Bazemore v. StateBazemore v. State
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- Before:
- Birdsong
Dоuglas A. Bazemore was charged with driving with an unlawful alcohol concentration, speeding, and failure to maintain lane. The trial court directed a verdict of acquittal for failure to maintain lane. Bazemore was acquitted of driving under the influence to the extent that it was less safe, but was found guilty of driving with an unlawful alcohol concentration (.13 grams percent) and speeding. Bazemore enumerates five errors relating to the denial of his motion to exclude from evidence the State’s blood test results. Held:
1. Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the chemical blood test results because the State failed to prove the qualifications of the person who drew his blood pursuant to
When the State seeks to prove a violation of
*742
An arresting officer testified that appellant’s blood was drawn at DeKalb Medical Center by Clarence Heard. Heard did not testify. The State submitted a “self-authenticating” document to prove his qualifications: a “Records Search” on stationery of “Georgia Department of Human Services, Office of Regulatory Services Health Care Section” at a certain address. It is signed February 16, 1996 by “Reviewing Official” Genеlla Forrester and states: “Records in the Diagnostic Services Unit, Health Care Section, Office of Regulatory Services verify that Clarence Heard is classified as Medical Laboratory Technician and that the above individual was first classified as such [in] Dеcember, 1986 and has been to our knowledge, so classified continuously since this date.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Appellant objected that this paper was not itself a “certification” and that it did not say Heard was “certified.” Appellant contends “classification” is not the “certification” or “licensing” which
Appellant contends the certification admitted at trial is only an official records search by someone at DHR and is thus hearsay under
Harden,
supra. This argument is inapposite. The evidence of qualifications in
Harden
was hearsay because it was оffered by a state trooper who could testify only to what hospital personnel had told him. Id. at 675. The document in this case is an official records search made in the course of business by a “Reviewing Official” at DHR.
2. Appellant contends the State failеd to prove the test result was “valid” pursuant to
The statute further provides, in context, that the GBI/DFS “shall approve satisfactory techniques or methods to ascertain the qualifications and competence of individuals to conduct analyses”; the GBI/ DFS “shall approve . . . techniques or methods ... to issue permits, along with requirements for properly operating and maintaining any testing instruments . . . and to issue certificates certifying that instruments have met those requirements.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The chemist who tеsted appellant’s blood sample introduced his permit authorizing him to test blood for alcohol content. He testified that he tested appellant’s blood sample using a technique or machine called headspace gas chromatography which “is the approved method for these types of analyses,” and he testified in detail as to the procedure he used. He testified the GBI crime laboratory has controls and techniques to make sure that a test machine is wоrking, and he described those controls and techniques. He testified that the machine used to test appellant’s blood was brand new and that therefore there were no maintenance records on that machine and the factory reprеsentative “has not had to come out,” but to the best of his knowledge it was working properly based on the controls and methods he used to test the accuracy of the machine. He testified he did not “lift up the hood” to see if this machine had all its рarts because he is not an engineer, but that according to the tests he used, the machine was working “fine.”
The chemist had his GBI/DFS testing manual at trial and offered to give them to appellant’s counsel who refused to receive them. At the pretrial hеaring on these issues, a copy of the rules and regulations enacted by the GBI pursuant to this statute was available and was studied by the court, the State’s attorney and appellant’s attorney. According to appellant’s counsel’s reading of these rules into the record, they provide that “all blood tests will be performed in accordance with, a quantitative gas chromatographic tech nique.” (Emphasis supplied.)
We find the State sufficiently complied with its burden to prove the test result in this case was “valid” under
The State also proved that the GBI/DFS had “approve[d] satisfactory techniques оr methods to ascertain the qualifications and competence of individuals to conduct analyses” and “to issue permits, along with requirements for properly operating and maintaining any testing instruments, and to issue certificates certifying that instruments hаve met those requirements.”
We find
Hobbs v. State,
224 Ga. App. 314 (480 SE2d 330);
Cullen v. State,
223 Ga. App. 356 (477 SE2d 620);
State v. Kampplain,
223 Ga. App. 16 (477 SE2d 143); and
State v. Hunter,
221 Ga. App. 837 (473 SE2d 192) to be distinguishable from this case. In
Hobbs
and
Hunter,
it was undisputed that the breath test machine lacked all its parts; likewise in
Kampplain
(id. at 17), the breath test machine evidently lacked all its parts. In
Cullen
at 357, we said that
Hunter
and
Kampplain
had held that “[u]nder
In this case it is not suggested that the gas chromatograph (blood) machine had any part missing. It is not suggested that the gas chromatograph is susceptible to being operated with any of its parts removed or “overridden,” as has been the case in certain Intoxilyzer (breath) cases. The record shows the GBI/DFS issued rules which approved the gas сhromatograph machine for use in blood testing. Cf. Corner v. State, 223 Ga. App. 353, 354 (477 SE2d 593). The testimony of the chemist shows he expertly tested and calibrated the machine and concluded that it was working when he tested appellant’s blood. He testified that the GBI/DFS had issued written *745 “apprоved techniques or methods” as to how to use the gas chromatograph machine; these apparently were in the manual which the expert offered to defense counsel at trial but which defense counsel refused to receive. Thаt this manual was not admitted at trial cannot entirely be laid at the State’s feet; appellant cannot contend that the State did not produce it or that he had no access to it, and he could not refuse to look at it and then complain that the State never produced it at trial.
We find no
requirement
in
Notwithstanding our above holding, we admonish prosecutors to become thoroughly familiar with the statutory requirements of
3. Appellant asserts that the “methods” and “procedures” required by
4. Appellant contends the arresting officer gave inaccurate impliеd consent advice. The officer read to appellant the implied consent warning from the Department of Public Safety form which contains the most recent codified implied consent warnings verbatim. We will therefore not hold this warning to be insuffiсient. Howard v. State, 219 Ga. App. 228 (465 SE2d 281).
5. The trial court did not err in quashing appellant’s subpoenas for production of “scientific reports.” The defense must make a prima facie showing that the requested materials are relevant to his defense and that he has a right to the mаterials.
Anglin v. State,
173 Ga. App. 648 (327 SE2d 776), and the trial court may properly quash an unreasonable and oppressive subpoena.
6. We have examined the evidence in this case and find it sufficient to persuade a rational trier of fact of appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 ’ LE2d 560).
Judgment affirmed.
Beasley and Blackburn, JJ, concur.