107 Neb. 831 | Neb. | 1922
Plaintiff, Bauer & Johnson Company, recovered a judgment against the defendant, National Roofing Company, in the sum of $2,500, for damages to one of plaintiff’s motor trucks on November 26,1918. Defendant appealed.
Plaintiff alleges the damages to have been caused by reason of negligence on the part of appellant in leaving a block of Avood in the roadAvay of Eleventh street
The evidence introduced by plaintiff tends to show that the accident occurred in the manner claimed by it. The driver of the truck and several other witnesses testified that the truck was backing along near the center of the roadway, at about 2y2 miles an hour; that on approaching a heating pot on the west side of the roadway and about 6 to 12 feet therefrom, as the truck was turning to pass said heating pot, there was a sudden jerk and change in the course of the truck, and it continued northeasterly, striking the curb, the flange of the right wheel riding it a short distance, the wheel then passing over the curb onto the sidewalk, and the truck then falling to the ground. At least three of the witnesses
The question whether the creosote block was on the pavement, was struck by the wheel of the truck and caused the truck to pass over the curb and fall from the viaduct, was, therefore, a question to be determined by the jury. Appellant argues and claims that, as a matter of law, the leaving of the block of wood in evidence on the roadway of the viaduct is not negligence.
“Deceased did not suffer from any causal or ordinary deviation from the roadway, nor do we think there was any danger of her doing so. The course of the car was extraordinary. Stopping on a slight grade about 100 feet from the bluff edge, it commenced to back, and it backed nearly straight and over the precipice. We think the city should not be required to anticipate such unusual occurrences or to guard against them.”
The extraordinary course of the car in that case was not caused by failure to have proper protection from falling over the bluff. The course of the truck in this case was also extraordinary, and, if the plaintiff’s evidence is true, its extraordinary course was caused by the loose block of Avood lying in the roadAvay. Moreover, appellant employed of plaintiff the use of the motor truck and its driver to carry asphalt over this roadway to the place Avhere directed by appellant and in the manner it directed. Appellant had exclusive charge of the roadway of the viaduct. It was appellant’s duty to keep the place for travel by the truck in a reasonably safe condition and free from obstacles which might
Other authorities cited by appellant are cases in which the claimed defect in the roadway and sidewalk was not movable, nor the roadway or sidewalk at a place where the defect complained of- would cause a vehicle to be damaged by falling off a bridge, viaduct or embankment. It would serve no purpose to analyze each case cited separately. The leaving of a block of wood the size of the one in evidence on the roadway might not be negligence under some circumstances, but under other circumstances different minds might reasonably differ as to whether or not there was negligence therein. We must take the facts and circumstances in evidence in this case, and if different persons may reasonably reach different conclusions as to whether or not it was negligence in leaving such block of wood on the roadway under those facts and circumstances, it is a question for the jury to determine. “Issues as to the existence of negligence and contributory negligence, and as to the proximate cause of an injury, are for the jury to determine, when the evidence as to the facts is conflicting, and where different minds might reasonably draw different conclusions as to these questions from the facts -established.” City of Omaha v. Houlihan, 72 Neb. 326.
Appellant also contends that it was physically impossible for the accident to have happened in the manner claimed by plaintiff. It claims that if the fire kettle was six feet south of the break in the curb where the wheel first struck it, and that the driver of the truck began to turn around the kettle when the rear end of the truck was within four or five feet of it, on such facts his wheel would strike the curb at almost right angles. There is no testimony that the driver of the truck turned to go around the fire kettle. All the testimony on that point is that he turned to the east to pass it. All the testimony as to the direction taken by the truck is that
Appellant also contends that the damage to the truck was not the natural and probable cause of leaving the block of wood in evidence on the viaduct, and ought not to have been foreseen by the defendant, and that therefore the negligence, if any, of the defendant was not, as a matter of law, the proximate cause of the damage complained of. The appellant had employed plaintiff’s truck and driver to haul the asphalt, which the evidence shows is a semi-fluid with a tendency to flow to the rear end of the truck when it is backing down a slope, and render it harder'to stop the truck. A motor truck is more liable to be deflected from its course and to have its wheels blocked and held so that the truck cannot be guided in its course, than a vehicle with wheels of greater diameter. There was testimony that the roadway was slippery on account of the first coat of asphalt thereon. These facts, together with the further facts that a loose block of wood was lying on such slippery roadway on a viaduct 50 feet above the ground traveled by motor trucks backing downward with loads of liquid asphalt, if such facts are found to be true, together Avith all the other faets and circumstances attending the course of the truck, found from the evidence by the jury, are all facts for the jury to consider, and to be considered, in determining whether or not it was negligence to leave said block in the roadway, and also in determining Avhether or not the appellant ought to have foreseen that the block of wood in the roadway, under such circumstances and conditions, might cause the truck to be deflected, so as to cause it to run off the roadway and fall from the viaduct.' Different minds might reach
Appellant asks that the judgment be reversed for the following reasons: “(1) That it Avas physically impossible for the accident to happen in the way the plaintiff claimed, or in any Avay that Avould have involved negligence on the part of the defendant; (2) that the leaving of this piece of Avood on the viaduct, if it was so left, Avas not, as a matter of law, a negligent act; (3) and, even though negligent; it Aims.not actionable negligence, for the accident that Avas claimed to have resulted therefrom Avas not the natural and probable consequence thereof and ought not, as a matter of law, to have been foreseen by the defendant.” We have already covered these points and determined that each is groundless.
Appellant also claims that the court erred in giving instructions Nos. 3, 10, and 12, and in refusing to give instruction No. 5, requested by the defendant.
The appellant claims error because neither in instruction No. 3, nor elsewhere, Avere the jury told that, if they find negligence on the part of the defendant was the proximate cause of the accident, they should find for the plaintiff, unless they find that negligence of the plaintiff contributed thereto, It also claims error because the jury were not instructed that, if they found that the negligence of the plaintiff, or its driver, caused the accident in question, they should find for the defendant.
To so instruct the jury in either case Avould be to ignore, and be contrary to, our contributory negligence statute, in a case where contributory negligence is pleaded and there is evidence tending to shoAv the same. The negligence of plaintiff might be contributory merely
Instruction No. 1 given by the court tells the jury that the plaintiff through its driver was backing the truck down the roadway. This tells them that such act. of the driver of the truck was the act of the plaintiff. If a more specific instruction on this point was desired, defendant should have requested the same. The instructions nowhere tend to mislead the jury into the belief that the acts of the driver were not acts of plaintiff. “Though an instruction may not be so specific as it
The only question remaining to be considered is, was the jury properly instructed upon the law applicable to the questions involved in the issues raised by the pleadings and supported by the evidence. “A court is bound to instruct the jury, whether requested or not, upon the material issues of the case.” Kyd v. Cook, 56 Neb. 71. Also Figg v. Donahoo, 4 Neb. (Unof.) 661.
Instruction No. 3, given by the court on its own motion, after instructing the jury that the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to establish by a preponderance of the evidence all of its material allegations not admitted to be true by the answer of the defendant, is as follows: “Therefore, before the plaintiff can recover in this action it must be established by a preponderance of the evidence: Eirst — That negligence on the part of the defendant was the proximate cause of the accident complained of. Second — The damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiff as a result thereof. If the plaintiff has established both of the foregoing propositions by a preponderance of the evidence, then your verdict should be for the plaintiff. If, however, the plaintiff has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that negligence on the part of the defendant National' Eoofing Company Avas the proximate cause of the truck being thrown from the viaduct to the railroad tracks below, then the plaintiff cannot recover, and your verdict should be for the defendant.”
The affirmative defense set out in appellant’s ansArer that the damage was caused by negligence of the plaintiff, unless it be treated as a plea of contributory negligence, would be simply a denial that the alleged negligence of defendant caused the damage, and there Avould be no error in this instruction. The appellee contends
By a parity of reasoning, a general averment in an answer charging that negligence on the part of the plaintiff caused the accident is good, unless assailed by motion to make more definite and certain. There was evidence tending to show that the truck could have been stopped by proper care on the part of the driver. •If it could have been so stopped, a failure so to do would be negligence chargeable to the plaintiff, and, if the jury found that' negligence of the defendant was the proximate cause of the accident, it also might find that such negligence by the plaintiff was contributory negligence. This court has held: “Where the facts in evidence tend to show both negligence and contributory negligence, the duty to make the comparison required by the statute rests with the jury, unless the evidence as to negligence is legally insufficient, or contributory negligence is so clearly shown that it would be the duty of the trial court to set aside a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Ordinarily, wherever there is room for difference of opinion upon these questions, they must be submitted to the jury.” Disher v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 93 Neb. 224; McCarthy v. Village of Ravenna, 99 Neb. 674. In the Disher case, it was also held: “A court is entitled to direct a verdict where the lack of evidence of negligence,. or the undisputed evi
The court treated the answer as pleading contributory negligence and instructed the jury thereon. The court, having so treated it, should properly instruct the jury on that issue on its OAvn motion. Prior to our statute on comparative negligence, it would have been error, in a case where contributory negligence was pleaded and there was evidence tending to establish it, for the court to fail to instruct that, if they found plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence, they should find for the defendant.
Under our present comparative negligence statute the jury should clearly be instructed, where the evidence in a case tends to shoAV negligence on the part of the plaintiff, from which the jury is permitted to determine whether the same was the proximate cause of the injury complained of or simply contributory thereto, that if it finds plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence it should find for the defendant, unless it also finds that the contributory negligence of the plaintiff is slight and the negligence of the defendant is gross in comparison.
By instruction No. 3, hereinbefore quoted, the jury were told that if plaintiff had established by a preponderance of the evidence that negligence on the part of the defendant was the proximate cause of the accident
An instruction which sets out a state of facts, and .authorizes a verdict for one of the parties upon a finding of such facts, is erroneous, unless it includes every fact necessary to sustain a verdict in favor of such party, unless the omitted facts are conclusively established. In Standard Distilling & Distributing Co. v. Harris, 75 Neb. 480, it is said:
“Where such instruction is complete in itself, the error therein is not cured by the giving of other instructions which correctly state the law or the facts essential to a recovery by such party.”
The only instruction given by the court concerning contributory negligence (except No. 12, which defines the same) was instruction No. 10. It was as follows: “If plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence contributing to the injury or damage complained of, that fact will not bar a recovery, if the contributory negligence of the plaintiff was slight and the negligence of defendant was gross in comparison, but in such case the contributory negligence of plaintiff will be considered by you in mitigation of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence attributable to the plaintiff.” This instruction correctly states the provisions of our statute. It does not tell the jury that they should find for the defendant unless they find the ‘plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence, unless they also find such negligence of the plaintiff was slight and the negligence of the defendant was gross in comparison. Nowhere in the instructions are the jury instructed to find for the defendant in such case. If the jury could infer from instruction No. 10 that it should find for the defendant if it found plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence, unless they also found that its contributory negligence was slight and the negligence of the de
From instruction No. 10 the jury might infer that by instruction No. 3 it had been instructed to find for plaintiff if it found that negligence of defendant was the cause of the accident, because contributory negligence of the plaintiff would not bar its recovery if that contributory negligence was slight and the negligence of defendant gross in comparison.
For these errors in instructions of the court, the judgment of the district court should be, and is, reversed and this cause remanded for a new trial.
Reversed.