Case Information
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA KURT BEACHNER,
Plaintiff , v. Civil Action No. 23-494 (TJK) HOWARD UNIVERSITY, et al.,
Defendants .
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Kurt Beachner, a white man, worked at Howard University Hospital’s Cardiac Catheteri- zation Lab, first as a technician and then as its manager. He sues Howard University and Adventist Healthcare, Inc.—who he says jointly employed him—for violating Title VII, the Family and Med- ical Leave Act, and their District of Columbia counterparts. Beachner alleges he was fired and subjected to a hostile work environment because of his race and sex; retaliated against for com- plaining about discrimination; and lost his job because he took medical leave. The Court dismissed his hostile work environment and sex-based discrimination claims. Defendants now move for summary judgment on the remaining ones. Finding no triable issue on any of them, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion and enter judgment for them.
I. Background
A. Factual Background
In April 2019, Kurt Beachner began working as a technician in Howard University Hospi- tal’s Cardiac Catheterization Lab (the “Cath Lab”). ECF No. 24-1 (“CSMF”) ¶ 1. The manager of the Cath Lab was a registered nurse, who was hired shortly before Beachner. ¶¶ 3–4. The nurse was soon promoted to director of the Cath Lab but resigned in November 2019, leaving both positions vacant. [1] Id. ¶¶ 5–8. Beachner was named the Cath Lab’s manager in January 2020. Id. ¶¶ 5, 10. Until a few months earlier, the manager’s job description required a nursing degree and license. Id. ¶¶ 24–26; ECF No. 21-6 (“Joseph Decl.”) ¶ 8; ECF No. 21-9 at 5. Because Beachner had neither, this was the first time in “at least fifteen years” that the Cath Lab was not led by a nurse. CSMF ¶¶ 12, 14. So Roxane Joseph and another nurse were asked to supervise the eight nurses working in the Cath Lab when Beachner assumed his role. Id. ¶ 13; Joseph Decl. ¶ 5, 7.
In February 2020, Adventist Healthcare, Inc. (“AHU”) began managing Howard Univer- sity Hospital. CSMF ¶ 15. Human resources leadership changed—with Maurice Roche at the top—as did the CEO. CSMF ¶¶ 16, 21; ECF No. 21-4 (“Medley Decl.”) ¶ 2. Dr. India Medley became the hospital’s new Chief Nursing Officer (“CNO”). CSMF ¶ 16; Medley Decl. ¶ 2. She reviewed all “nursing services lines,” including the Cath Lab, CSFM ¶ 17, and “was immediately concerned that the only managerial employee”—Beachner—“was not a registered nurse,” but a technician. Medley Decl. ¶ 4. Dr. Medley thought “that a Cath Lab should be led by a registered nurse” for “patient safety.” ¶ 5. She voiced those concerns to Roche. ECF No. 21-5 (“Roche Decl.”) ¶ 6. Both thought that District of Columbia nursing regulations required that Cath Lab nurses be supervised and evaluated by a registered nurse. Roche Decl. ¶ 7; Medley Decl. ¶ 5. So they investigated how Beachner got the position and learned that the hospital’s prior management had modified the manager job description to omit the nursing license requirement to allow Beach- ner to be hired. CSMF ¶¶ 22–27; Roche Decl. ¶ 6; Medley Decl. ¶ 8; see ECF No. 21-8 at 4.
Dr. Medley conferred with a CNO at another facility, who advised her to appoint a regis- tered nurse as director of the Cath Lab as soon as possible. CSMF ¶¶ 28–29. But the hospital could not afford to hire a new director. ¶ 32. So Dr. Medley instead asked Joseph to serve as director on an interim basis and without additional pay. ¶¶ 30, 32. She accepted. Joseph Decl. ¶ 7. To Dr. Medley, that was a good enough short-term solution to the lack of nursing leadership in the unit. CSMF ¶ 34; Medley Decl. ¶ 12. Beachner, for his part, could stay on as manager. CSMF ¶ 36. Still, because Joseph was directing other units of the hospital at the same time, Dr. Medley intended to hire a permanent director sooner than later. CSMF ¶¶ 33, 35.
Then COVID struck. CSMF ¶ 39. Beginning in March 2020, the hospital saw a rapid influx in patients and scrambled to secure adequate supplies of protective gear, arrange for testing and vaccination of employees, and ensure compliance with government guidelines. Id. ¶ 40. The hospital also struggled to retain and recruit nurses and had to rely on costly agency nurses, which strained its finances even more. Id. ¶¶ 41–42. And, in early 2021, the hospital began negotiating a new collective bargaining agreement with the union representing its nurses. Id. ¶ 43. All that placed “considerable demands on Dr. Medley’s time,” so hiring a new Cath Lab director became less a priority. Id. ¶¶ 44–45.
Meanwhile, the Cath Lab “performed satisfactorily” under Joseph’s leadership. CSMF ¶ 46. Problem was, Beachner and Joseph did not get along. Beachner did not think Joseph was qualified to lead the Cath Lab because she lacked cardiovascular knowledge. Id. ¶ 48. Nor did he think the unit needed supervision by a nurse. ¶ 47. Joseph felt that Beachner was resistant to her leadership. In July 2020, Joseph issued the first of three written reprimands to Beachner after he obtained a quote for the purchase of capital equipment without her approval. ¶¶ 37, 52–53; ECF No. 21-11 at 2. Beachner, in turn, complained to human resources that the write-up was false. CSMF ¶ 55; ECF No. 21-7 at 286:16-287:7. Although Joseph’s performance evaluation of Beachner in October that year concluded that Beachner had met expectations, CSMF ¶ 58, a month later, Beachner complained about unlawful discrimination against him, id. ¶ 57.
Joseph reprimanded Beachner a second time in October 2021 when Beachner failed to ensure adequate EKG technician coverage twice, CSMF ¶ 59; ECF No. 21-11 at 3, and a third time in November 2021, when a Cath Lab nurse informed Joseph that Beachner had refused to allow her to take a break, CSMF ¶¶ 62–64; ECF No. 21-11 at 4. That same month, Beachner complained to the hospital’s CEO about Joseph’s “unethical behavior” of evaluating the Cath Lab’s nurses without his input and requested that she “be removed from [his] reporting structure as Director of Cardiology.” ECF No. 24-3 at 7. Dr. Medley, who was copied on the email, reached out to Beach- ner. Id. at 13–14. She reminded him of “the proper chain of command,” noting it was “[her] responsibility to receive [his] concerns and complaints,” and asked that Beachner meet with her “to discuss” them. Id.
At that meeting, Beachner informed Dr. Medley that he was experiencing health issues. CSMF ¶ 97; ECF No. 24-3 at 20. Dr. Medley encouraged him to take a medical leave of absence, which he did. CSMF ¶¶ 98–99; ECF No. 24-3 at 20. Beachner’s leave was designated as covered under the Family and Medical Leave Act. Id. ¶ 99. While on leave, Beachner filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Id. ¶ 106. Also, in January 2021, while on leave, Beachner asked about a signing bonus he claimed he was promised as part of an agreement with the hospital’s prior management. Id. ¶¶ 68–69. Roche, who was unfamiliar with it, investigated and learned that the hospital agreed to pay him a $15,000 bonus—half in January 2020 and half in January 2021. Id. ¶ 70. That came as a “surprise” to Roche given the hospital’s poor financial condition in 2020, and because signing bonuses were unusual. ¶ 71. Still, he approved the bonus in mid-February, and Beachner received it a few days later. Id. ¶¶ 72–73.
Before Beachner went on leave, AHC began a comprehensive review of all cardiovascular services at the hospital, including the Cath Lab. CSMF ¶ 75. In early 2021, AHC Vice President Helen Tuffee, who spearheaded that effort, met with Dr. Medley to discuss the leadership situation in the Cath Lab. ¶¶ 74–77. Tuffee agreed that it should be led by a director with a nursing license, and Dr. Medley asked her to refer candidates. ¶ 78. She received two leads, but neither panned out. Id. ¶¶ 79–82. In September 2021, Tuffee issued a written report with her findings about the hospital’s cardiovascular service line. Id. ¶ 83; ECF No. 21-12 at 2–4. Among other things, she noted that although interim director Joseph “appear[ed] to be a great Nursing director for Critical care,” Tuffee “[was] not sure she [wa]s the right person to support the [cardiovascular] service line.” ECF No. 21-12 at 4. Instead, she recommended “someone with a [cardiovascular] background . . . who ha[d] grown services from the ground up” and who could “work with [Beach- ner] to mentor him.” Id. Tuffee also recommended that she “work” with Beachner and a recruiter to fill nursing vacancies in the unit. Id. at 3.
Based on that report, Dr. Medley concluded she “need[ed] to a hire a Director” with “a nursing license and more cardiovascular expertise than Ms. Joseph.” Medley Decl. ¶ 24. She con- ferred with Roche in October 2021, and together they agreed that the Cath Lab manager position “should be eliminated” for two main reasons. ¶ 28; Roche Decl. ¶ 10; CSMF ¶ 87. One, the position would be “redundant” if the hospital hired a director who, unlike Joseph, “would be able to focus exclusively on the Cath Lab.” Roche Decl. ¶ 10; Medley Decl. ¶ 25. Two, the hospital, “which continued to lose money,” could not afford to pay two managerial salaries within a low- patient-volume unit. Roche Decl. ¶ 10; Medley Decl. ¶ 26. So the “plan[]” was “to eliminate the position once a Director was hired.” Medley Decl . ¶ 28.
Dr. Medley then asked Tuffee for more candidate referrals. CSMF ¶ 95. In late December 2021, while Beachner was on leave, Tuffee recommended Ifeanyi Nkwocha for the director posi- tion. ¶ 111. Dr. Medley thought he was an “ideal candidate,” and emailed Roche about him on January 12, 2022. ¶¶ 112–13. “[A]s discussed,” she said, “we have to a nurse [sic]” as director of the Cath Lab “with cardiac/cath lab/cardiology experience,” which “[wa]s part of our planned restructuring and growth of the” unit. ECF No. 21-14 at 2. Dr. Medley was “impressed” after interviewing Nkwocha, and recommended setting up interviews with others, including Roche. Id. A few days later, Dr. Medley emailed Roche again, memorializing their “discussion” the day before about “Restructuring the Cardiac Cath Lab to have a Director and no Manager.” CSMF ¶ 115; ECF No. 21-15 at 2. “This has been our plan for several months in response to the requirement for the cardiology/cath lab leader to be a nurse with cardiology and leadership expe- rience,” she said. ECF No. 21-15 at 2. Yet the “one Manager” in the unit “[wa]s not a nurse.” Id. Though the unit also had a director, “per best practices and professional regulations, we must have a [registered nurse] leader with cardiology experience.” She explained that Nkwocha came “highly recommend[ed]” and again requested that he be interviewed by certain managers and phy- sicians. After further interviews, the hospital offered him the job. CSMF ¶ 118. But Nkwocha and the hospital did not agree on his compensation, so he rejected the offer on March 14. ¶ 119; Medley Decl. ¶ 33.
Dr. Medley then decided to post the director position for other applicants. CSMF ¶ 120; Medley Decl. ¶ 33. To do that, however, Dr. Medley had to “to complete a requisition form”— which had to be approved by the hospital—“and eliminate Mr. Beachner’s position.” Roche Decl. ¶ 14; CSMF ¶ 121; Medley Decl. ¶ 34. Dr. Medley signed the form on March 16, 2022. ECF No. 21-16 at 2. The form explained that the hospital was “phasing[] out [the] Manager position” as part of the Cath Lab’s “[r]estructuring” and restoring the Director position that had been vacated in 2019. CSMF ¶ 123; ECF No. 21-16 at 2.
Beachner was supposed to resume work on March 2, 2022. CSMF ¶ 107. But Dr. Medley “had concerns about the adequacy of the medical documentation he presented,” so his return was delayed until March 10. CSMF ¶ 108; Medley Decl. ¶ 45. Still, he was paid for the days he would have worked during that period. CSMF ¶ 109. A week after Beachner’s return, Roche told him that his position had been eliminated and he would be terminated. Id. ¶ 127; ECF No. 21-17 at 2. Roche memorialized that decision in a March 18 letter, explaining that the hospital “ha[d] decided to replace the Manager position with a Director-level position, which w[ould] require a nursing licensure” so that the director could “supervise and evaluate nurses” consistent with “District of Columbia law.” ECF No. 21-17 at 2. Beachner would be placed on administrative leave until April 7, the latter stated, and a recruiter would help him find “other roles within the organization.” Id. Indeed, the hospital offered him a position in the Cath Lab, but Beachner rejected it because “he no longer wished to work under Ms. Joseph.” CSMF ¶ 129.
No one replaced Beachner as manager of the Cath Lab. CSMF ¶ 130. And after he was let go, the hospital posted the director position for external applicants. Id. ¶¶ 130–31. Though it considered hiring an “agency nurse” with the required expertise, the cost of doing so would have been “prohibitively expensive.” ¶ 133. But in May 2022, Nkwocha reached out to Dr. Medley and told her he would accept the position after all. ¶ 134. After he arrived in July that year, and with help from a “lead Tech,” Nkwocha performed all of Joseph and Beachner’s duties. ¶¶ 135–37.
B. Procedural Background
In late December 2022, Beachner sued Howard University and AHC, whom he considers his joint employers, in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia. ECF No. 1-2. Beachner brought six claims under federal and D.C. law. In Counts One and Three, he alleged that Defend- ants fired him and created a hostile work environment because of his sex and race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (Count Three) and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act, D.C. Code. §§ 2-1401, et seq . (“DCHRA”) (Count One). Compl. ¶¶ 53–63, 73–82. In Counts Two and Four, he alleged that Defendants retaliated against him for engaging in activity protected under Title VII (Count Four) and the DCHRA (Count Two). ¶¶ 64–72, 83–91. And in Counts Five and Six, Beachner alleged that Defendants fired him because he took leave protected under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 260, et seq. , (Count Six) and the D.C. counterpart, D.C. Code §§ 32-501, et seq. (Count Five). Id. ¶¶ 92–109.
Defendants removed the case, ECF No. 1, and moved to dismiss Counts One and Three to the extent that Beachner claimed Defendants discriminated against him because of his sex (not his race) and subjected him to a hostile work environment because of his sex and race, ECF No. 5. The Court granted the motion. Defendants now move for summary judgment on the remaining claims: racial discrimination (Counts One and Three), retaliation for engaging in protected activity (Counts Two and Four), and retaliation for taking FMLA leave (Counts Four and Five). ECF No. 21.
II. Legal Standard
A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dis-
pute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). The Court asks whether, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
non-movant[] and drawing all reasonable inferences accordingly,” a “reasonable jury could reach
a verdict in [that party’s] favor.”
Lopez v. Council on Am.-Islamic Rels. Action Network, Inc.
, 826
F.3d 492, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2016). To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must “go beyond the
pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admis-
sions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett
,
III. Analysis
Defendants seek summary judgment on all remaining claims. First, they contend that no reasonable jury could find that Defendants discriminated against Beachner because of his race by firing him. They assert he was fired for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason: Defendants elim- inated the manager position as part of the Cath Lab’s restructuring. Second, Defendants say no reasonable jury could find that Defendants retaliated against him for complaining about interim director Joseph. Defendants reiterate that he was fired for legitimate reasons, and that is the only possible adverse retaliatory action at issue. Third, Defendants argue, no reasonable jury could find that Beachner was terminated for taking FMLA leave. Defendants are right on all fronts.
A. Defendants Are Entitled to Summary Judgment on Beachner’s Race Discrim-
ination Claims under Title VII and the DCHRA
Both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the D.C. Human Rights Act prohibit employers
from terminating employees because of their race.
See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); D.C. Code § 2-
1402.11(a)(1)(A). Where, as here, a plaintiff has no direct evidence of discrimination, the Court
applies the familiar
McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting framework.
[2]
Francis v. D.C.
, 731 F.
Supp. 2d 56, 77 (D.D.C. 2010). Typically, that framework requires a plaintiff to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination, after which the burden of production then shifts to the employer to
produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action.
McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green
,
In this case, whether Beachner makes out a prima facie case “drops out of the picture”
because Defendants have proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating him.
Brady
,
So Beacher must proffer evidence from which a reasonable jury could find—after consid-
ering all the relevant evidence—that Defendants’ asserted nondiscriminatory reason “was not the
actual reason,” and that they instead intentionally discriminated against him on the basis of race.
Evans v. Sebelius
,
To begin, Beachner argues that “there were no plans to restructure the Cath Lab and elim- inate his position in September 2021,” when Tuffee recommended to Dr. Medley that “someone with a [cardiovascular] background” replace Joseph as the unit’s director. ECF No. 24 at 3, 20; see ECF No. 21-12 at 4. Indeed, says Beachner, elsewhere in her report Tuffee said that Beachner should “take on a more active role in filling vacant nursing positions.” ECF No. 24 at 20, 23; see ECF No. 21-12 at 3 (“I will work with [Beachner] and his recruiter to see . . . how we could make the positions more attractive.”). But Beachner fails to explain why that is relevant. To the extent that he suggests Tuffee’s email shows that Defendants are lying, he misses the mark. Defendants never claimed Tuffee recommended that Beachner’s position be cut. Instead, the undisputed facts show that Dr. Medley and Roche reached that conclusion in October 2021 based on Tuffee’s rec- ommendation that Johnson be replaced by a new director—because the manager position would be redundant, and the hospital could not afford to pay both. CSMF ¶¶ 32–33, 87–91, 136–137.
Second, Beachner tries to undermine Defendants’ proffered nondiscriminatory reason by arguing that “there are no contemporaneous records to confirm any plans” to eliminate his position “in October, November[,] or December 2021.” ECF No. 24 at 20. And he hints that Defendants manufactured their justification after the fact by pointing to an email Dr. Medley sent to Roche on January 19, 2022. In it, Dr. Medley explained that “[r]estructuring the Cardiac Cath Lab to have a Director and no Manager . . . has been our plan for several months in response to the re- quirement for the cardiology/cath lab leader to be a nurse with cardiology and leadership experi- ence.” ECF No. 21-15 at 2.
Defendants, for their part, do not dispute the lack of contemporaneous documentation in
late 2021. ECF No. 25 at 11–12. But they correctly point out that this hardly undermines Defend-
ants’ proffered reason because they were not “requir[ed]” to document their decision-making pro-
cess. (citing
Jackson v. Gonzales
,
Beachner also argues that Tuffee expressed “genuine[] surprise[]” when he told her via text message “that his position had been eliminated.” ECF No. 24 at 21. That is, she replied, “Oh my.” But even if the Court were to consider that message, and it does not, this sliver of evidence hardly moves the needle. [4] Assuming Tuffee’s cryptic response showed genuine surprise, it would serve as evidence of pretext only if Defendants claimed that Tuffee had decided to eliminate the Cath Lab manager position. But Defendants do not say that. Instead, they say only that Tuffee’s recommendation—to hire a new Cath Lab director to replace Joseph—led to Dr. Medley and Roche’s decision to cut Beachner’s position.
Beachner next contends that a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendants’ reason is
pretextual because he was treated differently than a similarly situated employee who is not white.
ECF No. 24 at 21–22. He claims that Derek Perkins, who also does not have a nursing license,
“currently is still maintaining supervisory authority over nurses in Interventional Radiology.” ECF
No. 1-2 ¶ 44. This argument fails too. To raise a reasonable inference of race discrimination based
on comparator evidence, Beachner must show that Defendants “treated other employees of a dif-
ferent race more favorably in the same factual circumstances.”
Snowden v. Zinke
, 506 F. Supp. 3d
18, 34 (D.D.C. 2020) (citation omitted). That is, he must “demonstrate that ‘all of the relevant
aspects of [his] employment situation were nearly identical to those of the [other]’ employee.”
Burley v. Nat’l Passenger Rail Corp
.,
higher-level position.” ; CSMF ¶¶ 138, 140. Beachner, by contrast, was a manager in his unit,
serving under an interim director. And unlike the Cath Lab, Radiology is not a “nursing line of
service,” CSMF ¶ 141, so Perkins—whether as director or executive director—was not required
to have a nursing license,
id.
¶¶ 148, 149. Beachner disputes none of that. But, he says, “whether
two employees are similarly situated presents a question of fact for the jury.” ECF No. 24 at 21–
22 (quoting
George v. Leavitt
,
Finally, Beachner argues that “Defendant deviated from standard procedures by terminat- ing [him],” ECF No. 24 at 23. He is right that such a deviation can support an inference of pretext, but he points to no evidence to support his claim. Indeed, he does not even identify the “standard procedures” that Defendants purportedly disregarded.
In sum, Beachner has offered no evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find that Defendants’ proffered reason for terminating him was not the real reason, let alone that it was a pretext for discriminating against him because of his race. So the Court will grant summary judgment to Defendants on Beachner’s racial discrimination claims under Title VII and the DCHRA.
B. Defendants Are Entitled to Summary Judgment on Beachner’s Retaliation Claims under Title VII and the DCHRA
Beachner also claims that Defendants retaliated against him for engaging in protected ac- tivity. But because no reasonable jury could conclude that Defendants fired him for complaining about Joseph’s written reprimands or her allegedly discriminatory treatment—and his firing is the only cognizable adverse action—the Court finds that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on these claims as well.
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII and the DCHRA, Beachner
must show that (1) he engaged in protected activity, (2) Defendants took an adverse employment
action, and (3) a causal link connects the two.
See Hamilton v. Geithner
,
Applying that framework here is, at first blush, no easy task because Beachner combines a
hodgepodge of putative adverse actions that he thinks were retaliatory. So the Court pauses to sort
through them first. An “adverse action” is one “that a reasonable employee would have found
. . . materially adverse,” meaning “it well might have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making
or supporting a charge of discrimination.’”
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White
, 548 U.S.
53, 68 (2006). It typically “involves a significant change in employment status, such as hiring,
firing, [and] failing to promote,” but “does not reach every minor employment action that an irri-
table, chip-on-the-shoulder employee did not like.”
Holmes v. Washington Metro. Area Transit
Auth.
,
As for Joseph’s written reprimands, “the D.C. Circuit ‘has held that formal criticisms or
reprimands, without additional disciplinary action such as a change in grade, salary, or other ben-
efits, do not constitute adverse employment actions.’”
Holmes
,
Nor can Beachner rely on any “scolding” by Joseph because “rude, harsh, or unfair work-
place slights are not adverse actions supporting a retaliation claim.”
Harris v. Trustees of Univ. of
D.C.
,
That leaves only the delayed payment of Beachner’s signing bonus, which he should have
received in January 2022 but did not until a month later. Defendants argue that mere delay in
payment does not rise to an adverse employment action. ECF No. 21-1 at 38; CSMF ¶ 72. The
Court is inclined to agree; indeed, Beachner’s reliance on
Bell v. Gonzales
proves the point. That
court rejected the defendants’ argument “that the
lost
overtime [pay] . . . was nominal and thus
nonactionable,” because “employment actions resulting in
loss
of income in amounts less than at
issue [in that case] are actionable.”
The only remaining question, then, is whether Beachner has identified evidence from
which a jury could conclude that his
termination
was retaliatory. The answer is no. As noted,
Defendants have met their burden of articulating a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for that ac-
tion—the elimination of his position. Thus, it is up to Beachner to “produce sufficient evidence”
to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Beachner’s termination was instead the result of un-
lawful retaliation for his complaints against Johnson.
Holmes
,
To the extent that Beachner seeks to rely on the arguments he marshalled for his race dis- crimination claim, the Court has already rejected them. As relevant here, there is no evidence that Johnson participated in the decision to eliminate Beachner’s position. CSMF ¶¶ 87, 125, 127. And there is no evidence that the reprimands Johnson issued—which Beachner complained were false—factored into Defendants’ decision to fire him. CSMF ¶ 126 see Kilby-Robb v. Devos , 246 F. Supp. 3d 182, 201–02 (D.D.C. 2017) (granting summary judgment on retaliation claim where decisionmakers “all attested that neither” the individuals about whom plaintiff complained, “nor any other official played any role in” plaintiff’s non-selection, “nor influenced their decision in any way”). [6]
Because Beachner has offered no evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact about whether Defendants terminated him in retaliation for engaging in protected activity, the Court will grant summary judgment to Defendants on Beachner’s retaliation claims.
C. Defendants Are Entitled to Summary Judgment on Beachner’s Retaliation Claims under the federal and D.C. FMLA
Finally, Beachner claims that Defendants terminated him in retaliation for taking leave protected by the federal and D.C. FMLA. Once again, however, he fails to overcome Defendants’ legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for firing him. So the Court will grant summary judgment on these remaining claims too.
The FMLA and its D.C. counterpart entitle an employee to take temporary medical leave from employment “without the threat of[] or actual termination from [his] job,” thus prohibiting the employer to discriminate against the employee for taking such leave. Dorsey v. Jacobson Holman, PLLC , 756 F. Supp. 2d 30, 33 (D.D.C. 2010). Both statutes “create[] . . . retaliation claims,” which courts analyze “under the same legal framework.” Thomas v. D.C. , 227 F. Supp. 3d 88, 98 (D.D.C. 2016) (citations omitted). Conveniently, that is the McDonnell Douglas burden- shifting regime, again. at 99. So, as Defendants have proffered a non-retaliatory reason for Beachner’s termination, the Court need not slog through any prima facie factors. The crux of the issue—again—is whether Beachner can show that “those stated grounds are pretextual,” i.e. , that Defendants fired him because he took FMLA leave. at 100. He cannot.
Recognizing that Beachner’s FMLA leave and termination were close in time, Defendants
argue, correctly, that temporal proximity alone cannot “dislodg[e] an employer’s nonretaliatory
explanation as pretextual.” ECF No. 21-1 at 42 (quoting
Hamilton v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.
,
No. 19-cv-1986 (TNM), 2020 WL 6781234, at *7 (D.D.C. Nov. 18, 2020). Instead, Beachner
needs “positive evidence” beyond that. But all he musters is a reference to Tuffee’s September
2021 email to Dr. Medley, in which Tuffee recommended that “someone with a [cardiovascular]
background” replace Joseph as director of the Cath Lab and said that she “will work with [Beach-
ner]” to fill nursing vacancies in the Cath Lab. ECF No. 21-12 at 4;
see
ECF No. 24 at 28. Beach-
ner claims the email shows “Tuffee [had] plans for [him] to remain in his position,” which Dr.
Medley “agree[d]” to by responding, “I will incorporate this information in our strategic planning,
effective immediately.” ECF No. 24-3 at 45; ECF No. 24 at 28. But that is not the “smoking gun”
that Beachner thinks it is. ECF No. 24 at 28. For one thing, Dr. Medley nowhere “agree[d]” that
Beachner should “remain in his position,” as Tuffee did not make such a recommendation. For
another, this email tracks with Defendants’ account of how Beacher’s position came to be elimi-
nated. That is, about a month after “Tuffee recommended that Ms. Joseph be replaced by a Direc-
tor with cardiovascular experience,” Dr. Medley “concluded” that “hiring . . . a new Director”
would require “eliminat[ing] . . . Beachner’s position.” ECF No. 25 at 20; CSMF ¶¶ 84–87, 121.
So, as Defendants put it, the “wheels were already in motion for terminating [Beachner]” before
he took FMLA leave.
Chloe v. George Wash. Univ.
, No. 20-cv-3090 (EGS),
IV. Conclusion
For all the above reasons, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.
A separate order will issue.
/s/ Timothy J. Kelly TIMOTHY J. KELLY United States District Judge Date: March 25, 2025
Notes
[1] The Court treats Defendants’ statement of facts as undisputed for two reasons.
First, and most importantly, Beachner’s counter-statement—disputing 47 of 149 facts—is
based only on his own declaration, which does not include a statement certifying that he signed it
under penalty of perjury as required by Local Rule 5.1(f) and 28 U.S.C. § 1746.
See
ECF Nos.
24-1, 24-2 at 16 (“Beachner Decl.”). Beachner bears the burden of “establish[ing] a genuine dis-
pute of fact by ‘citing to particular parts of the materials in the record, including . . . affidavits or
declarations . . . .”
Kirkland v. McAleenan
, No. 13-cv-194 (RDM),
[2] “Courts look to case law construing Title VII . . . in analyzing claims under the analogous
provision[] of the [DCHRA].”
Robinson v. Red Coats, Inc.
,
[3] The Court reiterates that, for the reasons explained above, it treats Defendants’ statement
of facts as undisputed. Along with the overarching problem that Beachner’s counter-statement is
not signed under penalty of perjury, and thus can play no role in opposing Defendant’s motion, the
counter-statement never actually contradicts Defendants’ statement of facts. To take just one ex-
ample, Beachner purports to dispute Defendants’ statement that “Dr. Medley was immediately
concerned that the only managerial employee in the Cath Lab, Mr. Beachner, was not a registered
nurse.” CSMF ¶ 18. Beachner says that the “statement is false as Ms. Medley was provided with
plaintiff qualification to run the Cath Lab.” That non-responsive assertion does not “actually
dispute” Defendants’ statement.
Toomer
,
[4] Beachner cannot rely on these text messages to oppose Defendants’ motion because he
failed to produce them in discovery. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e), a party “who
has responded to an interrogatory, request for production, or request for admission” as part of
formal discovery under Rule 26(b) “must supplement . . . its disclosure” when “the party learns
that in some material respect the disclosure or response is incomplete or incorrect, and if the addi-
tional or corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other part[y] during the
discovery process or in writing.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1)(A). Rule 37(c)(1), in turn, provides that
“a party” who “fails to provide information” as required by Rule 26(e) “is not allowed to use that
information . . . to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was
substantially justified or is harmless.” That rule “is a self-executing sanction,”
Elion v. Jackson
,
[5] In resisting Defendants’ argument that only Beachner’s termination qualifies as an ad- verse action, Beachner also argues that “removal of duties that affects a plaintiff’s ‘future employ- ment opportunities’ can constitute adverse actions.” ECF No. 24 at 27. But to the Court’s knowledge, he has never alleged that Defendants stripped him of any duties during his employ- ment. More importantly, he provides no evidence to support such a claim.
[6] Although Beachner does not press this point, the Court notes that Beachner filed a charge
of discrimination in December 2021 and was terminated in March 2022, and “an adverse action
that occurs shortly after protected activity” can support a finding of retaliation.
Talavera v. Shah
,