Todd BAUER, Richard L. Bauer, and Janet Bauer, Appellants, v. Scott DANN; Thomas Dann d/b/a Tom‘s Painting Service; Brad Cole and Carol Cole, Appellees.
No. 87-1069
Supreme Court of Iowa
Aug. 17, 1988.
As Corrected Aug. 19, 1988.
428 N.W.2d 658
LARSON, Justice.
Addressing the question of double recovery, we note, first, that there is nothing inherently inconsistent between legal remedies for breach of contract and equitable remedies for specific performance. Id. at 906; see 5A Corbin on Contracts § 1222 at 473-75 (1964). Plaintiffs could bring both actions bеcause they both assume the validity of the contract. Second, the remedies are not necessarily alternative in nature. The power of the court in equity is not limited to settling the rights of the parties for past occurrences; it allows the court to declare their duties and rights for the future as well. Moser, 256 N.W.2d at 907 (quoting Bankers Surety Co. v. Linder, 156 Iowa 486, 494, 137 N.W. 496, 499 (1912)).
The legal remedy only determined the rights and duties of the parties up to the time the jury rendered its verdict. Specific performance would cover the future rights of the parties and the closing of the real estate contract transaction. We deem specific performance to be an appropriate, supplemental remedy to serve justice in this case. We reverse the trial court judgment on this issue as to defendant John A. Hаtt.
With respect to Dorris V. Hatt, the record does not fully reveal her contribution or participation in the contract negotiation. Because defendant Dorris V. Hatt did not sign the contract, no basis appears to allow enforcement of specific performance against her. At this juncture, the trial court judgment so far as it concerns Dorris V. Hatt is affirmed. We note, however, that the contract to be enforced against John A. Hatt obligates him to deliver to plaintiffs a “general warrаnty deed” upon receiving full payment. The feasibility of specific performance by plaintiffs against John A. Hatt alone is not an issue before us.
VI. Disposition. We vacate the court of appeals decision in both cases.
In the law action we reverse the trial court judgment as to plaintiffs’ abuse of process claim. As to plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim, we affirm the trial court judgment as to compensatory damages and post-trial allowance of attorney fees and reverse the judgment as to punitive damages. The law action is remanded for entry оf judgment consistent with this opinion.
In the equity action for specific performance, we affirm the trial court in denying specific performance against defendant Dorris V. Hatt. We reverse the trial court judgment as to defendant John A. Hatt and grant plaintiffs specific performance against him. The equity action is also remanded for such further orders and proceedings as are necessary to implement plaintiffs’ petition for specific performance against John A. Hatt based upon the existing record and such additional record as the trial court shall deem necessary.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENTS AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
Gaylen V. Hassman of Engelbrecht, Ackerman & Hassman, Waverly, for appellants.
Gene Yagla of Lindeman & Yagla, Waterloo, for appellees.
Todd Bauer and Scott Dann attended a New Year‘s Eve party given by the defendants, Brad Cole and Carol Cole. Bauer and Dann left the party in a car driven by Dann, whо was allegedly intoxicated. Dann lost control of the car, and Bauer suffered serious injuries from the resulting collision. Todd Bauer and his parents sued Coles (and other parties not included in this appeal).1 Bauers claimed that Coles had furnished beer tо Dann, a person under legal age, in violation of
Coles moved for summary judgment on the ground there is no statutory or common-law basis for liability of a social host for a violation of
The district court sustained Coles’ motion for summary judgment, and we granted permission for an interloсutory appeal under
I. The Proximate Cause Issue.
In Lewis v. State, 256 N.W.2d 181, 191-92 (Iowa 1977), this court rejected the longstanding rule of our prior cases that furnishing of alcohol could not be the proximate cause of damages by an intoxicated person. Lewis, like the present case, was a common-lаw claim for damages caused by the illegal supplying of alcohol to a minor. We held that the statute prohibiting supplying of alcohol to a minor set “a mini
We also held, regarding proximate cause, that
the sale or furnishing of intoxicating liquor in violation of section 123.43 [now
section 123.47 ] may well be the proximate cause of injuries sustainеd as a result of an intoxicated individual‘s tortious conduct and liability may thus be imposed upon the violators in favor of the injured, innocent third party. The question of proximate cause under such facts and circumstances would be for the trier of fact.
The rule of Lewis, thаt the furnishing of alcohol may be a proximate cause of damages, now seems to be well established. See, e.g., Haafke v. Mitchell, 347 N.W.2d 381, 384-87, 391 (Iowa 1984). Even those cases which have held against liability have done so on grounds other than proximate cause. See, e.g., Fuhrman v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 398 N.W.2d 807, 809-10 (Iowa 1987) (reaffirmed earlier Connolly case; dramshop statute exclusive remedy against licensee or permittee); Connolly v. Conlan, 371 N.W.2d 832, 833 (Iowa 1985) (as to licensees and permittees, dramshop statute provides exclusive remedy); DeMore v. Dieters, 334 N.W.2d 734, 738 (Iowa 1983) (facts did not show “supplying” to minor); Snyder v. Davenport, 323 N.W.2d 225, 226-27 (Iowa 1982) (dramshop statute exclusive remedy against licensee who provided alcоhol to intoxicated person).
There has been a recent development, however, which Coles contend changes the rules on proximate cause: A 1986 amendment to
The general assembly declares that this subsection shall be interpreted so that the holding of Clark v. Mincks, 364 N.W.2d 226 ([Iowa] 1985) [establishing social host liability for furnishing to intoxicated person] is abrogated in favor of prior judicial interpretation finding the consumption of alcoholic beverages, wine, or beer rather than the serving of alcoholiс beverages, wine, or beer as the proximate cause of injury inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person.
This amendment, however, is inapplicable for two reasons. First, as we recently held in Blesz v. Weisbrod, 424 N.W.2d 451, 451 (Iowa 1988), the amendment is to
We hold that the issue of proximate cause in this case is a question for the trier of fact.
II. The Preemption Issue.
The second ground of Coles’ motion fоr summary judgment asserted that the legislature preempted the entire field of alcohol-furnishing liability by enacting the dramshop statute,
While a broader view of preemption has been suggested by some of the language of our opinions, the fact is that the key to a successful preemption argument has been whether the particular defendant is one covered by the dramshop statute, i.e., whether the defendant is a licensee or permittee. See Fuhrman, 398 N.W.2d at 809-10; Connolly, 371 N.W.2d at 833; Haafke, 347 N.W.2d at 385-86; Snyder, 323 N.W.2d at 226-27.
As we noted in Haafke,
[w]e have never held that the statute preempts the entire field of liability or that it shields parties as to whom there is no statutory remedy. The implication of Lewis is clearly the contrary. In that case, although a dram shop cause of action did exist, this court found a parallel cаuse of action at common law.
The defendants do not cite any authority directly supporting this view of preemption nor have we found any. This is perhaps explained by the fact that the Iowa dram shop statute is considerably narrower than most, leaving a larger “no-man‘s land” in which recovery, if any is to be permitted, will depend upon traditional tort principles. For example, Iowa‘s act applies only when a specific criminal statute, sales to intoxicated persons, is violated, in contrast to most acts which do not even require that the sale be illegal. And our act applies only to “any licensee or permittee” in contrast to most acts which apply to “any person” or its equivalent.
We reaffirm the view that the dramshop statute,
Although it was not raised in Coles’ motion for summary judgment, they now suggest that they cannot be held liable because they were social hosts to Bauer and Dann. No authority cited by Coles directly supports that view, although they allude to
There is nothing in the language of
The prohibitions of
Immunization from the civil consequences of furnishing alcohol to a minor, on the other hand, would frustrate the purposes of the act and, we believe, would be based on questionable public policy. If this step is to be taken, it will not be taken by this court in the context of the common law.
We conclude that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the defendants. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
All Justices concur except HARRIS, J., and McGIVERIN, C.J., who dissent, and CARTER, J., who takes no part.
HARRIS, Justice (dissenting).
This is another in what has grown to be a list of tort suits arising from the furnishing of alcohol to persons who were or became intoxicated. Our court has been sharply divided on the question, especially on the issue of whether the legislature has preemрted the field.
It seems that the question cannot be put to rest. We have made judicial pronouncements that the field is preempted by legislation. See Fuhrman v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 398 N.W.2d 807, 808-09 (Iowa 1987). There has been at least one legislative pronouncement to the same effeсt. 1986 Iowa Acts ch. 1211, § 11. As soon as the ink is dry on a pronouncement of pre-emption
As asserted in trial court the plaintiffs’ claims were limited to theories under
Notwithstanding any prior judicial or legislative pronouncements the majority seems prompted to expand on the metes and bounds of liability which were fixed by the legislature. We should resist the temptation. The legislature will surely have the last word; it is entitled, so long as it acts within the framework of the Constitution, to set limits of tort liability.
I would affirm.