158 Mich. 483 | Mich. | 1909
The bill of complaint in this case was . filed by complainant for the purpose of setting aside certain deeds of real estate in Huron county made during his lifetime by Darling Anderson, her father, to complainant and to her brother, George D. Anderson, principal defendant, on the ground that said deeds were procured by fraud and undue influence, and that at the time of making such deeds Darling Anderson was mentally incompetent. Defendants George D. Anderson and Janet G. Anderson answered the bill of complaint, denying all the material allegations, and the other defendants, minor children of complainant, by a guardian ad litem, answered pro forma, leaving complainant to her proofs. A hearing was had, and a decree granted setting aside said deeds on account of the mental incompetency of the grantor, Darling Anderson, at the time they were made, executed, and delivered, and “because said deeds were procured by undue and improper influence exercised over said grantor.” From this decree defendant George' D. Anderson has appealed.
Before stating the material facts in the case, it will be proper to state that there is no substantive evidence in the case tending to show in any particular that any fraud, undue, or improper influence was at any time exercised or attempted by defendants George D. Anderson and Janet G. Anderson, or any other person, to induce the making of the deeds sought to be set aside, or for any other purpose ; nor is there any circumstantial evidence in the case from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that undue or improper influence was exercised or attempted by any of said parties upon Darling Anderson. The question of undue influence will be considered as abandoned by complainant. We find from a reading of the entire record that the material question in the case is one of fact, relative to the mental competency of this grantor at the time these deeds were executed.
Darling Anderson and three brothers, all natives of Scotland, removed from the Province of Quebec to Huron
On the evening of July 12, 1904, the son, George D. Anderson, was sent by his mother, at the request of his father, Darling Anderson, to request the three brothers to come to his house on the next day. The son did not know, and did not tell either of his uncles, what was wanted. On this same day complainant and her husband, Mr. Beadle, went on an excursion to Bay City, and returned the same night. The brothers came the next morning, as requested, at about 8 o’clock. They found him up and dressed, and were told by him that he wanted them because he wished to make a settlement of his property. He asked his brother George if he had brought any deeds with him, and was informed that he had, because he thought that this was what he wanted him for. This is the date, on which the deeds sought to be set aside in this suit were made and executed. Darling Anderson told his brothers the manner in which he wished to divide his property. Janet Anderson, his wife, was present. The first deed drawn was a deed of 200 acres of land to his son,'; George D. Anderson. The father dictated the description for this deed from memory, and directed the deed to be so drawn that he and his wife, Janet Anderson, should have a life estate in the land conveyed. The second deed was to his daughter, Dorothy Beadle. Tt appears that the father wanted a deed of 40 acres to be made to the children of Dorothy so it could
No witness in this case disputes any of the facts which have been stated so far in this opinion. It is claimed on the part of the complainant that the evidence of the lay and expert witnesses as to the mental and physical condition of Darling Anderson shows that at the time these deeds
“When a suit or proceeding is prosecuted or defended by the heirs, assigns, devisees, legatees, or personal representatives of a deceased person, the opposite party, if examined as a witness in his own behalf, shall not be admitted to testify at all to matters which, if true, must have been equally within the knowledge of such deceased person.” Section 10212, 3 Comp. Laws, as amended by Act No. 30, Pub. Acts 1903.
The objection was well taken. This court has already construed this statute as applying to similar cases. Lloyd v. Hollenback, 98 Mich. 203 (57 N. W. 110); Bailey v. Holden, 113 Mich. 402 (71 N. W. 841); Great Camp K. O. T. M. v. Savage, 135 Mich. 459 (98 N. W. 26). All of her testimony prohibited by the statute was incompetent. This court will therefore exclude from consideration all such testimony, which includes all statements, made by her father to her or to others in her presence, all statements made by her to her father or in his presence, and all other matters which, if true, must have been equally within his knowledge. If the testimony of those who were present at the time the deeds in dispute were executed can be relied on, the only conclusion will be that Darling Anderson was mentally competent at the time. Neither the character, reputation, or veracity of any one of these witnesses is attacked. They were not interested witnesses. There is nothing in their testimony to indi
The principal witnesses on the part of complainant, other than medical experts, to show the weak physical and mental condition of Darling Anderson when the deeds were made, are complainant and her husband. That both are intensely interested is evident from their testimony and their relations to the case. From their testimony it would appear that from early in 1904 until the time of his death Darling Anderson was a physical and mental wreck, and totally incompetent to dispose of his property. . The force of their testimony is considerably broken by statements made by both of them on July 12th, the day before these deeds were executed, to friends at Bay City, that the father was better and would get around again. It also appears that the disposition which he had made of his property became known to complainant and her husband, and that they were dissatisfied and unsuccessfully importuned him to change it. It is undisputed that Mr. Anderson during that year was subject to fainting spells, becoming at times unconscious; that he would be taken suddenly and would fall down wherever he happened to be; that after such spells he would be for a time confined to his bed, and during fever would become delirious, but it is also clear from the record that these conditions did not continue during all of this period, but that, when Mr. Anderson was able to be up and around, his mind was clear, and that the delusions testified to were present only when he was confined to his bed. As already, stated, two physicians attended him, Dr. Johnson three times in March, and Dr. McColl three times in May, and once in July. IThe former had known him many years. The latter had never seen him before being called to attend him. It appears from Dr. Johnson’s testimony that he was first called to attend him after one of his fainting spells, when he had fallen down. He diagnosed the case as valvular heart trouble. He prescribed for him, and advised, on account of the con
The testimony of the expert witnesses, to which complainant gives great weight, is all founded upon hypothetical questions based upon the extreme claims of the complainant as to Darling Anderson’s mental and physical" condition. Some of these conditions were not established by a preponderance of the evidence. These conditions were not any of them continuous for the six or seven months prior to his death. As already stated, they were recurrent, as the periods which intervened between the
As has been often stated, courts must recognize the intelligent and intended disposition the owner makes of his own property, whether or not it accords with what they would do under like circumstances. The fact that a division is not equal between children regarded apparently with equal affection is no sufficient reason to disturb a disposition of property so made, as has been many times declared. In the case at bar it appears sufficiently clear that Darling Anderson thought, on account of the ease with which his son-in-law accumulated debts, that the disposition made by him was sufficient for his daughter’s comfort, and the best to be made in order to insure her a home and the certain means of a reasonable support during her lifetime.
The decree of the circuit court is reversed and set aside, and a decree will be entered in this court denying the relief prayed and dismissing the bill of complaint, with costs of both courts to defendants.