56 Cal. 95 | Cal. | 1880
Lead Opinion
The question presented for decision in this case is, whether an election of the officers of the City and County of San Francisco is required by laxv to be held in the year 1880. If such election is required, the writ must be alloxved, secus if not. It is contended that the statute law requires such election; that if not so required by the statutes on the subject, it is by the proxdsions of the Constitution. These contentions will be considered in the order stated. By the first section of the act of the legislature, approved April 2nd, 1866 (Stats, of 1865—6, 718), it was provided as follows: “There shall be elected hereafter for the City and County of San Francisco, by the qualified electors thereof, at the times herein after mentioned, and in the manner prescribed by law for the election of State and county officers, one mayor, xvho shall be ex-officio president of the board of supervisors, a county judge, police judge, an attorney and counselor, probate judge, district attorney, sheriff, county clerk, recorder, treasurer, auditor, tax collector, assessor-, coroner, public administrator, surveyor, superintendent of common schools, sujrerintcndent of public streets highways and squares, chief of police, harbor master, and State harbor commissioner.” The third, fourth, and fifth sections of the act are as follows : Section 3. “ All elections for city and county officers, except as provided in § 2 of this act, shall be held in said city and county on the days prescribed by law for holding the general elections throughout the State, except in the years xvhen no general election is provided for by laxv, xvhen elections for city and county officers shall be held on the first Wednesday of September of said years.” (§ 2 refers to county judge, probate judge,' and police judge, who are to be elected at the special judicial elec
By the first section of the Act of March 30th, 1872, (Stats. 1871-2, 729) the fourth section of the Act of April 2nd, 1866, just above referred to, was amended so as to read as follows:
“ Section 4. At the general election to be held in the year 1873, and at the general election to be held every second year thereafter, there shall be elected an attorney and counselor for said city and county, an auditor, a tax collector, a public ad ministrator, a superintendent of public streets highways an squares, a chief of police, a superintendent of common school and one fire commissioner, and for each of the first, third, fifth, seventh, ninth, and eleventh wards, one supervisor and one school director, who shall respectively hold their offices for the term of two years from and after the first Monday of December next subsequent to their election, and until their successors are elected and qualified; and the present incumbents of the*98 respective offices named in this act shall hold their offices until their successors are elected and qualified.”
It is evident that the effect of this amendment was to fix the election of the officers of the city and county named in it and the former act all on the same day, and in an odd-numbered year. No doubt the object of the act was to bring on the election of all the city and county officers at the general election, which was at that time held on the odd-numbered years. To effect this, the terms of certain officers, (the then incumbents) whose successors would have been elected on the first Wednesday of September, 1872, (when no general election would have been held) were extended by the provisions of the act, and their successors were to be elected in 1873. (See. last clause of § 4 of Act of 1866, as amended by Act of 1872.) These officers were then to be elected at the general election to be held in 1873, and at the general election to be held every second year thereafter, by virtue of § 4 as amended; but in case there was no general election in such years, then the election was to be held by virtue of § 3 above cited, of Act of 1866, on the first Wednesday of September of said years. This provision of § 3 was left undisturbed, probably to meet the case which might occur of a change in the law of the State by which the general election might be fixed on the even-numbered years. In the event of such a change, (which was made by an act approved April 16th, 1880, fixing the day of the general election the first Tuesday after the first Monday of November, 1880, and every second year thereafter—see amendment of 1880 to § 1041, Pol. Code) the time of the election of the city and county officers was still to remain as fixed by § 3 of the Act of 1866, on the first Wednesday of September of the odd-numbered years.
The foregoing comprehend all the statutes relating to the matter under discussion to which our attention was called on the argument, or which we have been able to find; and we see nothing in the statute law of the State which fixes the day of the election of the officers referred to on any day in an even-numbered year.
It is further urged upon the Court that the Constitution makes the change, and requires the election of the officers re
In construing a constitution, as any other document, we must look to every portion of it bearing on the matter, as to which interpretation is required. The objective of all construction is to arrive at the thought or intention of the parties framing the paper; and to do this we must examine all that is stated in it bearing on the subject under consideration, just as we would ascertain the meaning of what a person says in speaking. It would be manifestly misleading and unfair to consider a portion of what he said. Now, the 12th section of article xxii provides
As to judicial officers, it is provided that the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court shall be elected at the times and places at which the State officers are elected (§3, art. vi) ; the judges of the Superior Courts at the general State election (§ 6, art. vi). In this section there is a special provision that the first election of these judges (as there is of the judges of the Supreme Court in § 3) shall take place at the first general election held after the adoption and ratification of the Constitution. The terms of these officers are fixed by the sections of article vi referred to, their terms to commence on the same day as the officers before mentioned. By § 14, article vi, the legislature is authorized to provide for the election of a clerk of the Supreme Court, and shall fix by law his duties and compensation, etc. The legislature is authorized to determine the number of justices of the peace to be elected in townships, incorporated cities and towns, and cities and counties, and shall fix by law their powers, duties, and responsibilities. Their term is not fixed by the Constitution; but they are to be, as regards the first election, as are all other judicial officers, elected at the time and in the manner that State officers are to be elected. (§ 10, art. xxii.) The above mentioned judicial officers are named among those in which the judicial power is vested. (§ 1, art. vi.)
A superintendent of public instruction shall, at each gubernatorial election after the adoption of the Constitution, be elected. (§ 12, art. ix.) It is provided, also, in § 10, article xxii.
It will thus he seen that, in addition to the special provisions requiring the election of the officers provided for in the Constitution, to be held at the general election in the year 1879, there is a general provision applicable to all of them in § 20 of article xx, requiring that, except as regards the election in 1879, the election of such officers shall be held on the even-numbered years. The reason for the insertion of this last requirement was, no doubt, to make such elections conform to the time of the election of representatives in Congress, and the electors for President and Vice-President, under the Federal laws. A further conformity at once appeared to be necessary. As the State officers were to be elected on the odd-numbered year, 1879, and their terms of office, both by the special provisions of the Constitution and the general provision of § 20, article xx, were to commence on the first Monday after the 1st day of January following their election, and their successors were to be elected on the even-numbered years next before the expiration of the terms of their predecessors in office, as provided in the section just referred to, such election of those successors would occur more than a year before the terms of their predecessors had ended. How, to make such election conform to this requirement, so that the election of their successors should take place the same year at the end of which the terms closed, it was necessary to shorten the terms of such officers one year, and this was done by § 10 of article xxii. This was intended to bring about such conformity, and effected it in the manner prescribed in the last named
The officers referred to in § 20 of article xx, and those referred to in § 10 of. article xxii, are the same officers, and both sections refer to officers mentioned in the previous portion of the Constitution, which were required to be elected at the general election in 1879. Now it is said that § 10 of article xxii refers to officers whose terms are fixed by law, as well as those fixed by the Constitution; and that all the terms of the officers are fixed in the Constitution, except that of clerk of the Supreme Court; that some effect is to be given to this requirement as to officers whose terms are fixed by law; and if effect is given to it, it must refer to the officers of this city and county, and of counties the terms of which are fixed by the statute laws of the State. We think that, in assuming that the terms of all the officers referred to, except the clerk of the Supreme Court, are fixed in the Constitution, the counsel for the petitioner has fallen into an error. The terms of the justices of the peace are not mentioned at all. In fact, the terms of these officers were fixed by law, and so fixed that the shortening of the term one year in each case would bring the elections of their successors to conform to the requirement of the Constitution, that such election would fall on the even-numbered years. Viewing the officers of the City and County of San Francisco as county officers, they are not the officers referred to in the section of the Constitution relied on. (§ 20, art. xxii.) Such officers arc not the officers “ provided for ” in the Constitution. They are left to be provided for by the legislature, with the most ample powers to do so. This will be seen by examining a few sections in article xi, in relation to “ cities, counties, and towns.” Of these sections, § 1 provides that “ the several counties, as they now exist, arc hereby recognized as legal subdivisions of the State.” Section 4 provides that “ the legislature shall establish a system of county governments which shall be uniform throughout the State, and by general laws shall provide for township organization,” etc. Section 5 is in these words: “ The legislature, by general and uniform laws, shall provide for the election or appointment in the several counties, of boards of supervisors, sheriffs, county clerks, district attorneys, and
From this, it is apparent that the entire control of the matters relating to county officers is vested in the legislature, with the restriction that its enactments in relation to them shall be general and uniform. It can provide for the election or appointment of the officers named, in the several counties, and of such other county, township, or municipal officers as public convenience may require; and may prescribe their duties, fix their terms of office, and regulate their compensation. Such officers are to be provided for by the legislature, in the exercise of the powers vested by the sections referred to. It can fix their terms at one, or two, or three, or four years. It may be added here, that the legislature did attempt to act on this subject, and fix the elections of such officers on the even-numbered years, but their action was declared void in Leonard v. January, ante, 3.
Treating the officers referred to in the petition as city officers or city and county officers, the provisions of §§ 7 and 8 of article xi show that they are not affected by the provisions of the Constitution contained in § 20, article xx, and § 10, article xxii. This matter is left to the legislature to be regulated by general laws, or the local authorities acting under general laws, or it may be in the case of the City and County of San Francisco, by the action of the corporation under § 8 of this article xi. (See Desmond v. Dunn, 55 Cal. 242.)
There is another view which shows the section referred to does not embrace the officers in question. The terms of such officers chosen at the first election referred to in the Constitution are to commence on the first Monday after the 1st day of January, 1880. That is not the case with the officers in question, as was held in the case of the county clerk, one of them.
There are special laws for some of the counties, which were referred to in the argument. If the terms of these officers are shortened one year, the election of their successors must occur in the odd-numbered years. Having been elected in 1879, shortening the term of such officers one year, the election of their successors must be held in 1881 for it must be recollected that in the same sentence of § 10, article xxii, referred to and relied on by plaintiff, it is provided that the election of the successors of the officers referred to in it must be held at the last election before the expiration of the terms shortened by one year. If, then, they cannot be elected in 1881, they would have to be chosen more than a year before the terms of their predecessors end. This certainly was not intended. It would be a. curious problem to ascertain when the successor to an officer whose term is one year, when shortened by one year, is to be elected. Carrying out the view urged upon us, he would have to be elected at the same time with his predecessor, and this would be to introduce a system of rotation in office novel and unprecedented.
We have fully considered the history of the action of the convention in relation to the section just referred to, as it was disclosed to us upon the argument. The vote of rejection on the proposition to exclude county officers from this section may, and doubtless, was had on the ground that it did not refer at all to such officers, that it did not include them. As to the address to the voters of the State, adopted by the convention, its reference to the effect of the Constitution in diminishing the number of the elections to be held, and thus saving expense, many who voted for it may have supposed that this would be brought about by the action of the legislature, in causing the election of county officers to be held on the even-numbered years, at the time of the general election in those years. The indirect as well as the direct effect of the Constitution may have been referred to. If we are correctly informed of the circumstances under which this address was adopted, it is entitled to but little weight in construing the constitution, especially in such a case as this, where a full examination of the provisions of the instrument leave no doubt as to its meaning. We are convinced that the conclusion above stated is correct; and acting upon this conviction, our judgment is, that the writ asked for must be denied.
Sharpstein, J., concurred.
Concurrence Opinion
I concur in the judgment, and, in the main, in the opinion of Mr. Justice Thornton. The only section of the Constitution which, in terms, requires any elections to be held on the even-numbered years is § 20 of article xx, which is in these words: “ Elections of the officers provided for by this Constitution, except at the election in the year 1879, shall be held on the even-numbered years next before the expiration of their respective terms. The terms of such officers shall commence on the first
Who arc the officers referred to as being officers whose election is “ provided for by this Constitution ” ? In the Stuart case, 58 Cal. 745, that question was answered by the unanimous opinion of the late Supreme Court, in these words : “ We think that these arc not municipal, county, or township officers chosen in 1879, but State officers, such as the governor and the other officers who constitute the executive department of the State government. These arc officers whose election is absolutely provided for by the Constitution itself. But as to the terms of municipal, county, and township officers, another and distinct and utterly inconsistent provision is found in the new Constitution. We refer to § 5 of article xi.” That section is as follows :
“ The legislature, by general and uniform laws, shall provide for the election or appointment, in the several counties, of boards of supervisors, sheriffs, county clerks, district attorneys, and such other county, township, and municipal officers as public convenience may require; and shall prescribe their duties and fix their terms of office. It shall regulate the compensation of all such officers in proportion to duties, and for this purpose may classify the counties by population; and it shall provide for the strict accountability of county and township officers for all fees which may be collected by them, and for all public and municipal moneys which may be paid them, or officially come into their possession.”
By this section the Constitution has, in express terms, committed to the legislature the power to provide by general and uniform laws for the election or appointment, in the several counties, of boards of supervisors, sheriffs, county clerks, district attorneys, and such other county, township, and municipal officers as public convenience may require; and has also committed to the legislature the power to fix their terms of office. The question whether the county, township, and municipal of
Suppose the last legislature had provided that there should no longer be any county recorders or tax collectors, or that all county officers should be thereafter appointed, and that none of them should be elected, as it clearly had the power to do under § 5 of article xi, how, if § 10 of the Schedule refers to county, township, and municipal officers, could such action' on the part of the legislature be reconciled with that part of § 10 of the Schedule which declares that “ the successors of all such officers (as are elected in 1879) shall be elected at the last election before the expiration of the terms, as in this section provided ” ? It is plain, that, by construing § 10 of the Schedule as applicable to county, township, and municipal officers, there would arise an irreconcilable conflict between it and § 5 of article xi; whereas, by construing it as applicable to the officers mentioned in § 20 of article xx, which, as already said, is the only section in the Constitution requiring- any elections to be held on the even-numbered years, there is no conflict whatever. It may have been, and probably was, contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, that when the legislature should provide for the election of county, township, and municipal officers, it would require such elections to be held upon the even-numbered years. Whether the legislature, when it shall act, must do so, is a question not before us in this case. As yet the legislature has not acted at all.
Morrison, C. J., concurred in the judgment, and in the opinion of Mr. Justice Boss.
Concurrence Opinion
I concur in the judgment, and, in the main, in the views expressed by Mr. Justice Thornton and Mr. Justice Boss. I do not, however, assent to the proposition that the legislature, under the present Constitution, has power to deprive the people of a county or township of the choice of every county or town
Concurrence Opinion
I think that all State and county officers who were elected under the Constitution at the first election held under it, in 1879, hold their offices subject to the provisions of § 20, article xx, and of § 10, article xxii, of the Constitution; and that such terms of office as were fixed by the Constitution, or by the law as it existed at the time of the first election, were made one year shorter, for the purpose of making all officers elective, in the future, at elections to be held on even-numbered years. To give to these sections of the Constitution any other construction, will, in my judgment, disturb the harmony of the system of elections intended to be established by the Constitution; and instead of shortening one year the terms of all officers elected in 1879, as was expressly intended, an opposite result will be attained.
The provisions referred to apply to all elective officers, ex
Dissenting Opinion
Although there is ambiguity in the provisions of the Constitution relating to elections, and some of the officers created and authorized by it, yet there is cnougli in it from which to ascertain the will of the people in adopting it. It is evident that the people did not deem it wise to continue the system, theretofore prevailing, of frequent elections. It is evident, too, that they intended that the new system should be at once entered upon ; that the old system should then and there stop; laws then in force being retained only as supplying machinery until the legislature should enact perfectly fitting laws. By § 12, article xxii, the Constitution took effect July 4th, 1879, at twelve o’clock M., so far as the same relates to the election of all officers, the commencement of their terms of office, and the meeting of the legislature.
Section 20, article xx, reads : “ Elections of the officers provided for by this Constitution, except at the election in the year eighteen hundred and seventy-nine, shall be held on the even-numbered years next before the expiration of their respective
Thus it is apparent, that all elections for all officers in this State, from and after July 4th, 1879, were and are to be held as follows : The first set of officers, at the general election in 1879, and thereafter in the even-numbered years. It is also apparent, that the Constitution undertook to and did provide for a uniform system for the commencement of the terms of all officers; viz., on the first Monday after the first day of January next following their election. When the Constitution says “future elections,” “ elections of the officers provided for by this Constitution,” “ all officers,” and “ the successors of all such officers,” I think that the people, in adopting the Constitution, intended to express, and did express, the view above indicated. Now, let us see what officers are provided for by the Constitution ; and it will be observed, in that regard, that the language is, “ elections of officers provided for,” not elections provided for. The following officers are expressly named: Members of Assembly, who “shall be elected in the year 1879, and on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November, 1880, and every two years thereafter ” ; senators, governor and lieutenant-governor, secretary of State, controller, treasurer, attorney-general, and surveyor-general; justices of the Supreme Court, Superior judges, and justices of the peace; reporter of the decisions of the Supreme Court; superintendent of pmblic instruction and county superintendent of schools; railroad commissioners ; State board of equalization; clerk of the Supreme Court; boards of super
At first view, it would seem that the provisions of the Constitution relating to the clerk of the Supreme Court, and county, township, and municipal officers, reading as they do, that the legislature shall provide, etc., referred to subsequent action of the legislature. There would be much force in that suggestion, were it not for the fact, that laws were already in existence relating to those officers, and that by the instrument itself such laws remain in force where consistent with the instrument; and therefore, until action by the legislature, the former statutes continue, except as controlled or modified by the Constitution.
I think that all of the officers designated in the Constitution, as well as those which the legislature may designate or establish, are “ officers provided for by this Constitution,” within the meaning of article xx, § 20, and that from and after the year 1879 no officer to be elected by the people can be elected in any but an even-numbered year. I think that the terms of all officers elected in 1879 were shortened one year, in order to conform to the new system ; and that if there should be (and it has been suggested that there arc) some local officers in some counties who were elected in 1879 for three years, such officers may be exceptions to the general rule as to shortening one year, and they "hold the full term to 1882, so as to preserve the harmony of having the elections of all officers occur on the even-numbered years, and the terms of office commence on the first Monday after the first day of January next following.
It has been suggested, that, as to the City and County of San Francisco, the Consolidation Act will prevail over the general laws relating to the State at large. I think that, in regard to the matter now under consideration, the Consolidation Act, as well as all other special laws and all general laws, will have to yield precedence to the provisions of the Constitution, in so far as there is conflict; and that every county in the State must fall in with the general system therein established.
The prevailing idea of the Constitution, concerning times of
As to county, township, and municipal officers, except justices of the peace and superintendents of schools, the legislature has the power to provide for their appointment, instead of election, and may fix their terms; viz., whether two years or four years, except as to superintendents of schools; but cannot make the terms commence on any other day than the first Monday after the first day of January next following the election; and in no case can the term extend beyond four years. (Art. xx, § 16.)
I think that, from this view, would follow, not only harmony in the various provisions of the Constitution, but uniformity of action under it. From the opposite view, the legislature may fix as many elections as there may be county, township, or municipal officers to elect; and may fix the terms at any period of duration, not exceeding four years.
