In this case the question for decision is whether four letters addressed to different individuals, all in the handwriting of and signed by the decedent, may together be classed as a holographic will merely because one was dated and all were found in a desk drawer intermingled with other papers.
Each of the three undated letters indicates not only a testamentary intent but that death was immediately impending. Death did occur by suicide. The dated letter specifically directed that upon the death of the writer all of her money in designated deposit accounts along with American Express Company checks should go to her mother. It made no reference to impending death. The other three letters were not shown to have been in existence at the time she wrote her letter of May 1, 1940. Moreover, they cut down the money bequest made to her mother in the letter of May 1st and give every indication they were drafted after that letter. This we think is persuasively shown by the fact that one of the undated letters—all of which were written on a different kind and size of paper from that of May 1st—refers to signed checks, all dated in June, 1940. The trial court ruled that all the letters constituted a single holographic will.
By statutory definition a holographic will must be entirely written, dated and signed by the hand of the testator himself. (Prob. Code, § 53.) The right to make a will is a statutory privilege, not an inherent right, and so the will must measure up to the requirements of the statute. In the instant ease the only document which complied with the statute was the letter dated May 1,1940. May, then, the other letters, each of which standing alone could not be admitted to probate as a holographic will, nevertheless be admitted as being parts of the letter of May 1, 1940, in view of the fact that the letter of May 1 does not incorporate by reference or otherwise the undated three letters but is sufficient in and of itself as a holographic will?
In
Simon
v.
Grayson,
15 Cal. (2d) 531 [
Only the letter of May 1, 1940, should have been admitted to probate. The order is reversed.
Moore, P. J., and Wood (W. J.), J., concurred.
Respondent’s petition for a hearing by, the Supreme Court was denied June 29, 1942.
