The opinion of the Court, filed was delivered by
— By the will of Charlotte Bitner (giving the premises in dispute to her daughter Barbara for life, and after her death directing it “to be sold, and the money thereout arising to be equally divided to and amongst her other three daughters, Polly, Louisa, and Sarah (the plaintiff), and to their heirs and assigns for ever, share and share alike, or to the survivors of them,”) the three daughters, upon the death of their sister Barbara, became entitled to their legacies as money. They had, respectively, an interest in the proceeds of the sale; but they had no interest or estate in the property as land. By the marriage of Sarah, the plaintiff, with George Stehley, her husband became entitled to reduce her chose in action into possession for his own use. As a necessary incident of this right to the money, he had the power to waive it, by any act indicative of his purpose, or even by his omission to reduce it into possession. Until he reduced it into ■possession, or did some act which divested her of her interest in the money, her right of survivorship remained. Representing her power and interests, in all matters concerning her personal estate, the right of electing to take the land, instead of the money, resided in him. Her coverture prevented her from acting, in regard to her dioses in action, and the law therefore clothed him with the accessary power over them. His own absolute right to them
Stehley had an interest in the premises which was the subject of a sheriff’s sale for the payment of his debts. The origin of his title, and the extent of his interest, were matters which fell within the range of the purchaser’s inquiries. He could not look at one without seeing the other. He was bound to know both. There is no evidence that he purchased more than Stehley’s title, or that Mrs. Stehley had any knowledge of his purchase of even this. She was therefore under no necessity to give notice of her claim.
As the plaintiff was a feme covert at the time the right to the legacy accrued, and remained under coverture until about a year before this suit was brought, there was no ground for holding that her title was barred by the statute of limitations. Her right of action for the land accrued upon the death of her husband, and the ejectment was brought in due time afterwards.
The plaintiff’s title being thus fully established, and there being no sufficient defence to the action, the Court below was in duty bound to direct a verdict for the plaintiff. This was done, and the defendant below has suffered no injury from whatever additional instructions may have been given.
The release of 5th April, 1824, was not for the premises in dispute. It contained an accurate description of a lot located in a different square, calling for different boundaries, and bearing a different number. The evidence proposed for the purpose of converting it into a release of the plaintiff’s right to the premises in dispute was not sufficient for the purpose. It was therefore properly rejected.
The plaintiffs in error have no just cause of complaint, and the judgment is therefore to be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.