89 Conn. App. 556 | Conn. App. Ct. | 2005
Opinion
In this statutory negligence action, the plaintiff, Greg Beale, appeals from the judgment rendered by the trial court after it directed a verdict in favor of the defendant, Yale-New Haven Hospital. The sole issue on appeal is whether the court properly directed the verdict on the basis of the plaintiff s failure to establish that the defendant’s conduct proximately caused him any injury. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The plaintiff has a long history of mental illness marked by several psychiatric hospitalizations and various diagnoses, including schizoaffective disorder and bipolar disorder with paranoid delusions. On May 4, 1998, the plaintiff went to the Connecticut Mental Health Center (center) in New Haven and requested a psychiatric evaluation in order to obtain a certificate for Probate Court stating that he was restored to mental capacity. Gail Sicilia, a clinician at the center who previously had treated the plaintiff, met with him and found him to be irritable, paranoid, angry and unable to sit down when talking. Sicilia telephoned the Probate Court to obtain more information about the plaintiffs request and, while she was doing that, the plaintiff abruptly left the center. Sicilia later telephoned the plaintiff at home to notify him that the center was willing to evaluate him. The plaintiff then became very angry and stated that he wanted to tape record the session. When Sicilia informed the plaintiff that center policies precluded him from recording his evaluation, he responded that if he was not permitted to bring a tape recorder into the building, “he would not leave and wanted to be arrested.”
Manganaro requested that the plaintiff leave the facility and, after he refused, Manganaro and other police officers handcuffed him and escorted him to the center’s public safety office. While there, the plaintiff seemed delusional and was making various nonsensical statements. After being advised by Sicilia that the plaintiff should be evaluated at the hospital, Manganaro escorted the plaintiff to the Yale-New Haven Hospital emergency room on a police emergency examination request,
Upon his arrival at the emergency room, the plaintiff was taken to the crisis intervention unit, a section of the emergency room that specializes in treating individuals exhibiting urgent psychiatric problems. Once at the cii
At that time, Sule Tokmakcioglu, a physician in the crisis unit, examined the plaintiff and found him to be agitated, psychotic and paranoid. Upon determining that the plaintiff was a danger to himself and to others, Tokmakcioglu ordered the plaintiff to be medicated with a single dose of three separate medications, Ativan, Trilafon and Cogentin. The plaintiff did not consent to that medication.
At approximately the same time, another physician, Claudia Bemis, signed a physician emergency certificate,
On May 9, 2000, the plaintiff filed a two count complaint against the defendant. In the first count, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s act of forcibly administering to him the single dose of medication on
On June 7,2002, the parties participated in arbitration proceedings pursuant to General Statutes § 52-549u.
In July, 2003, the defendant filed a motion to preclude the plaintiff from disclosing any expert witnesses on
In his brief in opposition, the plaintiff conceded that he did not intend to call any expert witnesses but asserted that he did not need an expert to prove his prima facie case — that, medication was administered to him without his consent. The plaintiff further asserted that the defendant would be unable to rely on the emergency provision of § 17a-543 (b) because that provision constitutes an affirmative defense, and the defendant had failed to plead that defense in its answer.
Although the defendant disagreed that the emergency provision of § 17a-543 (b) should have been specially pleaded as an affirmative defense, it nevertheless requested leave to amend its answer to assert that defense. The plaintiff objected to the request, arguing that the proposed amendment would “completely change the nature of this litigation . . . result in a substantial delay of the trial [and] require substantial otherwise unnecessary discovery . . . .” The plaintiff made that argument despite the fact that for the three years that the case had been pending, the defendant steadfastly had maintained the applicability of that provision, most notably during previous arbitration proceedings.
Trial took place in March, 2004. At the outset, the court addressed the yet unresolved motion to preclude
With respect to the first count of the complaint, which alleged a statutory violation, the court determined that the defendant bore the burden of proving that its actions fell within § 17a-543 (b).
The court also granted, in part, the defendant’s motion in limine, prohibiting the plaintiff from presenting evidence of any injuries other than those disclosed in his discovery responses, namely, rage, headaches, nightmares, emotional distress and post-traumatic stress disorder. The court postponed ruling on the second part of the motion in limine, pertaining to the plaintiffs qualifications to testify that his injuries were proximately caused by the defendant’s forced administration of medication, electing instead to
At trial, the plaintiff was the sole witness in support of his case. His testimony consisted mainly of a disjointed stream of consciousness that jumped inexplicably from topic to topic, including his religious beliefs, illogical dreams he had been having, various ill-defined injustices done to him throughout his life and his straggle to stay in school. During his confused discourse, the plaintiff did not testify that the injuries he disclosed during discovery were caused by the defendant’s administering him medication without his consent.
At the close of the plaintiffs testimony, the defendant moved for a directed verdict. With respect to both counts, the defendant argued that the plaintiff had failed to prove that any of his alleged injuries were caused by the defendant’s forced administration of medication on May 5, 1998. The court thoughtfully considered the defendant’s motion and questioned the plaintiffs counsel at length about the evidence related to causation. The court inquired: “[W]here is the evidence that that act, unconsented to medicating, caused him any problems whatsoever for which, it would seem to me, that there had to be some kind of a causal connection and evidence to support that?” The plaintiffs counsel responded that “[the plaintiff] has eloquently described his injuries on the [witness] stand. And then it’s up to a jury to decide.” The court persisted in its inquiry, and the discussion continued as follows:
“The Court: When you asked him about his injuries, he said that his self-esteem had been damaged in some way. I don’t know exactly how. He said he started school and apparently discontinued that. That he’s trying to get his life together. He used the expression deep stress. I don’t know exactly what that means. He has dreams that don’t seem to relate in a logical way. He says his
“[The Plaintiffs Counsel]: I can’t answer that question.
“The Court: Well, don’t you think somebody ought to supply us with the evidence that this is a reasonably probable result of the administration of the drugs? I didn’t hear any evidence that it was a painful experience, that the arm was damaged in any way. I heard no evidence that there was any physical damage which could have precipitated or caused, in terms of reasonable probability, a, you know, lessening of self-esteem. I don’t follow that. Or that any experience of deep stress, or that, as I’ve already mentioned, the situation with respect to dreams or the situation with respect to his religious beliefs. I mean, what does that have to do with this? . . .
“[The Plaintiffs Counsel]: Your Honor, the jury can figure that out. . . .
“The Court: And what I’m saying to you is, where is the evidence that that experience, assuming that the jury finds it to have been wrongful, okay, under the circumstances, I mean, where is the evidence that that act triggers all these things? . . .
“[The Plaintiffs Counsel]: [The plaintiff] testified to what happened to him after the act.”
At the conclusion of that colloquy, the court took a recess to further consider the motion and, when it returned, granted the motion. The court stated: “The evidence with respect to the injury is so vague that, in the opinion of the court, it could not reasonably lead
A few weeks later, on March 31,2004, the court issued a memorandum of decision, reiterating that the “plaintiffs evidence did not as a matter of law provide a causal connection between the defendant’s act and emotional difficulties alleged to have been caused thereby. Where the state of the evidence is such that a proper verdict could only be rendered in one way, it is the duty of the court to direct a verdict.” From that determination, the plaintiff appealed.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the court properly concluded that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence that the defendant’s forced administration of medication caused his alleged injuries and, on that basis, directed the verdict as to the statutory negligence count.
Our standard of review for challenges to directed verdicts is well settled. “Generally, litigants have a constitutional right to have factual issues resolved by the jury. . . . Directed verdicts [therefore] are historically not favored and can be upheld on appeal only when
“In order to predicate a recovery on the ground of statutory negligence, two elements must coexist. . . . [T]he violation of the statute must constitute a breach of duty owed to the plaintiff. . . . Second, a plaintiff must prove that the violation of the statute . . . was a proximate cause of his injuries.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Blancato v. Randino, 33 Conn. App. 44, 48, 632 A.2d 1144, cert. denied, 228 Conn. 916, 636 A.2d 846 (1993).
After reviewing the plaintiffs testimony, which was the only evidence presented at trial as to his injuries, we conclude that the court properly determined that the plaintiff failed to satisfy his burden of proving causation. The plaintiffs confused, often incomprehensible testimony failed to establish the necessary causal connection between the injuries he allegedly suffered and the defendant’s act of forcibly medicating him. Although the plaintiff did testify that he suffered from low self-esteem, strange dreams and psychological “damage,” he failed to connect those adequately with the defendant’s actions.
Furthermore, the plaintiff had a twenty year history of mental illness, during which time he was hospitalized and medicated, both voluntarily and involuntarily, on a number of occasions. The plaintiff himself testified that he had been forcibly administered medication at
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Emergency examination requests are statutorily permitted by General Statutes § 17a-503 (a), which provides in relevant part: “Any police officer who has reasonable cause to believe that a person has psychiatric disabilities and is dangerous to himself or herself or others or gravely disabled, and in need of immediate care and treatment, may take such person into custody and take or cause such person to be taken to a general hospital for emergency examination . . . .”
Physician emergency certificates are permitted by General Statutes § 17a-502 (a), which provides in relevant part: “Any person who a physician concludes has psychiatric disabilities and is dangerous to himself or others or gravely disabled, and is in need of immediate care and treatment in a hospital for psychiatric disabilities, may be confined in such a hospital, either public or private, under an emergency certificate as hereinafter provided for not more than fifteen days without order of any court . . . .”
General Statutes § 17a-543 (a) provides in relevant part: “No patient shall receive medication for the treatment of the psychiatric disabilities of such patient without the informed consent of such patient, except in accordance with procedures set forth in subsections (b), (d), (e) and (f) of this section . . . .”
To be clear, the plaintiff claimed only that the act of administering the medications caused him ipjury. He made no claim with respect to any effects or side effects of the medications, nor did he take issue with any of the defendant’s other efforts to control his behavior, such as placing him in four point restraints.
General Statutes § 52-549u provides for nonbinding arbitration in “any civil action in which in the discretion of the court, the reasonable expectation of a judgment is less than fifty thousand dollars exclusive of legal interest and costs and in which a claim for a trial by jury and a certificate of closed pleadings have been filed. . . .”
General Statutes § 17a-543 (b) provides in relevant part: “Notwithstanding the provisions of [§ 17a-543 (a)], if obtaining the consent provided for in this section would cause a medically harmful delay to a voluntary or involuntary patient whose condition is of an extremely critical nature, as determined by personal observation by a physician or the senior clinician on duly, emergency treatment may be provided without consent.”
It is notable that the plaintiff neither sought additional discovery, as to which he claimed a “substantial’' amount would be necessary, nor did he move to continue 1he trial date.
In so ruling, the court cited Hartford Hospital v. Dept. of Consumer Protection, 243 Conn. 709, 715-16, 707 A.2d 713 (1998), and Conservation Commission v. Price, 193 Conn. 414, 424, 479 A.2d 187 (1984) (“those who claim the benefit of an exception under a statute have the burden of proving that they come within the limited class for whose benefit it was established”).
Although the court directed the verdict on the entire complaint, including the claim of assault and battery, and despite the fact that the appeal form indicates that the plaintiffs appeal is from the directed verdict in its entirety, the plaintiffs brief malees no reference to the assault and battery claim, nor does it develop any legal arguments with respect thereto. When the appellant fails to brief an issue, we deem it abandoned. Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction, 87 Conn. App. 517, 518 n.1, 865 A.2d 1231 (2005).
The plaintiff argues that he is at least entitled to nominal damages because he established liability for a statutory violation. “Nominal damages are recoverable where there is a breach of a legal duty or the invasion of a legal right and no actual damages result or where, as here, such damages are not proven. See 22 Am. Jur. 2d, Damages § 15 (2003).” Wasko v. Manella, 87 Conn. App. 390, 400 n.8, 865 A.2d 1223 (2005). Nominal damages cannot be awarded, however, unless liability has first been established. Riccio v. Abate, 176 Conn. 415, 420, 407 A.2d 1005 (1979). Our review of the relevant portions of the transcript and record reveals that the court never found that the plaintiff had proved a breach of a legal duty or violation of a statute. In directing the verdict on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish causation, the court merely assumed for the sake of argument that the plaintiff had made out his prima facie case as to both counts. Absent a finding that the defendant breached any legal duty or violated any statute, the plaintiff is not entitled to nominal damages.