[¶ 1] Jеrry Lee Bay appeals an order denying his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he requested to withdraw his guilty plea to Gross Sexual Imposition. He also appеals the denial of his motion to reconsider that petition. We affirm the orders.
I
[¶ 2] Bay entered a guilty plea, in the form of an Alford plea, to Gross Sexual Imposition in violation оf N.D.C.C. § 12.1-20-03. After a pre-sentence investigation, the trial court sentenced Bay to ten years imprisonment with five years suspended and five years probation.
[¶ 3] Bay filed a petition fоr post-conviction relief to withdraw his guilty plea under N.D.R.Crim.P. 32(d) more than two years after he had entered his guilty plea. He made three arguments. First, Bay argued the sentence was a manifest injustice because the trial court failed to inform him before the acceptance of the plea that it was not required to accept the State’s recommended sentence. Second, he argued the trial court and the State violated his due process rights because they referenced the wrong child, M.G., instead of B.P. Last, Bay argued the police report was not filed until nine months after the incident, which he claimed was beyond the statute of limitations for this crime.
[¶ 4] The trial court denied the petition, cоncluding Bay understood at sentencing, that he was giving an open plea and that he understood an open plea means the trial court can impose whatever sentence it feels is appropriate. The trial court found that the court and counsel had
[¶ 5] Bay appealed both the trial court’s denial of his post-conviction petition and his motion to alter or amend the judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 59(j). On appeal, he makes numerous evidentiary arguments. In addition, Bay argues that the trial court failed to inquire whether his plea had resulted from previous discussions with the prosecuting attorney and that the trial court did not advise him that it could reject the prosecutor’s recommended sentence. The State argues Bay has not satisfied his burden to show manifest injustice necessitating the withdrawal of his guilty plea.
II
[¶ 6] In his petition for post-conviction relief, Bay argued the trial court and the Stаte violated his due process rights because they referenced the wrong child, M.G., instead of B.P. Bay also argued the police report was not filed until nine months after the incidеnt, which he claimed was beyond the statute of limitations for this crime. Bay does not raise or brief these issues on appeal. Issues not briefed by an appellant are deemed abandoned.
Boser v. Hanson,
III
[¶ 7] When a defendant petitions for post-conviction relief seeking to withdraw a guilty plea, we generally treat the petition as one under N.D.R.Crim.P. 32(d).
State v. Hendrick,
IV
[¶ 8] Bay argues he should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because the trial court violated N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(c) and 11(d)(1) when it failed to inquire whether his plea had resulted from previous discussions with the prosecuting attorney and when it did not advise him it could reject the State’s recommended sentence. He claims these alleged violations create a manifest injustice. Rule 11(c) provides:
c) Insuring That the Plea is Voluntary. The court shall not accept a plea of guilty without first, by addressing thе defendant personally [except as provided in Rule 43(c) ] in open court, determining that the plea is voluntary and not the result of force or threats or of promises аpart from a plea agreement. The court shall also inquire as to whether the defendant’s willingness to plead guilty results from previous discussion between the prosecuting attorney and the defendant or the defendant’s attorney.
N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(c). Rule 11(d)(1) provides:
(1) In General. The prosecuting attorney, the attorney for the defendant, or the defendant when acting pro se may engаge in discussions with a view toward reaching an agreement that, upon the entering of a plea of guilty to a charged offense or to a lesser or related offense, the prosecuting attorney will move for dismissal of other charges, or will recommend or not oppose the imposition of a particular sentence, or will do both. The court shall not participate in any such discussion.
N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(d)(1).
[¶ 9] Before a trial court accepts a guilty plea, it must advise the defendant of certain rights under N.D.R.Crim.P. 11.
State v. Farrell,
[¶ 10] Bay agreed to change his plea of not guilty to Gross Sexual Imposition to guilty in exchange for a nonbinding sentence recommendation. When accepting Bay’s guilty plea, the trial court did not specifically ask Bay if his guilty plea was the result of plea negotiations with the State’s Attorney. Nevertheless, the trial court personally addressed Bay and asked him if he understood the trial court was “ultimately free to impose whatever sentence seems appropriate,” if he understood the time the trial court would consider plea agreements had “come and gone.” Bay answered “yes” to both questions without any evidence of confusion or hesitation. Bay himself admits, in his brief in support of post-conviction relief, that the Statе’s Attorney was only recommending a sentence. The trial court also asked Bay if he had been pressured or coerced to change his plea to guilty. He answers “no,” аgain without evidence of confusion or hesitation.
[¶ 11] In the trial court’s Memorandum and Order in response to Bay’s petition for post-conviction relief, it considered Bay’s argument and concluded it had satisfied Rule 11. It stated, “A review of the transcript of the sentencing proceeding indicates that the Court inquired of the defendant as to whether or not he wаs clear that he was entering an ‘open plea’ to the charges and that the Court would be free to impose whatever sentence it determined.” We agree and сonclude that, as Fan-ell and Beckman require, the trial court determined that Bay knew it could impose whatever sentence it deemed appropriate, and it substantially complied with Rule 11.
[¶ 12] In аddition, Bay mistakenly believes the trial court was required to inform him that it was not accepting the State’s Attorney’s recommendation and was required to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea. “A nonbinding recommendation of sentence and a binding plea agreement under N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(d) are significantly different.”
Peltier v. State,
[¶ 13] We conclude the trial court satisfied Rule 11(c) and Rule 11(d)(1).
V
[¶ 14] Bay also argues the trial court should have permitted him to with
VI
[¶ 15] Finally, Bay raises several arguments regarding the admissibility of evidence. However, Bay pled guilty to the charges involved in this post-conviction proceeding, and defendants who voluntarily plead guilty waive the right to challenge nonjurisdietional defects occurring before entry of the guilty plea.
McMorrow v. State,
VII
[¶ 16] We affirm the orders denying Bay’s petition for post-conviction relief and for reconsideration of that petition.