J.A. BEAVER, Plаintiff-Appellee, v. RAYONIER, INC., Defendant-Appellant.
No. 98-8457.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Sept. 13, 1999.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. (No. 2:97-CV-47-AAA), Anthony A. Alaimo, Judge. Before CARNES, Circuit Judge, HILL, Senior Circuit Judge, and HOEVELER, Senior District Judge.
Plaintiff J.A. Beaver prevailed before a jury on his ADEA claim against his former employer Rayonier, Inc. (“Rayonier“). Rayonier now appeals the district court‘s denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law and, in the alternative, for an amended judgment. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. FACTS
Rayonier, a North Carolina corporation which manufactures dissоlving cellulose and fluff pulp, operates one of its two mills in Jesup, Georgia. Rayonier employs both hourly and salaried employees at the Jesup mill. Hourly employees are represented by one of four unions at the mill and their working conditions are determined through collective bargaining. Salaried employees are not represented by a union and their working conditions are set by Rayonier officials. In general, hourly employees do hands-on work while salaried employees do supervisory work.
The plaintiff J.A. Beaver began working as an hourly employee in the maintenance department of the Jesup mill in 1974. In 1980, Rayonier promoted him to the salaried position of shift maintenance
During the first quarter of 1996, the Jesup mill lost approximately $50 million in sales due to a decline in the price of pulp. According to Rayonier, that loss led the company to implement cost reductions at the mill. As part of that cost reduction, the company offered a voluntary early retirement program. Although 24 salaried employees retired as part of that program, that did not achieve as much savings as Rayonier wanted. As a result, Rayonier decided to terminate 10 salaried employees in a September 9, 1996 reduction in force (RIF). Beaver, who was 54 years old at the time, was one of two salaried employees terminated in the maintenance department. His position was eliminated as a result of Rayonier‘s decision to consolidate his MSU-2 supervisor position with the MSU-1 supervisor position. Rayonier assigned Silas Moxley, who was older than Beaver, to the new, consolidated position.
When Beaver was terminated, he told Rayonier he would take any available position with the company. Even though seven vacant supervisor positions were available at the time of Beaver‘s termination, Rayonier did not select him for another position. Instead, Rayonier chose employees who were younger than Beaver to fill six of those seven positions.
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
After his termination, Beaver filed a notice of charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Following the EEOC‘s issuance of a right to sue letter, Beaver filed this lawsuit alleging he had been terminated because of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),
The ADEA claim was then tried before a jury. At the close of all the evidence, the district court denied Rayonier‘s motion for judgment as a matter of law. The jury then returned a verdict in Beaver‘s favor and awarded him $80,242 in backpay salary and benefits. In addition, the jury found Rayonier had wilfully discriminated against Beaver. Accordingly, the district court doubled the amount оf Beaver‘s damages and, on February 17, 1998, entered judgment in favor of Beaver in the amount of $160,484.00.
Rayonier subsequently renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law and moved in the alternative for an amended verdict. The district court denied those motions on April 6. Rayonier appealed.1
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Rayonier‘s appeal requires us to address two issues: (1) whether the district court erred in denying Rayonier judgment as a matter of law on Beaver‘s ADEA claim; and (2) whether the district court erred in refusing to amend the judgment in regard to the amount of damages.
III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
“We review de novo a denial of judgment as a matter of law.” See Clover v. Total System Services, Inc., 176 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir.1999). We review only for an abuse of discretion a district court‘s refusal to amend a judgment. See Day v. Liberty Nat‘l Life Ins. Co., 122 F.3d 1012, 1014 (11th Cir.1997) cert. denied Liberty Nat‘l Life Ins. Co. v. Day, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 1797, 140 L.Ed.2d 938 (1998).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING RAYONIER JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
Rayonier also argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Beaver did not produce sufficient evidence of intentional discrimination. Although neither the district court nor the court of appeals may revisit the existence of a prima facie case, the Supreme Court has emphasized that “‘[t]he plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion [of showing intentional discrimination]. [H]e may succeed in this either directly by persuading the [factfinder] that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer‘s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716, 103 S.Ct. at 1482 (quoting Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1095, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)).
In this case, Beaver makes two arguments in support of his position that the district court properly denied Rayonier judgment as a matter of law. First, he argues Rayonier‘s claim that it needed to conduct an economically induced RIF at the Jesup mill was merely a pretext for age discrimination. Second, Beaver argues that even assuming Rayonier did conduct a legitimate RIF in response to a loss of sales, Rayonier
1. Whether Rayonier‘s Non-Discriminatory Reason for Terminating Beaver Was Pretextual
Beaver argues he presented sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that Rayonier‘s claim it needed to conduct a RIF for economic reasons was merely a pretext for age discrimination. He relies primarily on two types of evidence. First, Beaver points to evidence designed to show that, despite the $50 million drop in sales at the Jesuр mill in 1996, economic conditions were not so bad that a RIF was necessary. Specifically, Beaver points to the following:
- overall sales from all Rayonier facilities were still $1.2 billion in 1996;
- Rayonier wrote off $78 million in 1996 for closing its Port Angeles mill and $98 million for an accounting charge;
- Rayonier spent $150 million on new construction at its various facilities in 1996;
- Rayonier increased its repurchase of company stock from $16 million to $50 million;
- Rayonier increased dividends in 1996 by 16% for the third straight year;
- several executives at the Jesup mill received large bonuses in 1996;
- the vast majority of supervisors at the Jesup mill received raises in 1996.
According to Beaver, this evidence shows that economic conditions were actually good for Rayonier in 1996 and that Rayonier, by focusing on the $50 million loss in sales, has misrepresented its financial condition in order to show the RIF was economically induced. In support of his argument, Beaver cites Eskra v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 125 F.3d 1406 (11th Cir.1997). In that case, the employer terminated the plaintiff because his office, according to the report of the employer‘s actuary, was unprofitable. We held that the plaintiff‘s evidеnce showing that the employer‘s actuary had biased the report in favor of unprofitability was sufficient to show the employer‘s reason was pretextual. See id. at 1412-13.
We find the evidence cited by Beaver insufficient to support a fact-finding that the RIF was a pretext for discrimination. Beaver‘s evidence concerning profitability at Rayonier as a whole, as opposed to the
Next, Beaver seeks to show the RIF was pretextual by pointing to evidence that around the time Rayonier terminated thе ten salaried employees in the RIF, it hired some younger employees. Specifically, Beaver says Rayonier hired ten hourly employees in the maintenance department before the RIF and another twenty shortly after the RIF. He argues that evidence was sufficient for a jury to infer the RIF was a pretext to get rid of older workers. We disagree.
In Watkins v. Sverdrup Technology, Inc., 153 F.3d 1308, 1315-16 (11th Cir.1998), we held that the fact a company eliminates some positions in a RIF while simultaneously hiring younger workers in other positions is not sufficient to show that the RIF was pretextual. A plaintiff must also show that the new pоsitions were similarly situated to those that were eliminated in the RIF. See id.; see also Furr v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 82 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir.1996) (“[p]laintiffs’ evidence of [employer‘s] post-RIF hirings fail[ed] to show pretext because the people hired were not similarly situated to the [p]laintiffs.“). In this case, Beaver
For those reasons, we reject Beaver‘s argument that he produced sufficient evidence to show Rayonier‘s decision to conduct the RIF was a pretext to conceal intentional age discrimination.
2. Whether Rayonier Disсriminated Against Beaver Because of His Age By Denying Him Vacant Supervisor Positions Which Existed at the Time of the RIF
Beaver‘s second line of argument is that he presented sufficient evidence for a jury to find Rayonier intentionally discriminated against him because of his age in denying him vacant supervisor positions for which he was qualified and had applied at the time of his termination in the RIF. We agree.
The ADEA does not require employers to establish interdepartmental transfer programs during a RIF or to “transfer or rehire laid-off workers in the protected age group as a matter of course.” Jameson v. Arrow Co., 75 F.3d 1528, 1533 (11th Cir.1996). However, “a discharged employee who applies for a job for which [he] is qualified and which is available at time of [his] termination must be considered for that job along with all other candidates, and cannot be denied the position based upon [his] age.” Id. (emphasis added).
In addition to the evidence of his relative qualifications, Beaver presented evidence that Royce Daniel, the general manager of the Jesup mill and the ultimate decision-maker in personnel decisions at the mill, including those concerning Beaver, had expressed a desire to attract “younger, engineer-type employees or supervisors.”4 While Daniel‘s comment does not rise to the level of direct evidence of discrimination, and would not be enough standing alone to show a discriminatory motive, a jury could infer from it somе age-bias on Daniel‘s part when that comment is coupled with the other evidence in this case.5 See, e.g., Burrell v. Bd. of Trustees of Ga. Military College, 125 F.3d 1390, 1393 (11th Cir.1997) (statements by a decision-maker that are not direct evidence of discrimination may still be used as circumstantial evidence of a discriminatory motive).
With regard to the five positions filled by “set-up” hourly employees, Rayonier takes the position that Beaver cannot rely on the fact that younger, hourly employees filled those positions as a basis for showing age discrimination. In support of its position, Rayonier points to our statement in Marshall v. Western Grain Co., Inc., 838 F.2d 1165, 1170 (11th Cir.1988), that “because of their unique status in the workplace, bargaining unit employees are never similarly situated with non-bargaining unit employees.” Rayonier argues that because the hourly employees are bargaining unit employees represented by unions and the salaried employees such as Beaver are not, Beaver was not similarly situated to the hourly employees who were “set-up” into the available salaried positions. We disagree. Because Rayonier‘s hourly employees are not represented by the union after they are “set-up” into supervisor positions, the categorical distinction we drew in Marshall between bargaining and non-bargaining unit employees does not distinguish the “set-up” hourly employees in this case from Beaver. Accordingly, in the circumstances of this case, the fact that Rayonier chose younger hourly employees for the vacant supervisor positions was evidence it discriminated against Beaver because of his age.
Third, Rayonier argues that at least with regard to the five vacant supervisor positions filled by the “set-up” hourly employees, those hourly employees were chosen not because they were younger, but because they were already working in the departmеnts of the mill where the vacancies occurred. In contrast, Rayonier says it would have had to transfer Beaver from the maintenance department, Beaver‘s department prior to his termination, to one of the departments with a vacancy. Beaver, however, presented sufficient evidence for a jury to find that this reason was pretextual by showing that in the past, Rayonier had not required an employee to have worked in a particular department in order to be placed in a supervisor position in that department. Specifically, an employee named Marty Weathers testified at trial that, on a prior occasion, Rayonier had placed him in the supervisor position of Powerhouse Foreman and that he had done well in that position even though he had never worked in the powerhouse and was transferred from the technical department. Two of the vacant supervisor positions which were filled by younger hourly employees instead of Beaver were Powerhouse Foreman positions. In addition, Beaver also presented evidence that, although he was a supervisor in the maintenance department, he had performed work in the departments with the vacant supervisor positions.
Fourth, Rayonier argues that, consistent with its desire to cut costs at the mill, it chose other employees instead of Beaver for the vacant supervisor positions because it could pay them less than Beaver.
Finally, Rayonier argues that the ageist comment by Daniel is no more than a stray comment which occurred several months before Beaver‘s termination. Citing Tidwell v. Carter Products, 135 F.3d 1422, 1427 (11th Cir.1998), Rayonier argues that stray ageist comments made several months before a plaintiff‘s termination are insufficient to present a jury question on the issue of discriminatory intent. That argument is unavailing for two reasons. First, Tidwell is distinguishable because the ageist comments in that case were not made by the ultimate decision-maker in the plaintiff‘s termination. See id. Second, and more importantly, we do not hold that Daniel‘s comment, taken alone, is enough to present a jury question on the issue of discriminatory intent. Instead, we hold that Daniel‘s comment, taken in connection with the evidence that Rayonier chose younger employees for six of the seven vacant supervisor positions, even though Beaver expressed his willingness to take any of those positions and presented evidence that he was more qualified than the younger employees, provided a sufficient basis for a jury to find that Rayonier intentionally discriminated against Beaver because of his age.6
B. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO AMEND THE JUDGMENT
Beaver presented evidence showing he was entitled to $53,9057 in backpay salary and $31,000 in backpay benefits, for a total of $84,905. Thus, the jury‘s verdict of $80,242 was well within the range of the evidence. Although there was also evidence supporting Rayonier‘s view that Beaver was entitled to approximately $10,000 less in baсkpay benefits, it was within the province of the jury to resolve that factual conflict in Beaver‘s favor. The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to amend the judgment.
V. CONCLUSION
AFFIRMED.