Aрpellants, J.C. and Charlene Bass (collectively “Bass”), appeal a summary judgment for the defendants in this Administrative Procedures Act suit challenging the Farm Service Agency’s (“FSA”) appraisal of farm property. We affirm.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case involves a dispute over the way in which the FSA established the repurchase price for farm land that Bass conveyed to the FSA when he became unable to repay FSA-financed loans. 1 The property at issue consists of 531 acres located in Amite County, Mississipрi. Bass farmed the land beginning in 1966. In 1977, Bass financed the land through the FSA. Because of financial reverses in 1990, Bass entered into an agreement to deed the farm to FSA in exchange for forgiveness of the debt. The parties agreed that FSA would lease the fаrm back to Bass with an option to repurchase, pursuant to the FSA’s “leaseback/buyback” program, authorized by the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act (“CONACT”), 7 U.S.C. § 1921-2009 (1994).
In 1996, Bass notified FSA that he intended to exercise the repurchase option. A dispute arose concerning the value of the farm. After extensive administrative proceedings, Bass sought judicial review of the valuation ruling by the Director of the USDA’s National Appeals Division (“Director”). The district court entered summary judgment for dеfendants and this appeal followed.
II. TIMELINESS OF MOTION TO REOPEN APPEAL PERIOD
The district court entered judgment on November 10, 1998. On November 19, Bass retained new counsel who moved for reconsideration. On November 20, Bass’s new counsel filed a notice of appearance, giving as his address “300 West Claiborne, Avenue, Greenwood, Mississippi.” Defendants opposed the motion for reconsideration and on December 28, 1998, Bass’s counsel moved for an enlargement of time to file a rebuttal to defendants’ oppоsition. The district court granted this motion, but the clerk mailed a copy of the order to Bass’s counsel at “P.O. Box 1350, Greenwood, Mississippi.” The order was returned to the clerk’s office “not deliverable as addressed.”
On January 20, 1999, the district court enterеd an order denying Bass’s motion for reconsideration. The docket sheet indicates that copies of the order were mailed, and there is no “undeliverable” notation in the docket with respect to service of the order on Bass’s сounsel. On May 27, 1999, Bass’s counsel filed a notice of appeal. Counsel also filed an affidavit averring that on the morning of May 26, *962 1999, he received a telephone call from Mr. Bass advising him that the court had entered an order denying the motion fоr reconsideration. Counsel contacted the district court clerk’s office on May 26, and was advised by the docketing clerk that the order had been entered on January 20, 1999, and a copy mailed to him at “P.O. Box 1350.” Counsel averred that he had nоt received the order, had not used that address since 1997, and that he had provided the clerk with his correct address.
On June 3, 1999, counsel for Bass filed a motion to reopen the time for appeal, pursuant to Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(6). The motion was аccompanied by counsel’s affidavit, in which he stated that he received a copy of the order denying reconsideration in the mail on May 28, 1999. On June 22, 1999, counsel for Bass filed a second notice of appeal.
Federal Rule of Aрpellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(B) requires that the notice of appeal in a civil action in which the United States is a party be filed within 60 days of entry of the judgment or order from which appeal is taken. A timely motion to alter or amend a judgmеnt under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) suspends the time for filing a notice of appeal until entry of an order disposing of the motion. Fed. R.App. R. 4(a)(4).
There is no motion for “reconsideration” in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
See Hamilton Plaintiffs v. Williams Plaintiffs,
We must next determine whether the district court abused its discretion in granting Bass’s motion to extend the period for filing his notice of appeal.
See United States v. Clark,
In order to determine whether the motion was timely it is necessary to determine whether counsel received notice on May 26, when he learned of the order over the telephone and orally confirmed entry with the district court clerk, or whether he is deemed to have received notice on May 28, when he received a written copy of the order in the mail. The appellate computation-of-time rules provide that “in computing any period of time specified in these rules ... [ejxclude intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays when the period is less than 7 days....” Fed. RApp. P. 26(a). If the seven-day filing period was triggered on May 26, then in accordance with Rules 4(a)(6) and 26(a) the motion was due to be filed June 2, and thе motion filed on June 3 was untimely. If the seven-day period was triggered on May 28 when Bass’s counsel received a *963 written copy of the order, the motion was timely.
This circuit has not expressly held whether “receives notice” under Rule 4(a)(6) means acquiring knowledge of facts through oral communicаtion which would lead a prudent person to make inquiry or the receipt of written notice. Some circuits have expressly held that the seven-day period is triggered only by receipt of written notice.
See, e.g., Scott-Harris v. City of Fall River,
We are convinced that “the better perception is that the rule requires written notice.” 16A Wright, Miller, & Cooper, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 3d § 3950.6 (West 1999). Both the rule itself and policy concerns support this conclusion.
First, Appellate Rule 4(a)(6) and Civil Rule 77(d)
2
must be read
in pari materia. See Scottr-Harris,
provides a limited opportunity for relief in circumstances where the notice of entry of a judgment or order, required to be mailed by the clerk of the district court pursuant to [Rule 77(d) ],, is either not received by a party or is received so late as to impair the opportunity to file a timely notice of appeal.
Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(6) Advisory Committee’s Notes. Thе statement “required to be mailed” refers to “notice of entry of a judgment or order,” again suggesting that the notice must be in writing.
See Scottr-Harris,
Bass’s motion to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal, filed within seven *964 days of the date he received written notice of the court’s order, was timely. There appearing on this record nо other impediment to the district court’s exercise of discretion, we hold that the district court did not err in granting the motion.
III.EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
Bass argues that 7 C.F.R. § 1955.107(c), rather than 7 C.F.R. § 1922.201, governs how the purchase price for his farm should be determined. “As a general rule, in considering а petition for review from a final agency order, the courts will not consider questions of law which were neither presented to nor passed on by the agency.”
Myron v. Martin,
IV.APPLICATION OF 7 C.F.R. § 1951.909(i)(3)
The district court held that the Director’s citation tо 7 C.F.R. § 1951.909(0(3) governing the method for determining the repurchase price of the farm was erroneous, but because the error went only to the weight the Director accorded Bass’s evidence, it did not render the decision arbitrary, capricious, оr an abuse of discretion.
The regulation at issue provides that “[bjorrowers appealing the current market appraisal may obtain an appraisal by an independent appraiser selected from a list of at least three names provided by the servicing official.” 7 C.F.R. § 1951.909(i)(3)(i). This language does not mandate that Bass produce an independent appraisal in order to challenge the FSA appraisal. See id. Bass was required to show only that the FSA’s determination of value wаs erroneous “by a preponderance of the evidence.” 7 U.S.C. § 6997(c)(4). FSA properly applied this standard in rejecting Bass’s appeal. The record does not support Bass’s allegation that the Director totally disregarded Bass’s аppraisal. Although the Director accorded Bass’s appraisal little weight, the Director’s determination adequately articulates a relationship between the facts found and its decision to accept the FSA’s appraisal over the opinion submitted by Bass’s appraiser. We therefore conclude that the district court’s summary judgment for defendants must be affirmed.
V.CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we hold that we have jurisdiction to consider the merits of this appeal and that the district court’s summary judgment for defendants is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. The FSA was formerly known as the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA), an agency of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). For simplicity, the agency is referred to as FSA throughout this opinion.
. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 77(d) provides:
Notice of Orders or Judgements.
Immediately upon the entry of an order оr judgment the clerk shall serve a notice of the entry by mail in the manner provided for in Rule 5 upon each party who is not in default for failure to appear, and shall make a note in the docket of the mailing. Any party may in addition serve a notice of such entry in the manner provided in Rule 5 for the service of papers. Lack of notice of the entry by the clerk does not affect the time to appeal or relieve or authorize the court to relieve a party for failure to appeal within the time allowed, except as permitted in Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.