Beagle v. WaldenBeagle v. Walden
Cook, J.
{¶ 1} The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, has certified the following question to this court pursuant to
“Is Ohio Revised Code § 3937.18(A)(2) unconstitutional on any grounds under the facts of this case, including those stated by Plaintiff[?]”
{¶ 2} We respond to the certified question as follows: We do not find
{¶ 3} The statement of facts as presented to this court in the federal district court‘s certification order follows:
“This case involves a claim by Plaintiff, Jason Beagle, for benefits under an insurance policy issued by Defendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.
“On November 23, 1994, Plaintiff was operating a motor vehicle on I-76, eastbound, in Westfield Township, Medina County, Ohio. As Jason was proceeding on the interstate, a motor vehicle driven by Katherine Walden crossed the median and collided with the Beagle vehicle head-on. Mr. Beagle sustained serious injuries. To date, the medical bills for Jason Beagle are in excess of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00).
“Katherine Walden was insured by Farmers Insurance Company with One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00) per person and Three Hundred Thousand Dollars ($300,000.00) per accident liability coverage. Jason was an insured under automobile liability policies issued by Defendant State Farm, which policies provided for uninsured/underinsured limits of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00) per person and Three Hundred Thousand Dollars ($300,000.00) per accident.
“Under the provisions of amended
{¶ 4} The petitioner raises several grounds for finding that the amendment violates the
{¶ 5} In addressing the petitioner‘s arguments, we adhere to two well-established legal principles. The first requires that “[s]tatutes are presumed to be constitutional unless shown beyond a reasonable doubt to violate a constitutional provision.” Fabrey v. McDonaldPolice Dept. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 351, 352, 639 N.E.2d 31, 33. The second cautions that “[t]he legislature is the primary judge of the needs of public welfare, and this court will not nullify the decision of the legislature except in the case of a clear violation of a state or federal constitutional provision. Williams v. Scudder (1921), 102 Ohio St. 305, 131 N.E. 481, paragraphs three and four of the syllabus.” Savoie v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 500, 515, 620 N.E.2d 809, 820 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).
The One-Subject Rule
{¶ 6} The amendment to
{¶ 7} Petitioner and his amicus curiae urge that the late amendments to Senate Bill 20 constitute legislative logrolling -- the practice that the one-subject provision is intended to eliminate. Hoover v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 1, 6, 19 OBR 1, 5, 482 N.E.2d 575, 580. Specifically, petitioner contends that the amendments related to uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage do not share the required commonality with the financial responsibility amendments of the Act to satisfy the one-subject rule.
{¶ 8} In determining whether Senate Bill 20 passes muster under the one-subject rule, we follow State ex rel. Dix v. Celeste (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 141, 11 OBR 436, 464 N.E.2d 153. In Dix, this court stressed the directory nature of the
{¶ 9} No doubt, Senate Bill 20 addresses multiple topics. A common thread, however, ties each of these topics together. Each amendment works as part of a legislative scheme to reduce the dangers posed by uninsured and underinsured motorists. This court recognized the nexus between financial responsibility requirements and the availability of uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage in Savoie, 67 Ohio St.3d at 507-508, 620 N.E.2d at 815, wherein the majority noted:
“This interpretation of
“Regrettably, the General Assembly has not succeeded in its effort to force every motorist to maintain liability insurance coverage. *** The purchase of full uninsured/underinsured coverage is the only possible means for responsible motorists to protect themselves and their families.”
{¶ 10} Accordingly, we conclude that there exists a common relationship among the topics contained in Senate Bill 20, and, therefore, combination of those topics does not offend the one-subject rule.
Separation of Powers
{¶ 11} Petitioner argues that by legislatively overruling this court‘s decision in Savoie, the General Assembly usurped the exclusive province of the judiciary.
{¶ 12} Interpretation of the state and federal Constitutions is a role exclusive to the judicial branch. In the absence of a constitutional concern, however, the judiciary‘s function is to interpret the law as written by the General Assembly. “‘[T]he legislature is the final arbiter of public policy, unless its acts contravene the state or federal Constitutions.‘” State v. Smorgala (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 222, 224, 553 N.E.2d 672, 675, quoting State v. Kravlich (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 240, 246, 515 N.E.2d 652, 657-658 (Markus, C.J., concurring).
{¶ 13} The interpretation of
Equal Protection
{¶ 14} Petitioner alleges that
{¶ 15} The standard for determining violations of equal protection is essentially the same under the state and federal law. Beatty v. Akron City Hosp. (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 483, 491, 21 O.O.3d 302, 307, 424 N.E.2d 586, 591-592.
{¶ 16} The preliminary step in analyzing an equal protection challenge involves scrutiny of classifications created by the legislation. “[W]here there is no classification, there is no discrimination which would offend the Equal Protection Clauses of either the United States or Ohio Constitutions.” Conley v. Shearer (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 284, 290, 595 N.E.2d 862, 868. Moreover, “[o]nly when it is shown that the legislation has a substantial disparate impact on classes defined in a different fashion may analysis continue on the impact of those classes.” Califano v. Boles (1979), 433 U.S. 282, 294, 99 S.Ct. 2767, 2774, 61 L.Ed.2d 541, 551.
“‘[W]henever the law operates alike on all persons and property, similarly situated, equal protection cannot be said to be denied.‘” Union Sav. Assn. v. Home Owners Aid, Inc. (1970), 23 Ohio St.2d 60, 63, 52 O.O.2d 329, 330, 262 N.E.2d 558, 560, quoting Walston v. Nevin (1888), 128 U.S. 578, 582, 9 S.Ct. 192, 193, 32 L.Ed. 544, 546. Insureds carrying identical policy limits are treated the same under
{¶ 17} Insureds purchase their levels of protection. If an insured purchases uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage in the amount of $100,000 per accident and $300,000 per occurrence, the insured is guaranteed total recovery for an accident up to those policy limits, regardless of the tortfeasor‘s insurance status. If the insured purchases higher or lower policy limits, those limits will dictate the total recovery available stemming from an accident with an uninsured or underinsured tortfeasor.
{¶ 18} Differences in treatment based on the individual contract between the insurer and the insured do not impinge upon a fundamental right or burden a suspect class. Moreover, a rational basis undeniably supports giving effect to the policy limits bargained for by the parties.
Right to a Remedy
{¶ 19} Petitioner claims that
{¶ 20}
Privileges and Immunities
{¶ 21}
{¶ 22} Because the obligation to offer uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage is rooted in public policy and imposed by the legislature, the legislature is free to delimit the obligation. By obligating all motor vehicle liability insurers in a like manner, the General Assembly does not grant special privileges or
Conclusion
{¶ 23} In accordance with the foregoing analysis, we determine that
Moyer, C.J., and Lundberg Stratton, J., concur.
Pfeifer, J., concurs in part.
Douglas and F.E. Sweeney, JJ., dissent.
Resnick, J., dissents and finds the statute unconstitutional.
Pfeifer, J., concurring in part.
{¶ 24} I concur in the answer to the certified question given in the lead opinion with respect to the one-subject rule. I express no opinion on the other parts of the answer to the certified question given in the lead opinion.
{¶ 25}
{¶ 26} Am.Sub.S.B.No. 20, 145 Ohio Laws, Part I, 204 is titled: “An Act: To amend sections
{¶ 27} This is not to say that the process of enactment used by the General Assembly in this instance was not distasteful.
{¶ 28} An unduly narrow interpretation of the one-subject rule would lead to insuperable problems. States that have an extremely narrow interpretation of their versions of the one-subject rule are deluged with thousands of legislative proposals to amend statutes each year. The resulting profusion of legislation necessarily means that little attention can be paid to each matter. Often, in those states, as many as fifty different bills are presented and voted on as a single package. This practical response to an untenable situation defeats the purpose of a narrow interpretation of “one subject.”
{¶ 29} A narrow interpretation of “one subject” could lead the General Assembly to contemporaneously enact multiple amendments, creating attendant problems. See State v. Wilson (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 334, ___ N.E.2d ___.
{¶ 30} I continue to believe that the common understanding of the term “underinsured motorist coverage” encompasses all damages not covered by the tortfeasor‘s liability insurance, up to the independent limit of the underinsured
{¶ 31} “Combined motorist coverage” means logically what the General Assembly has defined “underinsured motorist coverage” to mean. This term could be readily understood by judges, lawyers and insurance agents, not to mention the insurance-consuming public. Though it may be anathema to some, I believe purchasers of insurance should be able to understand the extent of their coverage without the intercession of an attorney.
{¶ 32} Senate Bill 20 returns Ohio to the state of confusion concerning underinsured motorist coverage that reigned until Savoie v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 500, 620 N.E.2d 809, was decided. Much of the confusion has been generated by the failure to appreciate the difference between uninsured and underinsured. These terms represent two distinctly different concepts and should be treated differently.
{¶ 33} Pursuant to the current version of
{¶ 34} Until