The case, as presently presented, turns on the validity of the defendant’s agreement not to engage in the practice of medicine in the town of Lumberton, or within 100 miles, thereof, for a period of five years following the dissolution of the partnership between himself and the plaintiff.
There being no request to find thе facts, and no challenge to any fact found, it will be presumed that the court found sufficient facts to support the judgment.
Wood v. Woodbury & Pace, ante,
356;
McCune v. Mfg. Co., ante,
351. The case then comes to the single question whether the restrictive covenant in thе partnership agreement is valid and enforceable under the law of this State. It would seem that an аffirmative answer was adumbrated in the cases of
Scott v. Gillis,
In
Teague v. Schaub,
Speaking to a similar situation in
Butler v. Burleson,
The application of two principles аre here involved: freedom to contract and public policy. The plaintiff invokes the one; the defendant the other.
The parties evidently thought the plaintiff had a legitimate interest to proteсt when the agreement was signed. They so stipulated. And he did. The existence of such an interest is the first thing to look for in
*673
passing upon the validity of a restrictive covenant. Its presence is essential to make it enforceable in equity.
Williams v. Thomson,
Public policy is concerned with both sides of the question. It favors the enforcement оf contracts intended to protect legitimate interests and frowns upon unreasonable restrictions.
Granger v. Craven,
The test to be applied in determining the reasonableness of a restrictive covenant is to consider whether the restraint affords only a fair protection to the interest of -the party in whose favor it is given, and is not so broad as to interfere with the rights of the public.
Horner v. Graves,
7 Bing., 735, 131 Eng. Rep., 284;
Mandeville v. Harman,
42 N. J. Eq., 185;
Rakestraw v. Lanier,
The parties themselves, when the instant contract was made, regarded the restriction as reasоnable. They were dealing with a situation of which both were familiar. The defendant insisted on having the contrаct signed and did not object to the restrictive covenant. It is limited both as to time and place. We cannot say that the restraint put upon the defendant by his contract is unreasonable as presently аpplied.
Hauser v. Harding, supra;
Note,
It is not to be overlooked that cases arising out of the conventional relation- of master and servant, or employer and employee, are not wholly applicable to а situation like the present. Comfort Spring Corp. v. Burroughs, ante, 658. The attendant circumstances are different. A workman “who has nothing but his labor tо sell and is in urgent need of selling that” may readily accede to an unreasonable restriction at the time of his *674 employment without taking proper thought of the morrow, but a professional man who is the product of modern university or college education is supposed to have in his training an asset which should еnable him adequately to guard his own interest, especially when dealing with an associate on equal terms.
The line of demarcation, therefore, between freedom to contract on the one hand and public policy on the other must be left to the circumstances of the individual case. Just wherе this line shall be in any given situation is to be determined by the rule of reason. Of necessity, no arbitrary standard cаn be established in advance for the settlement of all cases.
Looking at the matter in retrospеct, the defendant may now regard the stipulation as unwise. Undoubtedly he does. Nevertheless, unless it contrаvene public right or the public welfare, he is bound by it.
B. & O. Ry. v. Voight,
There was no error in continuing the restraining order to the hearing.
Affirmed.