130 Misc. 181 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1927
The application was brought on for hearing by an order to show cause based upon petitioner’s petition, and the respondents have filed a so-called answer and affidavits in opposition thereto. The petition alleges, among other things, that the respondent, the Board of Managers of the Binghamton City Hospital, is a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of New York and conducts the Binghamton City Hospital in the city of Binghamton, N. Y.; that the respondent, the Nurses Training School Committee of the Binghamton City Hospital, has control over and conducts a student nurses training school, organized in accordance with the laws of the State of New York, at the Binghamton City Hospital and is a department of the Binghamton City Hospital; that the Student Nurses Training School is registered in accordance with the laws of the State of New York and is empowered to graduate and confer its certificate of graduation upon candidates who successfully complete the course in student nursing therein; that on March 1, 1925,
The. petition then charges that on March 19, 1927, the superintendent of nurses of said school ordered petitioner to her room where she was by said order confined for two days without reason, without cause and without any explanation therefor; that thereafter and on March 21, 1927, petitioner was by said superintendent’s orders summoned before said superintendent and accused of neglect of duty; that such accusations were false; that the superintendent refused to listen to any explanation from petitioner and ordered her from the hospital; that thereupon petitioner returned to her home and on March 24, 1927, received written notice purporting to come from the nurses training committee of the Student Nurses Training School stating that she had been expelled from the school; that said act was in disregard of petitioner’s right in that she was not given any opportunity to appear before the said committee; that subsequently petitioner demanded that she be given a right to be heard and on or about April 2, 1927, a second meeting of the committee was called, of which said second meeting petitioner was given less than one hour’s notice and was denied right of counsel and the further right to hear any testimony given against her. The petition also alleges in general terms that the action of the committee was based largely upon the testimony given by the superintendent of nurses and was largely false and entirely hearsay; that petitioner did not receive any official notice of the action of said committee at such second meeting and had no notice thereof except such as she has obtained from an investigation of the minutes thereof, which minutes petitioner knows to be largely false and believes on credible information to be incomplete.
The petitioner now insists that her expulsion was wrongful, because at the hearing she was not permitted to be represented by counsel; that she was not permitted to hear the evidence against her and that she had less than one hour’s notice of said hearing. Numerous cases are cited in her behalf in support of such con
It is the office of mandamus in cases such as this to require boards, officials and agencies to act, but not to substitute the judgment and discretion of the court for that of the authority upon whom such duty rests. Where, therefore, such judgment and discretion has been exercised by the proper authority, it is not the province of the court to redetermine the issues and make a new and perhaps somewhat different decision. Where it appears that there has been an abuse of discretion or that any such action was arbitrary, unauthorized or done in bad faith, the act may be set aside by the court but even then the court does not assume to act for the erring authority, but simply requires such authority to perform its act in a lawful manner. In other words, the court will not assume the burden of exercising the functions and performing the duties of boards, officials and agencies upon whom such obligation rests. In the case at bar the proper board having jurisdiction has acted and has exercised its discretion. The court should not attempt to interfere with such exercise nor say to the defendants what their decision should be upon a given state of facts. Even in cases where the statute required a hearing, the discretion of the determining officer exercised in good faith has been held not subject to review by the courts. As was stated in Matter of Griffin v.
It appears in the case at bar that the governing body investigated the conduct of the petitioner and expelled her after an investigation as to her conduct wherein she was charged with neglect and disregard of duty. The making of that determination was the province solely of the governing body. A case so similar that it seems to be controlling here, arising in our own department, is People ex rel. Goldenkoff v. Albany Law School (198 App. Div. 460), where a student was expelled from the Albany Law School by reason of having made seditious, unpatriotic and anarchistic utterances against the American government and was, therefore, an undesirable and unfit person to attend at said school. An investigation of the charges was had; the student relator was heard and denied the accusations, at least to some extent, but the governing body determined the issues of fact against him and he was expelled. The expulsion was upheld by the Appellate Division and it was there stated: “ ‘ Courts may be versatile, but they must be careful not to infringe upon the discretion vested in excise boards, colleges or inferior tribunals, nor to substitute its discretion for theirs. The determination by these bodies of any questions within the scope of their jurisdiction is, as it should be, as conclusive and free from control upon mandamus as that exercised by the highest jurisdictions in the country/ In this case, therefore, unless there is proof that the expulsion of the student was ‘ arbitrary/ that there was ‘ no exercise of discretion/ or that the facts did not ‘ justify the exercise of discretion/ or that in exercising discretion the faculty of this school were not acting ‘ within the scope of their jurisdiction/ the writ should not issue. In my judgment there is no such proof.” The .court further said (at p. 466): “ It is not the office of a writ of alternative mandamus to effectuate a redetermination by a court of facts relating to the conduct of an expelled student when such facts have already been decided against the student by the faculty of a school having jurisdiction. Its only function is to determine disputed facts upon which the rightful exercise of such jurisdiction may depend.”
In the case at bar the governing body had jurisdiction. It investigated the conduct of petitioner and upon disputed facts
The application of the petitioner should, therefore, be denied, with ten dollars costs.