17 Ala. 770 | Ala. | 1850
This was an action of trespass to try titles to a tract of land, and was brought by the defendant in' error, Catherine Welch, against Benjamin F. Bean. The facts were these: Jeremiah Pate, the father of the plaintiff below, being seized of several tracts of land, executed his last will, by which he gave to his wife during her life an eighty acre tract on which he lived, besides several slaves, and other articles of personal property. He also bequeathed to all his children some small pecuniary legacies, and gave to Thomas Pate, one of his sons, all the rest of his estate, both real and personal. When this will was offered for probate, the other children appeared and came
We think the covenant entered into by Thomas Pate estops him from asserting a title to the land as devisee under bis father’s will. Indeed he could not be permitted to claim title to the whole as devisee, after he had entered into a covenant founded on a sufficient consideration, the effect of which was to renounce his title as devisee, by stipulating that the estate should be divided between all the heirs; as if the testator had died intestate. The legal effect of this agreement was to vest in the heirs of the testator the same title they would have taken, had he died intestate as to the lands devised to Thomas; for we think the principle is well settled, that an estoppel will not only bar a right or title, but will pass one to him in whose favor the estoppel works. Thus if A. convey to B. with covenant of warranty, and at the time he lias no estate in the land, but afterwards acquires title, this title will inure to his grantee in the deed. — Comstock et al. v. Smith, 13 Pickering, 116; Springsteen v. Schemerhorn, 12
■ But the agreement, without more, would not have given the plaintiff a title in severalty to the looms in qtio, and the question, therefore, is whether the division made under the commission issuing from the Orphans’ Court can have that effect. I think it does. The covenant is that the estate shall be equally divided, precisely as if the testator had died intestate. Had he died intestate the division would have been good, and would have given the plaintiff an exclusive title. The agreement, therefore, has been fully executed and the rights of the parties settled in conformity with it. The parties to the agreement raise no objection to it, or to the manner in which it was executed, and we think it clear that a stranger should not be permitted to do so. There is no error in the record and the judgment must be affirmed.