380 Mass. 933 | Mass. | 1980
Bates and Sawyer executed two agreements,
We conclude that the instruments in question transferred to Bates a present interest in the Sawyer land. Our conclusion is supported in part by the formalities the parties observed, namely the fact that the agreements were in writing, acknowledged, and recorded. See White v. Foster, 102 Mass. 375, 378-379 (1869). But we are also influenced by the
As the owner of the profit a prendre, Bates held a compensable interest in the condemned real estate. 2 Nichols, Eminent Domain § 5.72 [7] (rev. 3d ed. 1978). It should have been allowed to share in the compensation to be awarded for the land as enhanced by the existence of the deposits of sand, gravel, and stone to the extent of the fair market value of its interest. See H.E. Fletcher Co. v. Commonwealth, 350 Mass. 316, 323-324 (1966); Joseph DeVries & Sons v. Commonwealth, 339 Mass. 663, 664 (1959); Manning v. Lowell, 173 Mass. 100, 102-103 (1899); Providence & Worcester R.R. v. Worcester, 155 Mass. 35, 41 (1891); 4 Nichols, Eminent Domain §§ 13.22, 13.22 [1] (rev. 3d ed. 1978). See generally Roberts, Condemnation of Coal, Lignite, Gravel, and Other Materials Mineable Through Surface Methods, 1979 Sw. Legal Foundation Inst, on Plan., Zoning, & Eminent Domain 369.
The judgment of the Superior Court dismissing Bates’ action is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
The two agreements are not in conflict with regard to terms determinative of the parties’ intent. Thus, we need not decide whether the second was meant to supersede the first — the result would be the same under either of the two instruments.