746 A.2d 228 | Conn. Super. Ct. | 1999
Counts five through nine of the complaint seek damages against the diocese and Notre Dame Church. Counts five and six allege the theories of respondeat superior and apparent authority against the diocese. Counts seven and nine allege negligence against the diocese and Notre Dame Church, respectively, in hiring, training, and supervising Jean. Count eight alleged that the diocese had violated the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, General Statutes §
In support of their motion, the diocese and Notre Dame Church (or, collectively, the defendants) have *255 filed eight affidavits from church officials.2 Together, these affidavits allege the following. The laws and standards of the Roman Catholic Church, as implemented by the Diocese of Norwich, require priests to be celibate. The Roman Catholic Church and the diocese also hold the view that all sexual activity between persons of the same sex is morally wrong. The diocese and Notre Dame Church have taught these principles to their members and communicated them to the general public. The Roman Catholic Church expects its priests to lead others by the example of living their personal lives in a morally upright way. The diocese has maintained a policy of reporting, investigating and dealing with any of its priests alleged to have engaged in any misconduct.
Jean was ordained a Roman Catholic priest in 1957, after his graduation from a theological seminary in France. Prior to the decision to ordain Jean, diocesan officials received written assurances from the seminary and an independent church investigation that Jean had the moral character, fitness and ability to serve as an able priest. Among the many specific moral and religious criteria about which the investigator reported favorably was whether Jean always conducted himself "properly and prudently with boys, girls and women." From 1957 to 1970, Jean served as an assistant pastor in various local parish churches within the Diocese of Norwich. He proved himself to be an excellent priest who performed his ministry well. Diocesan officials did not perceive any moral disorder or any other impropriety in Jean's conduct.
Diocesan officials consulted with each other prior to Jean's appointment as pastor of Notre Dame Church in 1970. They were unaware of Jean having engaged in *256 any sexual misconduct or having any propensity for such misconduct. During Jean's tenure at Notre Dame Church, diocesan officials made occasional visits to the church and received regular reports concerning Jean's job performance. Throughout Jean's tenure at Notre Dame Church, which ended in 1984, neither diocesan officials nor the Notre Dame Church Board of Trustees received any complaints or information that might have led them to know or suspect that Jean was engaging in or likely to engage in any sexual misconduct or that he posed any risk of danger to minor males. On the contrary, the information that church officials received led them to conclude that Jean was performing his priestly ministry well.
In response to the summary judgment motion, the plaintiff has filed his own affidavit and portions of his own deposition and the deposition of Jean. The affidavit and the plaintiffs deposition excerpts address the nature and location of the alleged sexual activity by Jean. In the attached portions of Jean's deposition transcript, Jean denies that, prior to his ordination, he underwent any psychological or psychiatric testing or that church officials interviewed or asked him about the nature of his sexuality. He also denies that, during his tenure at Notre Dame Church, diocese officials visited his church to see "what was going on" or that they regularly summoned him to the diocese to report goings on at Notre Dame Church.
On the other hand, the party opposing summary judgment must demonstrate the existence of a material fact issue by "counteraffidavits and concrete evidence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pion v. Southern New England Telephone Co.,
Ordinarily, the question of whether the wilful act of an employee has occurred within the scope of employment is one of fact. A-G Foods, Inc. v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., supra,
The plaintiff does not strenuously dispute this result. He instead argues that the defendants ratified Jean's conduct, thereby bringing the agent's conduct back within the scope of his employment and making the principal directly liable for the acts of the agent. See Larsen Chelsey Realty Co. v. Larsen,
An examination of the cases cited by the parties reveals that, in Connecticut, the doctrine of apparent authority is a principle of contract law or evidence rather than the law of torts. See, e.g., Hallas v. Boehmke Dobosz, Inc.,
In addition, there is no material factual issue about whether the defendants held out Jean as authorized to engage in the alleged sexual exploitation. The undisputed evidence shows that the defendants hold and teach the belief that priests should be celibate and live morally upright lives and that persons should not engage in homosexual acts. Further, as discussed in greater detail in the next part of this opinion, there is no evidence that the defendants knew or even should have known of the alleged misconduct while it was taking place. Accordingly, there is neither a legal nor *261 an evidentiary basis upon which to find the diocese vicariously liable in tort on the theory of apparent authority.
Negligence is often defined as "a breach of duty." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Shore v. Stonington,
In any determination of whether a special relationship should give rise to a duty to exercise care to avoid harm to a third person, the key element is foreseeability.Fraser v. United States, supra,
In the present case, there is no evidence at all that the defendants knew of Jean's alleged sexual misconduct while it was taking place. The plaintiff instead focuses on the claim that the defendants should have known about it. The evidence, however, uniformly supports the opposite conclusion. It is undisputed that the defendants received written assurances from both Jean's seminary and from an independent investigation that Jean had the moral character, fitness and ability to serve as a competent priest and to relate to children appropriately. Jean then served ably as an assistant pastor for thirteen years without a hint of trouble. Diocesan officials consulted with each other prior to Jean's appointment as pastor of Notre Dame Church in 1970 and had no information to suggest that he would commit sexual crimes.
It is also undisputed, as the plaintiff points out, that church officials did not require Jean to submit to any psychological or psychiatric testing or to answer questions about his sexuality. It is not clear, however, that such testing or questioning would have produced any relevant information. In any case, there was no reason to use these methods. It is simply not reasonable to *263
hold that church officials had a duty to conduct an investigation with the depth of a F.B.I. background check or a Pentagon security clearance.4 This point was especially true in 1970, when claims of sexual abuse by clergy were much less common. Further, nothing in Jean's background check even suggested any mental or sexual disorder that should have prompted church officials to probe further than they did. See Nutt v. NorwichRoman Catholic Diocese,
The plaintiff also contends the defendants should have known about Jean's alleged propensities while supervising him from 1970 to 1984. The plaintiff relies on Jean's deposition to create a factual dispute concerning whether diocesan officials visited Notre Dame Church and whether they regularly summoned him to the diocese to report on matters at his church.5
Even if the deposition does create a genuine issue about these facts, it does not upset the larger conclusion that the defendants could not reasonably have known about Jean's alleged activities.6 The plaintiff's submission does not negate the defendants' allegations that, *264
throughout Jean's tenure at Notre Dame Church, diocesan officials maintained a policy of reporting, investigating and dealing with any of its priests alleged to have engaged in any misconduct. Nor do the plaintiff's submissions dispute the defendants' evidence that, consistent with this policy, the defendants received regular reports concerning Jean's performance, that they received no complaints or information that might have led them to know or suspect that Jean posed any risk to minors and that the information they did receive was all positive. The plaintiff has failed to dispute this evidence by "counteraffidavits and concrete evidence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pion v.Southern New England Telephone Co., supra,
Given this undisputed evidence, there is no genuine issue of material fact concerning whether the defendants should have anticipated "that harm of the general nature of that suffered was likely to result. . . ." Noebel v. Housing Authority,