Baxter Homeowners Ass'n v. AngelBaxter Homeowners Ass'n v. Angel
For Appellees: Brian K. Gallik; Goetz, Gallik & Baldwin, P.C.; Bozeman; Arthur V. Wittich, Margot Barg Ogburn; Wittich Law Firm, P.C.; Bozeman; Timothy Little, Department of Labor and Industry; Helena.
JUSTICE BAKER delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 This matter comes before the Court on cross-appeals of the Eighteenth Judicial District Court‘s orders reversing the Human Rights Commission‘s finding of discrimination and award of $6,000 damages to Geоffrey Angel and denying both parties’ requests for attorneys’ fees. We affirm the District Court‘s orders. The dispositive issue on appeal is whether Angel possessed proper standing to file a complaint of discrimination on behalf of his unidentified and potential clients. We hold that he did not.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 Geoffrey Angel, a Bozeman, Montana, attorney, rented second-floоr office space in the Baxter Hotel in downtown Bozeman. The first floor, the mezzanine level, and the second floor of the former hotel are rented for commercial purposes to businesses open to the public. The top four floors house residential condominium units. The building contains a single elevator and a stairway that permit aсcess to all floors. Angel also owned one of the upper-floor residential units and, as such, was a member of the Baxter Homeowners Association (BHA). The BHA‘s Declarations, as amended in 1997, require that the elevator be locked at all times “in order to secure the safety of the occupants and their possessions.”
¶3 In 2007, the BHA board of directors began receiving complaints about the hotel‘s elevator not being locked as required by the Declarations. In response to the complaints, the board voted in January 2008 to restrict access to the elevator by only permitting unit owners and their tenants to access the elevator via swipe key cards. Members of the public could access the elevator only when accompanied by someone in possession of a swipe key card. The stairwell remained unlocked during business hours.
¶4 Angel complained to the Baxter‘s property manager that locking the elevator was inappropriate because it denied persons with disabilities access to his second-floor law office. Angel‘s complaint was brought to the
¶5 In the meantime, Angel‘s public accommodations discrimination complaint was investigated by the Montana Human Rights Bureau, which found reasonable cause to proсeed with the complaint. BHA filed a motion for summary judgment in the administrative proceedings on the ground that Angel lacked standing to bring the complaint. As summarized by the Hearing Officer, BHA claimed that Angel:
cannot show that he is associated with disabled persons, is not an affected person within the meaning of the Montana Human Rights Statute, cannot prove that he has аny damages, cannot prove that he moved out of the Baxter Hotel because the elevator was locked and allegedly denying disabled clients access to his office, and cannot seek any affirmative relief because that relief has already been completed.
¶6 The Hearing Officer issued an order on April 6, 2009, denying BHA‘s motion for summary judgment, but foreclosing Angel‘s ability to recover damages for lost profits, should he prevail on his claim, because he had failed or refused to identify any client or prospective client who had been denied access to his office because of the locked elevator. The Hearing Officer concluded summarily that because Angel is а licensed attorney who intends to practice discrimination law, “and because he was a tenant at the Baxter Hotel and could engage in discrimination law practice, he can fairly state within the confines of his complaint that he had a specific legal interest to be protected by the Human Rights Act.”
¶7 The matter proceeded to a contested case hearing in April 2009, following which the Hearing Officer concluded that Angel had not been discriminated against because installation of the automated time clock was a reasonable accommodation for disabled persons and the delay in implementation of the accommodation was not so long as to сonstitute a failure to accommodate.
¶8 Angel appealed the Hearing Officer‘s determination. BHA did not cross-appeal the denial of its motion for summary judgment. The Human Rights Commission rejected the Hearing Officer‘s proposed decision, concluding that the Hearing Officer applied an incorrect legal standard. The Commission ruled that, once Angel met his burden of showing that he had requested a modification and that the modification was reasonable, BHA had the burden to prove that the requested modification would fundamentally alter the nature of the public accommodation.
¶9 On remand, the Hearing Officer concluded that BHA violated
¶10 Both parties petitioned for judicial review. The Department of Labor and Industry reserved its right to intervene if issues pertaining to the Department arose, but did not intervene before the District Court. BHA argued before the District Court that Angel lacked standing to pursue his claim. The District Court held a hearing on both petitions on August 18, 2011. It ruled on both petitions on November 3, 2011, reversing the Hearing Officer‘s and Commission‘s finding of discrimination and award of damages to Angel and denying Angel‘s petition for judicial review and request for attorneys’ fees. In a seрarate order entered April 6, 2012, the court denied BHA‘s motion for reasonable attorneys’ fees on the ground that Angel‘s complaint of discrimination was not “frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless” and that Angel did not “continue to litigate after it clearly became so.” See McCann v. Trustees, Dodson Sch. Dist., 249 Mont. 362, 364, 816 P.2d 435, 437 (1991). Both parties appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶11 On appeal of a district court‘s ruling on judicial review of a contested сase proceeding under the Montana Administrative Procedure Act, we review findings of fact for clear error and conclusions of law for correctness. Briese v. Mont. Pub. Employees Ret. Bd., 2012 MT 192, ¶ 11, 366 Mont. 148, 285 P.3d 550. Issues of justiciability, such as standing, are questions of law, for which our review is de novo. Reichert v. State, 2012 MT 111, ¶ 20, 365 Mont. 92, 278 P.3d 455. The District Court‘s decision to grant or deny an award of attorneys’ fees is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Wohl v. City of Missoula, 2013 MT 46, ¶ 29, 369 Mont. 108, 300 P.3d 1119.
DISCUSSION
¶12 Angel сontends that the District Court erred in reversing the Commission‘s determination of discrimination and in reversing the award of damages. Angel also claims that he obtained affirmative relief in this action and is the prevailing party entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees, even though he represented himself throughout the proceedings. BHA contends that Angel lacks standing to сlaim discrimination because he was not an aggrieved party under the statute and there was no evidence of discrimination against any individual. In the alternative, BHA argues that the Hearing Officer applied the correct legal standard in the first hearing and the Commission erred by requiring the Human Rights Bureau to apply the “fundamentally alter” test instead of the “reasonable accommodations” test.
¶13 The Department of Labor has filed an Appellee‘s Brief, arguing that BHA failed to exhaust its administrative remedies on the issue of standing because, though briefing its arguments to the Commission on two separate appearances, it never raised Angel‘s lack of standing through a cross-appeal or otherwise. The Department additionally argues, along with Angel, that the District Court erred in reversing the Commission‘s finding of discrimination because it incorrectly interpreted public accommodations analysis by incorporating the “reasonable accommodation” standard unique to the employment discrimination context instead of looking to the “reasonable modification” standard used in public accommodations cases.1
¶14 As a preliminary matter, the parties dispute the status of Angel‘s standing as an “aggrieved party” as defined by
¶15 In relation to the courts, the doctrine of standing evaluates whether a party is entitled to have a court decide the dispute, and is determined as of the time the action is brought. Heffernan v. Missoula City Council, 2011 MT 91, ¶ 30, 360 Mont. 207, 255 P.3d 80. One of the recognized prudential limits on standing is that “the plaintiff generally must assert her own legal rights and interests.” Heffernan, ¶ 32. The Supremе Court has allowed limited exceptions to this rule, recognizing that a litigant may bring an action on behalf of third parties, “provided three important criteria are satisfied“:
The litigant must have suffered an “injury in fact,” thus giving him or her a “sufficiently concrete interest” in the outcome of the issue in dispute ...; the litigant must have a close relation to the third party ...; and there must еxist some hindrance to the third party‘s ability to protect his or her own interests.
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410-11, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1370-71 (1991) (citations omitted). The Court declined to invoke this exception in Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125 (2004). Though recognizing that under certain circumstances an attorney-client relationship may be sufficient to confer third-party standing, the Court denied standing to attorneys who lacked a sufficiently “close relationshiр” with as-yet unknown clients allegedly affected by Michigan‘s statutory procedure for appointing appellate counsel for indigent defendants who pled guilty. Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 130-31. Even though standing has been conferred “to litigate the
rights of third parties when enforcement of the challenged restriction against the litigant would result indirectly in the violation of third parties’ rights,” the litigant still must establish “a close relationship” with the third party, which the Court found could not exist with respect to hypothetical clients. Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 131.
¶16 The question in this case is Angel‘s standing before the Human Rights Bureau and the Human Rights Commission. We have explained that a litigant‘s standing before an administrative agency depends on the language of the statute and regulations which confer standing before that agency.2 Williamson v. Mont. Pub. Serv. Commn., 2012 MT 32, ¶ 30, 364 Mont. 128, 272 P.3d 71. Angel‘s complaint of discrimination was filed under
¶17 We conclude that the definition of “aggrieved party” in
discrimination in public accommodations is substantially similar to that found in Title III of the Americans With Disabilities Act.
alleged discrimination against its members).
¶18 These authorities are instructive in our construction of the Montana Human Rights Act and related administrative rules. Again, the statute requires “a specific personal and legal interest” in order to confer aggrieved party status. Section
¶19 As noted, there are limited exceptions under which a litigant may bring an action on behalf of third parties. We conclude, however, that Angel has not come close to establishing standing to assert a third party‘s claim. Like the lawyers in Kowalski, he failed to show а “close relationship” with a person who was unlawfully discriminated against by the limited access to the Baxter facilities or that such a third party faced some obstacle to asserting his or her own right. Angel protests that he was right to challenge the locking of the elevator—a challenge
¶20 Finally, the award of attorneys’ fees being discretionary, and upon review of the record, we find no basis to disturb the District Court‘s decision not to award fees to either party.
¶21 Affirmed.
CHIEF JUSTICE McGRATH, JUSTICES WHEAT, MORRIS and RICE concur.