¶ 1 In this appeal, we determine the nature of the relationship between mass-market tax preparer H & R Block, Inc., and H & R Block Eastern Tax Services, Inc. (Block), and taxpayers who retained Block’s services to file their tax returns under Block’s Rapid Refund ®, service between 1990 and 1993. Plaintiffs contend, inter alia, that Block was their agent and/or fiduciary and owed them a corresponding duty to disclose that their purported rapid refunds were, in fact, short-term, high interest, refund anticipation loans (RALs) in which Block shared an interest with Defendant Mellon Bank, N.A. (Mellon). The trial court entered summary judgment, concluding that Block was neither a fiduciary nor an agent and, consequently, did not owe the plaintiffs any duty of disclosure. For the following reasons, we reverse in part and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
¶ 2 Plaintiffs Sandra J. Basile and Laura Clavin commenced the underlying action by class action complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. Plaintiffs named as defendants both Block and Mellon. Plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that Mellon acted as the consumer lender through which the RALs were made and participated with Block in practices designed to deceive consumers as to the true nature of the RALs. Shortly after the action was commenced, Block and Mellon *578 served notice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, of removal of the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (U.S.D.C.) on the basis of federal diversity jurisdiction. In federal court, Plaintiffs filed their Amended Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial asserting substantive counts against both defendants for Violation of Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1638; Fraud; Negligent Misrepresentation; Violation of Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 73 P.S. § 201-2-201-9.2 (UTPCPL); and Violation of the Delaware Legal Rate of Interest, 6 DeLCode. § 2301(a). Plaintiffs also asserted Breach of Fiduciary Duty against Block.
¶ 3 The matter proceeded in the U.S.D.C. before the Honorable Edmund V. Ludwig. Upon completion of discovery, both Block and Mellon filed motions for summary judgment on all claims. Judge Ludwig granted Defendants’ motions in part, dismissing Plaintiffs’ Truth in Lending and interest rate claims. Judge Ludwig also found that “[i]nasmuch as plaintiffs’ unfair trade practices claim arises from the bank’s interest rate charges, it is preempted by the National Bank Act.”
Basile v. H & R Block, Inc.,
¶ 4 Following remand, Plaintiffs moved for class certification pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 1701-1716 and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In an order dated June 17, 1996, the Honorable Bernard J. Avellino, directed that, for purposes of certification:
the Court will assume (albeit arguendo) that H & R [Block] was the “agent” of any person for whom it prepared a tax return. That assumption is required because a certification motion is not the functional equivalent of a summary judgment motion. Stated differently, the Court should avoid a merits inquiry when faced with a certification question.
Order of Court, 1/17/96. Judge Avellino also denied summary judgment on the parties’ cross-motions without prejudice to refile after the class certification hearing.
¶ 5 Subsequently, the matter proceeded to a class certification hearing before the Honorable John W. Herron. Judge Her-ron reasoned that the order of the U.S.D.C., which Plaintiffs did not appeal, disposed,
inter alia,
of Plaintiffs’ UTPCPL claims in their entireties. Trial Court Opinion, 5/30/98, at 13, 15-19. The court concluded in the alternative, however, that had the claims not been pre-empted, they would not be appropriate for class treatment because Plaintiffs could not show causation without testimony from all individual members of the class. Similarly, Judge Herron denied certification of Plaintiffs’ claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation, citing precedent that would require a showing of individual reliance by each member of the prospective class.
Id.
at 69-70. Due to the numerosity of the class, numbering as many as 600,000, the court found this aspect of proof prohibitive.
Id. See
Pa.R.C.P. 1708(a)(2). By contrast, the court granted certification of the prospective class on Plaintiffs’ fiduciary duty claim, based in part on Judge Avellino’s presumption order,
infra,
and also recognizing that “no consideration of the merits of an action should be undertaken at [the certification hearing].” Trial Court Opinion,
supra,
at 74-75 (citing
Miller v. Federal Kemper Insurance Company,
All Pennsylvania residents who, while having their tax returns prepared by Block, applied for and received a “Rapid Refund” of their federal tax refund during the years 1990 through 1993 through Block’s Rapid Refund Anticipation Loan Program at Block’s offices or places of business located in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
*579 Order of Court, 5/30/97, at 2. The court also disqualified Laura Clavin as a class representative, citing Clavin’s potential conflict of interest under Pa.R.C.P. 1702(4), 1709(2). Id. at 1. Judge Herron found that Clavin had been employed as a paralegal at the law firm of class counsel until sometime in 1996. Trial Court Opinion, supra, at 9.
¶ 6 Following class certification, the plaintiffs and Block filed cross-motions for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim of fiduciary duty. Block asserted that it had not been engaged as agent for the plaintiffs, and further, that there was no confidential relationship between the parties. The matter proceeded for argument before the Honorable Stephen E. Levin, who agreed with Block and granted summary judgment, dismissing Plaintiffs’ complaint, ostensibly in its entirety. Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12/31/97. However, in a subsequent Memorandum, Judge Levin opined: “[T]his court does not believe that its dismissal of plaintiffs’ class action suit has any bearing whatsoever on any separate, individual claims under the Pennsylvania Consumer Protection Law.” Memorandum, 2/10/98.
¶ 7 Plaintiffs filed this timely appeal from Judge Levin’s order granting summary judgment on their claims of breach of fiduciary duty and agency, and from Judge Herron’s order finding Plaintiffs’ UTPCPL claims pre-empted, and disqualifying Laura Clavin as a class representative. Brief in Support of Plaintiffs’ Appeal, at 1-3. Plaintiffs also assert that Judge Levin erred in dismissing their entire action without reference to the individual claims of Clavin and Basile. Id. Defendant Block cross-appeals from Judge Avellino’s order affixing a presumption of agency to the court’s consideration of the motion for certification on Plaintiffs’ fiduciary duty claims. Brief of Cross Appellants/Appellees/Cross Appellants [sic] H & R Block, Inc., and H & R Block Eastern Tax Services, Inc., at 1.
¶ 8 We focus initially on Plaintiffs’ appeal from Judge Levin’s order granting summary judgment to Block on Plaintiffs’ claim of breach of fiduciary duty. Our scope of review is plenary.
State Farm Auto. Ins. v. Universal Ins.,
when the course pursued represents not merely an error of judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that the action is 'a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.
Tukovits v. Prudential Insurance Company of America,
¶ 9 Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1035.2 provides that the court may enter summary judgment upon motion where the “adverse party who will bear the burden of proof at trial has failed to produce evidence essential to the cause of action or defense which in a jury trial would require the issues to be submitted to a jury.” Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2(2). Judge Levin found, *580 in ruling on Block’s motion, that Plaintiffs had failed to produce evidence to show either principal-agent, or confidential relationships between the parties. The court concluded accordingly that Block did not owe Plaintiffs a fiduciary duty. Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra, at 3-8.
¶ 10 We first address the court’s ruling that the evidence failed to demonstrate a principal-agent relationship. In support of its ruling, the court found that Plaintiffs merely provided information for the preparation of the return, but that Block prepared “and ultimately filed the returns without any input from (or review by) plaintiffs.” Id. at 6. The court reasoned, accordingly, that “no evidence has been presented to establish that Basile — or any other plaintiff — exercised any substantial control over Block’s preparation and electronic filing of tax returns.” Id.
¶ 11 Upon review of pertinent case law, we conclude that the trial court’s conclusion reflects application of an incorrect standard to its consideration of the agency relationship. Though Judge Herron’s opinion does not directly so state, the focus of his analysis on control of the mechanical preparation and filing of the plaintiffs’ tax returns suggests application of the test for a master-servant relationship.
¶ 12 Both we and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court have drawn careful distinctions between the two forms of relationship based on the expansive right of control vested in a master, as opposed to the limited right of control held by other principals. Our Supreme Court has explained that:
A master is a species of principal, and a servant is a species of agent. A master is a principal who employs an agent to perform service in his affairs and who controls or has the right to control the physical conduct of the other in the performance of the service. A servant is an agent employed by a master to perform service in his affairs whose physical conduct in the service is controlled or is subject to the right to control by the master. Thus a master not only controls the results of the work but also may direct the manner in which such work shall be done, and a servant, in rendering the agreed services, remains entirely under the control and direction of the master. Those rendering service but retaining control over the manner of doing it are not servants. They may be agents, agreeing only to use care and skill to accomplish a result and subject to the fiduciary duties of loyalty and obedience to the wishes of the principal.
Smalich v. Westfall,
¶ 13 Agency is “[t]he relationship which results from (1) the manifestation of consent of one person to another that (2) the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and (3) consent by the other so to act.”
Smalich, supra,
at 413,
The right of control of the principal may be exercised by prescribing what the agent shall or shall not do before the agent acts, or at the time when he acts, or at both times.... The control of the principal does not, however, include control at every moment, its exercise may be very attenuated and, as where the principal is physically absent may be ineffective.
Smalich, supra,
at 413,
¶ 14 Upon applying Pennsylvania’s law of agency to the facts of record here, we find that the parties’ interaction was legally sufficient to establish an agency relationship. The record establishes that Plaintiffs visited Block offices in response to media promotions of the Rapid Refund program to engage Block to achieve two results: 1) to complete and file their tax returns, and; 2) to obtain a refund of any overpayment of taxes they had made to the Internal Revenue Service. Deposition of Laura Clavin, 11/18/93, at 103-04; Deposition of Sandra J. Basile, 11/17/93, at 33-35. Though the plaintiffs did not direct the actual preparation of tax forms, they remained at Block’s office while Block’s employee completed the forms. Clavin Deposition, supra, at 104-05; Basile Deposition, supra, at 39-40. After the employee had completed the return, he or she requested the Plaintiffs’ signatures on their returns prior to transmitting the returns to the Internal Revenue Service and the state Department of Revenue. Clavin Deposition, supra, at 104-05; Basile Deposition, supra, at 39-40.
¶ 15 A taxpayer who signs and submits a return bears ultimate responsibility for its contents.
United States v. Romanow,
¶ 16 Because we find as a matter of fact, that the evidence establishes a principal-agent relationship, we find as a matter of law that Block owed Plaintiffs a fiduciary duty as to all matters within the scope of the agency.
See Garbish v. Malvern Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n.,
¶ 17 We next address purported errors in Judge Herron’s disposition of the issue of class certification. Plaintiffs assert that Judge Herron erred in concluding that the order of the U.S.D.C., disposing of their interest rate claims, preempted Plaintiffs’ UTPCPL claim. In support of its finding of preemption, the trial court found that:
the [U.S.D.C.’s] analysis is cast in the broad terms of 73 Pa.C.SA. [sic; P.S.] § 201-2(4) without distinctions as to any particular subsection. Moreover, [the court] concluded that any alleged damage sustained by plaintiffs due to violation of § 201-2(4) fell within the parameters of the National Bank Act and was thus preempted by it.
Trial Court Opinion, supra, at 17.
¶ 18 Upon careful review of the decision in Basile, we disagree with Judge Herron’s analysis of the content of the federal court’s decision and its affect on Plaintiffs’ substantive claims. As discussed, Judge Ludwig concluded in Basile that “inasmuch as plaintiffs’ unfair trade practices claim arises from the bank’s interest rate charges, it is preempted by the National Bank Act.” Basile, supra, at 199. We find this holding ambiguous on its face and susceptible to competing definitions that accompany the use of “inasmuch as.” See Webster’s Third New International Die- *583 TIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 1140 (3d ed.1976) (defining “inasmuch as” to mean “1. In the degree that: insofar as,” or “2. In view of the fact that: ... SINCE, because”). We note, however, that Judge Ludwig’s discussion clarifies this ambiguity, focusing on specific allegations of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint. Basile, supra, at 198. The court framed its discussion as follows:
The amended complaint further alleges a violation of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act, 73 Pa.C.SA. [sic; P.S.] § 201-2(4). Specifically, plaintiffs contest the annual percentage rate charged by Mellon Bank. Amended Complaint, ¶ 60; response to motion for summary judgment at 43. Defendants claim federal jurisdiction over this issue by virtue of preemption under the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 85.
Id. Significantly, the court both cited to a particular paragraph of the complaint and characterized that paragraph as a dispute over the appropriate rate of interest. The court neither cited nor addressed allegations elsewhere in the Amended Complaint that delineated other conduct unrelated to the interest charged by Mellon Bank, but cognizable • nonetheless under the UTPCPL. Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 55-59. Thus, the court’s opinion provides no indication that it intended to dispose of any allegation other than that directly stated in ¶ 60. Accordingly, we find that because the court chose to address only ¶ 60, it restricted its disposition to a determination that the rate of interest charged by Mellon Bank could be addressed only as a violation of the National Bank Act, and not the UTPCPL. Thus, though allegations premised on the rate of interest are preempted by Judge Ludwig’s order, allegations asserting other grounds for relief are not. Consequently, we conclude the Judge Herron erred in finding that Plaintiffs’ UTPCPL claims were entirely preempted.
¶ 19 We disagree also with Judge Her-ron’s conclusion that regardless of the viability of Plaintiffs’ substantive cause of action under the UTPCPL, their claim for resulting damages was preempted. Opinion, supra, at 17 (“[A]ny alleged damage sustained by plaintiffs due to violation of § 201-2(4) fell within the parameters of the National Bank Act and was thus preempted by it.”). Upon review of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, in view of the federal court’s ruling, we find this conclusion unsupported. Plaintiffs alleged at ¶ 60 that: “as a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiffs and members of the Class have sustained damages in that they were caused to pay a usurious and/or outrageous, and/or unreasonable rate for monies lent to them.... ” Amended Complaint at ¶ 60. Though the federal court’s decision necessarily preempts consideration of whether the rate of interest charged is a substantive basis for relief under the UTPCPL, it has no bearing on whether the interest the plaintiffs paid is a cognizable measure of damages for other viable claims. Stately differently, if the Plaintiffs paid interest as a result of alleged unfair practices carried on by the Defendants, and Plaintiffs prove those practices, they may assert the interest as an item of damages, regardless of the rate charged, or whether the rate itself is a basis for relief. We conclude accordingly that Judge Herron abused his discretion in finding that Plaintiffs’ damage claims under the UTPCPL were pre-empt-ed by the National Bank Act.
¶ 20 Because we find that Plaintiffs’ UTPCPL claims are not entirely preempted, we must consider Plaintiffs’ assertion that Judge Herron erred in refusing class certification on the basis of those claims. We note initially that “trial courts are vested with broad discretion in determining the definition of the class as based on commonality of issues and the propriety of maintaining the action on behalf of the class.”
DiLucido v. Terminix International, Inc.,
¶ 21 Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1702 defines the prerequisites to class certification as follows:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members in a class action only if
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims of the class;
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately assert and protect the interests of the class under the criteria set forth in Rule 1709; and
(5) a class action provides a fair and efficient method for adjudication of the controversy under the criteria set forth in Rule 1708.
¶22 In this case, Judge Herron found that Plaintiffs’ UTPCPL claims lacked commonality and typicality under subsections 2 and 3 “due to the need to establish individual reliance or proof that the alleged misrepresentation caused [Plaintiffs’] damage.” Opinion, supra, at 18, 66-69. Plaintiffs argue that “[o]nly under the so-called catch-all provisions of the UTPCPL has [the Superior Court] held that reliance was a requisite element.” Brief in Support of Plaintiffs’ Appeal, supra, at 45. Plaintiffs appear to define the “catch-all” provision as 73 P.S. § 201-2(4)(xxi). Id.
¶ 23 We agree with Judge Herron’s conclusion that the UTPCPL requires a showing of detrimental reliance in private actions based on all provisions of the statute.
See
73 P.S. § 201-9.2.
See also DiLucido, supra,
at 1241. Additionally, we recognize that an action under the UTPCPL may not be amenable to class certification due to discrepancies in the respective levels of reliance displayed by individual class members.
Id.
In this case, however, we find no need for a demonstration of reliance by any member of the class due to the nature of the parties’ relationship. Because Block, as Plaintiffs’ agent was bound to conform to the duty of a fiduciary, reliance by the class plaintiffs is implicit and is established by operation of law as to all matters within the scope of the agency.
Cf. Young, supra,
at
¶24 Conversely, we agree with the court’s decision to deny certification to Plaintiffs claims against Mellon. To state a cause of action under the UTPCPL, Plaintiffs must establish that they suffered an “ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment by any person of a method, act or practice declared unlawful by section 3 of [the Act].” 73 P.S. § 201-9.2. Interpreting this provision, we have found that “the use of the phrase ‘as a result of indicates the intent of the Legislature to
*585
require a causal connection between the unlawful practice and a plaintiffs loss.”
DiLucido, supra,
at 1241. To demonstrate causation on their claims against Mellon, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that they relied to their detriment on Mellon’s actions in obtaining and processing their RAL applications and issuing RALs. However, because they failed to aver that Mellon acted in violation of an agency relationship or discreet fiduciary duty, they may not assert the reliance inherent in such a relationship to establish this requirement. Rather, because Plaintiffs’ claims against Mellon, unlike those against Block, assert conduct outside the confines of an agency relationship, Plaintiffs must establish reliance as a matter of fact on the basis of the testimony of individual class members.
See Prime Meats, Inc. v. Yochim,
¶25 We next consider whether Judge Herron erred in ruling that Laura Clavin was not an adequate class representative due to her apparent conflict of interest as an employee of the law firm of class counsel. In support of its ruling, the court entered the following finding of fact:
26. Ms. Clavin testified that beginning in March 1990, she was employed as a paralegal by Levy, Angstreich, Finney, Baldante, Main and Burkett (“Levy”), the law firm representing the plaintiffs in this action. Clavin Dep. at 51. Her employment with this law firm ceased sometime in 1996.
Opinion, supra, at 9 (footnote omitted). We read this finding to suggest that Clavin was not employed by class counsel on the date of the certification hearing in 1997. However, in an accompanying footnote, the Court cited to Plaintiffs’ Response to Supplemental Briefs of Defendants Mellon Bank, and Block, in a manner suggestive of skepticism. The court continued:
This response contained the following terse comment concerning Ms. Clavin’s employment:
Additionally, Plaintiffs call to the Court’s attention a change in Plaintiff Laura Clavin’s employment, a subject Defendants raised as an issue on her adequacy to serve as a class representative.
With respect to the change in Ms. Clavin’s employment, plaintiffs advise the Court that Ms. Clavin has ceased her employment with the Levy Angstreich firm. Id. at 1.
Id., n. 14. Thereafter, the court concluded that Plaintiffs’ explanation of Clavin’s employment situation was not sufficient to establish that Clavin could “adequately assert and protect the interest of the class,” within the meaning of Pa.R.C.P. 1702(4) and 1709. Id. at 58. The court grounded its conclusion on apparent doubt concerning the veracity of Clavin’s claim of separation from the Levy firm and Clavin’s earlier countervailing testimony that she had had a close professional relationship with the firm. Id. at 52-53. The court stated:
“The brief, however, provides no details concerning the departure of Ms. Clavin from the firm or about any other continued relation with it. In contrast, her deposition testimony amply documents her close professional involvement with both the firm and this particular case which was initiated more than three years ago.”
Id. We find the court’s reasoning, despite its statement in findings of fact, supportive of a conclusion that Clavin could not demonstrate her immunity to a conflict of interest because she had not demonstrated her independence from the Levy firm.
*586
¶ 26 As we have discussed, our scope of review of a trial court’s order denying certification is limited and we will not reverse the order “unless the court neglected to consider the requirements of the rules or abused its discretion in applying them.”
DiLucido, supra,
¶ 27 In considering whether a prospective class representative will fairly and adequately assert the interests of the class as contemplated by Pa.R.C.P. 1702(4), the court considers,
inter alia,
whether that party has an apparent conflict of interest in the maintenance of the action. Pa.R.C.P. 1709(2).
See also Klusman v. Bucks County Court of Common Pleas,
¶ 28 We are compelled to conclude that, in view of Clavin’s past employment with class counsel as documented of record, satisfaction of Rule 1709 requires that Plaintiffs establish Clavin’s subsequent separation by more than mere averment in an unverified brief. Plaintiffs provided the trial court with no documentation of Cla-vin’s current status, nor did they attempt such even belatedly to this Court. Instead, they have merely repeated their prior unverified assertion in their Brief for Appellant, again unverified. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that Judge Herron abused his discretion and we affirm his ruling that Laura Clavin is not an adequate class representative.
¶ 29 We consider next whether Judge Levin erred in dismissing Plaintiffs’ Complaint in its entirety where the only claims specified in the Defendants’ summary judgment motions related to the collective claims of the class for breach of fiduciary duty and not the individual claims of Basile and Clavin under the UTPCPL. In his Memorandum Opinion and Order entered December 31, 1997, Judge Levin ruled:
[U]pon consideration of the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment and all answers thereto, it is hereby ordered that plaintiffs’ motion is DENIED and that defendant’s motion is GRANTED. As a result, plaintiffs’ complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
It is also hereby ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion to modify the protective order in this matter is DENIED as MOOT.
¶ 30 Order entered December 31, 1997. The order provided no qualification of the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ complaint, but in a subsequent Memorandum, Judge Levin opined: “[T]his court does not believe that its dismissal of plaintiffs’ class action suit has any bearing whatsoever on any separate, individual claims under the Pennsylvania Consumer Protection Law.” Memorandum, 2/10/98. Because this appeal was then pending, however, the court was divested of jurisdiction to amend its December order. Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a).
¶ 31 As we have discussed, our scope of review of a trial court’s order granting summary judgment is plenary, allowing us to consider the entire record.
Keselyak, supra,
*587 ¶ 32 Upon review of Judge Levin’s December 1997 order, we find that the language of the order did not purport to limit its affect either to the Plaintiffs’ class claims or to any particular substantive count. Nor did it exclude Plaintiffs’ individual claims from the operation of the order. We conclude accordingly that, despite the court’s later reservations, the order did dismiss all claims stated in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint.
¶ 33 Upon review of Block’s motion for summary judgment and Plaintiff’s cross-motion, we find that the court’s ruling is erroneous because it fails to limit the effect of the dismissal to the claims under consideration. Both motions sought only partial summary judgment limited to count four of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, which stated a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against Block. Neither motion discussed Plaintiffs’ claims under the UTPCPL, either in relation to the class or to Basile and Clavin individually. Under similar circumstances, the Commonwealth Court held that an order that purports to dispose of claims beyond the scope of the motion for summary judgment filed by the moving party constitutes a clear abuse of discretion.
See Schreck v. North Codoms Township,
¶ 34 We find the court’s reasoning in Schreck persuasive, and we adopt it for application here. Accordingly, we find that because Judge Levin’s order provided Block the benefit of a summary disposition without imposing the requisite elements of proof under Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2, it constitutes an abuse of discretion. Consequently, we vacate the trial court’s order granting summary judgment on the individual claims of plaintiffs Basile and Clavin and remand for further proceedings on those claims consistent with this Opinion.
¶ 35 Finally, we consider the cross-appeal of Block asserting that Judge Avellino erred in ordering a presumption of agency for the purpose of determining whether Plaintiffs’ case could continue as a class action. In support of his ruling, Judge Avellino reasoned that:
[A presumption that Block was Plaintiffs’ agent] is required because a certification motion is not the functional equivalent of a summary judgment motion. Stated differently, the court should avoid a merits inquiry when faced with a certification question.
Order of Court, 1/17/96. In certifying that portion of the class action that alleged a fiduciary duty claim, Judge Herron accepted this presumption. Trial Court Opinion at 74-76.
¶ 36 Prior to addressing the propriety of the order, we note that Block has failed entirely to state, either in its Brief or an appendix thereto, where in the record it preserved its objections to the order, either before Judge Avellino, or subsequently before Judge Herron. Pa.R.A.P. 2117(c)(4), 2119(e). Indeed, Judge Her-ron’s opinion suggests that Block did not contest the propriety of the order, but merely sought to limit the extent of its application to decrease the membership of the subject class. Trial Court Opinion at 75. Where such derelictions occur, we are empowered to consider the issue waived. Pa.R.A.P. 302.
¶ 37 Moreover, we find no error either in Judge Avellino’s entry of the order or in Judge Herron’s adherence to it. The Rules of Court governing class certification provide expressly that:
The [certification] hearing is confined to a consideration of the class action allega *588 tions and is not concerned with the merits of the controversy or with attacks on the other averments of the complaint. Its only purpose is to determine whether the action shall continue as a class action or as an action with individual parties only.... [I]t is designed to decide who shall be the parties to the action and nothing more. Viewed in this manner, it is clear that the merits of the action and the right of the plaintiff to recover are to be excluded from consideration.
Pa.R.C.P. 1707 Explanatory Note — 1977. Accordingly, a court may not dispose of a certification motion on the basis of the perceived insufficiency of the facts pled or the evidence adduced
in support of the substantive cause of action.
To avoid such a disposition, the court may assume such elements of the cause of action as necessary to consider whether the prerequisites for certification are met.
See Janicik, supra,
¶ 38 Though, as Block argues, the presumption order relieved Plaintiffs of any burden to produce evidence of the agency relationship, Brief for Block at 47, we find no error in it. “Because the requirements for class certification are interrelated and overlapping, the class proponent need not prove separate facts supporting each; rather, her burden is to sufficiently establish those underlying facts from which the court can make the necessary conclusions and discretionary determinations.”
Id.
¶ 39 Order granting summary judgment REVERSED. Order denying class certification on Plaintiffs’ UTPCPL claims REVERSED as to H & R Block; AFFIRMED as to Mellon Bank. Order establishing presumption of agency for purpose of class certification hearing AFFIRMED. Case REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. Jurisdiction RELINQUISHED.