[¶ 1] Seventeen Realty Resources Hospitality, LLC entities (collectively, Realty Resources) and Restaurant Employee Leasing Co., LLC (Releo) appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court (Penobscot County, Hjelm, J.) entered after a jury verdict and awarding compensatory damages to Deborah J. Batchelder on Bat-chelder’s complaint for violation of the Maine Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA), 26 M.R.S. §§ 831-840 (2006), and the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA), 5 M.R.S. §§ 4551-4684 (2006). Realty Resources and Releo contend that the court improperly applied the integrated enterprise theory to hold them hable to Bat-chelder for damages. Batchelder cross-appeals from the same judgment, and contends that the court erred in applying a clear and convincing standard of proof to her statutory punitive damages claim. We affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶ 2] Batchelder was terminated from her position as a waitress at Denny’s restaurant in Bangor in December of 2001, after making several complaints to management about various company practices. In March of 2002, Batchelder filed a complaint against Releo with the Maine Human Rights Commission, from which she obtained a right-to-sue letter pursuant to 5 M.R.S. § 4612(6). 1 Batchelder later filed a complaint in the Superior Court against Realty Resources Hospitality, LLC, operating in seventeen locations throughout New England, fifteen of which were doing business as Denny’s restaurant, as well as Releo, alleging that her employment at Denny’s was terminated in violation of the WPÁ 2 and the MHRA. Batchelder alleged that all the named defendants (collectively, Denny’s) constituted a single entity, and that, based on an integrated enterprise theory, that entity was her employer and it was therefore liable for her damages.
[¶ 3] A jury trial was held in December of 2005. Viewed in the light most favorable to Batchelder, as the prevailing party,
see Poland v. Webb,
If, within 180 days of a complaint being filed with the commission, the commission has not filed a civil action in the case or has not entered into a conciliation agreement in the case, the complainant may request a right-to-sue letter, and, if a letter is given, the commission shall end its investigation.
*1119 Maine, and Realty Resources New England, LLC, for the Denny’s locations in Massachusetts and New Hampshire. Except for the two holding companies, each Realty Resources owns its own land or leasehold interest, equipment, and franchise rights. Each Realty Resources also employs its own managers and assistant managers.
[¶ 4] The eighteenth defendant, Releo, is an employee leasing company that leases hourly employees to each Denny’s location, including all the wait staff. Releo owns no restaurants and has no assets, and is instead an entity established to pay hourly wages in a centralized manner. Releo has no control over hiring and firing, budgets, or food safety. From 2001 to 2003, these fourteen Realty Resources restaurants filed only three aggregated tax returns.
[¶ 5] The jury returned a verdict in which it found in Batchelder’s favor on her whistleblowers’ claim, and that Denny’s did constitute an integrated enterprise. It awarded Batchelder $50,000 in compensatory damages for which all eighteen defendants were jointly and severally liable. The jury, having been instructed that it could award punitive damages only if it found that Denny’s acted with malice or reckless indifference by clear and convincing evidence, awarded no punitive damages to Batchelder. Denny’s appealed and Bat-chelder cross-appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Integrated Enterprise Theory
[¶ 6] Denny’s contends that the court erred when it instructed the jury as to the integrated enterprise theory. 3 The court gave the following instruction to the jury regarding the theory:
The plaintiff alleges that the defendants are an integrated enterprise, which means that they would be treated as a single employer. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving this allegation by a preponderance of the evidence. In determining whether the defendants are an integrated enterprise, you should consider the relationship among the defendants, including the extent to which there is, number one, the interrelation of operations, including such things as shared employees, services, records, office space and equipment, [commingled] finances, and common handling of tasks such as payroll, books, and tax returns. Number two, common management, such as where an individual or group of individuals controls all the businesses and serves as an officer or director for each of them. Number three, centralized control of labor relations such as where a single entity maintains personnel records for each of the companies, where the companies have a shared personnel department, or where the same persons make employment decisions for all entities, and the entities share a universal personnel handbook, and number four, common ownership. You should consider these factors in determining whether the plaintiff has proven that the defendants are an integrated enterprise. Of these factors, however, the most important consideration is whether the *1120 businesses have centralized control of labor relations.
We review the trial court’s jury instructions for prejudicial error to determine whether the court correctly and fairly informed the jury as to all necessary aspects of the applicable law.
Lee v. Scotia Prince Cruises Ltd.,
[¶ 7] The court’s jury instruction on an integrated enterprise was based on the theory as set forth in
Romano v. U-Haul Int’l,
[¶ 8] The integrated enterprise theory has been adopted and/or applied by a number of other jurisdictions, including the majority of the federal circuits.
See, e.g., Knowlton v. Teltrust Phones, Inc.,
[¶ 9] Denny’s does not dispute that Maine should adopt an integrated enterprise theory; rather, it challenges: (1) the application of the integrated enterprise theory to this case as a matter of law, (2) the four-factor test used by the court in applying the theory, and (3) the application of the theory to this case as a matter of fact. It also contends that the court’s jury instruction is not harmless error because the excessive number of defendants held to be hable had an influence on the size of the jury’s award of damages.
[¶ 10] Denny’s, however, failed to make the argument before the trial court that it now makes on appeal, that the integrated enterprise theory should be used only as a jurisdictional test not applicable to these particular defendants. Denny’s now contends that the test of the integrated enterprise theory should have been based on
Papa v. Katy Indus., Inc.,
[¶ 11] Because Denny’s’ arguments are not preserved, we review the integrated enterprise instruction only for obvious error.
See Estate of Bragdon,
B. Punitive Damages
[¶ 12] In her cross-appeal, Batchelder contends that the court erred when it instructed the jury that the standard of proof for Batchelder’s punitive damages claim was clear and convincing evidence, an instruction to which Batchelder objected. She contends that the standard of proof for her punitive damages claim, brought pursuant to the MHRA, should instead be preponderance of the evidence.
[¶ 13] The standard of proof for punitive damages claims has long been settled law in Maine. In 1985, we decided
Tuttle v. Raymond,
[¶ 14] In this case, however, Batchelder sought punitive damages pursuant to a particular statutory provision, 5 M.R.S. § 4613, rather than common law. Located within the MHRA, and applicable to WPA claims, section 4613 provides, in pertinent part: “A complaining party may recover punitive damages under this subparagraph against a respondent if the complaining party demonstrates that the respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless indifference to the rights of an aggrieved individual protected by this Act.” 5 M.R.S. § 4613(2)(B)(8)(c); see also 26 M.R.S. § 834-A (2006) (permitting the filing of a private civil whistleblowers’ discrimination claim pursuant to the MHRA). Section 4613, then, permits an award of punitive damages on proof of conduct found to be less than malicious, i.e., if a defendant acted with reckless indifference. Section 4613, however, does not speak to the standard of proof that is to be applied in determining whether a defendant acted with malice or with reckless indifference so as to be held responsible for punitive damages.
[¶ 15] Batchelder contends that punitive damages awarded in statutory employment discrimination litigation pursuant to section 4613 should be subject to a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof. In support of her contention, she argues that: (1) the standard of proof for punitive damages in corresponding federal legislation, the federal Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 1981-2000h-6 (LexisNexis 2000), is a mere preponderance of the evidence; (2) the Maine Legislature copied the exact language of the Civil Rights Act in adopting section 4613 in 1997 by allowing proof of punitive damages on a finding of malice or reckless indifference; and (3) the Maine Legislature’s adoption of the same language in the MHRA as in the Civil Rights Act, and its failure to modify section 4613 to reflect our prior holding in Tuttle, indicates a legislative intent that punitive damages in the MHRA be subject to the same standard of proof as in the Civil Rights Act. Finally, Batchelder argues that the intent element in employment discrimination cases already makes such cases more difficult to prove than common law tort cases, and that the Legislature could not possibly have intended to create a further hurdle to plaintiffs by also requiring them to prove an entitlement to punitive damages by clear and convincing evidence.
[¶ 16] Batchelder is correct that the standard of proof for obtaining punitive damages in federal employment cases, as well as federal civil cases in general, is preponderance of the evidence.
See, e.g., Karnes v. SCI Colo. Funeral Sews., Inc.,
[¶ 17] “When reviewing the construction of a statute, we look first to the plain meaning of the statutory language as a means of effecting the legislative intent.”
Home Builders Ass’n of Me., Inc. v. Town of Eliot,
[¶ 18] In this case, nothing in the plain language of section 4613 indicates what standard of proof is required in employment discrimination cases brought pursuant to the MHRA, or that in adopting section 4613 the Legislature intended to follow or to contradict either
Tuttle
or the Civil Rights Act on this point. When the controlling statute does not define the applicable standard of proof, it is traditionally a matter for the judiciary to resolve.
See Taylor v. Comm’r of Mental Health & Mental Retardation,
[¶ 19] The legislative history of section 4613 indicates that subsection (2)(B)(8) was adopted in 1997 in order to “make[] the remedies available in proven cases of unlawful discrimination under the Maine Human Rights Act the same as those now available under the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Federal Fan-Housing Amendments Act of 1988.” L.D. 1713, Summary (118th Legis. 1997). More specifically, the amendment was intended to “revise[] the new compensatory and punitive damages provisions to apply to only intentional employment discrimination, but [not to apply to] employers with fewer than 15 employees. This is consistent with the federal law.” Comm. Amend. A to L.D. 1713, No. H-592 (118th Legis. 1997).
[¶ 20] We have often looked to federal counterparts in interpreting state statutes,
see, e.g., Blethen Me. Newspapers, Inc. v. State,
[¶ 21] Although both the plain language and the legislative history of the MHRA are silent as to the applicable standard of proof, the circumstances of the adoption of the preponderance standard to federal statutory civil rights claims are instructive. Indeed, like the MHRA, the federal Civil Rights Act also contains no mention of the applicable standard of proof. Nevertheless, federal courts have looked to and adopted the federal common law standard of proof in interpreting federal statutes that are otherwise silent as to the applicable standard of proof.
See Pnce Water-house v. Hopkins,
[¶ 22] In Maine, however, the common law requires proof of punitive damages claims by the more rigorous clear and convincing standard.
Tuttle,
[¶ 23] Further, we have long embraced the well-established rule of statutory construction that “the common law is not to be changed by doubtful implication, be overturned except by clear and unambiguous language, and that a statute in derogation of it will not effect a change thereof beyond that clearly indicated either by express terms or by necessary implication.”
Valente v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot.,
[¶ 24] The rationale supporting the adoption of the clear and convincing standard in
Tuttle
in 1985 — avoiding an overbroad application of an extreme remedy for egregious cases — is equally applicable to employment discrimination cases. Indeed, we have applied the clear and convincing standard to every punitive damages matter that has come before us since our decision in
Tuttle
in 1985, including employment-related cases.
See, e.g., Ballard v. Wag
*1125
ner,
[¶ 25] Adoption of a higher standard of proof is necessary “to meet the degree of confidence our society thinks [the factfin-der] should have in the correctness of factual conclusions involved in those adjudications.”
Petit v. Key Bank of Me.,
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
. Title 5 M.R.S. § 4612(6) (2006) provides:
. The WPA provides in pertinent part that "[n]o employer may discharge, threaten or otherwise discriminate against an employee regarding the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, location or privileges of employment” because the employee reports to the employer or any public body an employer’s violation of any rules, laws, health and safety practices, or reasonable standards of care. 26 M.R.S. § 833(1) (2006). Because there is no challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s verdict that Batchelder proved her whistleblowers’ claim, we do not detail all the facts pertinent to that claim.
. Denny's also contends that Batchelder was precluded from recovering compensatory damages from the seventeen Realty Resources entities pursuant to 5 M.R.S. § 4622(1) (2006) because she failed to name them in her previous complaint before the Commission. Because Denny’s failed to preserve this argument by bringing it to the attention of the trial court,
see Fitch v. Doe,
. In
Papa,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected the four-factor integrated enterprise test, and adopted a more narrow version of the theory, concluding that corporations may be considered affiliated only in three circumstances: (1) when a parent corporation is liable for the employer entity’s debts, (2) when a corporation splits into a number of smaller corporations for the purpose of avoiding liability, and (3) when the parent corporation directs the discriminatory acts of the subsidiary.
Papa v. Katy Indus., Inc.,
. Because Releo does not dispute that it has sufficient funds to satisfy the judgment, we need not determine any allocation of liability among the defendants on the damages awarded. We also reject Denny’s’ contention that, as a matter of fact, insufficient evidence exists in the record to support the jury’s verdict as to the theory of an integrated enterprise on which the court instructed.
. In order to persuade a fact-finder by a clear and convincing standard of proof, the party with the burden must convince the fact-finder that the truth of the asserted factual contentions is “highly probable."
Taylor v. Comm'r of Mental Health & Mental Retardation,