*1 attor- per findings; maintains ther REMAND the issue of of 10.5% annum.13 rate Susan per ney’s recomputation upon rate is for correct interest 12% fees based that 43.05.225(2)(B), sum; pursuant judgment AS AS correct annum REVERSE 25.27.020, directing sup- and AS 25.27.025. child order interest on per port arrearages to accrue at 10.5% an- 43.05.225(2)(B)provides:
AS num. provided otherwise Unless (2) percent year interest rate is 12
for
(B) arrearages support pro- child for unless a rate
vided AS 25.27.025 lesser by applies. that
authorized section provides: 25.27.025 AS BATEY, Appellant, D. imposed rate of interest under AS 14] 25.27.020(a)(2)(C)[ equal shall the rate imposed under 45.05.225 or lesser BATEY, Appellee. Earline M. that is the maximum rate interest rate imposed under law. permitted federal No. S-7143. admittedly support owes child ar- James Supreme Court of Alaska. many years. rearages that date He back in an acknowledged arrearages these affida- March 8,1994. Although March vit executed James argues that Susan to state a “fail[ed]
prima imposition case of the 12 facie percent alleged arrearag- interest rate to the
es,” part prove because that she failed arrearages, had notice James’s
James that he no notice of the arrear-
assertion had
ages is without merit. 14, 1994, in its order
While of June
superior court on “[i]nterest directed support arrearages per accrues at
child 12% (or month),”
year per court 1% errone-
ously in its order of directed amended Octo- support
ber on child interest
arrearages would accrue at 10.5%.
IV. CONCLUSION AFFIRM the order $5,000 granting against credit James support arrearages; REMAND the cal-
child judgment owed to
culation of Susan error; correction a mathematical
allow peri- issue
REMAND the of whether James’s voluntary unemployment for fur-
ods of were law, subject agrees on costs and attor- to AS and to federal 13. Susan that interest sup- arrearages of uniform rate of interest on per ney’s accrues an- fees at the rate 10.5% upon port charged obligor that shall be num. support payments child notice if days payment or if is made more overdue 25.27.020(a)(2)(C)provides part: 14. AS by insufficient funds. check backed *2 “was aware that was still [Michael] and knew that was invalid.” The court further found that after Michael’s Peggy, divorce from Earline “became con- vinced that was now valid.” Eventually, both Michael and Earline “came they to believe that were in fact married.” Michael and Earline held themselves out as husband twenty years. and wife for over Throughout period they joint filed feder- returns, al tax and Michael named Earline as spouse provider. his with his health In care child, only after birth of their Ear- expressed line remarry, a desire to but never did so.
In September 1993 Michael filed for di- January vorce. In 1994 Michael amended complaint allege to that the complaint void. The sought only amended custody, support, partition child and a of the residence. Earline counterclaimed for child custody support. and Goiter, Associates, David A. Tull & Palm- er, Appellant. for superior trial, The court bifurcated the considering first the issue of the Mendel, Huntington, Allison E. Mendel & The court concluded that the Anchorage, Appellee. parties’ void, marriage was but that “there exists a valid between the COMPTON, C.J., Before and parties entitling [Earline] to a decree di- RABINOWITZ, MATTHEWS, EASTAUGH vorce, equitable parties’ prop- division of the FABE, and JJ. erty, spousal support.” superior and proceeded court to hear and decide issues of OPINION custody, support, property and division. COMPTON, Chief Justice. appeals. Michael I. INTRODUCTION Batey appeals superior Michael III.DISCUSSION division, property award, alimony and attor- dispute Earline does not that her ney’s fees award. reverse. 25.05.021(1) to Michael was void. See AS (“Marriage prohibited per- and void if II. AND FACTS PROCEEDINGS formed when proposed [ ] either to the Batey Peggy Lampley and were marriage living_”). has a husband or wife married in Alaska in They March 1967. Instead, argues superior she prop- separated in February the fall of 1969. In erly “putative marriage.” found a We have Batey 1971 Michael participated and Earline recently held that the court has the in a ceremony in Nevada. Michael power property acquired during divide Peggy September were divorced 1971. putative marriage which is found to be void. court found that at Rodriguez Rodriguez, the time See 908 P.2d Michael, (Alaska 1995).1 Earline’s case we Rodríguez argue 1. Earline relies on Rodríguez that the "[b]y married. we held that power properly including phrase court has the declaring divide 'or action a mar- void,' alimony 25.24.160(a)] and award parties legislature whether or not the [in AS Borg-Warner Corp. itself. v. Avco time what consti See for the first must decide 1993) question Carp., n. marriage. This is tutes independent begins our apply (“Statutory to which we construction with an anal lawof City Burcina v. Ketchi judgment. ysis language See statute construed (Alaska 1995). kan, n. 4 pro purpose.”). in view of its The statute *3 validity good vides if a faith in the that belief putative marriage doctrine marriage present, a the im of is then after 25.05.051, in codified Alaska at AS been marriage’s pediment validity the is re to part: in provides which legally parties moved will be the considered If, during the of a husband or wife lifetime long they live married as as “continue to force, in marriage a is still a with whom together good husband and in faith wife ” parties the person remarries and the to part the of one of AS on them.... subsequent marriage together as hus- live added). (emphasis impli The clear wife, parties of the to band and and one good is faith at cation must be subsequent good marriage believes in the times, precede at very all and must the least that the husband -wife is faith former impediment. the removal of the marriage or that the has been dead former by is or dissolved a divorce or annulled purpose of 25.05.051 is to AS marriage, knowledge without of the former provide spouse to an who relief innocent of after the death or divorce the other then marriage knowledge of enters into a without marriage, they if party to the former con- invalidity. Allowing person a know its who together tinue to live as husband and wife bigamous marriage ingly into a enters them, good part in faith on of one of the a eventually developed claim or she later he they legally married from the time of mar good validity faith in the of that belief impediment.... of the removal purpose.2 vitiate this The better would marriage putative basis of a is The essential rule, policy, in is to light of reason and one the good a faith belief at least of require good inception faith at the of the validity marriage. in the of the Id. parties State, marriage. putative See v. M.R.S. existed, marriage a finding putative (Alaska 1995) (“In 63, a interpreting P.2d requisite the the court assumed rule, adopt rule statute or this court will ‘the time, develop could over in this good faith light of persuasive law most in which is sometime after Michael was divorced case ”) policy.’ (quoting precedent, reason and Peggy. But we read AS 25.05.051 State, 849 P.2d Hernandez-Robaina require good faith to at the time of the exist 1993)). n. 2 Earline lacked Since putative validity the good a faith belief the marriage inception,3 take at its she cannot interpretation is Our of AS 25.05.051 advantage protections puta- a on of the of the afforded language first the statute based "good requirement prop- person the division to evade faith” must have intended to allow erty acquired during putative marriage basing theory simply by a which or her a claim on Rodriguez, 908 P.2d at is found void....” quasi-estoppel than existence of rather on the Thus, void, marriage supe- where a is 1011. putative marriage. may property and award alimo- rior court ny divide 25.24.160(a) only require- under AS if finding, objects to the court’s Earline statute, putative marriage of the AS ments 25.05.051, testimony, conflicting knew Mi- over that she infra, see are satisfied. him. when chael was still married she clearly finding and there- This is not erroneous proposed application doc- 2. The dissent’s Wright, Wright v. fore will not be disturbed. See quasi-estoppel also would run counter to trine of (Alaska 1995) ("This 405 n. 25.05.051, permit purpose AS it for would factual determi- will set aside a bigamous person knowingly who into a enters error.”); only upon finding nation of clear protections to obtain the reserved for Co., Mixing so, Parker v. Northern spouses. Though universally pu- putative ("It (Alaska 1988) trial of the function parties who tative cases often involve court, court, judge credi- not of this witnesses' together and "held themselves out to have lived evidence.”). bility weigh conflicting permit public" and to as married. We decline spouse tive in AS 25.05.051.4 joint the 1970s and 1980s filed federal tax returns. Michael named Earline as his argues 25.05.051 does not limit AS spouse with his health care insurer. When ability this court’s to create its own married, thought asked if he he was However, legisla- doctrine. that, testified: “I’m not sure how to answer code, enacting ture’s intent your guess my Honor.... I at the back of 25.05.051, provide which includes was “to mind, always weren’t, I’ve known that we but comprehensive marriage code for the state yes, played gone I have through life and Preamble, of Alaska.” ch. SLA 1963 acted with my Earline as if she was wife.” added). (emphasis A common law definition fact, questioned Michael never expands or alters until after he had filed an the definition found AS 25.05.051 would divorce,1 action for financially and it became *4 expressly run legisla- counter to the stated advantageous for him to do so. Basic notions tive intent. fairness, equity, justice of require and estopped denying he be validity from the of IV. CONCLUSION marriage the in attempt an sharing to avoid The in finding puta- court erred a what would paying be marital assets or oth- division, property tive The court’s appropriate spousal support. erwise award, alimony award, attorney’s and fees all agree I with the court that Michael and putative of which marriage flowed from the marriage putative Earline’s was not a mar- finding, must therefore be reversed. See riage under the definition of AS 25.05.051 Rosson, 469, Rosson v. 470 n. 4 because both Michael and Earline knew that (Alaska 1981) (“[PJarties who enter into a marriage their was not valid at the time of relationship marriage that is a neither lawful wedding ceremony. fact, however, their This nor a bona fide must be preclude application does not of the doctrine unmarried_”). treated as in leave it quasi-estoppel. the first instance to the court on Quasi-estoppel “precludes party a from appropriate remand to determine the relief. taking position a inconsistent with one he [or REVERSED and REMANDED. previously she] has taken where circum stances posi render assertion of the second FARE, Justice, with whom tion unconscionable.” Jamison v. Consoli RABINOWITZ, Justice, joins, dissenting. Utils., Inc., 97, dated 102 I opinion dissent from the of the court 1978). Quasi-estoppel require does not the my it because is view that Michael should be injured party to estopped have relied on the estopped denying from the of his party’s statements, conduct or nor does- it marriage to Earline. require injured party ignorant together Michael and Earline lived as hus- the truth. Id. at 102. In determining if twenty years. band and They wife for over quasi-estoppel applies, the court considers marriage participated obtained a license and party asserting “whether the the inconsistent marriage ceremony. a formal They position a gained had has advantage pro an son together. Throughout and raised him duced disadvantage through some the first interpreting Other courts marriage similar statutes have was valid at its mceptiqn...."). reached the today. same conclusion we reach acknowledged really “[t]here See, 799, e.g., Pigg, Succession 228 La. 84 any suggesting you aren’t cases ... if later on (1955) (requiring good So.2d 197 faith belief during marriage believe somehow it's been validity marriage incep- at the time of its you’re position ratified that ... in the same tion); Spearman Spearman, 482 F.2d putative spouse who believed she was mar- (5th Cir.1973) ("A putative spouse is one entering ried at marriage." the time of into the marriage legally whose invalid but who has (1) engaged marriage ceremony or a solem- complaint 1. His averred that he and Earline nization, (2) good on the faith belief in the validi- see also 52 Am.Jur.2d February were married in 1971 “and ever since ty marriage.”); that date have been and are now husband and (1970) (“The Marriage faith,’ § ‘good term wife." when putative marriage, used in connection with means an honest and reasonable belief that the simply it inconsistency marriage to Earline because was whether position; financially to do so. him significance as make benefits such unconscionable; whether and assertion denying Michael from the valid- Estopping knowledge of based on full was first assertion ity marriage val- of his does not facts.” Id. and idate a applied Appeal The California Court estoppel Nor 25.05.051 render void. does one. In In in case similar to this estoppel strong public policy ex- contravene the Recknor, Cal.App.3d Marriage re marriage statute. is a pressed our There (1982), Cal.Rptr. the Recknors declaring marriage void difference between in a formal participated preventing asserting its from knowing Eve Recknor’s divorce inimical law invalidity. It would be to our not and that their first final her husband family relationships to supporting committed was void. Recknors’ Batey marital allow Michael to now avoid his statutory of a definition did meet obligations. party pos- neither because I the trial court’s would therefore affirm good marriage’s faith belief in sessed property spousal and award of division of However, validity. Cal.Rptr. at 890. Id. 187 support. Ralph pay trial court ordered Recknor spousal support pendente lite and attor- Eve *5 fees,
ney’s citing previous support eases es- denying validity of
topping a from Id. decision, affirming trial Appeal that “the held
California Court independent, may upheld on
award be ground Id. equitable estoppel.” at 891. YERRINGTON, Appellant, Luba The Court reasoned: case, Ralph properly was es- this validly deny that he topped YERRINGTON, Appellee. Seth through Eve. went a formal mar- He No. S-7196. her, knowing that her with final, to live divorce was not and continued Supreme of Alaska. Court years, her as her husband for with during which time had two children. March Further, years Ralph waited almost
attempt invalidity of his mar- to assert
riage to Eve. at 892.
Id. reasoning the Recknor
Following the
court, provides quasi-estoppel the doctrine remedy in this case. After appropriate holding reaped the
Michael has benefits out married more
himself years, it is unconscionable for twenty
than to her is
him to assert now majority’s ease resolution this
void. period
penalizes Earline for seven-month yet final
in which Michael’s divorce was twenty years ignores more than dur-
ing they held themselves out as hus- Equity requires that Michael and wife.
band estopped denying the existence
be