—Appeal by plaintiff from an adverse judgment entered on a verdict of a jury in an action for damages for personal injuries.
*821 The accident occurred about 10:30 a. m. on July 11, 1949, on Mayflower Street in the county of Los Angeles. The pavement on Mayflower was between 22 and 24 feеt wide. The area was residential. Plaintiff, driving a Ford truck, entered Mayflower at its intersection with Duarte Road and went south. When he entered Mayflower there were two vehicles ahead of him going south: a butane truck which was a block and a half away, and an automobile which was following the truck. Plaintiff attained a speed of 30 miles an hour, went to the left side of the road, passed the automobile, slowed down and went to the right side of the road. When he did so the butane truck and the automobile were 75 to 100 feet apart. Plaintiff moved out to the left side of the rоad to cut around the butane truck and increased his speed. During this time the butane truck slowed down from 15 to between 5 and 10 miles an hour, when it made а left turn and collided with plaintiff’s truck. Plaintiff did not give a horn signal.
The driver of the butane truck testified his truck was 6 to 7 feet wide; when he was 90 to 100 feet from the рoint of the collision he looked in his rear mirror and saw plaintiff’s truck behind another car from 350 to 500 feet away; his truck was equipped with a signаling device which he extended horizontally when he was 90 feet away from his turn; plaintiff’s speed in attempting to pass him was 45 to 50 miles an hour; the impact was at the left front wheel of his truck; the signal arm was “tore off”; after the impact plaintiff’s truck traveled 100 feet.
Plaintiff first says the evidencе was insufficient to support the verdict. The point is manifestly without merit. It may reasonably be inferred from the evidence that the driver of the butane truck was not negligent and that plaintiff was negligent. The jury may well have concluded that the road was relatively narrow; that plaintiff did not watch the butane truck sufficiently; and that he traveled alongside the truck in an attempt to overtake it at an excessive rate of speed. It сould have concluded that plaintiff violated section 510 of the Vehicle Code which provides: “No person shall drive a vehicle uрon a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable or prudent having due regard for the traffic on, and the surface and width of, the highway, and in no event at a speed which endangers the safety of persons or property.” It could also have concluded that he violated section 671 of the Vehicle Code which in part provides: “The driver of a *822 motor vehicle when reasonably necessary to insurе safe operation shall give audible warning with his horn.”
Plaintiff called the driver of the butane truck as a witness under section 2055 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On doing so he requested the court to inform the jury as to the meaning of section 2055. The court stated: “All the jury need be concerned with is he may cross-examine the witness; that whether the witness is called under 2055 or otherwise, why, his testimony is before the jury to be considered with all the other tеstimony in the case. You may proceed.” Plaintiff asserts the court erred in making the statement. He says the testimony of the driver was not binding on him. Therе was no error. Section 2055 does not mean that the testimony of an adverse witness may not be given its proper weight. It merely means that the рarty calling such witness shall not be precluded from rebutting his testimony or from impeaching the witness; such testimony is to be treated as though given on cross-examination. This rule, of course, does not apply on a motion for a judgment of nonsuit or for a directed verdict; it does apply whеn the cause is submitted after a trial on the merits. Once such testimony is before the court after a trial on the merits it is substantive evidence in the сase for all purposes to which it is relevant, including contradiction of the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s witnesses. (See cases colleсted 21 West’s Cal. Dig. 674, § 591.)
When called under section 2055, the driver of the butane truck was asked: “Now, from the time you looked in the rearview mirror up until the time оf the impact, you didn’t look any more?” He answered: “No, I shifted down into second gear and on the gas and slowed down, and put up my arm signal. ” Counsеl for plaintiff then stated: “We will ask the answer be stricken as not responsive to the question, your Honor.” The request was denied. Plaintiff says the court erred in not striking the part of the answer which was not responsive to the question. The motion was to strike the entire answer, not the part that was nonresponsive. The motion was properly denied.
(Rose
v.
State of California,
The court refused to give the jury the standard instruction on imminent peril requested by plaintiff.
1
Plaintiff
*823
claims error. It was not error to refuse the instruction. There is no evidence in the record that plaintiff either knew or thought he was in peril, and thеre is no evidence that he did anything assuming that he was in peril. Plaintiff testified that the first he knew the driver of the butane truck was going to turn “was almost instantanеous with the impact”; that the driver turned suddenly into him. In
Bosserman
v.
Olmstead,
Plaintiff also contends the court erred in refusing to give several othеr instructions. The point is made by merely stating that the court was in error in refusing such instructions, giving the numbers of them. No argument is forthcoming nor is any attempt madе to show wherein there was error. In those circumstances a reviewing court will not consider the points. An appellant must show error resulting in рrejudice.
The case was well and fairly tried. The jury was fully, fairly, and accurately instructed on all principles of law applicable tо the evidence. There is no merit in any of the assignments of error.
Affirmed.
Shinn, P. J., and Wood (Parker), J., concurred.
Notes
Tlie instruction reads: "A person who, without negligence on his part, is suddenly and unexрectedly confronted with peril, arising from either the actual presence, or the appearance, of imminent danger to *823 himsеlf or to others, is not expected, nor required, to use the same judgment and prudence that is required of him, in the exercise of ordinary cаre, in calmer and „ more deliberate moments. His duty is to exercise only the care that an ordinarily prudent person would exercise in the same situation. If at that moment he does what appears to him to be the best thing to do, and if his choice and manner of action are the same as might have been followed by an ordinarily prudent person under the same conditions, he does all the law requires of him, although, in the light of after events it should appear that a different course would have been better and safer.”