206 Ky. 441 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1924
Opinion op the Court by
Affirming.
The appellant, Joseph Richard Baughman, a colored boy between 16 and 17 years of age, was convicted in the Fayette circuit court of murdering George I. Pierson, and his punishment fixed at death. The court overruled his motion for a new trial and he has áppealed.
The evidence, independently of that objected to and hereinafter considered, unmistakably establishes the defendant’s guilt, and it is uncontradicted, since the defendant neither testified nor introduced any witness to prove his innocence, either to show that he did not commit the deed, or that if he did so he was for any .reason not responsible therefor. So that, it becomes unnecessary for us to rehearse the testimony more than to say that the deceased was a merchant near Greendale, in Fayette county, and in the rear of his store he slept and •prepared his meals in compartments equipped for the purpose. Some time after seven o’clock on the evening of February 11, 1924, deceased and defendant were left in the store, as is shown by a witness who was the last person to see Pierson alive, and at that time he was preparing to close his store when defendant suggested that he wished to buy some candy,- and he and the deceased went or started back into the store for that purpose and the
Defendant was taken back to Lexington and seems to have become both friendly and confiding to another officer of Fayette county, who according to the record had treated him kindly and considerately. To that officer, along about 3 o’clock p. m. of the 13th of February, defendant made a confession in which he told that the rifle with which the deed was done was in a certain field a short distance from the pike and not far from the store where the homicide was committed, and at a point between that store and the place where a witness met defendant on the pike, as we have hereinbefore stated. He also stated in that confession, or another one made under the same circumstances, that a pistol known and proven to have been owned by the deceased-was at a certain place in Lincoln county and he expressed a willingness to go with the officer or officers to those two places to recover those weapons. He did;do so and both the rifle and the pistol were found at the places where defendant stated they were. A farmer living near Green-dale, with whom defendant had been' working, testified that he sold to the former a 22 rifle a short time before the homicide, and he positively identified the one found as being that rifle. There were other strong incriminat
Defendant is shown not to possess the strongest intellect for one of his age, and he is shown to have been somewhat subnormal in that respect, although physicians who examined him for the purpose testified that he conversed with them readily and intelligently, and they expressed their opinion that he had intelligence enough to be responsible to the law for his criminal acts. Other testimony in the case substantiates that of the professional witnesses, and, indeed, there is no contrary contention in this case. The instructions of the court are not complained of, and the only points urged for a reversal are: (1), That the court erred to the prejudice of defendant in admitting the testimony with reference to the discovery of the rifle and the pistol, and (2), that it was error to overrule defendant’s special demurrer to the proceedings and his motion to dismiss the prosecution upon the ground that the court did not have jurisdiction of it. We will dispose of- these contentions in the order named.
1. The first contention is bottomed oh section 11 of oür Constitution saying in part that, “He (the accused) cannot be compelled to give evidence against himself;” and on sections 1649b-l-1649'b-4, both inclusive, of our present statutes, commonly known as the “Anti-Sweating Act.” Before determining either of those objections, it will be appropriate to observe the precise matter complained of. The court heard the- confession in the absence of the jury and declined to permit any of it to be introduced. However, he did permit the Commonwealth to show that defendant stated the places where the rifle and the pistol might be found, and the fact that they were found at those places, but did not allow the witnesses to testify that defendant stated that he had placed them at those places. The only fact, then, that the jury was permitted to hear was that defendant stated where the weapons might be found and that statement was after-wards corroborated by the actual finding of them at those places. In confining the testimony within the limitations stated, the court necessarily found that the confession was made under such circumstances as to exclude
It is our conclusion that the defendant under the facts may not invoke the constitutional provision relied on, since it seems to have been interpreted as applying to a witness in a -judicial or quasi judicial proceeding, and not to a confession made outside of such a proeeed.ing and commonly known as an “extrajudicial” one. Mr. Jones in his excellent commentaries on Evidence, volume 5, section 884, in speaking of the scope, purpose and intent of such constitutional provisions, says. “These provisions are generally held to be. declaratory of the common law rule, neither limiting nor enlarging it. The protection applies not only to parties accused, but to witnesses, and in all kinds of proceedings where testimony is to be offered, civil as well as criminal. ’ ’ See also 28 R. C. L. 423, wherein the text says: “No principle of the common law is more firmly established than that which affords tó a'witness the privilege of refusing to answer any question that will criminate himself. As the common law had it, nemo tenetur se ipsum acensare.
There may be a few isolated opinions that extend the privilege given by such constitutional provisions, so as to include involuntary extrajudicial confessions; but the great weight of authority confines the privilege to a witness, either for himself (with the exception, supra) or for another in some sort of judicial or quasi judicial investigation, wherein it sought to compel him against his will to give testimony .that might incriminate him, and which would include grand jury investigations, coroner’s inquests, statutory inquisitions, and other investigations by functionaries having the right to swear .and interrogate witnesses, thé same as in a judicial tribunal established for the trial of causes. That being true, we must look to some other source for the protection of a defendant against involuntary extrajudicial confessions.
In a less humane period of English history all sorts of torture were administered to the accused in order to exact a .guilty confession from him. It was frequently done, not only by officers, but by ecclesiastical and other voluntary inquisitions, having no foundation in the law, and the practice became so intolerable that the courts took cognizance of it. As a consequence the modern rule excluding confessions obtained by duress, coercion, threats, promises of reward, or other means, denominated unlawful, became the settled practice. The principal foundation for the rule of exclusion of such confessions was the fact that the defendant, because of the unlawful means applied to him, may have confessed to a falsehood and that his confession was the result of the means applied to him rather than because it was the truth. No doubt another ground was to judicially condemn the barbarous and inhumane methods employed to obtain the confession. See 1 R. C. L. 551-2, paragraph 100. Other authorities confirm the history of the rule, as above given, and it will be unnecessary to insert them here.
Mr. Bishop, in his New Criminal Procedure, second edition, vol. 2, subsection 4 of section .1217, in stating the doctrine as to the nonadmissibility of involuntary extrajudicial confessions, says: “The doctrine, in its essence and divested of its technicalities, is that a defendant’s
In applying the common law rule, in the' absence of an anti-sweating or other kindred statute, courts generally admitted such collateral or extraneous demonstrated facts, although they were obtained as a result of some statement made in the involuntary confession. Thus, in 16 Corpus Juris 731, the text on the point says: “Where an involuntary confession discloses incriminating evidence which subsequently on investigation is proved to be true, or where the confession leads to the discovery of facts which in themselves are incriminating, so much of the confession as discloses the incriminating evidence and relates directly thereto, but not the confession in toto, is admissible; and the facts discovered in consequence of such involuntary confession may be proved. Thus in a prosecution for murder evidence of the discovery in a certain place of the remains, money, or clothing of the deceased, or of the weapon by which he was killed, with so much of an involuntary confession as relates directly to such facts, is admissible. And in a prosecution for burglary or larceny that portion of the involuntary confession of accused disclosing the hiding place of the stolen property, and all that he says or does in conveying the information which is directly connected with the discovery, is admissible, although his statement that he stole such property may be inadmissible.”
In 8 K. C. L. 196, paragraph 192, in stating the rule as to the admissibility of such facts, notwithstanding they were discovered through an inadmissible confession, it is said: “If one accused of crime in making an involuntary confession makes statements of extraneous facts, and, in consequence of the information thus obtained from him, any material fact is discovered, it may be shown that the discovery was made conformably with
It will, therefore, be seen that the constitutional provision protects the privilege of the accused on trial from the accusatory effects of an involuntary judicial confession made by him as a witness, while the common law rule referred to, and statutes in enlargement thereof, protect such privilege as to involuntary extrajudicial confessions ; but as to the latter, the rule has been evolved that extraneous statements as to collateral facts which are afterwards corroborated by demonstrative evidence, the privilege will not extend, and such demonstrated facts may be admitted against the accused unless a statute enlarging or modifying the common law rule is sufficiently explicit in its terms to exclude such demonstrated facts. Whatever, therefore, may be the ground for admitting such facts as to extrajudicial involuntary confessions, and whatever may be said as to its absolute soundness at the beginning, it is now too late for us, after generations of its adoption and application, to attempt to overthrow it or to announce a different rule; which brings us to a secondary contention made by learned counsel for appellant, that our anti-sweating statute is broad enough to render the testimony in this case which led to and the fact of, the discovery of the weapons incompetent.
In order to sustain that contention, we would be compelled to overrule the McQueen case, the principles of which, as declared in the opinion, are identical with the ones involved here. We have given our anti-sweating statute a thorough reconsideration in this case and have concluded that the intention of the legislature in enacting it was to only enlarge the list of involuntary confessions that were excluded under the common law rule. Prior to the enactment of that statute, many of the acts, denominated therein as “sweating,” were not forbidden, and confessions obtained thereby were considered as voluntary, and, therefore, admissible; whereas the statute enacted that they should thereafter be con
2. The second and last contention urged is that, defendant being a juvenile delinquent, the Fayette circuit court did not acquire jurisdiction of the prosecution in the manner pointed out by us in the cases of Commonwealth v. Franks, 164 Ky. 239; Talbott v. Commonwealth, 166 Ky. 659; Commonwealth v. Davis, 169 Ky. 681; Waters v. Commonwealth, 171 Ky. 457, and Compton v. Commonwealth, 194 Ky. 429. In those cases it was held that, under our juvenile statutes, circuit courts cannot initiate prosecutions against juvenile delinquents, but that they should first be apprehended by and a hearing' had before the county juvenile court, who is the county judge, and that not until that court had recommended a prosecution in the circuit court, would the latter acquire jurisdiction. Before the indictment was'returned in this case, proper proceedings under the juvenile statute were instituted before the county judge after the requisite notice and other preliminary steps for that court to acquire jurisdiction of the delinquent. It appears that the court heard the case and determined that it was one that
We do not understand that serious criticism is made of the form of the order made by the county judge and, as stated, neither is there criticism of the steps taken by him to acquire jurisdiction of the defendant as a juvenile delinquent; but even if such objections were made, we can find no ground to sustain them. It is insisted, however, that the county judge had not actually transferred or delivered his order to the Fayette circuit court before the indictment was returned, but the order of transfer of the defendant and his prosecution to that court had actually been made; and it is our conclusion that it would be surrendering the substance to the shadow to hold that the failure to furnish the circuit court or its prosecuting officer with a copy of the order, although as a matter of fact it had been made and entered, was fatal to the circuit court’s jurisdiction, and we find nothing in the opinions, supra, either expressly or 'by implication, sustaining such a conclusion.
The text in 31 Corpus Juris, 1106, in stating the measure of compliance with such statutes in order for the proceedings to be valid, says: “Although the proceedings are in a measure informal, and, if the order is authorized, mere irregularities will not invalidate it, yet the proper elements of a judicial proceeding should be present, such as, for instance, notice, opportunity to be heard, hearing upon evidence, and an order or decree.” We, therefore, conclude that it is not the fact that the circuit court is in possession of the copy of the order that gives it jurisdiction, but rather the fact that the proper order had been made so as to give it jurisdiction.
We are also of the opinion that another criticism made by learned counsel is equally without merit. It is, that the book in which the order was made was not delivered into the custody of the county court clerk, but was kept by the county judge in his office. Whether it was his purpose to later deliver it to the county court clerk is not shown, but certainly the latter officer was not forbidden to possess himself of it at any time he desired. It was under the general control and supervision of the county judge who by the statute is the juvenile court,
Lastly, it is insisted that the proof upon the trial in the circuit court of the court proceedings was incompetent, and the objection thereto by counsel for defendant should have been sustained. That proof was made by the county judge, himself, who testified from the record itself, and swore that he had made and entered the order as it therein appeared to be, and we think it was competent to prove the record in that manner. In 22 Corpus Juris 795, it is said: “It is’usually held that'an original judicial record properly verified will, if it can be produced, be admissible in any court, although a certified copy might also be admissible.” And, while the ordinary mode of proof is to introduce a certified copy of the record made by its lawful custodian, yet the introduction of the original may be made, and it may be verified by both the clerk of the court, if it is one having a clerk, or by the judicial officer who made it.
To the extent indicated, the proceedings by the Fayette county judge in this case, sitting as a juvenile court, were, perhaps, somewhat informal and irregular, but we are unwilling to hold that such irregularities rendered the proceedings invalid.
The purpose and intent of the legislature in enacting our juvenile statute were substantially complied with; the investigation by the county judge as a juvenile court was made after acquiring jurisdiction in the manner pointed out by the statute, and his judgment was made a matter of record in his office and duly subscribed by him. That judgment was proven by his own oath at the trial, and we think that it would be trifling with justice to reject those proceedings as invalid because of the informalities and irregularities pointed out. We, therefore, hold that this second, and last contention is without merit.
Because of the severity of the punishment, the age of defendant and the zeal of his counsel, we have tried to give this case a most thorough consideration. As stated, there can be no doubt of the defendant’s guilt; but, because, of his youth, coupled with the limited advantages under which he was reared, plus his somewhat subnormal intelligence, we might not have been willing
For the reasons stated, the judgment is affirmed.
The whole court sitting.