This is аn appeal from a summary judgment dismissing Virginia Beaudoin’s breach of fiduciary duty claim against Davidson Trust Company, which stemmed from Davidson Trust’s mistaken distribution of trust funds to Beaudoin when Beaudoin’s two children were, in fact, the designated beneficiaries. Because we find that Davidson Trust owed Beaudoin no fiduciary duty at the time of the alleged breach, wе affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Virginia Beaudoin’s mother, Geraldine Schneider, was trustor and Davidson Trust Company was trustee of a May 9, 1996 trust instrument entitled “2nd Amended And Restated Geraldine M. Schneider Revocable Living Trust.” Upon Ms. Schneider’s death, the trust property was to be divided into two equal shares for the lifetime use of her two daughters, Beaudoin and Margaret Van Dyke. Beaudoin’s share was to be held in trust for her lifetime benefit, remainder to her appointee or estate. Van Dyke’s share was also to be held in trust for her lifetime benefit, 1 remainder to “the surviving issue by right of representation of [Beaudoin].” The trust further provided that “[i]n the event that [Beaudoin’s] issue are not surviving then to [Beaudoin].”
Beaudoin was admittedly knowledgeable about the trust provisions and was present when her mother gave instructions to her lawyer to amend the trust to name Beaudoin’s children the remainder beneficiaries of Van Dyke’s share. Beaudoin was also appointed Advisor to the Trust pursuant to the 1996 trust instrument, and Davidson Trust was required to obtain her consent regarding investment strategy, discretionary payments, loans, and in determining whether and when Schneider was incapable of handling her own affairs. Ms. Schneider also gave Beaudoin a durable power of attorney and, beginning in 1999, when Ms. Schneider was determined incompetent, Beaudoin used that authority to make annual gifts from the trust to herself, her sister, and her immediate family.
Schneider died on March 10, 2004, and by October 2006, Beaudoin had withdrawn her entire $374,346.87 share of the trust principal. Van Dyke died on March 30, 2007. At that time, Beaudoin had two children— Brooks and Brianna — whose contingent interest in Van Dyke’s share vested, according to the trust, upon their survival of Van Dyke. However, Beaudoin spoke to a trust assistant for Davidson Trust, Jan Shelby, on March 31, 2007, and was allegedly told that she was the beneficiary of the remainder of Van Dyke’s share. Although the parties’ affidavits conflict on what exactly was said during that conversation, Beaudoin admitted in her deposition that she knew at the time that the children were the proper beneficiaries but thought it was Davidson Trust’s duty to find thаt fact out. 2
Beaudoin later consulted with Scott Baldwin, her financial advisor at D.A Davidson & Co., about whether she could retire from her job as a cosmetologist based on the additional trust distribution, and he suggested a meeting with the trustee. Around the second week of April 2007, Beaudoin put in her notice of retirement at her workplace and worked her last day during the last week of April 2007. That same week, subsequent to her last day of work, Beaudoin and Baldwin met with J. Todd Edmonds — a vice president, trust officer, and branch manager of Davidson Trust — to discuss Beaudoin’s retirement plans, and it was decided that she could retire. 3 Davidson Trust thereafter *704 made a partial distribution of the trust funds into one of Beaudoin’s acсounts. Beaudoin asserted that based on Davidson Trust’s conduct, she retired, sold all her business supplies and inventory, booked a non-refundable vacation, took distributions from her account, and made monetary gifts to her children.
When the mistake was discovered, Beaudoin sued Davidson Trust, claiming breach of fiduciary duty, negligent representation, and infliction of emotional distress. She claimed damages for the costs she allegedly incurred in reliance on the mistaken designation. The district court granted summary judgment to Davidson Trust on all of Beaudoin’s claims, finding in regard to the fiduciary duty claim — the only finding appealed — that no fiduciary relationship existed between the parties at the time of the alleged breach. The court reasoned:
Prior to Margaret’s death, Beaudoin had exhausted her share of the Schneider Trust in 2006, thus, her status as a beneficiary ended at that time. Further, any remote contingent interest she may have held in Margaret’s share ceased upon Margaret’s death, when Brooks and Brianna’s status as beneficiaries became fixed.
The court further found that Beaudoin showed no legal support for her claim that Davidson Trust assumed a fiduciary duty by treating her as if she was the designated beneficiary. Beaudoin timely appealed from the district court’s final judgment.
II.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
I. Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the basis that no fiduciаry duty is owed to a contingent beneficiary after the contingency has failed to occur?
II. Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the basis that no fiduciary duty was assumed by Davidson Trust in this case?
III. Whether any fiduciary duty that Davidson Trust owed Beaudoin was breached?
III.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
“This Court reviews a motion for summary judgment pursuant to the same standards as the district court.”
Mackay v. Four Rivers Packing Co.,
B. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Beaudoin’s fiduciary duty claim because no fiduciary duty is owed to a contingent beneficiary once the contingency has failed to occur.
On appeal, Beaudoin first argues that although her status as lifetime beneficiary ended when she exhausted her trust share in October 2006, she remained a contingent beneficiary оf her sister’s share under the terms of the trust. Although she cites little legal support for her theory, she argues that as a contingent beneficiary, she was owed a fiduciary duty that survived Van Dyke’s death and continued until her children actually accepted the trust distribution and the trust was terminated. Davidson Trust responds that even if a fiduciary duty was owed to Beaudoin after she exhausted her share, it terminated upon Van Dyke’s death and, thus, *705 no duty was owed at the time of the alleged breach.
Although we have held that a trustee indeed owes some fiduciary duty to a contingent beneficiary, Beaudoin’s status as a contingent beneficiary was eliminated upon Van Dyke’s death and, thus, no fiduciary duty was owed at the time of the alleged breach. To estаblish a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, the plaintiff must first establish that a fiduciary relationship existed at the time of the breach.
Sorensen v. St. Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc.,
Although this Court has not specifically addressed the scope of a trustee’s fiduciary duty to a contingent beneficiary, we have recognized that a residual beneficiary of a trust may have a sufficient interest to complain about actions that jeopаrdize its corpus.
Taylor v. Maile,
Notwithstanding, Beaudoin’s contingent interest — and Davidson Trust’s accompanying fiduciary duty to her — ended upon Van Dyke’s death, when Brooks’ and Brianna’s contingency occurred and Beaudoin’s contingency did not. Beaudoin creatively argues that this Court should recognize a fiduciary relationship up until the funds were actually distributed to Brooks and Brianna because they could have died or disclaimed their interest up until that point, causing the interest to accelerate to Beaudoin. In addition to the fact that there is no legal support advanced or to be found for this theory, there is no logical reason to recognize such a lingering duty.
First of all, the trust clearly provides that, “Upon the death of [Van Dyke] her share of this trust shall terminate and shall be distributed to the surviving issue by right of representation of [Beaudoin].” That language clearly makes the death of Van Dyke the moment of the vesting of Brooks’ and Brianna’s interests and the termination of Beaudoin’s interest. Further, when а gift is beneficial, acceptance by the beneficiary is presumed; thus, recognizing a lingering duty up until some conscious decision not to disclaim would run counter to that presumption.
See
97 C.J.S.
Wills
§ 1710 (2011);
Matter of Estate of Ashe,
The more legally cogent time to sever a contingent interest and its accompanying fiduciary relationship is the moment that the contingency fails to occur. This squares with the generally recognized scope of the trus
*706
tee’s duty upon the termination of the trust and final distribution of the trust principal, as is the situation here. “Upon the termination оf the trust it is the duty of the trustee to the person beneficially entitled to the trust property to transfer the property to him____” Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 345 (1959). The trustee owes this duty to the fixed remainder beneficiary alone, to the exclusion of the interest of any third party.
See Edwards v. Edwards,
Thus, because Beaudoin does not dispute the fact that the terms of the trust made Brooks and Brianna the fixed beneficiaries upon Van Dyke’s death, nor the fact that the аlleged breach occurred after Van Dyke’s death, summary judgment was appropriately granted on the basis that Davidson Trust owed Beaudoin no fiduciary duty at the time of the alleged breach.
C. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Beaudoin’s fiduciary duty claim on the basis that Davidson Trust did not assume a fiduciary duty to Beaudoin because no relationship of trust and confidence was created by Davidson Trust’s conduct.
Alternatively, Beaudoin argues that Davidson Trust assumed a fiduciary duty to her by erroneously treating her as the remainder beneficiary, citing a single case dealing with voluntary assumption of a duty in the negligence context as her support. Davidson Trust responds that Beaudoin’s assumed duty claim cannot be raised on appeal because it was not alleged in her complaint, and, regardless, there is no legal support for the proposition that a trustee assumes a fiduciary duty to a third party by mistakenly informing her that she is a beneficiary.
As an initial matter, we will evaluate Beaudoin’s assumed fiduсiary duty argument because it is simply an alternative theory advanced in support of her fiduciary duty claim rather than a wholly separate claim. Although, as Davidson Trust asserts, it is true that a “voluntary duty is distinct from any other duty the party may have as a result of another undertaking or relationship,” that does not mean a party cannot arguе both in support of the same cause of action.
Jones v. Runft, Leroy, Coffin & Matthews, Chtd.,
However, we find that no fiduciary duty was assumed here because no relationship of trust and confidence arose between Beaudoin and Davidson Trust. In support of her position, Beaudoin cites
Baccus v. Ameripride Services, Inc.,
[t]he term fiduciary implies that one party is in a superior position to the other and that such a position enables him to exercise influence over one who reposes special trust and confidence in him.... As a general rule, mere respect for another’s judgment or trust in [his] character is usually not sufficient to establish such a relationship. The facts and circumstances must indicate that the one reposing the trust has foundation for his belief that the onе giving advice or presenting arguments is acting not in his own behalf, but in the interests of the other party.
Idaho First Nat’l Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc.,
*707 Here, Beaudoin asserts that Davidson Trust’s actions of informing her via phone that she was the beneficiary, meeting with her to discuss her retirement, and making a partial distribution of the trust money to her account all gave rise to a fiduciary relationship even if none existed before. However, the facts and circumstances here show that Davidson Trust was not in a superior position over Beaudoin in regard to the soundness of these actions, and Beaudoin had no foundation for her alleged belief that Davidson Trust would follow through with its mistake. Beaudoin’s own deposition revealed several important facts in this regard.
First, Beaudoin was present when her mother designated her children the remainder beneficiaries. Second, she was appointed Advisor to the Trust and had worked with the trustee to govern execution of the trust provisions for years in what the district court characterized as a “co-fiduciary” cаpacity. Third, Beaudoin knew the trust well enough to exercise authority over the trust property via her durable power of attorney. And finally, she admittedly knew at the time of Davidson Trust’s conduct that it had made a mistake — that she was, in fact, not the designated beneficiary. This admitted knowledge, coupled with her active, authoritative rolе over the trust, show that no foundation existed for the submission of trust and confidence required for the imposition of a fiduciary duty.
Accordingly, we find that the district court properly granted Davidson Trust summary judgment notwithstanding Beaudoin’s assumed fiduciary duty theory.
D. Because Davidson Trust neither owed nor had assumed a fiduciary duty to Beaudoin at the time of the alleged breach, this Court need not address the question of breach.
Davidson Trust also argues that Beaudoin alleges no conduct on the part of Davidson Trust that would constitute breach of a fiduciary duty to her. Beaudoin argues that the question of breach is irrelevant to this appeal. Beaudoin is correct. As stated above, tо establish a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, the plaintiff must first establish that a fiduciary relationship existed at the time of the alleged breach.
Sorensen,
VI.
CONCLUSION
Because we find as a matter of law that Davidsоn Trust neither owed nor had assumed a duty to Beaudoin at the time of the alleged breach, we affirm the judgment of the district court. Costs on appeal are awarded to Davidson Trust.
Notes
. However, while Beaudoin's interest in her share was unrestricted, Van Dyke’s was limited to income distributions.
. Beaudoin also called her son. Brooks, to inform him about the death, and she told him at that time that she thought he was a beneficiary but Davidson Trust was telling her differently.
.However, Beaudoin stated in her deposition that Edmonds did not indicate at that meeting that he had read the trust instrument himself or that he had concluded she was indeed the beneficiary. She did not inform Edmonds of her doubts regarding her status as beneficiary at the meeting.