BAUM ET AL., APPELLEES, V. OHIO STATE HIGHWAY PATROL ET AL., APPELLANTS.
No. 93-2495
Supreme Court of Ohio
Decided July 12, 1995
72 Ohio St.3d 469 | 1995-Ohio-155
Submitted March 7, 1995 | APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 93AP-68.
In the absence of willful or wanton misconduct, the State Highway Patrol is immune from liability for injuries caused by a patrol officer in the operation of his vehicle while responding to an emergency call.
{¶ 1} On August 3, 1989, sometime before midnight, fourteen-year-old Doug Stacy and a friend went joyriding in a car that they took without the owner‘s consent from the garage of Stacy‘s next-door neighbor. With Stacy driving, the pair proceeded to drive around the town of Milford and the neighboring town of Loveland until they were spotted by a Miami Township police officer. The officer turned on the pursuit lights of his patrol car in an attempt to stop the Stacy vehicle. Stacy observed the activated pursuit lights, but he panicked and fled.
{¶ 2} The township police officer pursued the Stacy vehicle onto I-275 westbound. At that point, two Ohio State Highway Patrol Troopers, each in separate cruisers, picked up the pursuit and the Miami Township policeman ceased pursuing the Stacy vehicle. Through radio communications at the Hamilton County Communications Center, two Hamilton County deputy sheriffs learned of the chase. On their own volition, and without communication with the Ohio State
{¶ 3} The appellee, Steven E. Baum, entered the interstate highway and eventually came upon the roadblock area, where he was required to stop his vehicle on the highway. While he remained stopped, his vehicle was struck from behind by Officer Blyberg‘s patrol vehicle.
{¶ 4} Appellees, Steven E. and Beverly J. Baum, filed a complaint in the Ohio Court of Claims against the Ohio State Highway Patrol. Appellee sought damages from the patrol for injuries he sustained from the collision. The complaint alleged that the patrol, through its agent, Officer Blyberg, acted negligently, wantonly, willfully, and recklessly. There was evidence presented at trial that Officer Blyberg, as a back-up vehicle, failed to assume responsibility for radio communications and followed the lead vehicle too closely, thereby allowing himself to become too directly involved in the pursuit.
{¶ 5} The Court of Claims entered judgment in favor of the Ohio State Highway Patrol, finding that the patrol‘s actions were not willful or wanton and, therefore, under
{¶ 6} This cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Becker, Reed, Tilton & Hastings and Dennis A. Becker, for appellees.
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Gregg H. Bachmann and Catherine M. Cola, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellants.
Schottenstein, Treneff & Williams and John Gilchrist, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Association of Chiefs of Police.
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J.
{¶ 7} The sole issue before this court is whether the State Highway Patrol is immune from liability in the absence of wanton or willful misconduct for injuries caused by a patrol officer in the operation of his vehicle while responding to an emergency call. For the following reasons, we find that the State Highway Patrol is immune from liability in the absence of willful or wanton misconduct and, accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment.
{¶ 8} In York v. Ohio State Hwy. Patrol (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 143, 573 N.E.2d 1063, this court determined that if an officer-employee of the State Highway Patrol inflicts injury upon an individual while the officer is operating a motor vehicle during an emergency, and that injury is the result of the officer‘s negligence, the agency is immune from liability pursuant to
{¶ 9} This case was brought against the State Highway Patrol, an agency of the state, pursuant to
“The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and consents to be sued, and have its liability determined, in the court of claims created in this chapter
in accordance with the same rules of law applicable to suits between private parties, except that the determination of liability is subject to the limitations set forth in this chapter ***.”
{¶ 10} In order for plaintiffs to impose liability upon the state pursuant to
{¶ 11} In the present case, the appellees seek to impose a negligence standard of care upon the state as this would be the applicable standard of care if the suit were brought between private parties. However, the very fact that the defendant is the State Highway Patrol, and not a private party, changes the standard of care as private parties are not afforded the same rights and duties as patrol troopers. The State Highway Patrol, unlike private parties, is under a legal duty to pursue fleeing lawbreakers. See
{¶ 12} In determining whether liability can be imposed upon patrol troopers on an emergency call, we find it persuasive that the General Assembly has exempted all county, city and township police officers on an emergency call from liability when there is no evidence of willful or wanton misconduct. See
{¶ 13} Finally, a finding that patrol troopers are immune from liability in the absence of willful or wanton misconduct also serves a vital public interest. Patrol troopers have the duty to preserve the public peace, safety, and welfare.
{¶ 14} Based on the foregoing, we conclude that, in the absence of willful or wanton misconduct, the State Highway Patrol is immune from liability for injuries caused by a patrol officer in the operation of his vehicle while responding to an emergency call.
{¶ 15} The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed and the judgment of the Court of Claims is reinstated.
Judgment reversed.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, WRIGHT, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and COOK, JJ., concur.
PFEIFER, J., dissents.
PFEIFER, J., dissenting.
{¶ 16} Hot pursuit. The high speed chase. As comfortable to our perception of good law enforcement as fireworks and parades are on the Fourth of July. From images of posses on horseback chasing cattle rustlers to G-men in open air
{¶ 17} This should not be so. Unlike the days when criminals fled on horseback through sparse country, today‘s high speed chases are carried out on crowded public highways in vehicles that top speeds of one hundred miles per hour. The danger posed to innocent bystanders and the police involved in hot pursuit often far outweighs any benefit derived from the chase.
{¶ 18} In this case, the State Highway Patrol troopers risked not only their own lives in pursuit of two teenage joy riders, but the lives of the teenagers and hundreds of motorists as well. And for what? This was not a kidnapping or a hostage held at knifepoint. The two offenders were not armed robbers, terrorists or escaped convicts. They were kids in a stolen car, and their crime did not warrant putting anyone‘s life in danger.
{¶ 19} The state has set speed limits for the public‘s safety. To recklessly exceed those speed limits inherently imperils anyone in the path of the chase.
{¶ 20} Movies and television have glamorized the chase. In fact, there is nothing glamorous about it. The high speed chase is the deadliest use-of-force action employed in law enforcement. More people are killed each year by high speed chases than by bullets from police weapons. Columbus Dispatch, August 10, 1993, at 1A.
{¶ 21} Understandably, a high speed chase can take on a life of its own. An officer tries to pull over a vehicle, the vehicle speeds up a little. The officer accelerates to keep up with the offender, and before long, both are flying down the road at one hundred fifteen miles per hour.
{¶ 22} Despite its long-standing acceptance and the natural difficulty involved in breaking bad habits, this court should put the brakes on hot pursuit. At the very least, we should not be bending over backward to embrace the practice.
{¶ 23} To relieve the state and State Highway Patrol troopers from responsibility gives a tacit stamp of approval for hot pursuit. There may be some circumstances that warrant a high speed chase, but only as a last resort, not as a matter of course. Rather than justifying the practice of high speed chases and exonerating negligent conduct, our message should be clear: public safety is of greater import than the thrill of the chase.
{¶ 24} In addition to public policy considerations, the Revised Code also dictates that we should refrain from judicially immunizing the negligent conduct of State Highway Patrol troopers during a high speed chase.
{¶ 25} Absent from the majority‘s analysis is any direct statutory authority supporting its conclusion that State Highway Patrol troopers are not liable for damages caused by their negligent operation of motor vehicles during pursuits. Instead, the majority examines the standard contained in
{¶ 26} The majority cites
“This section does not relieve the driver of an emergency vehicle or public safety vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons using the street or highway.”
{¶ 27}
{¶ 28} The majority contends that the statutory negligence standard applicable to State Highway Patrol troopers is logically inconsistent with the statutory willful-and-wanton standard applicable to municipal, township and county officers. I disagree. The individual being chased by a municipal, township or county officer is more likely to be a dangerous criminal that may merit vigorous pursuit. Thus, the General Assembly has provided local law enforcement officials with more deference.
{¶ 29} In this case, there is sufficient evidence that the State Highway Patrol troopers acted negligently. The State Highway Patrol‘s own assessment of Trooper Blyberg‘s conduct concluded that, during the high speed chase that traveled as fast
{¶ 30} Statutes and statistics dictate that State Highway Patrol is liable when its troopers’ negligently conducted high speed chases result in injury. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.