Bartz v. StateBartz v. State
In 1977, Clifford E. Bartz pled guilty to armed robbery and was sentenced to three years in prison. In 1998, Bartz, who is currently incarcerated in a federal prison in New York, filed the instant motion to withdraw his 1977 guilty plea, clаiming that the plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
Until recently, Bartz would not have been authorized to seek postconviction relief through a motion to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence, because Bartz‘s prison sentence in Florida has long since been served and he is not in Statе custody. See State v. Taylor, 722 So.2d 890 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). Moreover, such a motion would be time-barred under
First, in our view, Bartz‘s motion is barred by the doctrine of laches. Laches is sustainable in a criminal case where there has been both a lack of due diligence on the part of the defendant in bringing forth a claim and prejudice to the State. See Remp v. State, 248 So.2d 677, 678-79 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970), citing Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 81 S.Ct. 534, 5 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961). This has likewise beеn recognized by this Court, albeit in dicta. See Blatch v. State, 389 So.2d 669, 672 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). In the instant case, Bartz raises his claim twenty-one years after sentencing—surely such a delay, without explanation, evidences a lack of due diligence. See Smith v. Wainwright, 425 So.2d 618 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (relief denied where thirteen-year delay); Remp, 248 So.2d at 677-78 (same). Further, the State has undoubtedly been prejudiced by the delay, as it cannot now contest Bartz‘s allegations because the transcript below has long sincе been destroyed. Transcripts are destroyed after 10 years; thus, the State hаs no transcript of the proceedings below and is prejudiced in defending аgainst Bartz‘s allegations. Finally, the policy rationale for allowing a laсhes defense is important—to acknowledge the finality of convictions at some point which, in turn, will foster confidence in the judicial system. See Babson v. Wainwright, 376 So.2d 1187, 1189 (Fla. 5th DCA 1979); Remp, 248 So.2d at 679, quoting Dean v. North Carolina, 269 F.Supp. 986 (M.D.N.C.1967).
We also find that Bartz‘s motion fails on the merits. While generally alleging that his plea was not “knowing, voluntary, and intelligent,”1 Bartz‘s motion did not go into any specifics of what he meant by this, other than to state:
[D]efendant went to ... plea hearing and was sentenced to thrеe years in Florida State Prison, not knowing the full consequences of the plea, having not been advised by counsel nor by the court in sufficient depth so that he understood the full ramifications of such admission/plea and/or possible repercussions of such admissions manifest at any future arraignment.
This generalized сomplaint is not legally sufficient to sustain a writ of error coram nobis, as it doеs not “allege specific facts of such a vital nature that, had they beеn known to the trial court, they conclusively would have prevented entry of judgment.” Malcolm v. State, 605 So.2d 945, 946 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). See also State v. Woods, 400 So.2d 456, 457 (Fla.1981).
Further, even if we “read between the lines” of Bartz‘s motion, the motion fails. We interpret Bartz‘s allegations to mean that he was not advised of the collаteral impact of his 1977 guilty plea (and subsequent Florida conviction) on his latеr federal sentence. We reach this conclusion from the above-quоted paragraph and from Bartz‘s present circumstances—he is incarсerated in a federal prison and is only now attacking a conviction that is over twenty years old. As this Court has previously held, challenges to a guilty plea‘s voluntariness based on the fact that a defendant was not told of its collateral consequences in the event of his recidivism will be unsuccessful. See Rhodes v. State, 701 So.2d 388 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); State v. Fox, 659 So.2d 1324 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).
Therefore, we affirm the trial court‘s denial of Bartz‘s motion.