48 A.D.2d 667 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1975
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (1) to review a determination of the appellant Zoning Board of Appeals, rendered August 30, 1973, approving an application for a use variance and (2) to revoke the building permit issued by the appellant building inspector, the appeal is from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Rockland County, dated May 31, 1974, which annulled the said determination and revoked the said building permit. Judgment affirmed, without costs. No opinion. Martuscello, Acting P. J., Latham and Cohalan, JJ., concur; Shapiro, J., dissents and votes to reverse the judgment, dismiss the petition, confirm the determination and reinstate the building permit, with the following memorandum, in which Christ, J., concurs. This court is affirming the judgment of Special Term, which annulled a determination of the respondent Zoning Board of Appeals. That board, after a public hearing, granted a variance to one Martin Landa, permitting him to install a second kitchen in the one-family residence he was constructing for himself and his son and daughter-in-law on a plot he owned, which was located in an area zoned for one-family residences. I believe that the board’s action should be sustained and, consequently, I dissent from the determination of this court. At the public hearing held by the Zoning Board of Appeals on Landa’s application for a variance, the petitioner respondent appeared in person and by counsel and voiced his objection to the granting of the variance. The Zoning Board of Appeals granted the variance after finding that (1) differences in the degree of religious observance between the applicant and his son and daughter in law required that the applicant have a kitchen separate and apart from that used by his son, (2) the structure being built had a single entrance, a single boiler and only one utility room, (3) the staircase separating the upstairs and downstairs consisted of an open staircase and (4) there was a single entrance to the premises. The board also found that the applicant had consented to a living arrangement with his son and daughter in law in order to permit his son to continue to attend school and had agreed to remove the second kitchen when it was no longer required for his personal use. Thus, the major issue posed by this appeal is whether the fact that a house which is to be occupied by what would clearly qualify as one