128 Me. 14 | Me. | 1929
Bill in equity brought by the executor of the will of Lovina White, late of Corinna, to construe the will and to determine whether a specific bequest under the seventeenth paragraph and the bequest of the residue under the nineteenth paragraph of the will are valid. The will was executed July 21, 1920. She died October 30,1925. The case was reserved by the sitting Justice with the consent of the parties for decision by this court on the legally admissible evidence of the record.
The will, after providing for specific bequests to fourteen individuals and a bequest in trust to the Town of Corinna for the
Paragraph nineteenth provided that the residue be held in trust to use the income to aid a niece during her life as in the discretion of the trustee it was from time to time needed for that purpose, “and at her decease I give and bequeath all such principal and the income not so used under the trust, unto the Methodist Episcopal Church Society of Corinna, Maine, to be used as shall seem best in the discretion of said Society. Should said Society not be in existence at the termination of said trust, then and in that case, I give and bequeath said remainder unto such Society as shall be the successor of said Methodist Episcopal Church Society, and the same directions as to its use shall apply as I have made in behalf of said Methodist Episcopal Church Society.”
The niece died during the life of the testatrix.
From the admissible evidence, it appeared that at the date of the will and of the death of Mrs. White and for many years prior thereto, there was in Corinna a voluntary, unincorporated association of individuals known as and generally called the Methodist Episcopal Church, but also called the Methodist Episcopal Church Society. The association was the only one in Corinna known or called by either of these names. It occupied and used a church edifice in which were held meetings and religious services of the association, conducted by a resident pastor who was a minister of the Methodist Episcopal Church. Such services had been attended by Mrs. White up to and for many years prior to her decease.
Meetings called “Quarterly Conferences” were held annually in and for the “District” in which Corinna was located, and such Conferences were held in 1923 and 1924 and attended by the “District Superintendent” whose duty it was to attend them. Failure to produce the original records of these meetings was duly accounted for, and by proper secondary evidence it appeared that there was submitted to the Superintendent at each of the Conferences for his approval, the nomination of Lovina White as “steward” of the Corinna association, that he approved the nomination, and that she was elected.
Evidence is’ admissible to identify a devisee or legatee. Preachers’ Aid Society v. Rich, 45 Me., 552; Howard v. American Peace Society, 49 Me., 288; Ladd v. Baptist Church, 124 Me., 386; Norwood v. Packard, 125 Me., 220; Trust Company v. Pierce, 126 Me., 67; First Parish in Sutton v. Cole, 3 Pick., 232; Tucker v. Seaman’s Aid Society, 7 Met., 188; Church and Congregational Society v. Hatch, supra.
The evidence above stated is sufficient, without considering the admissibility of other evidence to the admission of which objection was made, to establish that Mrs. White intended to designate as her legatee this one association with which she had been connected and called by the name of either the Methodist Episcopal Church or Methodist Episcopal Church Society.
It was not established by admissible evidence that there were duly elected “stewards or trustees of the Methodist Episcopal Church” or “trustees of the local Methodist” church within the provisions of Rev. Stat., Chap. 17, Sec. 19. Nor was there evidence that a corporation was organized as therein provided. The bequests therefore do not appear to be gifts to a corporation under the statute. In Ladd v. Baptist Church, supra, referred to by counsel, the opinion states that the church was incorporated and no question appears to have been raised about its incorporation.
This court in Pushor v. Hilton, 123 Me., 227, reserved decision of the question whether a devise or bequest directly to a voluntary association can be upheld. The association in that case was admittedly not a charitable organization. Neither shall we consider the question of the validity of such a direct bequest even to an organization assumed to be charitable.
The only question we shall consider is whether these bequests are valid charitable trusts. Charitable trusts are always favorites of the law and in construing them, a liberal policy has been con
The definition of a “charitable trust” or a “public charity” as given in Jackson v. Phillips, supra, has been adopted and applied in this state. Bills v. Pease, supra; Haskell v. Staples, 116 Me., 103. “A charity in the legal sense, may be more freely defined as a gift, to be applied consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their minds or hearts under the influence of education or religion, by relieving their bodies from disease,' suffering or constraint, by assisting them to establish themselves in life, or by erecting or maintaining public buildings or works, or otherwise lessening the burden of government. It is immaterial whether the purpose is called charitable in the gift itself, if it is so described as to show that it is charitable in its nature.”
The heirs at law deny that valid charitable trusts were created by the will, contending, in the first place, that the beneficiaries of a charitable trust must be indefinite but capable of being ascertained ; that they can not be ascertained here because the society has no records disclosing who constitute it and the trustee can not select, as he must, the members of a society which has no record of its membership, and therefore that the trust fails; but further that, if the members were accurately ascertainable, they would no longer be indefinite, and therefore again the trust fails. •
The major premise of this argument, that the beneficiaries must be indefinite but capable of being ascertained, contains a fallacy. Beneficiaries is there used with two meanings, one for the qualifying word “indefinite,” another for the qualifying words “capable of being ascertained.” The former looks to the future and means the beneficiaries who may be such. They must be indefinite, “an un-ascertained, uncertain, fluctuating body of individuals.” Doyle v. Whalen, 87 Me., 425; Hospital Association v. McKenzie, 104 Me., 327; Bills v. Pease, supra. The latter looks to a given moment and means the beneficiaries then entitled to receive the benefit of the trust and whom the trustee selects therefor. In a valid public charitable trust at a given moment, all the beneficiaries who may
If, therefore, the members of this association had records by which its membership at the death of Mrs. White .could be accurately ascertained, such present ascertainability would not have ipso facto made definite the required indefiniteness of the beneficiaries in the future with consequent failure of the trust, as contended by the heirs.
If Mrs. White had intended to give the bequests to the society, as it was at her decease comprised of its then and ascertainable members, a different question would be presented. The members, if held to be beneficiaries of a trust, would have been certain and designated individuals, known persons or class of persons and the question of a “private,” as distinguished from a public or charitable, trust would have arisen. Doyle v. Whalen, supra.
The test therefore is whom did Mrs. White intend to designate as beneficiaries of her bounty and not the record of the membership of the Society. We think, as considered below, that she had in mind and intended the indefinite, fluctuating membership of the Society, not its actual then membership at her decease.
The contention, however, that members of the society can not be ascertained because there are no records, errs in two respects. It can not be said there are no records of the association. There was at the hearing a record book in the possession of the association not put into evidence by the association or by the heirs. What the book showed did not appear. Again, records would be primary evidence of membership, but if not available, secondary evidence would be admissible. Evidence of the membership of a voluntary unincorporated association is not confined to records. There was un-contradicted admissible evidence that the Methodist Episcopal Church of Corinna had a definite membership “capable of being determined from its record or hy other means.”
The heirs contend, in the second place, that the purpose of a charitable trust must be limited to charitable objects; that if the trustee is given discretion to apply the trust property to purposes not charitable — -and that there was such discretion here — the trust fails.
A valid charitable bequest must be for a purpose recognized in
Bequests therefore to a Methodist Episcopal Church Society without declaration or restriction as to the use to be made of the subject matter of the gift must be deemed a gift for the promotion of the objects of the Society and given for a charitable purpose.
The purposes for which such bequest can be used must be charitable only. If the intention of the testator was that the gift could be used for other than charitable uses, it is fatal to the validity of the bequest. If a part may be so otherwise used, all of it may be. Fox v. Gibbs, 86 Me., 87, 94; Tappan v. Deblois, 45 Me., 122, 129; Murdock v. Bridges, 91 Me., 124, 132; Prime v. Harmon, supra, 301.
The purpose of the specific bequest in paragraph seventeenth was expressed in these words, “to be used for the said Society in any way it may deem best.” “For,” not “by,” was used. “For” connotes “the end with reference to which anything is, acts, serves, or is done.” Webster’s International. The Society can in its discretion select the “way,” the particular, specific form or forms of use, but any such use must be “for the said Society.” These words constitute a limitation on the manner in which the bequest could be used. Pratt v. Miller, 37 N. W., 263, 265 (Neb.). The limitation necessarily implies a use for the object and purpose of the Society and these are religious and charitable. The purpose of this bequest is therefore clearly and wholly charitable.
The purpose of the residuary bequest in paragraph nineteenth is “to be used as shall seem best in the discretion of the Society.”
“For” was not used; but neither was “by” used. The will taken as a whole indicates clearly an intent to provide bequests for the benefit of the various donees only. The income of the trust for the
So, too, taking the will as a whole, the intent of the testatrix to give the bequests to the association with a membership indefinite and fluctuating, and not as constituted at her decease, seems clear. The amounts of the specific and residuary bequests differ, but there is no direction or implication for any immediate use of either for the church as then constituted. She intended a specific bequest to this religious association and then more if there were a residue unused for the niece. We do not find any different intent, express or implied, in either bequest. Further, the residuary bequest, if the Society were not in existence at the expiration of the trust for the niece, was given to the successor of the Society. In both bequests, she appears to have had in mind an indefinite, continuing religious body.
The bequests were valid charitable trusts in their purposes and beneficiaries.
It may appear upon further hearing by the court below that there are trustees of the association, or trustees may be elected by or for the association, legally empowered to receive the property of these trusts and administer them. If not, the court may appoint.
The plaintiff may have costs and reasonable counsel fees to be determined by the sitting Justice and paid out of the estate.
The mandate will be
Bill sustained.
Decree in accordance with opinion.