Baugh v. StateBaugh v. State
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Hаrry Baugh was arrested for driving while intoxicated on a street whose center lane is the border of two counties. He contends that the statute allowing for a trial in either county is unconstitutional because he drove on only one side of the road and has a right to be tried in the county where the crime оccurred. We hold that dangerous driving on a highway creates risk on all lanes of the highway, and invades interests of both counties in the case of a road that forms their common border. Therefore venue in either county was proper.
Factual and Procedural Background
Just after 3:00 a.m. on January 31, 2001, Officer Derek Shelley of the Carmel Police Department observed Baugh‘s car weaving and speeding eastbound on 96th Street, which forms the boundary between Marion and Hamilton Counties Shelley рulled Baugh over and asked Baugh if he had
Baugh was chаrged in Hamilton County with operation of a motor vehicle with a specific amount of alcohol in the body, a Class C misdemeanor; operating while intoxicated, a Class A misdemeanor; and operating while intoxicated within five years of a previous conviction for the same offense, a Class D felony. At the conclusion of the evidence in a bench trial, Baugh moved for Judgment on the Evidence arguing that the State had failed to prove the proper venue was Hamilton County. The trial court denied the motion and found Baugh guilty on all three counts. Baugh was sentenced to three years imprisonmеnt, with all but 180 days suspended, and an additional eighteen months of probation. Baugh appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed. Indiana Code seetion 35-32-2-1(i) (2000) provides for venue in either county when the crime occurs on a highway bordering two counties. The Court of Appeals held that when all evidence points to the existence of venue in a particular county, the statute must yield to the defendant‘s state constitutional right to be tried in the county where the crime is committed. Baugh v. State, 781 N.E.2d 1141, 1144 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). We granted transfer, and now affirm the trial court.
Constitutionality
The right to be tried in the county in which an offense was cоmmitted is a constitutional and a statutory right.
The Indiana Constitution provides that, “Tiln all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to a public trial ... in the county where the offense has been committed....”
In this case, the Court of Appeals reasoned that Navarettа v. State, 726 N.E.2d 787 (Ind.2000), allowed venue in an adjacent county when it could not readily be determined in which county the offense occurred. The court concluded that the venue statute applies only in situations where the evidence of location of the crime is inconclusive. In contrast, here the еvidence was conclusive that Baugh never entered Hamilton County, so he contends Navaretta did not apply by its terms. We agree that Navaretta does not confer venue on Hamilton County under the facts of this case, but neither does that decision preclude it.
Venue is not limited to the place where the defendant acted. To the con
Baugh‘s offense had a sufficient nexus to Hamilton Cоunty on the undisputed facts. Drunk driving poses a “public danger,” particularly to the public sharing the roadway with the impaired driver. See State v. Gerschoffer, 763 N.E.2d 960, 971 (Ind.2002). Bаugh argues that because he drove on the south side of 96th Street, his offense occurred solely in Marion County and lacked a nexus to Hamilton County. We hаve held that inadvertent consequences in another county may not support venue over an offense committed solely in one county. Wurster v. Stаte, 715 N.E.2d 341, 350 (Ind.1999) (Bureau of Motor Vehicles processing of a false affidavit in Marion County, after the defendant filed it in another county did not create a suffiсient nexus for venue in Marion County). However, if the defendant directs acts into a county, venue is proper in that county. State v. Moles, 166 Ind.App. 632, 639, 337 N.E.2d 543, 550 (1975) (resident of another county mailing tax returns to Marion County for filing with the State was sufficient nexus to create venue in Marion County). Dangerous operation of a vehiclе on one side of a highway is a hazard to the entire road, even in the case of a divided highway. Moreover, erratic driving on a road patrollеd by law enforcement officers from two counties is observable by both, and requires both to respond. This is also an intrusion into both counties and an impositiоn on the resources of both. Operators of vehicles know or should know they trigger consequences on both sides of the road. A driver on a border rоad thus knowingly imposes hazards in both counties. Because the risks created by drunk en driving on a boundary road do not stop at the county boundary, a sufficient nexus exists between the place of operation and either county. This is an application of the same principles that justify concurrent vеnue where the defendant acts in one county and the victim is in another,
In short, we agree with those courts in other statеs with similar constitutional venue limits who have held that the legislature may establish concurrent venue for violations on or near borders. See State v. Swainston, 139 Ariz. 95, 676 P.2d 1153, 1154 (Ct.App.1984); State v. McCown, 113 Or.App. 627, 833 P.2d 1321, 1322 (1992).
Conclusion
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, SULLIVAN, and RUCKER, JJ., concur.