Beal v. State
91 S.W.3d 794
Tex. Crim. App.
2002
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*1 sum, expressly requires Code petition signer’s include city part of the signer’s residence address expressly allows a petition omit only the signer’s zip Today, state or code. performs Court amazing feat of

legal legerdemain in statutory construction by removing the “city” word from one Keller, P.J., filed concurring opinion. inserting section of the Code into clear, another. Court stat- disregards

utory mandates to circumvent the Code fix perceives

and what it an inconse- be

quential technicality. decision, Legislature’s amend- specifically

ments defining what informa- is and

tion is not necessary are eviscerat- Accordingly,

ed. I dissent. BEAL,

Daniel Appellant, Louis

The STATE of Texas. Criminal Lieberman, McLean,

Steven J. Ken Mac Houston, Secrest, Appellant. Curry, Houston, Alan Atty., Assist. Dist. Paul, Austin, Matthew State’s Atty., State.

OPINION HERVEY, J., delivered the in which MEYERS, PRICE, WOMACK, JOHNSON, HOLCOMB, KEASLER and JJ., joined.

Today we settle the of which determining date should be used in *2 795 Beal, at 686- an court’s mandate.” 35 S.W.3d in finality of 812, 87; 814 see 416 purposes. for enhancement S.W.2d ap- that “the (holding final when the (Tex.Cr.App.1967) We hold becomes affirm- affirmance and of appellate court issues its mandate the issuance peal, the ing the conviction. on June [appellate court’s] mandate” 25, affect the date of the 1960 “did not committing was Appellant indicted en- finality of the rendered possession of of a controlled offense 11,1960). January on tered” deliver on substance with intent to 7, an This indictment contained therefore, reject Appeals, The paragraph alleging challenge sufficiency appellant’s legal ed signed trial court since the robbery. trial aggravated court’s Septem robbery case on aggravated convicting appellant ag- commit appellant well before ber gravated robbery signed offense delivery ted the offense on Appellant Beal, at A concurring 35 686-87. S.W.3d aggravated robbery from this Appeals, in the Court appellate court issued its man- significant noted a on this issue” “conflict appellant’s affirming date “among appeals” both the courts of (one conviction on Ap among “also the Court of Criminal appellant pos- month after committed the Beal, on the peals’s decisions issue.” offense). with intent to deliver session (Cohen, J., concurring at 688 S.W.3d jury appellant After a convicted of the rehearing); appellant’s denial of motion delivery the trial court found Rener, compare (appeal at 814 paragraph “true” and sen- is final on ed conviction is affirmed appellant forty years. tenced signs judgment) date trial court 634, 636 Jones v. 711 S.W.2d claimed, appeal, appellant On direct Cr.App.1986) (appealed not final legal sufficiency of a way challenge, affir- until court’s mandate of “appellate that the trial court erred in finding final”); mance becomes paragraph “true” because appellant’s aggravated robbery conviction not final until (appealed conviction in that paragraph been “judgment the lower court has had not become final when com court”). appellate We affirmed delivery Beal v. mitted the offense. discretionary granted review resolve (Tex.App . —Houston this conflict. 2000). on this Relying [1st Dist.] concurring opinion in Rener in the Court decision Court of correctly points that our deci- Appeals Appeals decided that out in conflicts with our decisions appel “when mandate sion Rener resolving trial Arbuckle. affirming late court issues court’s Jones and conflict, initially note that this Court’s the date used in determin to be in Rener consider out- ing finality judg of the trial court’s 1967 decision Arbuckle, nor did previous 1937 decision ment is the appellate distinguish or overrule it.1 not the it or signed, “when of conviction en 1944 decision in Rener relied this Court’s pronounced upon an ac tered and sentence Goodale v. In holding before a conviction may comes final appellate when the court issues be relied for enhancement in a later affirming the conviction. case, such final, conviction must be We reverse the of the Court and, taken, appeal the conviction and remand the case there for does not become final appellate until the *3 further proceedings consistent with this conviction, court affirms the the Arbuckle opinion. court noted that:

It is not necessary to length KELLER, discuss at P.J., concurring filed a foregoing propositions two or to cite opinion. authorities to support They them. COCHRAN, J., not participating. too well established our own deci- sions, as juris- well as those from other concurring filed a dictions to space consume time or fur- opinion.

ther than to state them.... Our on finality of convictions for Arbuckle, 105 S.W.2d at 219-20. This purposes need some untan- post-Rener 1986 decision in Jones gling, but I do not believe they are incon- cited and followed Arbuckle. The weight sistent. The term “final judgment” can authority, therefore, is consistent with have several meanings different in legal our line of cases. Arbuckle/Jones parlance, two of which are relevant here: (1) judgment a that appealable, general- We further practical note the diffi ly by virtue of disposing parties of all adhering culties of to our decision in Ren issues,1 a that is not example, this, er. For in a case like direct, subject nonextraordinary re- prior alleged conviction view,2 the meaning applicable to the issue purposes is appeal, reversed on then the before the allegation prosecu tion’s indictment becomes false.2 We de The Court of Appeals relied on Rener cline to adhere to a decision that creates that the date of finality potential for making an indictment’s is the date the signed.3 We, allegations untrue. Rener was a variance case. The indict- therefore, overrule Rener and hold that an alleged the date of a appealed prior 1/11/60, in an in when dictment for signed. be- was Rener claimed a fatal vari- cused, mandate, became final notwith the Court of issued its then standing he 31, 1998, from such allegation indictment's and sentence.” Goodale v. 146 Tex. had been convicted of Crim. Goo- aggravated robbery would be false. dale, however, authority sup cited no consider, ports position did nor Tarver, 1. See Ex Parte distinguish, or overrule Arbuckle. 1986); (Tex.Crim.App. Hayes v. (Tex.Crim.App.1973); Ex example, 2. For the indictment Renter, Parte 734.S.W.2d was filed on 1998. The enhancement App.1987) (Teague, dissenting). J. allegation in this indictment had been convicted of Renter, 2. See 734 S.W.2d at 365. 14, 1995, which is the signed. trial court's If conviction, however, had been reversed instead of affirmed on when that as as the argued, long the evidence showed that anee because (mandate final were is- In conviction became date of was 6/20/60. sued) return the indictment variance, before the no the Court re- there was Goodale, new lied the date of on Goodale.4 for enhancement. The could be used alleged in indictment. mandate was noting issue a fatal Court resolved held that there was charged that the defendant had variance between be- of the old offense “final” on the conviction was cause the commission” the new. sentencing. date of conviction,” “final there “conviction” meant do the Court of support These cases not failure, prove the averment. Appeals’s holding because address *4 dissented, Judge relying Lattimore rather meaning finality, the first than plain language of the enhancement that, simply Those hold second. upon policy for a dif- statute and reasons for purposes describing judg- interpretation. policy ferent ar- While pleadings proof, prior judg- force, argu- guments some similar have ment used for must be de- rejected in ment were our recent by the on which the case was scribed State,8 rejected they Jordan v. disposed of at the trial level.5 But satisfy judgment must still the sec- opinion, reaf- eligible join ond I which meaning finality to be more firms in Arbuckle. might clearly use. An indictment state, example: dated subsequently which

became final before the commission “final”

instant offense” the word here meaning the second

carrying term. point.6 Neither is Jones v. State CHAVEZ, Jr., Appellant, Ricardo merely Jones held that if the State’s v. conviction shows on face its appealed, that the conviction was STATE put must evidence that mandate has issued. Texas. Court of Criminal Court did ad- the issue us.7 The dress before

began analysis by noting although explicitly statute

require a “final” for enhance-

ment, consistently done so. It was 6. Jones 711 S.W.2d 634 Tex.Crim. Goodale (1944). App.1986). State, 132 7. Arbuckle v. longer requires law no indictment, S.W.2d 219 enhancement convictions jurisdictional. where are not See at least Brooks v. Jordan v. Crim.App.1997).