Donald BATTLE, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and David John McPherrin, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Daniel P. Hyndmаn, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
WARNER, J.
Appellant seeks to reverse the revocation of his probation on the ground that thе trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress cocaine found when an officer stopped him. He contends that the officer did not have a founded suspicion that appellant was loitering and prowling at the time he was stopped. Therefore, the stop and ensuing seizure of drugs was unlawful. We conclude that basеd upon the facts and circumstances presented to the officer, he had reasonable suspicion to stop appellant. We therefore affirm.
Deputy Woulard was patrolling a residential area in a marked police car at 2:15 in the morning, conducting an area check using his vehicle's spotlight. The аrea was dark, with street lights more than 150 feet away. The officer was familiar with the area and considered it a high crime area, as he had made apprоximately 75 to 100 drug arrests in the area. While driving along, his spotlight illuminated appellant standing in the dark, in the hedges between two rooming houses. The officer recognized аppellant from prior contacts. During those contacts, appellant told the officer his address, which was different than the address of the rooming houses where he was spotted.
When the spotlight shone on appellant, the officer observed him pull something into his person and conceal it. Appellant then began to walk away. Seeing appellant *588 attempting to conceal something with his body, the officer called out for him to stop, as he suspected appellant was loitering and prowling. When appellant refused to stop, the officer grabbed him. In that process the officer observed appellant drop or throw a "hitter pipe" which contained cocaine and was the subject of the motion to suppress.
Appellant was arrested for possessiоn of cocaine. At the suppression hearing the trial court concluded that based upon the time, location, and the other factors present, the officer was justified in stopping appellant to make further inquiry. The court revoked appellant's probation and imposed sentence. This appeаl follows in which appellant claims the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress.
As the supreme court recently stated, "[a] trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress comes to the appellate court clothed with a presumption of correctness and the court must interpret the evidence and rеasonable inferences and deductions derived therefrom in a manner most favorable to sustaining the trial court's ruling." Doorbal v. State,
Section 856.021, Florida Statutes (2002), provides:
(1) It is unlawful for any person to loiter or prowl in a place, at a time or in a manner not usual for law-abiding individuals, under circumstances that warrant a justifiable and rеasonable alarm or immediate concern for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity.
(2) Among the circumstances which may be considered in dеtermining whether such alarm or immediate concern is warranted is the fact that the person takes flight upon appearance of a law enforcement officer, refuses to identify himself or herself, or manifestly endeavors to conceal himself or herself or any object. Unless flight by the person or other cirсumstance makes it impracticable, a law enforcement officer shall, prior to any arrest for an offense under this section, afford the person an opportunity to dispel any alarm or immediate concern which would otherwise be warranted by requesting the person to identify himself or herself and explain his оr her presence and conduct.
(Emphasis added). In E.C. v. State,
Here, the officer observed appellant in a residential area at 2:15 a.m. Appellant was nоt on the street or a sidewalk, but was "in the hedges" between two rooming houses and in the dark. The officer recognized appellant and knew that the address appellant gave as his residence during prior encounters was not near the *589 address at which appellant was spotted. We think this conduct alone shows cоnduct at a place, time, and manner not usual for law-abiding individuals. Lurking in the dark by residences in the wee hours of the morning is unusual for law-abiding persons. In Ecker, the court held the loitering and prowling statute constitutional and applied the statute to the facts of several consolidated cases before it.
When appellant was spotted, he concealed something on his рerson. Section 856.021(2) specifically provides that endeavors to conceal oneself or any object are circumstances which must be considеred when determining whether alarm is warranted. Under such circumstances, alarm is presumed. See C.H.S. v. State,
Based uрon his observations the officer had reasonable suspicion that appellant was loitering and prowling. In Illinois v. Wardlow,
[i]n Terry, we held that an officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. While "reasonable suspicion" is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop. The officer must be able to articulate more than an "inchoatе and unparticularized suspicion or `hunch'" of criminal activity.
Id. at 123-24,
Here, the officer sought to dispel the alarm caused by finding appellant concealing somеthing, in the early morning hours in the hedges between two residences. The officer had a reasonable suspicion to support an investigatory stop for this purpose. Therefore, the stop of appellant was lawful, and the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the stop.
Affirmed.
GROSS and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.