200 S.W. 839 | Tex. Crim. App. | 1918
Appellant was convicted of the theft of two turkeys. The State relied upon the testimony of an accomplice whose evidence was sufficiently corroborated. Appellant denied the theft and introduced evidence tending to establish an alibi. The issues were submitted to the jury in a charge which is not complained of.
Bill of exceptions No. 1 complains of the refusal of the court to permit appellant, upon the examination of the juror Parker, on his voir dire, to ask the following question: "If in the trial of this case it should develop that the State relies for conviction upon the testimony of an accomplice would you convict the defendant solely upon the testimony of the accomplice?" In allowing the bill the court qualified it with the statement that each juror, responding to the question by the *470
court, stated that be would decide the case according to the law as given in the charge by the court in regard to the testimony of an accomplice, as well as to all other testimony. It is not disclosed by the bill that Parker was on the jury that tried the case. This renders the bill inoperative to show error even if the court was in error in refusing to permit the inquiry, and this, we think, the bill as qualified, does not show. Kramer v. State, 34 Tex.Crim. Rep.; Segars v. State, 35 Tex.Crim. Rep.; Jones v. State,
Bill No. 3 reiterates the subject matter of bill No. 1, supra, and states that counsel proposed, and was refused permission, to ask each of the jurors the same question, and that on motion for new trial this action was complained of, and in connection therewith, after exhausting his peremptory challenges he was "compelled to accept the juror Francis," who was objectionable to the defendant for the reason that upon his voir dire he had stated that the filing of a complaint created in his mind an evidence of guilt. Qualifying this bill, the court says that each of the jurors on their voir dire that they would decide the case according to the law as given in the court's charge in regard to the testimony of the accomplice, as well as to all other matters of evidence; and that the juror Francis stated that an indictment for chicken theft would prejudice him to some extent against a person so charged, but that if selected as a juror he could and would lay aside any prejudice he might have and would try the case solely according to the law as given in charge by the court, and the evidence submitted under his rulings. The bill fails to show that the question to the juror Parker, and the proposed inquiry of the other jurors, would have elicited an answer disqualifying them or rendering them objectionable to appellant, and in this respect is incomplete. Caton v. State,
The Assistant Attorney General has filed a motion to strike out bill of exception No. 2, which is copied in the record, in which there is failure to show its filing. We can not consider the bill.
Finding no reversible error in the record the judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
[Rehearing denied February 12, 1918. — Reporter.]