, 73 Ohio L. Abs. 481, 138 N.E. 2d 180 (1955); Gedney Estates, Inc. v. City of White Plains, 99 N.Y. S. 2d 111 (1950); 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3 ed.) §§ 25.44, 25.66.
The evidence does not support a finding that the council‘s action was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. The rezoning was predicated upon a number of studies, surveys, hearings, and deliberations. Evidence was received, at various times, from traffic engineers; civil engineers; planning agency officials; experts with regard to fire safety, energy and power, environmental concerns, sewer and water problems, and parks and recreations; various city officials; local residents; and interested citizens. The general opinion of many who testified was that the rezoning was both in the short-term and long-term best interests of the city and its residents. Where the ultimate reasonableness of a zoning ordinance is debatable, it is not the function of the courts to interfere with discretionary legislative determination of such issues.
Reversed and remanded.
YETKA, JUSTICE (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur in that portion of the opinion which holds that the rezoning by the city of St. Paul was proper in this case.
Notes
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“5. That the Saint Paul City Council finds and determines that this resolution is for the sole purpose of initiating the procedures for amending the zoning code as requested by the Stuart Corporation and is in no manner a final approval of such an amendment request.”