130 Iowa 651 | Iowa | 1905
The property in controversy, being a lot in the city of Independence, was owned by Jane War-dell at the time of her death. It had been purchased with pension money obtained by her from the general government. Immediately after her purchase of the property
The creation of homesteads and exemptions is the work of the Legislature, and to its acts we must look in determining such controversies as this. In the Code, under the title “ Homesteads,” we find the followixig provisions: “ The hoxnestead of every family is cxexnpt from judicial sale, where there is no special declaration to the contrary.” Section 2972. “ The homestead may be sold on execution for debts contracted prior to its acquisition.” Section 2976. “ Upon the death of the wife ... if there be no survivor the homestead descends to her issue according to the rules of descent . . . and is to be held by such issue exempt from any antecedent debts of their parents, or of their own, except those of the owner thereof contracted prior to its acquisition.” Section 2985. Under these statutes it will be observed that the homestead while used and occupied by the family is exempt, and that it is also exempt to the heirs, except for the antecedent debts of the anees
But they rely upon another provision of law, found in the Code under the title “ Executions,” which reads as follows: “ The homestead of every pensioner, whether the head of a family or not, purchased and paid for with pension money or the proceeds or accumulations thereof shall be exempt, and such exemptions shall apply to debts of such pensioner contracted prior to the purchase of the homestead.” Code, section 4010. Under this section the property in question was exempt to the pensioner during her life, although she was not the head of a family, even from debts contracted by the owner thereof prior to its acquisition. So that, so long as Jane Wardell lived, plaintiff could not have enforced his judgment against the property, although she lived upon it alone, and notwithstanding the debts for which it was rendered were contracted prior to its acquisition by her.
But the question here is, did the heirs take the homestead, free from the antecedent debts of their ancestor? There is nothing in any of these statutes which expressly so declares; and, if there be any such exemption, it must be bottomed on the thought that, as the property could not have been taken by the .judgment creditor during the life of his debtor, the exemption so stamped upon it passed to the heirs or successors in interest and freed it from the antecedent debts of their mother. It is true that section 4010 provides that the homestead of every pensioner purchased and paid for with pension money shall be exempt, no matter if he be living-alone, and that it shall be exempt even from debts contracted
Appellants’ contention, broadly speaking, is that section 4010 creates a new homestead, which is exempt in the hands of heirs, free from the antecedent debts of the ancestor. But this is evidently unsound. True this homestead is relieved of certain rules which apply to homesteads in general; but for the rules applicable to homesteads in general we must look to the statutes and decisions relating thereto. IJnder the general homestead statutes, which we have quoted, this property, although homestead in character, and exempt during the life of the pensioner, did not pass to her heirs, free from her antecedent debts. Code, section 2985. This is the only section of the Code relating to homestead exemptions after the death of the owner, and, if that is to control, the property is subject, in the hands of the heirs, to the antecedent debts of the owner. ‘Conceding, then, that the property in question was a homestead, and exempt in the hands of the purchaser, there is nothing-in the statute which declares that it shall be exempt in the hands of the heirs..
If we turn to the statute with reference to the descent of homesteads, there is nothing to indicate that it shall pass free from antecedent debts, although purchased with pension money or the avails thereof. This was a homestead during the pensioner’s life, although she had no family living with her, and could not have been taken for antecedent debts; but, in order to determine the rule to be applied after her death we must look to the general statute as to the descent of homesteads. Turning to that, we discover that it is not
Appellants rely upon a line of eases relating to exemptions of personal property to the widow under a section of the statute which says, in effect, that personal property
We are clearly of opinion that the property is subject to plaintiff’s judgment, and the decree is affirmed.