96 Wash. App. 517 | Wash. Ct. App. | 1999
The City of Monroe advertised for bids for a park improvement project. After the City awarded the contract to A-l Landscaping and Construction, Inc. (A-l), as the lowest bidder, unsuccessful bidder BBG Group, LLC (BBG) sued to enjoin the City from signing a contract with A-l. The trial court ultimately dismissed that complaint, ruling that BBG lacked standing to sue after the contract was awarded under Dick Enterprises, Inc. v. King County
FACTS
On August 12, 1998, at its regular City Council meeting, the City awarded the Lake Tye Park project to A-l, as the lowest bidder. BBG filed a written protest the next day, claiming A-l’s bid was unresponsive and that it was the lowest bidder. The City rejected that claim.
On August 26, BBG sued to enjoin execution of the contract. It also got a temporary restraining order (TRO) to prevent the City and A-l from executing the contract. At the subsequent show cause hearing, the trial court dissolved the TRO and dismissed BBG’s complaint for lack of standing. It ruled BBG was foreclosed from suing under Dick Enterprises and J.J. Welcome because the City had already awarded the contract.
BBG immediately filed a notice of appeal and an emergency motion requesting a stay of the trial court’s decision. A commissioner of this court denied the stay in a notation ruling. BBG did not file a motion to modify and the contract was signed thereafter.
DECISION
The lone substantive issue presented is whether the trial court erred in dismissing BBG’s complaint for lack of standing. The trial court stated in its written findings and conclusions that “[pjursuant to the decisions in Dick Enterprises, Inc. v. King Co[unty], 83 Wn. App. 566[, 922 P.2d 184] (1996) and J.J. Welcome & Sons Constr. Co. v. State of Washington, 6 Wn. App. 985, 497 P.2d 953 (1972), the formation of the Contract at the City Council meeting
In Dick Enterprises, this court framed the issue as whether “the policy of protecting the public treasury permits a [disappointed] bidder to sue to stop performance once a contract is signed.”
While using contract formation as a bright-line cutoff point for bidder standing necessarily limits the protection of bidder rights, the bidder is not without a remedy: It may seek an injunction before contract formation. If the contractor fails to obtain a temporary restraining order and the parties threaten to enter into a contract, it can immediately appeal the trial court’s decision.[4 ]
That language comports with the Supreme Court’s decision in Peerless Food Products, Inc. v. State.
J.J. Welcome, on the other hand, involved a contract ref
The basic contract formation discussion contained in J.J. Welcome does not apply to the issue at hand. The courts have given bidders a limited remedy to sue for injunctive relief before a contract is signed. To say, as the trial court did, that a bidder must sue before a contract is awarded renders that limited remedy meaningless. Because a bidder generally does not learn it was denied the contract until an award is made, such a rule would practically foreclose a disappointed bidder from ever seeking injunctive relief. The trial court therefore erred in dismissing BBG’s complaint for lack of standing.
But a case is moot when the court cannot provide meaningful relief.
Dismissed.
83 Wn. App. 566, 569, 922 P.2d 184 (1996).
6 Wn. App. 985, 497 P.2d 953 (1972).
Dick Enters., 83 Wn. App. at 569.
Id. at 571 (emphasis added).
119 Wn.2d 584, 835 P.2d 1012 (1992).
Peerless, 119 Wn.2d at 596; see also Platt Elec. Supply, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 16 Wn. App. 265, 555 P.2d 421 (1976) (although standing not discussed, existence of standing implicit in decision by this court reversing trial court’s denial of
J.J. Welcome, 6 Wn. Ápp. at 988-89.
Robb v. Kaufman, 81 Wn. App. 182, 186, 913 P.2d 828 (1996).
According to the parties, the contract has been partially performed and is scheduled for completion in June 1999.
See Dick Enters, 83 Wn. App. at 569 (“To allow damages would violate the public interest by subjecting taxpayers to further penalties when they are already injured by paying too high a price under an illegal contract.”). BBG argues, for