7 Ct. Cl. 297 | Ct. Cl. | 1871
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of tbe court:
The petitioners claim $45,712.33 for beef, &c., sold and delivered to the United States, under a contract dated February 1,1862.
The contract provided that payment should be made monthly for the beef, &c., delivered, and the evidence showed that the latest deliveries were made in June, 1862. The claims for payment were presented at the War Department and disallowed.
Tbe petition was filed in this court February 3, 1869, and the defendants pleaded in bar the statute of limitations. (Stat. March 3,1863, § 10.)
To this plea the claimants replied “ that said claim was duly presented to the War Department of the United States for settlement and payment; the said Department being the Executive Department where such claims are ordinarily settled, and that the same were disallowed on the 24th clay of October, A. D. 1867. Whereupon these claims first accrued, and the right to file this petition first accrued.”
The Question raised on these pleadings is, whether tbe statute began to run when tbe price for the deliveries, &c., became payable, or when the claims were disallowed at the Department.
We think the claim u first accrued,” in the language and meaning of the statute, when the right to demand the price for the property sold first vested in the petitioner.
The purpose of a statute of limitation requires that it should not leave the time at which it is to attach at the control of the creditor.
In the case of The United States v. Thomas Clyde, appealed from this court, the Supreme Court, at their present term, decided that the rule of this court, requiring a claimant hereto to first present his claim to the proper Department, transcended the authority of this court, and was of no, legal effect, and they remanded for trial here the claim we had dismissed under that rule. If the presentation to the Department is not obligatory on a claimant, he cannot thereby postpone the operation of the statute of limitations.
We find, as a conclusion of law, that all the claims sued for are barred by the tenth section of the act of 3d March, 1863.
The petition is ordered to be dismissed.
Concurrence Opinion
I concur in the foregoing opinion, under the authority of the Supreme Court in Clyde's Case (ante, j>. 262.)