Barton Ex Rel. Estate of Barton v. Taber

services, for fail to see how the insurers’ vided reimbursement 32nd Street’s ser- we pursuant to those undisputed payment litigation, vices at all times relevant to this pay constitute refusal to requested contracts could of we see relevance docu- although Additionally, ments, them. including loss under memorandum to policies [insurers] “authorize make by to protected the district court found be directly for to Providers Cov payments privilege. Accordingly, attorney-client Services,” language does not ob ered district court’s denial of mo- 32nd Street’s if to insurers do so. Even ligate the compel tion to have been “an some practices insurers’ reimbursement thus ruling.” erroneous at 994. We comprise requisite “refus how were of find no abuse discretion. al,” however, prac conclude those we pursuant tices occurred contracts and III. reasonable cause excuse” “without above, For forth the reasons set the statute and the case law re as both grant affirm the district of court’s sum- Farm See State Mut. Auto. Ins. quire. mary in judgment favor HMO Missouri Shahan, F.3d Co. n RightCHOICE. and Cir.1998) (applying the Missouri vexatious- finding in “refusal refusal statute unambigu ... the clear and

pay based language policies” the insurance

ous cause”). not without reasonable

“clearly not err in

The district court thus did

granting summary judgment to the insur claim.

ers on the vexatious-refusal Regina BARTON, personal represen as D. Jeffry for Alan tative Estate Finally, we address 32nd Street’s Barton, Plaintiff-Appellee argument that the district abused its court by denying 32nd Street’s motion discretion of the compel production insurers’ inter TABER, individually Donnie and in his that, nal Street documents. 32nd capacity official Chief as the Malvern used the because the insurers methodolo Police; Callison, individually Tim data, in a gies series of contained work capacity and his official as a Mal papers, and memoranda Officer; Ledbetter, vern Police Chad and 2012 determine the maximum individually Spring County as Hot allowable amount reimbursement Sheriff; George Wright, individually providers, those documents non-network capacity and his official Hot as to 32nd Street’s claims were relevant Spring County Administrator; Jail inadequate reimbursement. review a We Martin, individually Amie her discovery rulings “in district court’s capacity Spring County official as Hot deferential,’ manner ‘both narrow and Deputy; Orrell, individually Brian if only reversal is warranted an erroneous capacity his official Hot to a ruling ‘gross amounted abuse of dis County Spring Deputy, Defendants Potter, cretion.’” Robinson v. Zachary Owens, individually 994-95 In of our capacity that express gov determination contracts official as Arkansas State Trooper, Defendant-Appellant pro- erned the rates at which the insurers Arkansas; City County, Springs Hot Arkansas; Malvern, State

Arkansas, Defendants.

No. 14-3280. of Appeals,

United States Court

Eighth Circuit. 21, 2015. Sept,

Submitted: April

Filed: May

Corrected: En Banc

Rehearing Rehearing July 2016.*

Denied

* Loken, Judge Judge Judge Shep- banc. Colloton and grant rehearing petition for en herd would

nam, Rock, AR, brief, on the Little Plaintiff-Appellee. WOLLMAN, COLLOTON,

Before KELLY, Judges. Circuit WOLLMAN, Judge. Circuit Barton, personal representa- Regina Jeffry tive for the Estate of Alan Barton (Barton), § suit filed under U.S.C. Rights Civil Act of and the Arkansas (ACRA), 16-123-105, §Ann. al- Ark.Code leging Trooper Zacha- that Arkansas State ry and other defendants denied care, of his violation Fourth, Eighth, Fourteenth Amend- rights. Trooper appeals ment of his to the district court’s1 denial motion of qualified dismiss on the basis and statu- tory immunity. affirm. We I. 12, 2011, September Barton was

On single-vehicle involved in a accident at an overpass on Highway located scene, along Owens at the accident arrived Malvern, Arkansas, with Police Officer Tim Callison and other law enforcement arrived, officials. After the officers Bar ground multiple fell to the on ton almost swayed occasions. He and used his truck portable to After steady himself. breath test that Barton’s blood-alcohol indicated .11, placed concentration the officers was During Barton under arrest. the search Warren, AAG, ar- Quentin Jonathan person, ground of his Barton fell Sullivan, AAG, brief, gued, on Gary L. responsive. and was not Callison checked Rock, AR, Defendant-Appellant. Little pulse respond Barton for a after he did Linam, questions or Bar Stephanie argued, Ann Charles commands. Because Davidson, Sr., own, Ann Li- Stephanie Darwin ton not stand on his Callison Dawson, Arkansas, 1. The Honorable Robert T. United now retired. Judge States District for the Western District (8th Cir.2013). placed and lifted Barton him Owens de We review novo the into Owens’s car.2 denial of a motion to on dismiss based qualified statutory immunity. Hager transported Barton to-the Hot Health, Ark. Dep’t Spring County Detention Center. Barton (8th Cir.2013). “Under Federal Rule questions' during to answer unable 12(b)(6), of Civil Procedure the factual alle- booking process, and when he speak, did gations in complaint accepted are speech point was slurred. At one dur- true favorably and viewed most ing booking process, Barton off fell plaintiff.” Hager, 735 F.3d at (citing bench onto the floor. Weber, Gross v. incarcerated the Deten- Cir.1999)). pretrial tion Center as detainee and room, holding in a placed which was Qualified A. Immunity being unable without walk assisted by ' State officials are entitled to jail trustees, Barton was found dead in qualified immunity for discretionary their holding shortly, room midnight after acts those acts clearly unless “violate es September 13, autopsy deter- An. statutory tablished rights constitutional mined the cause death to abe of which person a reasonable would have right coronary, ar- condition—anomalous known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. tery, fatty right infiltration of ventricle and 102 S.Ct. 73 L.Ed.2d 396 atrium of autopsy heart. The also re- (1982). “(1) thusWe ask: [whether] the ethanol, vealed a small amount small facts, viewed most favorable to hydroeodone, amount of non-toxic plaintiff, deprivation demonstrate the of an anti-anxiety level medication. of a or statutory right; constitutional moved dismiss the right [whether] estab for failure to a claim on state which relief lished at deprivation.” time granted, 12(b)(6), could be Fed.R.Civ.P. Howard, City v. Kan. Police Dep’t, 570 asserting that qualified he was entitled to (8th 984, F.3d 988

immunity from the federal claim statu- and tory immunity claim, from the ACRA Ark. 1. Constitutional Violation 19-10-305(a). § Code Ann. The district argues Owens that the facts al court dismissed the against claims Owens leged in complaint the not do establish that in his capacity, official but otherwise de- he violated Barton’s rights. constitutional motion, nied the leading Owens to file this complaint A include must “a short and appeal. plain of the claim showing statement that pleader the is entitled to relief.” Fed. n II. 8(a)(2). R.Civ.P. The Federal Rules re “ Although ordinarily a of a quire denial more than ‘labels and conclusions’ pretrial motion is not appealable, interlocu or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of ” tory appeals from the denial of a cause of action.’ Iqbal, 556 qualified Ashcroft statutory immunity permitted 662, 678, are un U.S. 129 S.Ct. 173 L.Ed.2d der the collateral-order doctrine. (quoting 868 Bell Corp. Atl. Burton State, Sec’y Ark. F.3d Twombly, 1228 550 U.S. 127 S.Ct. of Regina appeal, 2. On- has asserted alleged complaint, Barton sev- limited to the facts in the 12(d), allege eral facts that she did not see Fed.R.Civ.P. in the com- and we have consid- plaint, Our review only allegations. of a motion to is dismiss ered those (2007)). accident at the detention com scene the “[A] L.Ed.2d Thus, inquiry mat wheth- proper sufficient factual is plaint must contain center. true, ter, to ‘state a claim er, viewing most -accepted the facts ” on its face.’ plausible is failure plaintiff, relief Owens’s favorable at Twombly, (quoting secure medical care to take some action to 1955). plausibili has facial “A claim S.Ct. for Barton violated Barton’s constitutional factual pleads content ty plaintiff when below, conclude rights. we we As discuss the reason the court.to draw that allows it does. defendant liable that the able inference alleged.” Id. thusWe To whether Owens’s determine the misconduct alleged, not

accept facts care for Barton as true failure seek “[tjhreadbare recitals legal rights, conclusions violated Barton’s constitutional action, sup cause of of a the elements Amendment “deliberate apply Eighth conclusory statements.” by mere ported See Jackson v. indifference” standard.3 (8th Id Buckman, 1060, 1065 Cir. 756 F.3d 2014) Eighth (applying Amendment the claim to a pre standard deliberate-indifference facially plausible, be against him is provide trial1 élaim of failure detainee’s only mentions him complaint cause the process in violation of the due medical care says do paragraphs, which four Amendment). clause the Fourteenth para violation. The allege a constitutional re The deliberate-indifference standard had direct con graphs allege subjective quires “both an objective leading up to hours in-the tact with Barton Ramsey County, analysis.” Hall v. death, to the scene responded Cir.2015)'(quoting F.3d Scott lift from accident, Barton helped Callison Benson, 335, 340 Cir. car, him in his place ground 2014)). Barton the detention and transported J.A, 3, para those 4-5. When center. objective compo To meet the of the full in the context graphs are read stan nent the deliberate-indifference however, complaint states complaint, dard, plead facts complaint suffi must against As facially claim Owens. plausible cient to Barton suffered demonstrate above, alleges that set forth medical need. serious at the scene unconscious became Ross, Grayson v. 808-09 See accident, that Callison checked a vehicle (8th serious, objectively “To be respon he was not pulse because Barton’s ‘diagnosed a have been medical need must sive, not stand or that Barton could walk requiring by physician a as treatment’ own,, not on that Barton could and that must be ‘so even layperson obvious fell off the bench questions and answer recognize necessity for a easily would the at detention center. onto the floor the ” Jackson, at doctor’s attention.’ 756 F.3d allegations these Accepting J.A. 4-5. Scott, 340). true, (quoting 1065 F.3d Ow to infer that Owens 742 at it reasonable complaint' at the ens that does symptoms both observed Barton’s -, 135 — decision, drickson, Bailey S.Ct. in recent We note that our Feltmann, 589 (8th Cir.2016), (2015) (holding 810 F.3d we v. that 192 L.Ed.2d 416 regarding acknowledged disagreement objective reason Fourteenth Amendment’s s proper apply standard denial-of-medical- governs ablenes standard excessive-force brought by Bailey, claims arrestees. See care detainees). brought by pretrial claims 592-93; Kingsley 810 F.3d at see also v. Hen 965 by persons, serious need those exhibited plead objectively an medical intoxicated not indi Barton’s behavior would when totality because viewed their suffering that he layperson cate to a non-moving most favorable to the kill from a condition that would later heart party, they were that sufficient establish required complaint him. But the objectively Barton suffered from an seri- allege that Owens knew Barton’s ous need. medical condition, only that Barton-showed subjective component re signs objectively of an serious obvious showing actually quires that Owens knew medical need. whether an We determine that Barton care and dis needed medical medical need .exists serious regarded “a known risk to the [arrestee’s] circumstances, ir on the based attendant Frank, ex rel. health.” Gordon Gordon v. respective of what the officer-believes (8th 858, Cir.2006) (citing 454 862 F.3d Vaughn v. Gray, See 557 cause be. (8th Bloomberg, Olson 736 (8th Cir.2009) quali F.3d (denying Cir.2003)). showing requires “This a men immunity to who claimed officers fied thpt tal state ‘akin to criminal recklessness.’” thought prisoner’s vomiting they “was Jackson, 756 F.3d 1065 (quoting at Gordon ingestion shampoo”); by caused see Gordon, 862). at ex rel. F.3d com A Sanders, also McRaven F.3d plaint allege must facts that demonstrate (8th Cir.2009) (denying qualified im than than negligence, “more more even munity symp an inmate exhibited where gross negligence.” (quoting Fourte toms intoxication circum severe of. County, 746 F.3d Faulkner suggested stances the inmate had Cir.2014)). Such a mental state can be medications); prescription on overdosed inferred,, however, from facts that demon Grayson, (granting quali 454 F.3d at 809 that a medical obvious and strate need was immunity up- fied where arrestee was response “obviously that the officer’s methamphetamines, der the influence of inadequate.” Thompson King, F.3d calmly in the back of the “sat (8th Cir.2013) (“However, if a car, directions,, ques followed answered obviously risk is response to known inad posed, quiet tions remained seated equate, may this- lead an inference Although on a bench inside the we jail”). ‘recognized inappropriate can assume most individuals arrested ” (quoting Krout v. ness .his conduct.’ charges are not intoxication-related Cir.2009))). Goemmer, care, prompt obvious need medical om his at observations Fr complaint here has stated sufficient facts of the accident and at the Detention scene experiencing to. show Barton was Center, knowledge of Owens had direct layperson so that a medical need obvious prompt Barton’s obvious need recognize prompt needed yet steps to secure attention and took Accepting again medical attention. once Accordingly, for Barton. such care complaint’s allegations, the truth of the allegations that the hold Barton fell at the of his acci down scene -to inference that were sufficient create an dent, own, on could not walk his and be deliberately indifferent to Bar unresponsive came that an officer such for attention. ton’s need medical obliged pulse. At check for a center, he not answer detention could Clearly Established questions and could not remain seated falling Barton’s over. some of.these without While clearly alleged symptoms right are consistent with was not estab constitutional 966

lished, a reasonable also the officers he acted as The detainee informed because psychotropic under that he had taken officer would circumstances. several established, clearly right drug a be Id. A “For medications. influence evalua- right must of the be suffi contours appeared tion to have ‘[t]he indicated he a reasonable official ciently coordination, clear that speech, flushed poor slurred- doing that what he is face, would understand eyelids; his droopy skin on his right.’” Thomp Meehan v. violates that pressure temperature blood were (8th Cir.2014) 936, son, (quot 940 “down”; and a alcohol test blood indicated 635, Creighton, 483 ing Anderson v. U.S. any that he not alcohol. Id. had consumed (1987)). 640, 107 523 97 L.Ed.2d S.O. a The officers consulted with nurse at the of a perspective reasonable adopt We facility they should regarding whether scene, taking into account the officer at the transport hospital. the detainee to at the time. Id. possessed information he nurse, The of the results unaware im qualified to overcome plaintiff a “[F]or drug screening, concluded detainee’s existing precedent must have munity, and that require hospitalization he did question ‘beyond placed the constitutional simply off alcohol.” Id. “sleeping ” Ann, City v. Hollingsworth St. debate.’ Later, at was discover- the detainee Cir.2015) (quoting 989 cell, longer breathing, in ed which County San Francisco Shee City & damage. His resulted severe brain Id. — U.S. -, 1765, 1774, han, 135 S.Ct. guardian brought against §a claim (2015)). an offi Whether 191 L.Ed.2d 856 center, alleg- the officers at the detention care denial violates cer’s ing deliberately in- the officers were rights is con constitutional thus arrestee’s different to medical need. the detainee’s clearly text-specific, for we do not “define summary judg- for Id. officers moved high generali at a level of established law ment, claiming quali- they were entitled to —Luna, U.S. -, ty.” Mullenix immunity they fied relied because (per 193 L.Ed.2d 255 S.Ct. nurse’s conclusion that the detainee did al-Kidd, curiam) (quoting Ashcroft not have an serious medical S.Ct. L.Ed.2d rejected at 980-81. this need. Id. We (2011)). The appropriate inquiry, argument light of and held that then, is whether reasonable officer knowledge cir- officers’ of the attendant 2011 would have understood September cumstances, they rely on the post- for a failing to seek medical care at nurse’s recommendation. See id. arrestee who exhibited vehicular accident (noting of the that the officers were aware symptoms Barton exhibited vio drugs the and that detainee had consumed rights. constitutional late the arrestee’s suggested [the detainee] “circumstances McRaven v. Sanders and We conclude that prescribed did not consume dos- [them] Ross, Grayson in 2009 decided es,” symptoms that the detainee “exhibited prece respectively, provide the relevant im- severe intoxication” and was dent. paired, and that the nurse had not known pretrial McRaven detainee involved all of the relevant facts when she made her driving while under who was arrested recommendation). drugs. F.3d at 978. influence contrast, By Grayson, granted During booldng process, the officers arresting qualified immunity to an sample urine that indicated the collected booking pretrial mari- and a officer after de detainee was under influence of juana, benzodiazepines, tainee died “excited opiates. delirium methamphetamine saying result acute intoxi that our holding should be read in physical struggle.” cation and F.3d at of the fact that it is based on the a, Although 808. the knew that the officers court’s denial of district Fed.R.Civ.P. methamphetamine, they detainee had used 12(b)(6) At stage pro- motion. this the not know he had did much consumed. how ceedings,, required to are the facts treat we arrest, at During Id. 806. the detainee’s alleged in as and make true calmly “sat the back of the all reasonable inferences favor of the car, directions,, followed [and] answered plaintiff. is highly deferential stan- This questions.” Similarly, Id. at 809. while he dard, opposed summary at that being booked and for first several judgment stage, parties at which must detention, of his hours he was non-combat support their factual assertions cita- with Id, ive and able to questions. answer at tions to an established record. We hold concluded that the We detainee did only complaint, marginally suffi- not have an medical serious be, claim, cient though may it has stated a have, need that to a would obvious been. not that it will scrutiny. withstand further symptoms because his did layperson at emergency. indicate medical Statutory B. Immunity In both Grayson, McRaven con that he is entitled severity sidered of the de intoxicated statutory immunity under the ACRA symptoms tainees’ and the context the complaint because not contain does Thus, symptoms presented. which the facts sufficient demonstrate that Owens officer have would rec reasonable acted with malice. As relevant this ognized failing to seek medical care appeal, states, the ACRA “Officers ... of for an intoxicated arrestee who exhibits Arkansas State are immune from symptoms more than substantially severe ,.. liability damages suit for ordinary intoxication arres- violates the' omissions, or acts other than malicious acts rights, tee’s constitutional all the more so omissions, or occurring within the course surrounding when the circumstances indi scope of employment.” their Ark. that a emergency cate See exists. 19-10-305(a). §Ann. Supreme Code Thompson, (discussing 730 F.3d at 747-49 Court of Arkansas has defined malice as above, Grayson). As the com recounted doing of wrongful intentional act alleged plaint facts that Barton exhibited excuse, just without cause with an symptoms more substantially serious than intent to injury inflict an or under cir ordinary intoxication Owens was imply cumstances the law will symptoms these aware of and of fact the" evil intent----A conscious violation of recently that Barton had in a vehicu been preju- the law ... operates which that, lar Accordingly, accident. we. hold person. of another A condition of dice circumstances, under these a reasonable showing .fatally the mind ... “comprehend that he was bent on mischief. violating dearly con [Barton’s] established Flowers, Fuqua v. rights.” stitutional 341 Ark. See v. Rich S.W.3d Gladden Malice, bourg, Cir.2014); (quoting Black’s 1990)). Dictionary see also Law Estate Crouch v. Madison ed. (S.D.Ind. County, F.Supp.2d argument bases his premise 2010) (noting prisoner that a objec statute'provides had an protection more than tively serious qualified immunity. Supreme medical need he be when But unresponsive). came It go should without consistently Court Arkansas has stated heartbeat.) a 19- must have demonstrated provided by section immunity that “the other officers to later worked with by the Owens 10-305(a) provided to is similar car, place him into a lift Barton and civil-rights for federal Supreme Court Marshall, Barton to a detention and Owens drove 369 Ark. claims.” Simons is no booking. Although there center for (citing 447, 255 S.W.3d in allegation the that Owens remained Norris, 89 S.W.3d 351 Ark. Fegans booking transported Barton after he Nor area (2002)). Langford see But center, partici or1that (8th Cir.2010) to the (deny detention ris, process, booking in the court pated to officials immunity prison qualified ing claims; Owens also observed that presumes that civil-rights for federal plaintiffs questions to Barton unable answer statutory immunity for the granting during booking, spoke speech, slurred claims). with con We have law plaintiffs state a off bench and onto the alleges suf once fell facts complaint cluded that the holding in a floor. later died cell Barton inference that create an ficient to indifference, to a heart condition. and we due acted deliberate with complaint alleg similarly conclude that Even all the facts recounted assuming create an inference facts sufficient es above, immu qualified Owens is entitled malice. empha nity. Supreme As the Court has sized, “qualified immunity protects all but III. incompetent or plainly those who immunity denying af- judgment is

The violate the law.” Mullenix knowingly — firmed. Luna, U.S. — 136 S.Ct. (2015) (internal quotation 193 L.Ed.2d

COLLOTON, Judge, dissenting. Circuit omitted). complaint The al marks must a view, lege adequately too that Owens violated goes court far my In trooper liability clearly right for a established constitutional exposing a state issue, undiagnosed con- Barton. To by an determine death caused clearly I court driver. would reverse must not “define established of a dition drunk generality.” “The denying high the mo- law at a level Id. court’s order the district* by Trooper Zachary dispositive is question filed whether the viola- tion to dismiss clearly is particular tive nature of conduct Owens. must be inquiry established.” “This alleges against The specific context undertaken to the one- scene responded that he case, general of the not as broad propost driver, Arkansas. The vehicle accident tion,” Id. Barton, registered a Jeffry Alan blood- placed September It of 0.11 and was established alcohol content arrest, Eighth of the driving while at'least under law presumably under Circuit, Ow law enforcement allegations are that officer intoxicated. using his must not act indifference swaying and with deliberate Barton ens observed falling the serious medical needs of an. arrestee. almost support truck for while Sanders, McRaven v. 979-81 ground multiple occasions. Gener construed, general complaint also this a broad asserts But ously The issue here is proposition. at one whether that Barton that Owens observed specific- this alleged, non- facts context of ground, and was fell point case, (Another only, incompetent plainly show responsive for a time. knowingly trooper, trooper or a who state pulse, checked Barton for — Carman, law, ——, v. would have turned Carroll 135 violates - 350, 190 348, (2014) (per center S.Ct. custody over to the of the detention L.Ed.2d 311 curiam)) Thompson 2013, In decided attention. oth- seeking without medical years two after Barton’s death so words, clearly it must established er be provide clearly it not could established law allegations are suffi- complaint’s that the for this incident. See Boyer, Parker v. 93 to that from an cient show Barton suffered (8th Cir.1996). F.3d need, and objectively serious medical that Owens exhibited deliberate indifference The relies court instead McRaven v. recklessness) (i.e., by (8th criminal to that need Sanders, Cir.2009), 577 F.3d 974 but failing to seek medical attention. The the decision there on dissimilar facts did precedents put clearly do not not Owens on notice of relevant a estab- case; right lished. constitutional qualified immunity. of in this support denial The officers McRaven that an knew require The not Constitution does arrestee had po- consumed “cocktail of to arresting law officer seek enforcement =drugs” tent under circumstances attention for every medical arrestee who “strongly suggested” they not were taken appears E.g., to be Burnette intoxicated. prescribed dosages, yet they failed to (11th Taylor, v. Cir. F.3d seek attention when the arrestee 2008); Peed, Grayson 195 F.3d symptoms drug exhibited extreme of intox- (4th Cir.1999); Walsh, Estate Hocker v. Owens, ication. Unlike who unaware (10th Cir.1994); 999-1000 condition, of Barton’s heart the officers in Isle, v. Cty. Presque Meier 376 Fed: specific McRaven had to reason believe (cid:127) Appx. 524, 529 that the offender suffered a-serious driver, that Barton knew was a drunk drug, medical need—a overdose—that dis- trooper a reasonable no medical state with tinguished him from an arrestee who had training that his could have believed consumed excessive amounts alcohol. walking, inability speech, difficulty slurred Ross, Grayson cites court also temporary to questions, answer and even (8th Cir.2006), F.3d 802 but officers in in non-responsiveness were results that case did not commit a constitutional require toxication that did not immediate violation,, clearly the decision so did not alleged, medical attention. On the facts it any right establish trans- constitutional layper not to a have been obvious gressed by Owens. Id. at 809-10. symptoms exceeded son Barton’s More instructive is a unfor decision that those of acute There is no intoxication. tunately by party. not cited In either allegation any knowledge that Owens had Beggs, v-. Martinez F.3d 1082 that Barton from the heart condi suffered Cir.2009), officers arrested* a man named eventually tion that his caused death. And public arresting Ginn intoxication. The there is assertion that how Owens knew reported that !Ginn to -“was unable distinguish symptoms of intoxication A stand.” witness testified officers coronary from those of an impending . him “picked “dragged” up” Ginn and thought Thompson court The district transporting The officer Ginn car. (8th Cir.2013), King, thought center had detention Ginn clearly established that Owens’s conduct out, your most of “passed like drunks do” rights, violated Barton’s constitutional facility. At the during a ride deten Assuming center, conclusion this was error. tion could walk Ginn line, disposi- helped sup controlling precedent' straight circuit is a and officers law, in a port weight. placed Ginn was cell. tive source established cf later, he from a heart died Three hours SALDANA; artery Felipe coronary disease. Israel Lira Elizabeth

attack due Peralta; Pino Matilda Isabel Lira officers, arresting Ginn’s estate sued Pino; Felipe Pino; Lira Israel Karla had they knew that Ginn alleging Pino, Petitioners, Elizabeth Godinez alcohol, quantity large consumed help, may have been un- walk without time, talking and was for a short conscious LYNCH, Attorney E. Loretta hallucinating. plaintiff if he were General, Respondent. officers, asserting two custodial also sued drunk, too Ginn was they knew No. 15-1226. jail, into and had to be booked incoherent difficulty walking. Appeals, United States Court Eighth Circuit. grant summary affirmed

The court judgment for the officers there because Oct. Submitted: show evidence to deliber- insufficient April Filed: serious ate indifference detainee’s needs: medical sufficiently objective harm serious

[T]he attack faced was Ginn heart

death, and not acute intoxication.... subjectively knew that Ginn

The officers intoxicated, no evidence there anyone have known

to show that would an imminent would face heart Ginn death, or much that the indi-

attack less county subjectively

vidual defendants

knew Ginn was at risk of heart

attack death.

Id. at 1090. too that Barton

So here. Owens knew driver,

was a drunk exhibited and Barton that a

symptoms trooper reasonable

associate with acute intoxication. Owens Barton suf-

had know that reason to undiagnosed from an condition

fered may

that would cause his death.

have had an serious heart, it

need for treatment but was

not a which Owens was deliberate- need

ly under established law indifferent alleged. the facts I therefore denying

reverse district court’s order

the motion to dismiss.

Case Details

Case Name: Barton Ex Rel. Estate of Barton v. Taber

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Date Published: May 24, 2016

Citation: 820 F.3d 958

Docket Number: 14-3280

Court Abbreviation: 8th Cir.