ORDER
This matter is before the court upon defendants’ motions to dismiss and motions for judgment on the pleadings.
BACKGROUND
This privacy dispute arises out of defendants’ access of the motor vehicle record of plaintiff Brooke Nicole Bass between 2005 and 2012. Compl. ¶260. Bass asserts claims against numerous counties and cities, as well as against the current and former commissioners of the Minnesota Department of Public Safety (DPS).
DPS makes drivers’ motor vehicle records available to law enforcement officers through a computerized Driver and Vehicle Services (DVS) database. Id. ¶ 128. In 2013, Bass requested an audit of her DVS motor vehicle record from DPS. Id. ¶ 3; see id. Ex. A. The audit showed that the record had been accessed hundreds of times from facilities maintained by defendant counties and cities. See Compl. ¶ 371. The record included her address, photograph, date of birth, weight, height, eye color and driver identification number. Id. ¶ 227. Each City and County Defendant accessed the record between one and seventy-four times. See id. Ex. A. Bass alleges that there was no legitimate purpose for each access, and that the Commissioner Defendants “knowingly disclosed [her] ... [p]rivate [d]ata and violated state policy by devising and implementing ... the DVS Database.” Compl. ¶ 240.
On April 12, 2013, Bass filed suit, alleging claims (1) under the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), (2) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and (3) for invasion of privacy. The Commissioners, County and City Defendants each move to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings.
DISCUSSION
1. Standard of Review
The same standard governs a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
II. DPPA Claims
Bass first asserts a claim against all defendants for violations of the DPPA. The DPPA provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to obtain or disclose personal information,
A. Statute of Limitations
Defendants first argue that some of the DPPA claims are time-barred. Because the DPPA does not contain a statute of limitations, the general four-year federal statute of limitations applies. See 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a) (“Except as otherwise provided by law, a civil action arising under an Act of Congress ... may not be commenced later than 4 years after the cause of action accrues.”). The parties dispute, however, when a DPPA cause of action accrues. Defendants argue that the court should adopt “[t]he general rule concerning statutes of limitation^ which] is that a cause of action accrues when the wrong occurs and a party sustains injuries for which relief could be sought.” Ridenour v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms., Inc.,
Although the Eighth Circuit is silent on when a DPPA cause of action accrues, courts in this district hold that the general accrual rule applies to the DPPA. See, e.g., Rasmusson v. Chisago Cnty., No. 12-632,
B. Claims Against Commissioners
As to the timely claims, Bass first alleges DPPA claims against the Commissioner Defendants. Bass does not allege, however, that the Commissioner Defendants personally obtained the record or personally communicated such information to others. Rather, Bass alleges that the Commissioner Defendants created, maintained and inadequately monitored the DVS database, thereby facilitating others’ improper access to the record.
To be liable under the DPPA, however, “the Commissioners themselves must have acted with ... a[n impermissible] purpose.” Nelson v. Jesson, No. 13-340,
As to the remaining claims, Bass alleges that the City and County Defendants accessed her motor vehicle record “for a purpose not permitted under the DPPA.” Compl. ¶ 313. Defendants respond that such allegations are insufficient to state a claim under Iqbal and Twombly. The court agrees.
Under the DPPA, the plaintiff has the burden of pleading that a defendant accessed a motor vehicle record with an impermissible purpose. See Maracich v. Spears,
Moreover, “in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that [public officers] have properly discharged their official duties.” United States v. Chem. Found., Inc.,
III. Section 1983 Claims
Bass next alleges § 1983 claims, arguing that defendants violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by accessing her information or allowing others to do so. Claims under § 1983 require that defendants acted under color of state law and that their conduct resulted in a denial of rights secured by the United States Constitution or by federal law. Scheeler v. City of St. Cloud, Minn.,
A. Constitutional Claims
Bass alleges that defendants violated her constitutional right to privacy and her constitutional right to be free from unreasonable search, and that the City Defendants are vicariously liable for the unconstitutional acts of their employees.
1. Right to Privacy
Bass alleges that defendants violated her Fourth Amendment right to privacy.
Here, the mere fact that the data about Bass allegedly accessed by defendants was personal information does not render it private information subject to constitutional protection. An expectation of privacy is reasonable where there is “both an actual subjective expectation and, even more importantly ... that expectation must be one which society will accept as reasonable.” McDonell v. Hunter,
Bass alleges that defendants accessed data including her address, photograph, date of birth, weight, height, eye color and driver identification number. Even if Bass had a subjective expectation of privacy in this information, such an expectation is not one that is objectively reasonable. Indeed, such information is not uniquely available from the DVS database. See Condon v. Reno,
Moreover, contexts involving public regulation necessarily require reduced expectations of privacy. See id. (“[P]ervasive schemes of regulation, like vehicle licensing, must necessarily lead to reduced expectations of privacy.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Further, drivers routinely share such information with government actors for purposes of vehicle licensing and registration, and “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.” Smith v. Maryland,
Finally, Congress expressly recognized numerous situations in which the information contained in motor vehicle records may be lawfully accessed. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b). Given these exceptions, the information in the DVS database is not subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy once communicated to DPS. In sum, any expectation of privacy Bass had in the information defendants allegedly accessed is not one society recognizes as reasonable. As a result, there is no constitutional right to privacy in the information allegedly accessed, and dismissal is warranted.
2. Right to Freedom from Unreasonable Search
Bass next alleges that, by accessing the record, defendants violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search. Bass, however, lacks standing to argue that the alleged access of the record violated her Fourth Amendment rights. “Fourth Amendment rights are personal and may not be asserted vicariously.” United States v. Green,
Even if Bass had standing, however, defendants argue that accessing a motor vehicle record is not a search under the Fourth Amendment. The court agrees. An intrusion is a search for Fourth Amendment purposes only “if it violates a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy,” Nelson v. Jesson, No. 13-340,
3. Municipal Liability
Bass next argues that the City Defendants are liable for the acts of unknown defendants who accessed her information. “[A] municipality may be held liable for the unconstitutional acts of its officials or employees when those acts implement or execute an unconstitutional municipal policy or custom.” Mettler v. Whitledge,
B. Statutory Claims
Bass next argues that defendants’ alleged violations of the DPPA are enforceable through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Defendants argue that, even if Bass could state a claim for violations of the DPPA, her § 1983 claims for statutory violations should be dismissed because the DPPA is not enforceable through § 1983. Several courts in this district have agreed with such a position, finding that the DPPA precludes enforcement through § 1983. See, e.g., Rasmusson, 991F.Supp.2d at 1073-
In Kiminski, for example, Judge Ericksen analyzed the text of the DPPA and its similarity to other statutes that preclude enforcement through § 1983 and held that “consideration of the DPPA’s explicit private remedy under 18 U.S.C. § 2724 confirms that enforcement under § 1983 would be inconsistent with it.”
IV. Invasion of Privacy Claim
Bass next alleges claims for invasion of privacy. Specifically, Bass argues that defendants intruded upon her seclusion. Under Minnesota law,
Here, the information allegedly-accessed included Bass’s address, photograph, date of birth, weight, height, eye color and driver identification number. No reasonable person could find that the alleged access of such information meets the “highly offensive” threshold. The information, though personal, is not particularly sensitive or intimate in nature. Further, as already explained, individuals routinely turn over such information. Moreover, the few cases that have found actionable invasions of privacy are based on much more egregious facts than those present here. See, e.g., Swarthout v. Mut. Serv. Life Ins. Co.,
V. Severance
Finally, Hennepin County moves for severance pursuant to Rule 20. Rule 20 permits persons or entities to be joined as defendants if “(A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a)(2). Rule 20 permits all “reasonably related” claims against different parties “to be tried in a single proceeding.” Mosley v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
Bass fails to satisfy the first prong of the test announced in Rule 20. A plaintiff may not join defendants on the mere basis of similar transactions — “the rule permitting joinder requires that [a right to relief] arise from the same transactions.” Movie Sys., Inc. v. Abel,
In essence, Bass suggests that “because [she] was wronged in the same way by several different individuals, the transactional requirement of Rule 20 is met. Such a reading of Rule 20 would improperly expand the Rule.” DIRECTV v. Loussaert,
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, based on the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. The motions to dismiss and motions for judgment on the pleadings [ECF Nos. 25, 43, 55, 59, 62, 67, 71] are granted;
Notes
. Defendants include Anoka County, Benton County, Blue Earth County, Carver County, Chisago County, Clay County, Cook County, Crow Wing County, Dakota County, Dodge
. The City of Minneapolis is the sole defendant that does not move to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings.
. The DPPA defines "personal information” as including "an individual's photograph, social security number, driver identification number, name, address ..., telephone number, and medical or disability information.” 18 U.S.C. § 2725(3).
. Section 2721(b) provides that permissible uses include, but are not limited to: court and law enforcement functions, motor vehicle or driver safety or monitoring, certain conduct ed legitimate businesses, research activities, production of statistical reports, insurance-related purposes, private investigative agency or security service activities and bulk distribution of surveys and marketing materials. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b).
. A "person” includes "an individual, organization or entity, but does not include a State or agency thereof.” 18 U.S.C. § 2725(2).
. Bass also argues that, even if the general accrual rule otherwise applies, the court should apply the discovery rule because defendants fraudulently concealed their activities. In some situations, "fraudulent concealment of information material to a non-fraud claim will toll a limitations period.” Abbotts v. Campbell,
. "The Fourth Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.” Barrett v. Claycomb,
. Courts have broadly construed § 1983 as providing a remedy for official violations of many federally-protected rights. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc.,
. Intrusion upon seclusion is subject to the two-year statute of limitations for torts resulting in personal injury. Hough v. Shakopee Pub. Schs.,