Case Information
*1
[This opinion has been published in
Ohio Official Reports
at
I NSURANCE C OMPANY , R ESPONDENT .
[Cite as
Beagle v. Walden
,
motorist coverage—Amended R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) is constitutional. (No. 95-2409—Submitted November 12, 1996—Decided March 26, 1997.) N O RDER from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, Certifying a Question of State Law, No. 5:95CV1146. __________________
Jeffrey S. Wilkof, for petitioner.
Buckingham, Doolittle & Burroughs and David W. Hilkert; Meyers, Hentemann, Schneider & Rea and Henry A. Hentemann, for respondent.
Clark, Perdue, Roberts & Scott, Edward L. Clark and Glen R. Pritchard, in support of petitioner, for amicus curiae Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers.
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, John J. Kulewicz and William D. Kloss , in support of respondent, for amicus curiae Ohio Insurance Institute.
__________________ OOK , J.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio,
Eastern Division, has certified the following question to this court pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. XVIII:
“Is Ohio Revised Code § 3937.18(A)(2) unconstitutional on any grounds under the facts of this case, including those stated by Plaintiff[?]” We respond to the certified question as follows: We do not find R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) unconstitutional on any ground argued by the plaintiff. *2 The statement of facts as presented to this court in the federal district
court’s certification order follows:
“This case involves a claim by Plaintiff, Jason Beagle, for benefits under an insurance policy issued by Defendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.
“On November 23, 1994, Plaintiff was operating a motor vehicle on I-76, eastbound, in Westfield Township, Medina County, Ohio. As Jason was proceeding on the interstate, a motor vehicle driven by Katherine Walden crossed the median and collided with the Beagle vehicle head-on. Mr. Beagle sustained serious injuries. To date, the medical bills for Jason Beagle are in excess of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00).
“Katherine Walden was insured by Farmers Insurance Company with One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00) per person and Three Hundred Thousand Dollars ($300,000.00) per accident liability coverage. Jason was an insured under automobile liability policies issued by Defendant State Farm, which policies provided for uninsured/underinsured limits of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00) per person and Three Hundred Thousand Dollars ($300,000.00) per accident.
“Under the provisions of amended Ohio Revised Code 3937.18(A)(2), effective October [20], 1994, Jason Beagle would not be entitled to any underinsured motorist proceeds.” The petitioner raises several grounds for finding that the amendment
violates the Ohio Constitution. Petitioner argues that R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) invades the judiciary’s exclusive province (Section 1, Article IV) and violates the “one- subject” rule (Section 15[D], Article II), the Right to a Remedy Clause (Section 16, Article I) and the Equal Protection and Privileges and Immunities Clauses (Section 2, Article I) of the Ohio Constitution. *3 In addressing the petitioner’s arguments, we adhere to two well-
established legal principles. The first requires that “[s]tatutes are presumed to be
constitutional unless shown beyond a reasonable doubt to violate a constitutional
provision.”
Fabrey v. McDonaldPolice Dept.
(1994),
The One-Subject Rule The amendment to R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) in question was accomplished
by the enactment of Am.Sub.S.B.No. 20, 145 Ohio Laws, Part I, 204, 210 (“Senate Bill 20”). The bill as originally introduced did not affect R.C. 3937.18. Its scope was limited to Revised Code sections dealing with financial responsibility law. It was only after the bill had been passed by the Senate and considered by the House on several occasions that this court announced its decision in Savoie , and that Senate Bill 20 was amended to include a legislative response. Petitioner and his amicus curiae urge that the late amendments to
Senate Bill 20 constitute legislative logrolling -- the practice that the one-subject
provision is intended to eliminate.
Hoover v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Commrs.
(1985),
subject rule, we follow
State ex rel. Dix v. Celeste
(1984),
thread, however, ties each of these topics together. Each amendment works as part
of a legislative scheme to reduce the dangers posed by uninsured and underinsured
motorists. This court recognized the nexus between financial responsibility
requirements and the availability of uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage in
Savoie,
“This interpretation of R.C. 3937.18(G) is consistent with the concerted effort of the General Assembly to force all motorists to maintain liability insurance coverage on motor vehicles being operated within the state of Ohio. The Financial Responsibility Act requires that all motorists have the ‘ability to respond in damages for liability,’ and provides severe penalties for failure to comply. R.C. 4509.01(K).
“Regrettably, the General Assembly has not succeeded in its effort to force every motorist to maintain liability insurance coverage. *** The purchase of full uninsured/underinsured coverage is the only possible means for responsible motorists to protect themselves and their families.” Accordingly, we conclude that there exists a common relationship among the topics contained in Senate Bill 20, and, therefore, combination of those topics does not offend the one-subject rule.
Separation of Powers Petitioner argues that by legislatively overruling this court’s decision
in Savoie, the General Assembly usurped the exclusive province of the judiciary. *5 Contrary to the petitioner’s assertions , however, the Savoie court did not rely upon constitutional considerations in reaching its conclusions. Instead, the Savoie court interpreted the legislative purpose behind R.C. 3937.18.
{¶ 12}
Interpretation of the state and federal Constitutions is a role
exclusive to the judicial branch. In the absence of a constitutional concern,
however, the judiciary’s function is to interpret the law as written by the General
Assembly. “‘[T]he legislature is the final arbiter of public policy, unless its acts
contravene the state or federal Constitutions.’”
State v. Smorgala
(1990), 50 Ohio
St.3d 222, 224,
Equal Protection Petitioner alleges that R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Ohio Constitution because it denies “certain insurance consumers the benefit of the underinsured coverage they had purchased, while permitting others access to those benefits.” Again, we disagree. The standard for determining violations of equal protection is
essentially the same under the state and federal law.
Beatty v. Akron City Hosp.
(1981),
“‘[W]henever the law operates alike on all persons and property, similarly
situated, equal protection cannot be said to be denied.’”
Union Sav. Assn. v. Home
Owners Aid, Inc.
(1970),
the insurer and the insured do not impinge upon a fundamental right or burden a suspect class. Moreover, a rational basis undeniably supports giving effect to the policy limits bargained for by the parties.
Right to a Remedy Petitioner claims that R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) destroyed a remedy
created by Savoie . Savoie , however, did not create a remedy. The Savoie court interpreted what coverage R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) then mandated. The Savoie controversy involved the amount which the insureds were entitled to receive in accordance with insurance contracts which were subject to the requirements of R.C. *7 3937.18. Savoie was not based on constitutional or common-law principles of full recovery in tort. R.C. 3937.18 results from legislative policymaking. Coverage in
accordance with R.C. 3937.18 is not a
common-law
right
.
Any
contractual
right
to coverage prescribed under R.C. 3937.18 does not, therefore, come within the
protection of Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.
Fabrey v. McDonald
Police Dept.
, 70 Ohio St.3d at 355, 639 N.E.2d at 35;
Mominee v. Scherbarth
(1986),
Privileges and Immunities R.C. 3937.18 places a statutory obligation on all motor vehicle
liability insurers to offer uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage. To this extent, the parties’ freedom to contract is superseded in furtherance of important public policy concerns. In placing this obligation on insurers, the General Assembly dictates the terms of the mandatory offering of uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage. Petitioner takes issue with those portions of Senate Bill 20 that limit an insurer’s statutory obligation, claiming that those limitations violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Ohio Constitution. Because the obligation to offer uninsured/underinsured motorist
coverage is rooted in public policy and imposed by the legislature, the legislature is free to delimit the obligation. By obligating all motor vehicle liability insurers in a like manner, the General Assembly does not grant special privileges or
S immunities. Accordingly, the Privileges and Immunities Clause is inapplicable to this case.
Conclusion In accordance with the foregoing analysis, we determine that R.C.
3937.18(A)(2) survives each of petitioner’s constitutional challenges.
M OYER , C.J., and L UNDBERG S TRATTON , J., concur.
P FEIFER , J., concurs in part.
D OUGLAS and F.E. WEENEY , JJ., dissent.
R ESNICK , J., dissents and finds the statute unconstitutional.
__________________
P FEIFER , J., concurring in part. I concur in the answer to the certified question given in the lead opinion with respect to the one-subject rule. I express no opinion on the other parts of the answer to the certified question given in the lead opinion. Section 15(D), Article II of the Constitution states that “[n]o bill
shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title.” The Constitution does not state that all provisions of a bill must affect the same chapter of the Revised Code. The Constitution does not prohibit legislative logrolling, whatever exactly that is. Rather, the Constitution requires a bill to contain no more than one subject. Am.Sub.S.B.No. 20, 145 Ohio Laws, Part I, 204 is titled: “An Act:
To amend sections 3301.07, 3937.18, *** 4509.102, 4509.103, 4509.104, and 4513.022 of the Revised Code to revise the Financial Responsibility Law relative to the maintenance and demonstration of proof of financial responsibility and to the law’s administration, enforcement, and sanctions; *** to permit automobile liability insurance policies to preclude all stacking of coverages; to declare that underinsured motorist coverage is not excess coverage ***.” Senate Bill 20 diminishes the protection provided by underinsured motorist coverage and is *9 logically inconsistent with the General Assembly’s ongoing attempt to ensure that all drivers in this state are covered by insurance. Nevertheless, using “one subject” in its commonsense meaning compels the conclusion that Senate Bill 20’s amendment of R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) does not violate the one-subject rule. To conclude otherwise would put legislation through too fine a strainer and result in a less responsive General Assembly, if not a paralyzed one. This is not to say that the process of enactment used by the General
Assembly in this instance was not distasteful. R.C. 3937.18 (A)(2) was amended without due deliberation and as a last-minute change at the end of the legislative session, even though the decision to be superseded had been decided nearly a year earlier. Further, the General Assembly’s supersedure of a decision of this court by name is highly unusual. See Am.Sub.S.B.No. 20, Sections 7, 9 and 10, 145 Ohio Laws, Part I, 238-239. However ugly the process may have been, it was not unconstitutional. An unduly narrow interpretation of the one-subject rule would lead
to insuperable problems. States that have an extremely narrow interpretation of their versions of the one-subject rule are deluged with thousands of legislative proposals to amend statutes each year. The resulting profusion of legislation necessarily means that little attention can be paid to each matter. Often, in those states, as many as fifty different bills are presented and voted on as a single package. This practical response to an untenable situation defeats the purpose of a narrow interpretation of “one subject.” A narrow interpretation of “one subject” could lead the General
Assembly to contemporaneously enact multiple amendments, creating attendant
problems. See
State v. Wilson
(1997),
Assembly has defined “underinsured motorist coverage” to mean. This term could be readily understood by judges, lawyers and insurance agents, not to mention the insurance-consuming public. Though it may be anathema to some, I believe purchasers of insurance should be able to understand the extent of their coverage without the intercession of an attorney. Senate Bill 20 returns Ohio to the state of confusion concerning
underinsured motorist coverage that reigned until
Savoie v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co.
(1993),
motorist coverage applies only when the tortfeasor’s liability coverage does not provide as much coverage as the victim’s underinsured motorist coverage. According to the statute, “underinsured motorist coverage” is always less than the dollar amount listed on the policy and the billing to the insured. In fact, to collect the full stated amount of underinsured motorist coverage, the insured has to collect under his or her uninsured motorist coverage. Until R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) is amended to put consumers on notice as
to what is actually being purchased, the ongoing viability of R.C. 3937.18(A)(2), *11 on grounds other than the one-subject rule challenge rejected today, will be in question.
__________________