126 N.Y.S. 47 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1910
Lead Opinion
It appeared that the president of the board of trustees of Bellevue and Allied Hospitals, on March 29, 190í, sent a letter to the comptroller asking that the board of estimate and apportionment authorize the establishment of the position of general inspector of construction, department of Bellevue and Allied Hospitals, at a salary of $2,000
The only position to which the relator was appointed was that of general inspector of construction of the particular hospitals specified in the resolution appointing him. ■ The resolution specified the particular hospital or building to which he was appointed. The appointment must come from the trustees, and while the position to which the salary is attached by the resolution passed by the board of estimate and apportionment and approved by the board of aldermen was that of general inspector, the position to which the
That it was not the duty of the trustees to make such a transfer seems to have been settled by the Court of Appeals in People ex rel. Chappel v. Lindenthal (173 N. Y. 524). In that case the relator had been appointed a bridgetender for a particular bridge. The work ■upon that bridge having been completed, he was discharged, and he then claimed the right to be appointed upon other bridges, irrespective of the question as to whether or not that would involve the discharge of persons there employed. In the Court of- Appeals it was said: “His [the relator’s] claim that, notwithstanding the .positions of bridgetenders upon this bridge had been abolished* he was entitled, as of right,' to be reinstated in his position, or that some other per
In Matter of Breckenridge (160 N. Y. 103) it was said: “ The legislative intent was to secure the retention in the public service of the veteran, who is thrown out of office by its abolition, £ in such position as lie may be fitted to fill, receiving the same compensation therefor; ’ which seems necessarily to imply that a vacancy in such a position must exist.” As, therefore, the position to which the. relator was appointed was abolished because of the fact that the building, the construction of which he was appointed to supervise was finished, the city had no more need of his services in that position, and the defendants were not bound to discharge a competent person who had been inspector of another building to make a place for the relator.
The question as to the effect of the acceptance by the relator of a position in the office of the State Architect upon his proceeding for reinstatement is not necessary to be determined. I think, however, that in view of our decision in Sutliffe v. City of New York (132 App. Div. 831), it would only have the effect of reducing his claim for damages by reason of his discharge if the discharge had been illegal. We there held that the same rule would apply in the case of an illegal discharge by the city of one of its employees as was applicable in a case of an unauthorized discharge of an employee in any other case; that in such case the discharged employee was bound to obtain such employment as he could pending the time of his reinstatement. If the relator was bound to do all he could to obtain employment during this period, his employment by the State, city or private individual would not affect his right to reinstatement.
For the reasons before stated, however, the order appealed from
Laughlin, Clarke and Miller, JJ., concurred.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring):
I concur in the result reached by Mr. Justice Ingraham and should concur in his opinion without reservation but for the intimation contained therein and which, as the learned writer himself says, is unnecessary to the decision, that the acceptance of another office or position in the public service did not amount to an acquiescence by relator in his discharge.. While it may be that the position to which relator seeks reinstatement does not fall strictly under the classification of a,n office, it is one of the positions mentioned in the opinion in Sutliffe v. City of New York (132 App. Div. 831) as possessing many of the attributes of an office, including a prima facie right, upon reinstatement, to compensation during the period of separation from the public service. The general rale of' law applicable to such a case is that the acceptance by one who holds a municipal office of a second office incompatible therewith operatesipso facto as a resignation of the first, and the same rule has been expressly enacted as to the city of New York by section 1549 of the Greater New York charter (Laws of 1901, chap. 466).
In my opinion, therefore, the acceptance by relator of. a position in the State service was a relinquishment of any claim to reinstatement in the city service.
■In all other respects I concur in the prevailing opinion.
■Order' reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements, and proceeding dismissed, with fifty dollars costs.