*1 Í88 See, judge. e.g., People
on remand it should
tried
a different
be
Sumner,
v.
40 Ill. App. 3d
Reversed and remanded. O’BRIEN, JJ,
BUCKLEY and concur. BEAUDETTE, Deceased, by Joy Beaudette, Widow,Appellant, STEVEN his v. (Eastman Kodak, Appellee). THE INDUSTRIAL al. COMMISSION et (Industrial Division) First District No. 1—98—-2217WC
Opinion September filed *2 RARICK,J., COLWELL, dissenting, joined by J. Stookal, Nilson, Bobrow, Ltd., Chicago, appel- & for
Marc B. Stookal lant. Crofts, Nyhan, Pfister, Bambrick
Edward M. Pfister and Bruce D. both Kinzie, PC., Chicago, appellees. for & opinion of the court:
JUSTICE McCULLOUGH delivered 23, 1990, injured right his arm while April On Steven Beaudette (Kodak). Company Kodak Steven working respondent, for Eastman (TTD) disability total benefits under Workers’ temporary received 305/8(b) (West 1994)) (Act) (820 until he died Compensation Act ILCS death, during the week of Steven’s point 1992. At some Kodak, widow, Beaudette, who Joy spoke representative his with a claim for further benefits incorrectly stated that she did not have a 3, 1994, Joy filed a claim for benefits under the Act. On November (Com- August under the Act. On the Industrial mission) dismiss, finding though that granted Kodak’s motion to Kodak was from asserting the normal statute of limitations (820 305/6(d) (West under the Act 1998)), ILCS the claim was barred by two-year period began limitations that on the date of Kodak’s giving conduct rise to the estoppel. We affirm.
According Joy’s testimony to arbitrator, before the Ooyama, Clara attorney Kodak, an person was the to whom she talked about her January 23, 1991, husband’s case. On Ooyama wrote Steven letter stating, in part:
“As we previously, discussed your compensation workers’ case can be settled with a lump sum you for the April 1990 ac- cident. Please you let me know if would be in pursuing interested so, If your alternative. I will present review file you with a proposal for settlement.”
No response by by anyone Steven or on his behalf is shown in the rec- ord. Claimant testified she understood this letter to mean that when he was done with all of treatments, his cancer he would get a settle- ment payment. Claimant testified Ooyama she trusted upon and relied her, information provided she though Ooyama even told her it was job her represent Kodak and its interests. On March Ooyama Steven, informing wrote him his workers’ claim being administered the Martin Boyer Company, Inc., and that questions regarding his accident should Small, be referred to Judith representative claims Joy there. testified she spoke with Small frequently, and Small sent them Steven’s paychecks. Joy testified she *3 believed Small and relied on her information. Small never informed Joy of a time limitation for Joy a claim. did not ask Small about time limitations.
Within a week after 18, Steven died on January 1992, Joy called Small, who told her to return half of the most paycheck. recent Ac- cording Joy, when she asked Small what was to happen next:
“She done; told me that —She it said was it was over with. Your dead, husband’s and that she—What makes me remember that is that is what she said: The case is—There’s no case. He’s dead.” When asked if she ever called again, Joy “No, Small responded, because of the coldness in her. just dead, She said he was there’s noth- ing you Joy can do.” did any not have further conversations with Ooyama, Small, or anyone else representing Kodak.
The Act for provides periods two of limitation: case,
“In any other than injury one where the was caused exposure radiological materials equipment or or unless asbestos *** application the compensation is filed years within 3 after accident, the date compensation paid, of the years where no has been or within 2 payment compensation, after the date of the last of
191 later, right the to file shall be any paid, has been whichever 1998). 305/6(d)(West ILCS be barred.” 820 application such shall on injury, expired the date of The measured from period, limitations measured from the last date 22, period 1993. The limitations April claim 17, Joy 1994. did not file this January on compensation expired 3, until November 1994. from as estopped and Commission found Kodak
The arbitrator
by the comments of Small
serting the normal statute of limitations
18,
v.
City
Chicago
1992. Under
during
January
the week of
Comm’n,
281,
406,
(1979),
412
a
270,
75
2d
388 N.E.2d
Industrial
Ill.
to file a claim
given
claimant
is not
indefinite
which
from assert
simply
point
because the
at some
Instead,
ing
the statute of
the limitations
starts
limitations.
giving
estoppel.
rise to the
running again as of the date of the conduct
281,
parties
The
City Chicago,
The Commission found
that “the statute
25,
Although
run on
1992.”
do not address the
parties
estoppel issue,
finding.
evidence
not
A
support
does
review
ing
any legal
court can affirm the
decision
basis in
upon
Commission’s
support
decision, regardless
the record to
its
of the Commission’s find
ings
Comm’n,
reasoning.
Corp.
or
General Motors
(1989).
695,
App.
992,
3d
534
Estoppel
ordinarily
N.E.2d
1000
question
fact,
but it becomes a matter of law where there is no
dispute of material fact and
one inference can
only
be drawn. See
Comm’n,
Pantle v. Industrial
61 Ill. 2d
335 N.E.2d
494
In Phillips Products Co. v. Industrial
94 Ill. 2d
(1983),
injured
He
May
N.E.2d
claimant was
on
received his last
1975. In
October
April
inquired
rights;
personnel
claimant
as to his
director
“
”
him
nothing coming’
prior
informed
he
‘had
to that time the
“
”
foreman
‘just forget
Phillips,
told claimant to
about it.’
stated, “A
li
supreme
at
Additionally, initially enough if even Small’s statements were *4 they employer raising the from estoppel, establish would not bar Estoppel apply the statute of limitations defense here. will not legal rights long the claimant knew or should have known of her before 192 See Smith v. Cook expire. of limitations was to original period
the (1987); 857, 866, 336, 342 3d 518 N.E.2d County Hospital, App. 164 Ill. 846, 852 Holt, App. 3d 544 N.E.2d Neaterour v. asserting statute of employer from Typically, misleading expira to the engages it in conduct close limitations when employee the into a false sense of the statute of limitations to lull tion Tegeler v. Industrial security delay him from a claim. See and (1996) Comm’n, 498, 508-10, 672 N.E.2d 1130-31 173 Ill. 2d adjuster failed to inform em employer’s (estoppel occurred where roughly would terminate negotiations that and settlement offer ployee later, three-year expired); statute of limitations two months when 46, 50-51, Molex, Comm’n, 62 Ill. 2d 338 N.E.2d Inc. v. Industrial (1975) the roughly six weeks before (employer negotiating started requested claimant informa expired, of limitations one-year statute of the and expiration period, the tion two weeks before him tell him that no further to contact and period expired waited until made); Constructors v. Industrial offer would be Kaskaskia settlement Comm’n, (1975) (insur 534-35, 713-14 337 N.E.2d 61 Ill. 2d the month employee claim with representatives ance carrier discussed him statute was and did not inform expired the of limitations statute Comm’n, 61 Ill. 2d v. Industrial expire); about to Schumann (1975) (the estoppel no supreme court found 335 N.E.2d sought to mislead adjuster the no evidence showed that insurance since limita months after the the claim was filed six the claimant where expired). tions and employer’s conduct longer delay between
Where there is
limitations, estoppel
only
has
original statute of
expiration
of the
justify
employee’s
circumstances
special
been found where
Herlihy
In
Mid-
employer’s
conduct.
continued reliance on
211, 218-19, 625
App.
Continent Co.
(1993),
where about six months
estoppel
110-11
occurred
N.E.2d
of the
expiration
conduct and the
employer’s
between the
remained
continuing
claimant had a
This court found that
period.
limitations
insurers;
pay
medi
the insurer continued
working relationship with
run;
the claimant
period had
cal
after the limitations
expenses
in fil
delay
salary; and the claimant’s
continued to work and receive
verify his condition.
to his need to
ing a claim was due
holding
not affected
estoppel is
This limit on the doctrine of
long
estoppel ends
giving rise to
If the conduct
City Chicago.
not a bar
estoppel is
expires,
of limitations
original
statute
under
the new
established
statutory
original
period,
to that
to the
Chicago referred
City
effect.
Chicago never takes
City
in Molex:
court’s statement
supreme
*5
“
to the
are conducted as close
negotiations
settlement
‘When
notice
they
in this case
the limitation
as
were
expiration of
claimant a
negotiations
given
should be
to the
of the termination of
may
he
length
expiration
time before the
date so that
reasonable
adjust
application
file an
adequate
prepare
have
time to
and
”
2d at
388 N.E.2d at
City Chicago,
ment of claim.’
411,
Molex,
quoting
for an
or its insurance
Act,
employee
lead the
to
Compensation
tions of the Workmen’s
precipitously
date and then
very
expiration
brink of the
”
preserve
Tegeler,
abandon him too late for him to
his claim.’
Molex,
quoting
Ill. 2d at
Tegeler provide and Molex a sound for the proposition basis substantial, estoppel unjustified that there can be no there is a where delay misleading after the conduct and before the statute of limita expired. tions has 6(d) above,
As stated section establishes a of limitations of years three from the date of the period expired April accident. This 6(d) However, section provides period also of limitations of years two from the compensation, any date of last paid. paid January has been The last was 1992. At (around 25, 1992), misleading time of Small’s statements at two-year period passed. most one week of the had The in engaged misleading nothing ap- no further conduct. There is in the pellate why Joy original record to indicate statute of limi- allowed expire investigating tations to before and a claim. reasons,
For all of the above we affirm.
Affirmed. HOLDRIDGE, JJ,
RAKOWSKIand concur. RARICK, dissenting:
JUSTICE my I in recent respectfully expressed dissent for the same reasons dissent in Alexander v. Industrial Comm’n. Alexander, in argument present requested
As oral in the case was panel and heard before a of three At the time the commissioners. however, entered, Commission’s decision the term of one of the remaining expired. commissioners had The two commissioners were agree on a A com separate unable result wrote decisions. third missioner, present argument, signed who was not at oral one of the de pursuant Zeigler cisions
N.E.2d 342 I believe issue of decision under such circum comport unambiguous language stances does not with the clear and 19(e) Act, section of the Compensation provides Workers’ which pertinent part: “In the event either party requests argument, oral argument shall had a panel be of 3 members of the Com A mission ***. decision of the shall approved by be ma 305/19(e) jority of present hearing.” Commissioners at such 820 ILCS (West 1996). Because a majority pres of the commissioners who were decision, ent at the I hearing approve did not believe no we have jurisdiction to I appeal. ap entertain this would therefore dismiss the peal and remand the cause to Commission to enter a valid deci sion.
COLWELL,J., joins this dissent. ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF v. MARC HAYES, Defendant-Appellant. M.
Second District No. 2—98—0632
Opinion filed October