OPINION
In this appeal by writ of error appellant attacks the default judgment as void in four points of error. Finding that the record does not show reasonable diligence was used in attempting to serve appellant’s registered agent before serving the Secretary of State, we reverse.
Appellant was one of two defendants named in a personal injury suit. The other defendant was served, filed an answer and was later dismissed on appellee’s motion. Appellee’s Original Petition named the registered agent for service of process as Eugene J. Pitman, 2454 Houston Natural Gas Building, Dallas, Dallas County, Texas. The citation issued on this petition does not indicate whether service was attempted on appellant’s agent as the return is blank. Appellee’s First Amended Petition listed *685 the same name and address for service. The return on the citation issued on this petition indicates that R.J. Hasley, a Brazo-ria County constable, attempted and perhaps executed personal service of process on appellant’s registered agent, Eugene J. Pitman, in Harris County. (The uncertainty results because the return was, except for the hour and date of service, fully completed, including the constable’s signature.) Appellee’s Second Amended Petition listed the registered agent for service of process as Eugene J. Pitman, 2454 Houston Natural Gas Building, Travis Street, Houston, Harris County, Texas. In this petition appellee alleged that Constable Hasley attempted personal service on two different occasions at this address but “was told there was no one in the building by that name.” The petition further alleged that this was the address for service according to the records of the Secretary of State’s office, and requested substituted service on the Secretary of State pursuant to article 2.11 of the Texas Business Corporation Act. The petition was accompanied by Constable Hasley’s affidavit stating that he was unable to serve appellant at the given address on July 30, 1984, “despite due dilli-gence [sic].” Hasley further stated that, “For the reason set forth above, it is impractical to secure personal service of citation on said [appellant], and [appellee] will be unable to do so despite due dilligence [sic].” Citation was then served on the Secretary of State, and, according to the records of that agency, a copy of the process was forwarded by certified mail, return receipt requested, to Beach, Bait & Tackle, Eugene J. Pitman, 2454 Housotn [sic] Natural Gas Building, Travis Street, Houston, Harris County, TX. The citation was returned to the Secretary of State’s office bearing the notation “Forwarding Order Expired.” Default judgment against appellant for fifty thousand dollars was then entered.
In its second point of error appellant contends the default judgment is void and should be set aside because the record does not show the diligence required for personal service before obtaining substituted service on the Secretary of State.
Because this is a writ of error proceeding, the question before this court is whether there is error on the face of the record which invalidates the trial court’s judgment.
McKanna v. Edgar,
This record raises several questions which bear on the issue of the diligence used by appellee to serve appellant. While we question the propriety of sending a Brazoria County constable to serve process on a party in Harris County in violation of Tex.R.Civ.P. 103, there are other indications of lack of diligence which are dispositive of this appeal. When a citation has been returned unserved, the officer’s return must itself show the diligence used by the officer to execute the citation and the cause of his failure to execute it. Tex.R.Civ.P. 107;
David A. Carl Enterprises, Inc. v. Crow-Shutt #14,
The judgment is reversed and remanded for a trial on the merits.
