70 Minn. 1 | Minn. | 1897
Appeal by the defendant Nash from an order overruling his demurrer to the complaint. The complaint alleges that at all times between July 1, 1895, and January 16, 1896, the Irish-American Bank was a corporation duly organized under the laws of this state as a bank of deposit and discount, and doing business as such. That
Do these facts constitute a cause of action? We answer the question in the affirmative. The defendants, in receiving the deposits knowing the bank to be insolvent, violated a legal duty, and committed an act prohibited by Laws 1895, c. 219, § 2, which, so far as here material, is in these words:
“Any officer, director, stockholder, cashier, teller, manager, member, messenger, clerk, person, party or agent of any bank, * * * who shall accept or receive on deposit in such bank * * * from any person any money, * * * when he knows, or has good reason to know, that such bank. * * * is unsafe or insolvent * * * and any person * * * who shall be accessory to or permit or connive at the receiving or accepting on deposit therein or thereby any such deposits * * * shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison not more than ten years, nor less than one year, or by fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars and not less than five hundred dollars.”
The purpose of this statute is to protect depositors in a bank, by
This case, then, falls within the rule that where the statute, for the protection and benefit of individuals, prohibits a person from doing an act, or imposes upon him a duty, if he disobeys the prohibition or neglects to perform the duty, he is liable to those for whose protection the statute was enacted for any damages resulting proximately from such disobedience or neglect. Bishop, Noncont. Law, §§ 132-141; Cooley, Torts, 780; Bott v. Pratt, 33 Minn. 323, 23 N. W. 237; Osborne v. McMasters, 40 Minn. 103, 41 N. W. 543.
This proposition is not seriously controverted by defendant, but he claims that the allegations of the complaint do not bring this case within the rule. His contention, as stated in his brief, is briefly this: When the plaintiff made the deposit, no contract was created between him and the directors, but the contract was with the corporation; hence the person or officer who actually accepted and received the deposit is alone criminally liable, — that is, the statute is applicable only to the person performing the physical act of receiving the deposit, or who connives at receiving it. That it is not alleged that the defendant directors received the deposit in question, or connived at receiving it; therefore the complaint does not state a cause of action.
It is true that there was no contract between the directors and the plaintiff as to the deposit, and that the contract was between the plaintiff and the corporation; but the latter is an intangible legal entity, and could only contract through its duly authorized officers, of whom the directors were chief and had supreme control. When the receiving teller of a bank accepts a deposit for a bank, it is an act performed for the corporation by the direction and author
Now the complaint specifically charges that the defendants, as directors, knowing the bank to be insolvent, by an officer authorized by them so to do, did receive the deposit in question, then knowing that the bank was insolvent. This is a sufficient allegation that they themselves received the deposit, within the meaning of the statute. The complaint also shows upon its face that the plaintiff’s loss of his deposit was the direct result of the defendants’ failure to obey the statute, and to discharge the duty they owed to him,— to refrain from receiving deposits when they knew the bank to be insolvent.
Order affirmed.