2004 Ohio 6422 | Ohio Ct. App. | 2004
{¶ 2} We agree that the Cleveland District was not unjustly enriched at the expense of the North Olmsted District. Therefore, we reverse the common pleas court's judgment to the extent that it ordered the Cleveland District to pay the North Olmsted District the amount the Cleveland District had collected for 1997 and 1998 based upon its levies on the personal property at issue. However, we find the Cleveland District has no standing to challenge the portion of the court order directed to the county auditor, who is not a party to this appeal. Therefore, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
{¶ 4} The North Olmsted District sought to recover the personal property tax proceeds improperly allocated and distributed to the Cleveland District for tax years 1997 and 1998 on a theory of unjust enrichment. It also sought an order declaring the County Auditor's right and obligation to correct the property tax duplicates and/or assessment certificates for 2002, and to reallocate and redistribute to North Olmsted the personal property tax proceeds attributable to Circuit City property in the North Olmsted District which had not been distributed yet.
{¶ 5} Both the North Olmsted District and the Cleveland District moved the court for summary judgment. The common pleas court concluded that "[t]his case is on all fours with the decision by the Eighth District Court of Appeals in Rocky River Board of Education v. Fairview Park Board of Education,
{¶ 7} The parties do not dispute that the Cleveland District received tax dollars to which it was not entitled on personal property not in its jurisdiction. Nor is there any dispute that the North Olmsted District did not receive tax dollars to which it was entitled. However, the benefit the Cleveland District received as a result of the mistaken levy was not conferred on it by North Olmsted, and therefore North Olmsted cannot recover under a theory of unjust enrichment. In order to recover on a claim of unjust enrichment, the party asserting the claim must demonstrate that (1) the claimant conferred a benefit upon the recipient; (2) the recipient had knowledge of that benefit; and (3) circumstances render it unjust or inequitable to permit the recipient to retain the benefit without compensating the party who conferred it. Hambleton v. R.G. Barry Corp. (1984),
{¶ 8} The North Olmsted District's argument that it was seeking restitution of funds mistakenly paid to the Cleveland District rather than North Olmsted is unavailing. Unlike the situation in Village of Indian Hill v. Atkins (1950),
{¶ 9} The question whether the plaintiff could recover under a theory of unjust enrichment was not raised in or decided by the court of appeals in Board of Edn. of Rocky River City Sch. Dist.v. Board of Educ. of Fairview Park City Sch. Dist. (1989),
{¶ 10} Like the court in Zupancic, at ¶ 33, we are perplexed at the apparent lack of a statutory remedy for the school district in the situation in which the North Olmsted District has found itself. While we do not foreclose the possibility that a remedy may exist, we hold that the North Olmsted District has no right to recover from the Cleveland District under a theory of unjust enrichment or restitution with respect to the 1997 and 1998 tax years. Therefore, we reverse the common pleas court's judgment to the extent that the court awarded the North Olmsted District $74,849 plus interest for property tax proceeds erroneously allocated to the Cleveland District for tax years 1997 and 1998. We remand with instructions to dismiss these claims.
{¶ 11} The county auditor has not appealed the court order requiring it to correct the personal property tax duplicates and assessment certificates for tax year 2002, and to reallocate and redistribute personal property tax proceeds attributable to property in the North Olmsted District from the Cleveland Board to the North Olmsted Board. The Cleveland Board does not have standing to challenge this ruling. Therefore, we decline to address its assertion that the North Olmsted District's sole remedy lay in the statutory procedures for tax budgeting, levying and distribution.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded with instructions.
This cause is affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is, therefore, considered that said appellant recover of said appellee its costs herein.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Dyke, P.J. and Sweeney, J., Concur.