Battista v. StateBattista v. State
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- Before:
- Pope
Alan Battista was tried and convicted of trafficking in cocaine by a Gwinnett Superior Court and appeals, arguing that his conviction violated the protections against double jeopardy. After reviewing the matter, we reject Battista’s arguments and affirm the judgment.
Battista entered into a stipulation of evidence for the November 6, 1995 bench trial underlying this appeal. The stipulated facts were that special agents from the United States Drug Enforcement Agency, along with Gwinnett County police officers, conducted a drug investigation in Gwinnett County and discovered that Battista had more than 28 grams of cocaine, which he was trying to sell. Battista was the owner and operator of a laundry business at 285 Pine Street, Lilburn. The officers approached Battista at his laundry business and conducted a consensual search, which led to the discovery of more than 28 grams of cocaine. Battista was arrested for possession of the cocaine.
Before trial, Battista filed a motion in bar of prosecution and to enjoin the proceedings pursuant to the double jeopardy provisions of the United States and Georgia Constitutions and of
The superior court denied Battista’s motion, judgment was entered and this appeal followed.
1. In three enumerations, Battista claims that the subsequent state criminal prosecution violated the double jeopardy clauses of the
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United States and Georgia Constitutions and of
In resolving this matter, we note that in
Murphy v. State,
219 Ga. App. 474 (465 SE2d 497) (1995), aff’d, 267 Ga. 120 (475 SE2d 907) (1996), this Court concluded, and our Supreme Court affirmed, that a previous
state
civil forfeiture proceeding did not prohibit further prosecution on the criminal charge. Nevertheless, citing
Austin v. United States,
509 U. S. 602 (113 SC 2801, 125 LE2d 488, 503) (1993), this Court previously has distinguished the federal forfeiture statute by stating that “punishment has been found to be one purpose of forfeitures under
Here, citing
Austin v. United States,
and
United States v. Halper,
490 U. S. 435 (109 SC 1892, 104 LE2d 487) (1989), Battista argues that because he was punished under the federal forfeiture statute, the criminal action was barred by double jeopardy. The United States Supreme Court recently rejected this argument in
United States v. Ursery,
518 U. S._(116 SC 2135, 135 LE2d 549) (1996). In that case, the court stated that historically, in rem civil forfeitures have been viewed as remedial civil sanctions, distinct from potentially punitive in personam civil penalties such as fines, and do not constitute punishment under the double jeopardy clause. The court reviewed the narrow holdings of
Halper, Austin,
and
Dept. of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch,
511 U. S._(114 SC 1937, 128 LE2d 767) (1994), and concluded that nothing in those cases “purported to replace our traditional understanding that civil forfeiture does not constitute punishment for the purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause.”
Ursery,
135 LE2d at 567-568. The court then conducted a two-part inquiry of the specific statutes in question as to: 1) whether Congress intended proceedings under
Similarly, in the instant case, Battista’s arguments fail and the rationales of
United States v. Ursery
and
Murphy v. State
control. See generally
Moser v. Richmond County Bd. of Commrs.,
263 Ga. at 63 (1). Therefore, we find no violation of the Georgia or United States constitutional provisions against double jeopardy, nor do we find any violation of
2. Given our consideration of these issues, we need not address Battista’s additional arguments.
Judgment affirmed.
Andrews and Smith, JJ, concur.