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Bates v. State
587 S.W.2d 121
Tex. Crim. App.
1979
Check Treatment

*1 ROBERTS, JJ., DALLY, PHILLIPS

dissent reasons in the opinion stated

on original submission.

CLINTON, J., dissents. BATES, Appellant,

Garth Texas, Appellee.

The STATE of

No. 58338. Texas,

Court of Appeals Criminal

En Banc.

Jan. 1979.

Rehearing Sept. Denied 1979.

Second Motion Rehearing Denied

Oct. 1979.

123 *4 Houston, appel- for Teague,

Marvin 0. lant. Vance, Dist. Michael Atty.,

Carol S. Kuhn, B. Burge John W. and William Houston, Holmes, for Jr., Dist. Attys., Asst. the State. Austin, Huttash, on Atty.,

Robert State’s rehearing, for the State.

OPINION DAVIS, Judge. W. C. for appeal

This from a conviction is an which bribery; punishment, of offense court, imprisonment was is assessed eight years. for (1) the statute Appellant that: contends prosecuted is unconsti- under was which he defective; (3) tutional; (2) the indictment sustain is insufficient to evidence verdict; ad- (4) items which were certain of were the result mitted in evidence seizure; (5) certain and unlawful search erroneously admitted tape recordings were predicate proper in evidence because established; in (6) erred the court was not examine appellant’s motion to overruling (7) certain tape recordings; original to the co-party of acts and statements admitted; (8) the erroneously offense were allowing of the State’s court in three erred (9) proffered testify; evidence witnesses to testimony of by appellant to rebut ex- erroneously was State’s chief witness eluded; (10) representatives of erroneously the court failed enforcement officers and charge jury on special the law circumstantial of the district crimes division evidence, erroneously refused thirteen meeting, this Fonten- attorney’s office. At special instructions were re- agreed police and rec- ot to work with (11) quested by appellant; prosecu- might ord he have future conversations engaged improper argument. tor concerning anyone payment with his lighter sentence. money exchange It was established that was months, During from March the next few judge elected Judicial 174th District 16, recorded numer- through July Fontenot state on 1972. Appel November ous Riklin. In these conversations with lant took the on oath of office December taped conversations, specifical- never Riklin 1972, and on January commissioned Januaryly money paid to stated that the was to be 1973. He was office on removed from probated exchange for a sen- Bates, See In re 1977. However, tence. numerous occasions (Tex.1977). Riklin someone else as “the would refer to Nukie “Frenchy” prin- friend,” party,” “my your friend and cipal witness for the He State. testified big “the boy,” which indicated that he was September 21,1975, indicted on tape was the On two of the appellant. 174th District Court the offenses recordings, cognizable, voice is robbery concealing goods, stolen indicating apart- in Riklin’s presence both of which arose out an incident *5 ment. which we shall refer to as the Mize robbery. December, the part 1975, In latter conversations, Fon- finally After these it was tenot was Riklin, introduced to Ed who said agreed give money would the that Fontenot “he had been talking somebody higher to probation, price for the of which had the up” and indicated he help that could Fon- 16, $60,000, July been raised to Riklin on to tenot probated secure a sentence in ex- that arranged 1976. It was Riklin would change $30,000. for subsequent In conver- Northwest meet Fontenot at the National Fontenot, sations with Riklin stated that he Bank at 9:00 a. m. at which time Fontenot awas “real close of appellant, friend” with $60,000. give would Riklin the At 8:20 a. whom he previous had “dealings.” had Rik- m., met July Fontenot Bob Bennett of lin never specifically mentioned to whom they the office and attorney’s district money the was paid, referring only to be to $59,000 placed bills in Fontenot’s in $100 “big the somebody man” and “higher up.” deposit safe the box at bank.1 Fontenot Fontenot testified that he understood from met Riklin m. and handed the at 9:00 a. his conversations with Riklin that the mon- money to him. was near Appellant ey was to paid appellant. Before bank at the time was situated so that and paying Riklin, the money to Fontenot want- exchange. he could observe the Immediate- ed assurances that proba- he would receive bank, ly ap- at the exchange after the tion, but Riklin judge stated that the would pellant and Riklin at the office of met Fontenot, not meet or talk with and that Brown, appellant’s James H. accountant. Fontenot just would have trust Riklin. meeting, At that handed Brown two Riklin $10,000 March, packets amounting to money and

In Fontenot was arrested stated, payment aggravated assault, “This is the on the down an offense not con- apartment nected Brown robbery to the at the Beaconsfield.” pending charge. apartments jail When Fontenot testified that the Beaconsfield was released from appellant March he had property had a conversation with a leasehold Hous- police $10,000 ton been purchasing. detectives Sam Nuchia and Earl interested in Musick. Later evening, payment that same from Riklin on an Fonten- was a down ot and attorney buy ap- with apartment met several law intended to once Riklin $60,- 1. While the amount was intended to be left in a Xerox machine law enforcement $1,000 money photocopied. it later was that was established was officers when the in his own behalf pellant acquired Appellant testified property. had Brown Riklin, by appellant was instructed to take the Riklin while he was a friend $10,000 get and a cashier’s check to be used paying was that Fontenot never indicated money as earnest purchase he would understanding that money on an left, property. appellant After Riklin and Appel- sentence. give probated Fontenot a acquired Brown the cashier’s check and de- approached that Riklin explained lant livered it to the escrow holder. Fontenot was stated that appellant bank, attorney get After he left the Fontenot went an his friend and he wanted office, attorney’s district where he Appel- represent Fontenot. appointed to $59,000 only learned that he had delivered requisites for outlined to Riklin lant $60,000. Upon instead of the intended represent an indi- attorney to appointing an learning shortage, of this tele- help he would Fon- and said gent defendant phoned appellant Riklin. attorney ap- was seeing tenot exchange After the at the Northwest Na- Riklin not know Appellant did pointed. Bank, tional law officers lost enforcement Fontenot or that money from receiving Riklin, appellant following contact with to believe leading Riklin they established surveillance at the in ex- money would receive appellant apartment. house and Riklin’s at Concern- change probated for a sentence. Appellant approxi- arrived at his home at testified exchange, appellant ing the actual mately 10:30 a. m. was under surveil- Riklin was by Riklin that that he was told m., approximately p. lance until 1:30 at a friend money from going to receive some again which time the officers lost contact asked on an old debt. Riklin apartment with him. Riklin arrived at his take care accompany him in order to m., at approximately p. 2:15 and as he en- give money and so he could apartment tered his enforcement offi- law apartment. payment on Riklin’s down carrying shotgun they cers saw him be- Brown, $10,000 it gave the When Riklin illegal length. lieved to be of The officers money be- was indicated that never tried to obtain a search warrant any dis- nor was there longed appellant, *6 prohibited weapon, they could do but before concerning cussion Fontenot. emerged apartment so Riklin from the with time, shotgun p. at 2:40 m. At that pos- money found in his regard to the In placed Riklin was under arrest. Riklin sub- session, that Rinklin stated appellant sequently of his consented to the search intended $4,000, was given him had $30,000 $59,- apartment original appellant for $5,000, owed to be that Riklin arrest, 000 was recovered. After Riklin’s sold Riklin and had appellant an automobile appellant was arrived at the scene and also deposit- After debt. gambling for a small placed recovered under arrest. The officers account, appellant had $1,100 ing in a bank $2,900 $59,000 original appel- from the time $2,900 officers at found pocket. lant’s coat arrest. introduced other evidence State rebuttal, the tes- introduced In the State a appellant which tended to show the had Howard, testified timony Irwin who relationship Testimony close Riklin. with for theft under indictment he had been also was introduced which tended to show After appellant’s court. pretense false appellant certain financial difficul- had Riklin, he contacted Howard had been purchase proper- ties with the of two ranch stated, “Mr. spoken appellant to banking ties in 1976 and certain transac- in the me for somewhere Riklin has told sought rebut tions in 1975. The defense to $10,000 this case neighborhood of evidence to and introduced your court- against me pending that’s show the not in financial of,” to which be taken care room can pur- to difficulty amply and could afford Riklin and Mr. replied, “Myself properties chase both and the the ranch Riklin and Mr. looking the matter are into apartments. Beaconsfield (1940); Lowrey, 301 U.S. point Herndon v. handling you will be it with from this (1937). 732, V.T. worry 242, on. Don’t about it.” 81 L.Ed. 1066 57 S.Ct. 36.02, Code, as provides Penal Section C.A. rebuttal, appellant On defense denied he follows: spoke Howard, attorney and Howard’s if he “(a) commits an offense person A testified that Howard never mentioned offers, con- intentionally knowingly or Further, talking appellant. it was estab- another, fers, or agrees to confer on or proba- lished that Howard had been offered accept from solicits, agrees to accepts, or plea bargaining agreement tion in a worked another: attorney out between Howard’s

State. as consid- (1) any pecuniary benefit decision, recipient’s eration Appellant’s ground second of error recommendation, vote, or other opinion, complains of the trial court’s refusal to rule public serv- discretion as a exercise of Code, V.T.C.A. Penal Sections 36.02 and voter; official, ant, party or 36.08 unconstitutional on account of their (2) any as consideration benefit alleged violation of federal and state consti decision, vote, recom- recipient’s provisions. tutional mendation, of official or other exercise respect With re- contention administra- judicial in a or discretion garding 36.08, ap- Section we conclude or proceeding; tive pellant standing challenge has no such for a (3) any as consideration benefit clearly being prose- statute since he was on a duty imposed by a law violation of pursuant felony provisions cuted party or official. public servant Irwin, Section 36.02. See U. 354 F.2d S. un- (b) prosecution It is no defense (2nd 1965). Cir. person whom der this section that Appellant contends that Section quali- influence was not sought actor indefiniteness, 36.02 vagueness, is void for way whether act in the desired fied to and overbroadness. A statute is void for yet assumed office because he had vagueness give person if it fails to or for jurisdiction he lacked ordinary intelligence notice that his fair reason. contemplated conduct is forbidden is a section (c) under this An offense statute, Papachristou City of Jackson Amended degree. felony of the second ville, 156, 839, 405 U.S. 31 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. 915, 342, 1975, Leg., p. ch. by Acts 64th Harriss, (1972); United States v. 1975.” Sept. sec. eff. (1953), U.S. 74 S.Ct. 98 L.Ed. 989 for- offense, in our This as set forth encourages arbitrary and if it erratic same code, similarly attacked penal Papachristou arrests and convictions. v. mer Mutscher v. City Jacksonville, vagueness in supra; being void for Thornhill *7 Alabama, (Tex.Cr.App.1974).2 88, 736, 905 310 U.S. 84 L.Ed. 514 S.W.2d S.Ct. contract, tion, matter, proceeding 159, V.A.P.C., provided of cause 2. Article as follows: may pending, or be is or thereafter which accepting “Officers bribe may brought in before him be or come which Any legislative, judicial or offi- executive place, agency capacity, or or in his his official position honor, cer, any employee agent, person or or or position employment, of or in his of honor, holding position profit a or of trust profit, make that he shall trust or or with, of, any person acting or or on behalf appointment, any particular or or nomination commission, Texas, board, any the State of act, act, any any to do or omit shall do thereof, county, agency department any or officer, duty his a or his as in violation of district, town, city any political school or or employment be position, agency shall or municipal corporation subdivision or whatso- bribery punished is as guilty be and shall of ever, bribe, accept agree who shall a or or Act; any provided or such 1 this in Section of agreement accept consent an a bribe under ask, to ac- person or offer who shall solicit act, vote, understanding or with an that his pur- cept for the with the intent or a bribe recommendation, opinion judgment vote, decision, or shall act, influencing pose of done, given any particular recommendation, any question, be in influenced or opinion matter, on or any ques- nomination, cause, upon particular proceeding or manner or side of This Court in Mutscher of U. concluded that the administration the law.” S. v. bribery relevant appli- Irwin, statutes of the then Although at 196. Irwin dealt supra, penal cable code “clearly ade- statute, 18, bribery Title furnish[ed] with the federal warning quate anyone ordinary of intelli- U.S.C., 201(f), reasoning equal its is Section gence that the kind of conduct embarked on applicable sought ly to the conduct be appellants an would constitute offense.” hold that restricted Section 36.02. We present penal code making section brib- in violation Section 36.02 is not overbroad ery offense is an amendment of an the 1974 Colten any provisions. of constitutional See provisions codification of previ- the various 1953, 104, Kentucky, 407 U.S. 92 S.Ct. ously V, 1, set forth in Chapter Title of our (1972); su L.Ed.2d 584 McMorris penal readily former apparent, code. It is pra. statute, from a review of the current what Appellant constitu- further attacks the prohibited conduct is by the statute ground tionality 36.02 on the of Section application that the statute’s is appropriate- caption of fails to said statute ly restricted so arbitrary not to result in as comply with the constitutional mandate of and erratic convictions. We therefore hold 35, III, Consti- Article of the Texas Section Code, that V.T.C.A. Penal Section 36.02 is caption to tution. He contends that the not unconstitutionally vague or indefinite. Legislature amended Acts of 64th which Connally v. See General Construction Com- public or put Section 36.02 failed pany, 269 U.S. 46 S.Ct. 70 L.Ed. changes enacted legislature on notice of the (1925); McMorris v. by the in amendment said statute. (Tex.Cr.App.1974). McMorris, As supra, noted “a III, 35, Texas Con Article Section precise clear and may statute nevertheless stitution, as provides, pertinent part, fol be overbroad if prohibits in its reach it lows: constitutionally protected conduct.” See subject any “But if shall be embraced Rockford, Grayned City of 408 U.S. act, expressed an shall not be (1972). S.Ct. L.Ed.2d It is title, only as such act shall be void pointed noted that has not thereof, so so not be ex- much shall constitutionally protected activity may pressed.” be restricted of the reach Section 36.02. provision the Texas It is this clear part Such omission on is un construc- Constitution is entitled to liberal inequity derstandable since “[T]he tion, Castellano officials, procuring public itbe intention standard is (Tex.Cr.App.1970), but stricter unintentional, al fatally is so destructive is an when the matter addressed enforced good government designed that a statute State, 440 amendatory act. White v. public temptation to remove the for a offi The critical (Tex.Cr.App.1969). S.W.2d 660 give preferment cial to to one member compli- question determining adequate another, public over prohibiting all III, 35, of the ance gifts act,’ ‘for or with Article Section of an official is a because caption reasonable and Texas whether proper insuring means Constitution integrity, reader no- impartiality “put any caption fairness and reasonable 177, V.A.P.C., may provided: pending, contract which time be at Article may brought or which or come before him “Bribe Code, throughout capacity, employment, By in his official in his used *8 or a ‘bribe’ as agency place honor, emolument, money thing position any gift, or or or of trust or meant value, testimonial, profit bribery appointment guilty privilege, shall be of and shall be of penitentiary advantage, promise personal of ei- confined in the not or less than two or the purpose years, ther, promised nor more than the ten or be in bestowed or confined person,' jail influencing for not less than one month of officer or nor more years, chapter, in than two named in the or be fined not less than Five such as are official, performance any duty, public Hundred or or Dollars nor more than Five Thou- of Dollars, offering sand such as to favor the one or both fine and im- an inducement same, prisonment.” person.” or some other hereinafter “. . . GARTH BATES tice that he will find new matter in the Jimenez, Defendant, heretofore parte of the bill.” Ex body referred to as the 183, (1958). cap- 16, 1976, and Tex. The did then July about on or 36.02, amending tion to the act inter acting party Section with unlawfully, as a there alia, reads as follows: knowingly Riklin, intentionally and Ed accept from solicit, agree to accept, and amending parts “An Act various of benefit, pecuniary Nukie Fontenot ; Penal Code as . follows: . amend- representation money, with the namely, ing relating bribery 36.02 and Section Defendant, a. understanding that the therefor; and penalty . . . .” Acts in the Judge presiding Leg., p. 64th ch. Texas District 912. County, Harris District Court of 174th changes The effected in 36.02 Section specific in the Texas, be influenced would Legislature the Acts of the 64th now com- decisions, powers, his official exercise of plained by appellant (1) of reflect that: Judge, District discretion as a duties and applies actors to which the offense and the would not Defendant namely that requisite culpable mental state were consol- the Texas Fontenot sentence Nukie (a); (2) pro- idated under Subsection felony in the Department of Corrections purposes scribed for which the unlawful against Nukie Fonten- pending case then activity engaged in were consolidated of Harris ot in the 174th District Court (1), (2), (3) in Subsections and of Subsection Texas, the Defendant County, and (a); (3) proscribed purpose for the un- felony Fontenot in help would Nukie activity changed “specif- lawful from a Fonten- against Nukie pending case then ic exercise powers” of official to a more of Harris ot in the 174th District Court general proscription; (4) all offenses Texas, the Defendant proscribed County, by this section were sub- made sentencing Nukie ject uniform, lenient degree felony to a second would be penalty. pending felony case the in the 174th Dis- against Nukie Fontenot caption The set forth above cannot be ” Texas . . County, trict Court of Harris construed as any way obscuring pur- pose of the legislators amendment from is,

citizens and contrary appellant’s posi- substantially the employs The indictment tion, give sufficient required the notice Code, language V.T.C.A. Penal Section III, under Article Section of the Texas one allege more than 36.02. It does not State, supra, Constitution. Unlike White v. offense, means of alleges rather several but there is not a veiled reference to the The bribery. committing the offense changes amendatory enacted act. overruling appellant’s court did not err in Any caption apprised reader would be quash the indictment. motion to the fact bribery being that the statute was that the evidence Appellant asserts penal- amended in terms of substance and be to sustain the conviction is insufficient ties. caption We therefore hold that accomplice wit cause the relating to the amendments of V.T.C.A. Pe- re ness was not corroborated Code, nal 36.02 does not violate the Section 38.14, quired by Article V.A.C.C.P. III, provisions of Article Texas Section corrobora- sufficiency “The test of Constitution. accomplice tion of the of an evidence of witness is to eliminate the Appellant contends that the court then accomplice from consideration overruling quash erred in his motion witnesses evidence of other examine vague indictment indef because it is so evidence inculpatory ascertain if there apprise inite that it him of the did not character', incriminating charged. offense or evidence with which he was We do accused with to connect the agree. alleges, perti which tends indictment part, nent of the offense.” as follows: the commission *9 130 appel- Musick then told (Tex.Cr.App. pockets of his coat.

Cherb v. 273 coat, 1971). in the instant case the The evidence lant to remove his hand from which of the corroborates the laid it on the appellant the coat and doffed accomplice witness Fontenot includes the any- car, “I have saying, don’t seat of following: stepped appellant After thing my coat.” being

(1) in- he was tape recordings why which were car he asked from the appel- get troduced into evidence showed that to his asked Musick stopped. He then spoken coat, lant had to Fontenot and for were in his keys, which he said car during appellant’s coat, voice was discernible inside the When Musick looked him. conversations between Riklin and Fon- dollar hundred twenty-nine he saw one tenot; bills. (2) each oth- appellant and Riklin knew argues that his arrest—and Appellant well; er re- his coat which the search of therefore (3) appellant present and observed $2,900—was sulted in the seizure of exchange money of between probable Musick lacked unlawful because Riklin; appellant When appellant. cause to arrest (4) appellant possession was in of a arrested, in- was aware Musick portion money of the when he was arrest- recordings had been made criminating tape ed; and and Rik- of between conversations (5) appellant’s por- accountant used a appellant. lin and between Fontenot money purchase tion of the a cashier’s money be- the transfer Musick observed check for use in real estate transaction and observed and Riklin tween Fontenot appellant was involved. vicini- very close to the appellant “was amply This evidence is sufficient to corrobo- money from ty.” After Riklin received the testimony rate of Fontenot and to sus- Fontenot, departed in dif- appellant he and tain the conviction. same time. approximately ferent cars at up drove as he Appellant was arrested Appellant complains also that cer hours after apartment several Riklin’s items, including portions money tain exchange money. paid Riklin, by Fontenot which were him, admitted in taken from evidence were V.A.C.C.P., 14.01, provides, Article car, apartment by his Riklin and Riklin’s part, as follows: pertinent ap unlawful searches and seizures. Since of- “(b) may arrest an peace A officer pellant legitimate expectation had no a warrant fender without privacy or interest of kind in either presence his offense committed in person apartment, Riklin’s and since or his his view.” within against appellant depend the case did cause existed probable We hold that possession evidence at the seized arrest was arrest and that appellant’s seizure, time of the he contested search and 14.01(b), supra. authorized Article standing challenge lacks the admission and the seizure appellant’s search of coat the evidence taken from Riklin. Brown inci were conducted States, money therefrom United U.S. S.Ct. exceed and did not to a lawful arrest (1973); 530 dent L.Ed.2d 208 Smith a search. for such permissible scope (Tex.Cr.App.1975). S.W.2d 827 California, 395 U.S. See Chimel appel Detective arrested Musick (1969); Bodde 23 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. apartment. lant as he arrived at Riklin’s (Tex.Cr.App.1978); 568 S.W.2d recognized appel Musick testified that he (Tex.Cr. Tarpley v. up apartment lant as he drove App.1978). while that he ran to vehicle dis tape urges that Appellant playing badge appellant and asked ev erroneously admitted recordings were stop. step When Musick asked had not predicate car, proper from the reached into the idence because *10 State, Detmering v. Appellant relies on necessary predicate been established. The (Tex.Cr.App.1972), and Ter the 481 S.W.2d tape recordings admission of is as follows: App.1977). Edwards v. vice was cording, authenticity and correctness of the re- a tions or deletions have not been tion without from the some of the ly acquired of a shown with the quired for admission of showing showing “(1) “. [*] speakers, of the competent, (3) breathalyzer A . (4) capable showing Without [*] . of the manner that the elicited was recording, (6) testimony and need not a evidence, requirements kind of inducement. [W]e showing [*] of test.” same (7) that the indulging also find that at least operator taking testimony, establishment of the such as the results [*] voluntarily showing particularity identification of of can be changes, recording of the in a detailed mechanical- [*] preserva- made, (5) inferred (Tex.Cr. device made addi- [*] de- (2) re- rell v. one strand which constituted dence adduced at trial. ant charged cordings in the instant supra, of the indispensable to the State’s 1975). tended to connect charged.) mission of tains no indication that of the so tape pellant moved for an examination discretion in does Art. Article any way suggest sought recordings, examination recordings was laid. proper In each of those with 39.14, V.A.C.C.P., 39.02, in web of important altered, inspect predicate for the introduction incriminating evidence 521 S.W.2d considering appeal. a offense possessing; V.A.C.C.P., vests the appellant with was the case constituted evidence, but were with (See requested contraband he appellant does incriminating evi cases, such under trial court recordings were The record con- case. the which he (Tex.Cr.App. the defend motions, as discussion, which items of the com not provides The re of which with only only was ap recitation testimony, of Fontenot’s we by the defend depositions taking for the of merely observe that he established each of an abuse held that before ant. We have taking the seven required by refusing elements to allow the Edwards. discretion in found, defendant We proper predicate depositions hold that the will be was laid thereby injured. he was must show that tape admission of the recordings. (Tex.Cr. James v. Appellant argues tape also that the State, 461 App.1977); Beshears recordings were inadmissible because Fon also have held (Tex.Cr.App.1970). We tenot comply did not provisions with the comply failure to prosecution’s 4413(29bb), Article 13(a), Sec. V.A.T.S. 39.14, Art. discovery under with a order That licensing statute is concerned with the Hol error. supra, may constitute harmless private investigators patently and is in (Tex.Cr.App. lowell applicable Fontenot, taking part who was affirmatively 1978). Appellant has not in a investigation agent criminal injured by the court’s shown how he was the State. tape re inspection of refusal to allow of the Consequently, the denial cordings. Appellant contends that the court harmless inspection constituted motion for overruling erred in inspection his motion for error. original tape recordings of the con versations between Fontenot Riklin in four related Appellant contends (cid:127) appellant. (Ap and between Fontenot and and state- certain acts grounds of error that pellant inspect copies was allowed to erroneously admitted ments of Riklin recordings). granted The court should have hearsay, be- they were in evidence because appellant’s inspect original motion to violated their admission cause tape recordings. witness- right Given facts of this constitutional confront case, however, him, were mere they the failure to do so does not against es and because constitute reversible error. “narrative declarations.” sought there indepen

Where is sufficient testified that to assist *11 dent evidence to establish a conspiracy, Riklin after Ford had arrested Riklin on a hearsay conspira acts and statements of a charge. George, County narcotics a Harris tor during which are made the course of sheriff, deputy appellant testified that and in conspiracy the furtherance of the are employee asked him to hire Riklin as an against admissible conspirator. another Department. Appellant ar- Sheriff’s State, Denney (Tex.Cr. v. 558 467 S.W.2d Odom, gues George that Ford and should App.1977); Delgado State, 544 v. testify not because have been allowed to (Tex.Cr.App.1977). 929 testimony their showed extraneous offenses appellant were irrele- committed which independent The evidence of a con appellant vant for was to the offense which spiracy quite in the ample. instant case is being The agree. tried. We do not State contention, It however, is that prove, to show the entitled to order the conspiracy terminated when Fontenot a close rela- conspiracy, existence of paid money Riklin, to and any subse Rik- tionship appellant between quent existed acts and statements Riklin were important, lin. More therefore Delgado inadmissible. See v.

State, complains only shows supra. agree. We do not he tried Riklin on several occasions to assist conspiracy is not terminated until “[A] guilty and did that he was not show

everything has been done that was con- Kennedy v. offense or misconduct. See templated to be conspira- done State, (Tex.Cr.App.1975). 520 776 tors.” Baugh State, 135 Appellant Tex.Cr.R. that the court erred in asserts (1938). Tanner, S.W.2d 297 conspiracy an refusing John under- to allow instant did upon case County terminate cover officer of Harris Sheriff’s completion of the offense of bribery, of Department, testify to and rebut certain which appellant was It convicted. was con- Fontenot testimony given by Fontenot. templated by conspirators that Fonten- “deal” with testified that he did not have a ot granted would probated sentence, be to have attorney’s the district office done, and until that was the conspiracy exchange pending charges dropped in for Denney State, could not terminate. See cross-examination, Fon- testimony. On supra; State, Lamberson v. 504 S.W.2d 894 jewels tenot that he to admitted sold some (Tex.Cr.App.1974). Admission the acts Tanner, in the Mize but denied involvement and statements of Riklin did not violate negotiating robbery. also denied Fontenot appellant’s right to confront witnesses exchange guns to sell to Tanner against State, Morgan him. See asking kill a man narcotics or Tanner to (Tex.Cr.App.1975). S.W.2d 449 Pope. named Since appellant has not directed our at- sought this evi- Appellant impeach tention particular to which statements Tanner, dence who with the declarations,” Riklin mere “narrative testified, that he had exception, bill of on a nothing presented for review as to that as an under- capacity met in his ground of error. Williams v. See ma- trying purchase cover officer while (Tex.Cr.App.1977); S.W.2d 183 Smith v. testified, Originally, he guns. chine Tanner (Tex.Cr.App.1977). with mari- guns the machine pay huana, later demanded mon- but Fontenot Appellant urges court shop during ey. pawn Odom, While in Fontenot’s allowing Jr., erred Wendell Tanner Ford, negotiations, these Fontenot asked George Charles testify. O. and Gus jewel- Odom, doing a if Tanner interested in attorney, an assistant “was district testi Tanner told ry robbery fied that on a salesman.” had intervened in Rik- only after investigating lin’s behalf while Fontenot he would be interested Odom was Ford, were com- gun negotiations Riklin in case. a consumer fraud the machine identi- Department, pleted. specifically officer of later the Houston Police fied Mize as target course, robbery. great Of latitude should occurred, After robbery a witness’ negotia- be allowed the accused to show against tions him. testify falsely on the bias or guns machine terminated. motive (Tex.Cr. arranged Tanner then See Castro v. purchase some of However, App.1978). trial courts have con jewelry from the robbery. Mize Fon- when siderable discretion as to how and tenot stated that he was the “brains of the and as to what evidence may proved bias operation” up” and had “set the Mize rob- purpose. is material for that See Cloud bery. After Fontenot jewelry sold some (Tex.Cr.App.1978); *12 S.W.2d Tanner, he was subsequently arrested and Evidence, 457 Wharton’s Criminal Sec. indicted for that offense. Tanner testified case, (13th no 1972). instant ed. In the during negotiations pur- as to the charges brought against had been chase jewelry of the Fontenot asked Tanner alleged gun and any of the if he would be activities — killing interested in an indi- plot drug transactions and a murder —of vidual named Pope. agreed excluded, which evidence was nor was it gun furnish the killing for the and stated he way shown that those events were in guns several stolen pawn shop. in his appel connected to the offense for which Appellant argues that this evidence was State, being lant was Cloud v. tried. See impeach admissible to Fontenot’s denials of State, (Tex. supra; 532 624 Garza v. S.W.2d these facts and to implication rebut the his State, Cr.App.1976); v. 516 S.W.2d Smith testimony left with the jury that Fontenot (Tex.Cr.App.1974). Consequently, 415 was “a fine Christian man.” The court proffered evidence of unrelated misconduct ruled that defense counsel could not intro- part proba on the of the witness was not duce deal,” evidence of the gun “machine testify falsely, tive of and bias or motive “dope deal,” arrangement or of the properly excluded it. trial court made Fontenot to Pope, they kill Appellant complaints a number of makes matters, collateral but the court ruled that First, concerning charge. the court’s he the defense could introduce urges refusing his court erred concerning the robbery. Mize Appellant requested charge on circumstantial evi- failed to avail himself of the ruling court’s dence. admitting evidence of the robbery by Mize Where there is direct evi not calling Tanner testify about it before proved, dence of the main fact to be a jury. charge on is not circumstantial evidence State, required. Ridyolph v. 545 S.W.2d 784 When a witness is cross-exam State, (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Ransonette v. 550 matter, ined on a collateral the cross-exam Opinion Ap (Tex.Cr.App.1977, S.W.2d 36 ining party cannot then contradict the wit pellant’s Rehearing). Motion for Such ness. Arechiga State, (Tex. 462 1 S.W.2d given instruction need not be where the Cr.App.1971); State, Gatson v. only part State relies on circumstantial 65 (Tex.Cr.App.1965); State, Hatley v. 533 State, evidence, supra; Ransonette v. Lawl S.W.2d 27 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Barrett State, 460, er v. 110 9 259 Tex.Cr.R. State, (1919). 86 Tex.Cr.R. S.W. (1927); State, Coleman Tex.Cr.R. Evidence, See 2 Wharton’s Criminal Sec. . (1921), though 235 S.W. 898 even the State (13th 1972) ed. The test as to whether relies on chain of circumstances which a matter is collateral is whether the cross- may major part of the be considered the examining party prove would be entitled to incriminating Ransonette evidence. part it as a tending of his case to establish supra; Dodd v. 149 Tex.Cr.R. plea. Hoffman v. (1946). (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Arechiga v. su pra. Evidence, Wigmore, See 3A tried as Appellant Sec. was indicted and (Chadbourn 1970); Wharton, rev. party bribery, Sec. to the offense of supra. jury of crimi- charged court on the law

nal responsibility. defendant, Bates, See V.T.C.A. Penal that the and Ed Garth Code, Sec. 7.01. Direct appel evidence of agreed Riklin had to commit and were participation lant’s in the offense included acting together in the commission Fontenot’s concerning conversa alleged in the indictment. In this offense tions with tape and Riklin and you you connection are instructed that recordings conversations, appel those defendant, may not find that Garth lant’s exchange observation of the money Bates, agreed to com- and Ed Riklin had Riklin, between Fontenot appel acting together mit in the com- and were possession lant’s portion of a money. of that alleged in the in- mission of the offense The court did not err refusing the re dictment from of the state- consideration quested charge on circumstantial evidence. ments, any, presence if outside the made Of the thirteen requested Bates, instruc- defendant, Garth tions which appellant contends the court Riklin, Ed between Nukie Fontenot and refused, improperly one concerns the law of evidence, alone, but there must be other parties, two deal necessity with the for cor- statements, in addition to such to war- roboration of accomplice witnesses’ testimo- defendant, finding rant a Garth that the *13 ny, and three are pres- addressed to mere Bates, agreed to com- and Ed Riklin ence, being association or discussion insuffi- acting together in the com- mit and were cient to corroborate the of the alleged in- mission of the offense in the accomplice witness. charged The court dictment. jury on the law parties necessity of and the believe, you you “If do not or if have so the testimony accomplice of the wit- thereof, you a reasonable doubt cannot nesses be charge corroborated. This ade- statements, any, if evi- consider such as quately protected appellant’s rights, and the defendant, against dence Garth court did not refusing err in the requested Bates.” instructions. argues Appellant that he was entitled to Appellant has not directed our attention requested the law of con- instructions on any evidence which would have raised conspira- spiracy because he was tried as a presence, issues of mere association and Appellant tor. was This is not the case. Appellant discussion. witnessed the ex- indicted to the offense party and tried as a change money of between Fontenot and bribery, charge authoriz- and the court’s possession later was portion found in of a jury ed the on this convict money. See Dillard v. theory was conspiracy alone. The law of S.W.2d 45 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). Appellant’s only admissibility relevant insofar as the requested instructions on these issues were concerned, certain acts and statements properly refused. charge adequately and the thereon court’s remaining The seven instructions protected rights. requested by appellant deal with the law of is that Appellant’s final contention conspiracy. The court jury instructed the following argument by prosecutor, as follows regarding conspiracy: the law of made, objection to which constituted no “There have been admitted in evidence fundamental error: allegedly statements by made the witness judge? “Believable You know there’s

Nukie Fontenot to Ed Riklin and state- person allows a thing little in law that allegedly ments by made Ed Riklin to they take the they when are on trial and Fontenot, Nukie having said statements attack, credibility they is under been made stand and presence outside the defendant, bring witnesses to show can in character Garth Bates. You are in- and vorac- they person structed are a of truth you may that before consider statements, I see a any, ity. Maybe such if I missed this. didn’t as evidence against defendant, Bates, even you Judge guilt one. The who denies his Garth beyond must believe a reasonable doubt on this.” in the product of counsel except the work argument We cannot characterize the their and investigators appellant complains being prej- which so case and their letters, accounts, books, report), it not have been rendered udicial that could notes or things tangible objection objects or sustaining harmless of an photographs, or con- jury thereto and an instruction to the constitute privileged, which not matter in- disregard any it. Baker v. See material tain evidence are in the (Tex.Cr.App.1963). Appellant action and volved in the any ob- of the State custody has waived error his failure to or control possession, ject. order shall See Williams v. The agencies. or of its manner of (Tex.Cr.App.1971). time, and place specify the taking the inspection and making the judgment is affirmed. any of the copies photographs tangible CLINTON, JJ., partici- ODOM aforementioned documents evidence; however, pating. provided, extend to granted shall not rights herein PHILLIPS, Judge, dissenting. between written communications representa- agents or any of its State or I. Act Nothing in this employees. tives or Corrupt public are no less citi- officials evi- of such the removal shall authorize deserving protection zens of our laws possession of dence from procedures person than who pres- in the shall be any inspection appeals majority to this Court. The affirms of the State.” representative ence of a notwithstanding this case two serious errors ultimately over- motion was Appellant’s committed the trial court in the course trial. prior the trial court ruled *14 failing of this trial. The first error was to independent allow the defense to ex- have exclusively on this appellant relies The perts tape recordings examine the that State, 481 Detmering v. rulings in Court’s indispensable were to the case. The State’s v. Terrell (Tex.Cr.App.), and 863 S.W.2d failing second such error allow the to ap- State, (Tex.Cr.App.), 618 S.W.2d develop jury defense to for the the context of possession for peals in which convictions in “Frenchy” which Nukie Fontenot was re- marihuana, were respectively, LSD brought “principal to them as the State’s overruled courts because the trial versed witness.” for an inde- pretrial motions appellants’ the allegedly drugs pendent examination II. Judge Mor- by opinions possessed. In both 18, 1976, August a appellant On filed of wheth- rison, is made express no mention examination, independent motion an in- for must be “good cause” er and to what extent alia, original tape recordings ter at “inspec for in a motion alleged or shown any laboratory designated by the district things “tangible non-privileged tion” of 39.14, V.A.C.C.P., pro- attorney. Article evi or contain . which constitute vides: in matter involved material dence matter, we hold As a threshold

“Upon motion of the defendant show- the action.” cause” is “good of ing good upon requirement cause therefor and notice as well inspection a motion for parties, necessary to the the court in which an State, 468 v. discovery. Smith pending may order the State as one for action is v. Sonderup (Tex.Cr.App.); during before or trial of a criminal action Hoff State, (Tex.Cr.App.); produce and 418 S.W.2d pending therein or on trial to (Tex.Cr.App.); State, permit pho- man v. 514 S.W.2d inspection copying (Tex.Cr. State, Feehery v. tographing by or behalf of the defend- of consideration documents, That this Court’s designated papers, App.). ant of confronting a defendant, issue when (ex- “good cause” written statement of the of examination independent request cept written statements of witnesses particular evidence be upon by accomplice relied the was an witness as a matter of law, State analysis thereby varies from its requiring vis-a-vis more State corrobo- general discovery jury rate his could motions is demonstrated before the upon 38.14, rely it. Article in V.A.C.C.P. The opinions Detmering Terrell, its tape recordings of conversations between supra, and is Judge Doug underscored appellant Riklin and Fontenot and and Fon- las’s opinion Feehery supra, tenot, Fontenot, made crucial were 2. primary Footnote The reason for this corroborating accomplice witness testi- analysis variation in “inspection” is that an mony tape recordings of Fontenot. These means “more than a visual examination of tended to connect offense object. an visual examination would [A] bribery of and make Fontenot’s always not divulge anything probative of likely trustworthy. Caraway more than value” concerning “the item on which the (Tex.Cr.App.); Ar- State its bases case . . . .”1 Detmer 38.14, V.T.S.A., C.C.P., ticle Note 119. ing supra, Additionally, at 864. Of additional relevance to the considera- Detmering leaves with us the idea that “good existed for tion whether cause” “good cause” imputed will be by this Court independent ex- appellant’s motion if the evidence sought be is examined original tape recordings amination “the item on State bases its accomplice fact witness case,” e., i. piece crucial of physical evi provided predicate for the testimonial dence. Id. at 864. tape recordings required as admission of the Thus, inquiry now turns to whether the under Edwards tape recordings sought to be examined (Tex.Cr.App.). elements One the seven pieces physical evidence required predicate changes, for a no is that or, crucial to the State’s case in other additions, or deletions have been made on or words, on which the State “item[s] base[d] vein, tape recordings. to the In this there against its case” appellant. appear pauses recordings, as The incriminating State’s chief witness statements marked as unintelligible well (Frenchy) Nukie Fontenot. The trial “(?)” pauses in the were ex- record.2 charged jury court this witness plained to have resulted from respect adequacy 1. minority important With to the of an examina- infor- constitutes copies provided tion of the defense counsel mation. *15 motion, discovery testimony under ques- their the of MR. I further REYNOLDS: have no hearing Dr. Thomas G. Stockham at the on tions. illuminating. motion for new trial is CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. QUESTIONS HOLMES: Now, then, my question sir, you, of “Q Doctor, you copy listen to a of the Q could your opinion, professionally agreeable is it to original tape listening determine from to inspect tapes or examine to from do so a any copy that reasonable whether not copy original? rather than the tests, ground subject exists it to further to extremely A will It much difficult more example? any intelligent to make tapes of such examination reliability. A Not with much copy compared origi- from a to from an copy You would not listen to a to make Q nal. you that determination? explain just briefly why Can this is Q Well, copy, you you might A listen but to a so? very weight place wouldn’t on all, tape much that original A Yes. First of the has particular of kind examination . concerning information on it of the details made, how it was what kind of machine it example following statement 2. An is on, was made of the nature that machine and 8, 1976, following a Riklin Fontenot June on, completely so which are eliminated in the recorded call between Bates and Fontenot process creating copy. of a Much of the pointed impropriety out of which Bates germane information that is to the authentici- parte necessity ex communication and the ty originality tape, first the actual disqualifying if did not termi- himself Fontenot tape originally physically made cannot be nate the conversation: can, by making copy. transcribed however, a Some (inaudible) going amount information that is RIKLIN: “It’s over with copy disqualify transferred on it that —” this relative to issue himself and that’s this displacement III. suction-cup of the device phone used on the to record the conversa- one, ground In his of error Although tions. question ultimate failing the trial court erred contends that tapes whether the are admissible is a mat- Tanner, an undercover offi- to allow John discretion, ter for the expert trial court’s cer, testify and rebut certain witness given primary would be material to the witness Nukie informed the State’s that he did exercise of Fontenot. Fontenot testified that discretion. a Such witness attor- with the district any not have “deal” would also any be essential defense ex- charges in ney drop any pending against the admissibility tape record- change testimony. On cross-exami- for his ings. nation, denied his involvement Finally, bribery in a prosecution, the es- robbery stated he was the Mize house sence of the “understanding” offense is the guilty of that offense. Fontenot admit- upon acceptance which the offer or of mon- jewels offi- ted he sold some to undercover ey or predicated. other benefit is It must telling cer Tanner Tanner he but denied be “as recipient’s consideration for the . up” robbery. regard “set With to other exercise of official discretion . . . .” actions, criminal testified as fol- V.T.C.A., Code, Thus, Penal Section 36.02. lows: linguistic discussions or context of the “Q [By appellant’s attorney] As terms of the acceptance offer or are critical you of fact asked Mr. Tanner matter bribery prosecution. successful This conversation, during Fon- Mr. inescapable fact tape renders the recordings tenot, you asked him would he kill critical to the State’s case and renders the Pope. you man Do the name of trial court’s refusal to independent order an remember that? original examination of the tape recordings sir, A No I did not. reversible Detmering error. su- Q You did not do that. You don’t re- pra; Terrell v. supra. asking if he member Mr. Tanner majority concedes much of the fore- Pope price would kill if the going when it holds the motion should have right? granted. been ignores Yet it the same con- sir, A No I didn’t. siderations when it concludes the error was Q asking youDo remember Mr. Tanner harmless because there has been no showing you you going if to furnish tampering or holding alterations. In weapon you you said the accomplice witness Fontenot was would? corroborated in testimony, his tape re- sir, A No I did not. cordings are cited Only possession first. money corroboration, marked aids Q talking you Sometime before started but not as to Fontenot’s it Riklin, you to Mr. did tell Mr. Tan- was his “understanding” payoff that the *16 working you ner that had been on Riklin inwas appel- consideration for the buying guns? some machine granting probation lant’s to Fontenot. For Tanner, A Not to Mr. no. case, crucial element of the tapes the were indispensable. Additionally, the ma- [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] jority points out that predicate the for the Tanner, Q you you Did tell Mr. who tape admission of the recordings into evi- working now for the know dence was accomplice established the Office, work- you Sheriff’s had been witness Fontenot. ing buying guns? some machine sir, A No I did not.

The failure of the trial court to accord appellant the adequate opportunity an Q you you Did tell Mr. Tanner that prepare his defense should call for a rever- guns would like to sell some machine sal. for narcotics? sir,

A No I did not.” impeachment admissible purposes. State, (Tex.Cr. Hoffman v. 514 S.W.2d The sought impeach this evi- App.); State, 482 Thrash v. S.W.2d 213 dence Tanner, with the of John State, (Tex.Cr.App.); Garcia an undercover detective with the Harris general 400 (Tex.Cr.App.). principle This County Department, Sheriff’s Narcotics Di- applies reviewing propriety vision. when of a testified, Officer Tanner on a bill of exception, ruling admissibility trial court’s to the that as he had met Fontenot in his capacity specific those acts acts when are first an undercover officer try- while However, ing sought purchase to be once a guns machine introduced. from Fonten- ot. testify Originally, concerning spe witness is allowed to pay Tanner was to for the events, guns machine marihuana, general principle cific acts with but Fonten- ot instance, later money. apply. oppos does not demanded While in Fon- In such pawn tenot’s shop during ing party evidence to negotia- may present these rebut the tions, Fontenot testimony. asked Tanner if evidence is Tanner rebuttal ad Such “was doing interested in a jewelry directly missible relates to the robbery because it on a salesman.” Tanner told credibility properly Fontenot he and is of the witness would be only interested after the machine dispel any impressions admitted to false gun negotiations completed. conveyed Fonten- initial jury to the testimo ot later specifically identified State, Charles Mize ny. Montemayor v. S.W.2d 93 as the target robbery. After this (Tex.Cr.App.); Binnion v.

robbery occurred, negotiations on the Randolph (Tex.Cr.App.); guns machine terminated. Tanner then ar- (Tex.Cr.App.); S.W.2d 311 Freeman ranged purchase some of the jewelry 726; 166 Tex.Cr.R. robbery. from the Mize Fontenot stated Redding 161 Tex.Cr.R. that he operation” was the “brains S.W.2d 712. and had up” robbery. “set the Mize After State, supra, appeal In an Montemayor v. Tanner, jewelry sold some he aggravated from a assault on conviction for subsequently arrested and indicted for police officer, a a conviction for we reversed that offense. impeachment failing testimony. to allow during Tanner negotia- testified that witness, Deputy complaining The Sheriff tions as purchase to the of the jewelry Menchaca, that at- testified Fontenot asked Tanner if he would be in- provocation. tacked him without On cross- terested in killing individual named examination, denied he had ever Menchaca Pope. agreed gun to furnish the fight been involved in a with one Oscar killing for the and stated he had several Later, Antu. was not al- defendant guns stolen pawn shop. present lowed to from Antu that evidence argued defense this evidence provoca- Menchaca him without had beaten impeach admissible to Fontenot’s deni- reversing, county jail. tion in In we als of these facts rebut the inferenc- held: es his testimony with jury left “It is fundamental that when witness Fontenot was “a fine Christian man.” The specif in a testifies about a criminal case trial court ruled defense counsel could event, ic fact or that fact or event is not introduce gun evidence the “machine more than minor detail of his very deal,” deal,” “dope or of arrange- may side testimony, opposing then the ment made kill Pope Fontenot to as they present testimony. rebut evidence to matters; but, were collateral the trial court goes directly to the impeachment Such ruled the defense could introduce the testi- *17 witness, a factor that in credibility of the mony concerning robbery. Mize the many critically affect the out may cases g., Daley The ruling trial was come E. v. apparently prosecution. court’s of the 932; principle State, based on general specific Tex.Cr.App., the 491 S.W.2d Si 15, State, acts 317 a witness are mons Tex.Cr.R. misconduct not v. 167

139 740; State, S.W.2d argued Freeman v. 166 Tex. Nor can it be that the error 626, 726; Redding Cr.R. v. guilt closely harmless. The issue of State, 53, 161 Tex.Cr.R. 274 712 S.W.2d upon the hinged primarily contested and (on rehearing). right motion for witnesses, credibility of two State’s relative impeach prosecution’s witnesses is Fon appellant. and the witness Fontenot aspect also one of the Sixth Amendment His testi accomplice tenot was an witness. right See, g., of confrontation. e. Davis recordings by tape mony was corroborated Alaska, v. 415 U.S. 94 39 S.Ct. testi which he authenticated. Fontenot’s (1974); Illinois, Napue L.Ed.2d 347 v. 360 mony concerning interpretations U.S. 79 S.Ct. 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 taped impressions he from the conver drew (1959).” case. crucial to the State’s sations was State, In Binnion v. supra, we reaffirmed Further, appel testimony on which the holding In Binnion, our Montemayor. sought impeach lant Fontenot concerned Jerry Officer Davis testified that the de immediately and after occurring acts before fendant had sold him over 14 ounces of the basis robbery charge which formed cross-examination, marihuana. On Davis present As was noted of the offense. denied that he had ever smoked marihuana Illinois, Napue supra: jury’s “The esti v. or that he had ever offered to sell heroin to reliability of a mate of the truthfulness and the defendant. This Court held the trial given may witness well be determinative court reversibly subsequently erred when it guilt innocence, . . . .” testimony excluded offered the defense Further, State, 562 S.W.2d in Castro v. to rebut prior Davis’s denials since such (Tex.Cr.App.), opinion 252 a unanimous testimony credibility went to the of the Davis, Judge W. C. this Court held: witness and related to the case. ., al great “. . latitude should be State, In Randolph supra, v. in an even- showing any fact lowed a defendant application rule, handed we affirmed feelings, ill which would tend to establish a conviction for the sale of heroin. On bias, upon part animus motive and State, cross-examination the defend- against him. any testifying witness ant denied only having sold heroin on State, (Tex.Cr. Jackson v. charged, the date having but denied sold State, police App.1977); heroin to 550 Robinson S.W.2d officers at time. In rebuttal, the State impeach (Tex.Cr.App.1977); was allowed to 54 Simmons the testimony of the by showing defendant Evans (Tex.Cr.App.1977); S.W.2d the details of purchases of heroin and (Tex.Cr.App. S.W.2d barbiturates. 1975); Smith Blair v. (Tex.Cr.App.1974); upon These cases rest reasoning (Tex.Cr.App.1974). jury is the sole judge of the credibility Having witnesses. once allowed a witness testify concerning specific acts By presenting . evidence to the and events which are more than trivial de- that, jury prosecution while Rhoades [a tails of the testimony, opposing party crimi- participated in some witness] may then rebut that in order to had been arrested nal offense and present jury with the true facts from and indicted robbery and murder credibility. which to determine In the in- theft, no charges were but those case, having stant allowed Fontenot to tes- him, appellant longer pending against tify deny his involvement in the trans- had some sought that Rhoades to show action for the guns sale of machine testifying for the interest and motive in denying sought he to commission Officer jury could inference that the State. The Pope, Tanner to kill should per- had a have have drawn was that Rhoades been allowed to rebut prosecution helping impressions eliminate false con- sonal interest and, veyed jury. against appellant to the prove its case *18 therefore, may (Chadbourn have been an 1970). unreliable recog- rev. We have jury witness. While the may have chosen nized that exposure of a witness’ mo- reject inference, to such an especially testifying proper tivation in is a and im- since Rhoades denied that testify- he was portant constitutionally function of the ing for the State because of his vulnera- protected right of cross-examination. evidence, status, ble this was nevertheless 474, 496, Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. admissible appellant should have 1400, 1413, (1959).” S.Ct. 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 facts, permitted been prove to these [ci- While language concerns from Davis tations omitted]” primarily right to confront witnesses The proffered contends that cross-examination, principles equal- are evidence tended to show accomplice ly applicable under this case. the facts of Fontenot’s testimony prompted by show, through The sought to desire charges that no concerning be filed Tanner, testimony of Officer that Fonten- gun the “machine deal” or his solicitation of testifying ot’s motivation in for the State Tanner to Pope. V.T.C.A., Code, kill Penal curry prosecuting was to favor with the 15.03, 19.03(a)(3), Sections 46.06(a)(2), and charges hope authorities in the that no Section 15.01. See Simmons v. su- would be filed on the other criminal acts. pra; Coleman v. supra; Castro v. Simmons v. (Tex.Cr.App.), therein; and cases cited see supra. generally, 62 A.L.R.2d 20 A.L.R.2d speculate We cannot as to whether the 1421. jury, as judge credibility sole As stated the United Supreme States witnesses, would have chosen to believe Alaska, Court in supra: Davis v. testimony. jurors Tanner’s were enti- principal “Cross-examination is the tled to have this before them in means which the believability of a place order Fontenot’s in the witness and the truth of his testimony proper perspective jury and to allow the Subject are always tested. to the broad judgment make an as to Fonten- informed discretion of judge a trial preclude reliability. Consequently, ot’s the trial repetitive and unduly harassing interro- reversibly excluding prof- court erred in gation, the cross-examiner only impeachment testimony. fered permitted to delve into the story witness’ forth, respectfully For the reasons set I to test the perceptions witness’ and mem- dissent. ory, but the cross-examiner has tradition-

ally e., been allowed impeach, i. dis-

credit, the witness. ... OPINION ON APPELLANT’S MOTION A more particular attack on the witness’ credibili- FOR REHEARING ty is effected means of cross-examina- DALLY, Judge. tion revealing possible directed toward granted We have motion biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of rehearing for leave to file his motion for they may witness as directly relate ground reconsider his first error personalities issues or in the case at hand. reads: The partiality of a subject witness is

exploration trial, at and is “THE ‘always rele- LEARNED TRIAL COURT COM- vant as discrediting the witness and af- MITTED ERROR BY REVERSIBLE fecting weight testimony.’ of his 3A REFUSING TO ALLOW THE WIT- Wigmore, Evidence, J. NESS, TANNER, p. 775 § JOHN AN UNDER- Evidence, 3. As prosecution stated in Wharton’s Criminal a witness for the who is a code- (13th Ed.): Sec. 435 accomplice, person fendant or or who is a prosecution threatened with criminal independent for an great “The cross-examiner is allowed lati- crime, testimony against whose questioning tude in a witness to ascertain his may by prom- the defendant be motivated testifying. particularly motive true where the defendant is This is leniency.” hope immunity ise or cross-examining

141 COVER DEPUTY SHERIFF WITH ness’s assertions about those facts. If COUNTY, THE sought HARRIS to be contradicted TEXAS SHER- collateral fact OFFICE, cross-examination, this safe- IFF’S TO TESTIFY A RE- is elicited on AS by say- guarding expressed BUTTAL is often WITNESS TO REBUT rule CER- or that ing TAIN that the answer is conclusive TESTIMONY GIVEN BY THE WITNESS, the an- must ‘take STATE’S NUKIE cross-examiner FONTEN- OT, swer.’ . DURING THE STATE’S CASE IN

CHIEF, FOR THE REASONS HEREIN- with- regarded is to be herein as “What AFTER art, SET FORTH IN THIS BRIEF.” protean in this word of ‘collateral’? by deter- inquiry The is best answered reconsidering After ground of error mining are not within the what facts we are confident properly that it was decid- term, finding escapes from and thus ed and applicable that the clearly law was contradicting prohibition against stated in the majority opinion original on ap- upon collateral facts. The classical However, submission. appellant cites proach is facts which would have many recent argues cases which he are in independently provable regardless been conflict with our holding in this case and of of the contradiction are not ‘collateral.’ “benefit;” which he has not obtained the we general “Two kinds of facts meet the agree that two of the cases he cites are in test. The that are first kind are facts conflict with holding our in this case. We relevant to the substantive issues in will therefore discuss these cases and re- case . state the law that we applicable. believe is meeting “The second kind of facts The ground statement of the facts that are above mentioned test for of error important fact, omits an one which would not collateral includes facts which recognized was also not in the dissenting provable by extrinsic independently opinion original submission. The testi- contradiction, evidence, apart from the mony Fontenot, appellant wanted impeach disqualify or the witness. “rebut,” by was not elicited bias, in- Among showing facts these are but was by elicited the appellant on cross- crime, terest, conviction of and want examination of Fontenot. The is knowledge. capacity opportunity complaining permitted that he was not showing the witness Facts misconduct of extrinsic evidence —that is (for had) which no has been conviction of Tanner —to contradict the facts, are kind of not within second he elicited from Fontenot. collateral, but are if on cross- denied The complaining that the tes- proved examination cannot be to contra- timony of Tanner was not admitted before dict. jury; appellant’s ground of error is not “Finally, fact must be a third kind of concerned with right his constitutional . contradic- considered . . . [T]he confrontation and cross-examination of the any part tion of of the witness’s account Alaska, State’s witness Fontenot. Davis v. background and circumstances of a U.S. S.Ct. 39 L.Ed.2d 347 transaction, material which as a matter (1974), and Evans v. experience not have of human he would (Tex.Cr.App.1975) applica- are therefore not story been mistaken about if his helpful ble and not deciding the issue permissible].” [Emphasis true added.] [is presented by the appellant ground in this ed., McCormick, Evidence, (2d Sec. error. 1972). applicable The A review of the authorities demonstrates rule is stated Professor long followed the rule McCormick this Court has as follows: stated McCormick. courts safeguarding maintain the “[T]he rule may impeached that a not be following ap- witness rule statement of the by producing extrinsic evidence ‘collat- pears Tex.App. Sims eral’ (1878): facts to ‘contradict’ the first wit- that,

“The rule in such cases is upon recently, More the correct rule was stated try cross-examination to applied credit of a in Arechiga v. witness, only general questions (Tex.Cr.App.1971): can be S.W.2d put, and he cannot be *20 asked as to State, “In Gatson Tex.Cr.App., v. 387 collateral and independent fact merely 65, held this Court that when a with a view to contradict him afterwards witness is on cross-examined a collateral by calling another danger witness. The matter impeach testimony, even to practice obvious, such cross-examining besides the party cannot then inconvenience of trying many as collater- contradict the witness. The test as to al issues as parties one of the might whether a matter is collateral is whether introduce, choose cross-examining party and which the would be enti- could not prepared prove part tled to it to meet.” as a of his case tending plea. to establish his Britton v. State, In 265, Drake v. 29 Tex.App. 15 State, 241, 744; 130 Tex.Cr.R. (1890), S.W. 725 prosecuting attorney, 221, 1 Branch’s Annotated Penal Code during his cross-examination of a defense State, Corpus Sec. 200. v. 463 See: witness, elicited testimony with regard to a (1970). S.W.2d 4 collateral permitted, matter. He was then part “If a direct as of his over the objection, impeach defendant’s evidence, prove tried that Serna this collateral testimony through other wit- was in hospital particular the state on a nesses. The Court held impeach- that such date it would have been inadmissible. ment impermissible, was and reversed the Court, excluding the inadmissible judgment. In the opinion, course of its evidence, way proc- in no violated the due Court reviewed the authorities as follows: ess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “ ‘When a witness is cross-examined on a to the United States Constitution al- matter collateral to the issue his answer leged by appellant.” cannot be subsequently by contradicted principal appel- The two cases on which party putting question.’ isNor it State, Montemayor lant relies are v. proper to allow a witness to be cross-ex- (Tex.Cr.App.1976), S.W.2d 93 and Binnion amined as to matter which is collat- State, (Tex.Cr.App.1977), v. eral and irrelevant to the issue merely for upon which were also relied in the dissent- the purpose of contradicting him by other ing opinion original submission. In (9th evidence. Ed.) Whart.Crim.Ev. Sec. Montemayor, prosecution ag- was for y. 484; State, Rainey 473; 20 Tex.App. gravated peace assault on a officer. The State, 202; Hart v. Tex.App. Johnson defendant contended he acted in self-de- State, 609; 22 Tex.App. S.W.Rep. During fense. his cross-examination de- 368; Brite v. 10 Tex.App. Stevens counsel, Menchaca, fense Officer the com- Tex.App. 39. What is collater- witness, plaining knowing admitted one Os- al and irrelevant matter within the rules having fight car Antu but ever denied above stated? In his work on Criminal with him. The defense later called Antu as (9th 484), Wharton, Evidence Ed. Sec. Mr. witness, but the trial court refused to quoting opinion from the in Hildeburn v. permit testify alleged beating Antu to to an Curran, [59,] says: 65 Pa.St. ‘The test he had received at the hands of Officer of whether inquired a fact of in cross-ex- proffered Menchaca. We held that the tes- amination is collateral is this: Would the timony proper impeachment and was cross-examining party be entitled to erroneously excluded. prove part it as a tending of his case plea?’ establish his Binnion, This test has been In prosecution was for deliv- quoted adopted by this court in ery Hart of marihuana. The chief wit- State’s denied, 15 Tex.App. and in agent Johnson ness was an undercover who Tex.App. 2 S.W.Rep. during coun- cross-examination defense sel, 609.” 15 offering S.W. at 727. smoking ever marihuana case, denied, dur- sell heroin to the defend- In the instant defendant. The subsequently counsel, ant offered the ing cross-examination defense two other witnesses who would have con- gun sale to Tanner negotiating an unlawful tradicted testimony by agent. Cit- man. These asking Tanner to kill a ing Montemayor, proffered we held that the collateral, involving wholly matters impeachment erroneously by Fontenot for alleged acts of misconduct excluded the trial court. had. The had been which no conviction refusing permit not err in trial court did We have concluded that Montema col- Fontenot on these impeachment yor and Binnion correctly were not decided. lateral matters. cases, In both during facts adduced collateral; is, cross-examination were *21 by appel cited The other cases they would not have independently been which this Court lant involve situations in provable regardless of the contradiction: improper had concluded that trial court the facts were not relevant substan ly by the defend excluded evidence offered case; tive issues in the the facts were not bias, preju tending ant a witness’ to show independently provable by extrinsic evi dice, interest, testify against or motive dence, apart contradiction, from the State, (Tex. him. Blair v. 511 S.W.2d impeach witness; disqualify the facts State, Cr.App.1974); Jackson v. 482 S.W.2d part were not background of a mate State, (Tex.Cr.App.1972); v. Simmons rial transaction about which the witness (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Randle 548 S.W.2d 386 would not have been story mistaken if his State, (Tex.Cr.App.1978). were true. contrary, To the the facts con course, should be allowed Of the accused alleged cerned acts of misconduct prejudice great to show the bias or latitude witness for which no conviction had been Indeed, evidence against of a witness him. holding had. The Montemayor Binn charges against a wit pending criminal ion, that the defendant should have been under certain circum ness is admissible permitted to elicit testimony on a collateral showing purpose stances for the limited during matter cross-examination of a State statu exception or motive as an to the bias witness and subsequently impeach that tes tory unadjudicated criminal of rule that timony through witness, a different is con may impeachment. fenses not be used for trary to the well-established rule in this and V.A.C.C.P.; 38.29, su Art. Randle jurisdictions. Montemayor and Binn- (Tex. pra; ion Castro v. are they overruled to the extent conflict charges had been opinion Cr.App.1978). with this But no majority opinion original brought on for either of the against submission. which Tanner would alleged activities to In Cooper v. (Tex. noted that have testified. It should also be Cr.App.1979), not by appellant, cited testify Tanner to did not call trial court permit refused to a defense wit concerning involve jury Fontenot’s fore ness testify grounds on the although the trial robbery in the Mize ment witness had entered the courtroom after such was admis court ruled that the Witness Rule had been and his invoked sible. See Adams proffered testimony impeach constituted Finally, the record does (Tex.Cr.App.1979). ment of a State witness on collateral mat any personal Tanner had not show that ters brought during first out cross-examina knowledge as to whether or not State majority opinion tion. The in Cooper, while offered Fontenot consideration upholding the action of the trial court on opinion We adhere to our testimony. ground, the first stated that the trial court court did original submission that the trial had been concerning in error the second concluding ground. not abuse its discretion The majority cited Binnion and question was not admissi Montemayor extent, approval. with To this majority opinion bias or motive Cooper is in error ble to show Fontenot’s against appellant. is overruled. testify rehearing motion for overruled.

ROBERTS, J., concurs in result.

PHILLIPS, J., dissents. CLINTON, JJ., partici-

ODOM and

pating. RAMIREZ, Appellant,

Manuel S. *22 Texas, Appellee.

The STATE of

No. 57350. Texas, Appeals

Court of Criminal

Panel No. 3.

May 1979.

Rehearing En Banc Denied Oct. 1979.

Case Details

Case Name: Bates v. State
Court Name: Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
Date Published: Jan 10, 1979
Citation: 587 S.W.2d 121
Docket Number: 58338
Court Abbreviation: Tex. Crim. App.
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