81 Wash. 257 | Wash. | 1914
— The lower court dismissed appellant’s action to recover commissions for the sale of real estate under a written contract, upon the ground that the contract did not con
The description in the contract is as follows: “. . . my property, including (121) one hundred and twenty-one acres of land near Ephrata, and appurtenances, water right, water contract with the city of Ephrata, etc. etc.” This description is insufficient, and the ruling of the lower court must be sustained, under the authority of Cushing v. Monarch Timber Co., 75 Wash. 678, 135 Pac. 660, and Thompson v. English, 76 Wash. 23, 135 Pac. 664, and cases cited. It is clear that the description given in the contract cannot apply to any definite property without resorting to parol testimony. It was said in the Cushing case:
“Parol evidence may be resorted to for the purpose of applying the description contained in a writing to a definite piece of property and to ascertain its location on the ground, but never for the purpose of supplying deficiencies in a description otherwise so incomplete as not to definitely describe any land. The description must be in itself capable of application to something definite before parol testimony can be admitted to identify any property as the thing described.”
Appellant accepts this test and contends that, inasmuch as Ephrata is a small country town of well-known location, any one conversant with property holdings in that vicinity could easily identify the Tolliver ranch of 121 acres, having water contract with the town of Ephrata. That may be accepted, but that is not the description in the contract. In reading a contract, every word must be given some meaning and interpreted as though used by the parties for a particular purpose indicating their meaning and intent. This description is not confined to the Tolliver 121 acres near Ephrata, but includes other property of unknown descrip
Appellant contends that the correct rule is that the description is sufficient if it meets the requirements of a sufficient description under any other phase of the statute of frauds, as when invoked in actions for specific performance. We admit this to be the correct test, and as such it was laid down in the Cushmg case. Under this phase of his argument, appellant contends that the description here is analogous to those contained in the following and other like cases where the descriptions are held sufficient: “The ‘Byers place’(Ranney v. Byers, 219 Pa. 332, 68 Atl. 971, 123 Am. St. 660). “We agree to purchase of H. his place at S. containing 15 acres more or less(Hodges v. Kowing, 58 Conn. 12, 18 Atl. 979, 7 L. R. A. 87). “A house and lot on Amity street, Lynn, Massachusetts;” (Hurley v. Brown, 98 Mass. 545, 96 Am. Dec. 671) ; “Our farm in LeClaire’s reserve, Rock Island county, and consisting of 83.31 acres more or less;” (Guyer v. Warren, 175 Ill. 328, 51 N. E.
We, therefore, hold the description is insufficient to satisfy the statute, and the judgment is affirmed.
Crow, C. J., Parker, and Mount, JJ., concur.