Bartlett v. StateBartlett v. State
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Pope
Defendant Charles Franklin Bartlett was convicted of two counts of child molestation. He appeals the denial of his motion and amended motion for new trial. We affirm.
1. In his first four enumerations of error defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his pre- and post-trial motions for an in-camera inspection pursuant to
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,
480 U. S. 39 (107 SC 989, 94 LE2d 40) (1987) and in refusing to conduct an in-camera examination of Dr. Joseph Peek, a psychologist who had at one time counseled the victims (defendant’s girl friend’s daughters), and who testified on defendant’s behalf at trial. We find no error. Although it was contended that Dr. Peek’s communications with the victims (which occurred
prior
to the incidents alleged in the indictment) and their mother were privileged pursuant to
Likewise, we find no merit to defendant’s contention that the trial court also should have conducted an in-camera examination of Dr. Peek, as well as Dr. Peek’s files. Relying on Bobo v. State, 256 Ga. 357 (349 SE2d 690) (1986), defendant argues that this case should be remanded for an “in camera examination of Dr. Peek for discovery of his findings and any statements made by [the victims] to him material to the issues on trial.” Bobo v. State, however, specifically prohibits the kind of “fishing expedition” defendant wishes the trial court to embark on here. Id. at 360. Thus we decline defendant’s request to remand the case for this purpose.
2. In his next four enumerations of error defendant contends the trial court erred in the manner in which it conducted its in-camera examination of the State’s and Department of Family & Children Services’ files pursuant, to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (83 SC 1194, 10 LE2d 215) (1963), and in denying his renewed and post-trial Brady motions. Defendant requests that this court undertake an independent examination of these files. As stated in Division 1, supra, the trial court informed defendant it had provided him with all material of an exculpatory or impeaching nature, and clearly indicated it realized its obligation in this regard was on-going throughout the trial. “The trial judge’s discretionary ruling on the lack of exculpatory [or impeaching] matter in the [relevant files] established that as a fact absent a counter-showing. We will not call up the [S]tate’s files for review unless the [defendant] can show cause, by showing that particular evidence was suppressed which was material.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Upshaw v. State, 172 Ga. App. 671, 672 (324 SE2d 529) (1984). See also Barnes v. State, supra.
3. Lastly, defendant contends the trial court erred in charging the jury, upon request by the State, as follows: “I charge you that a single count of an indictment may charge in [sic] commission of the offense in different ways. According [sic] on the trial of a defendant under an indictment charging the defendant with the commission of the offense in different ways, it is not necessary for the State to prove all such separate ways or methods alleged in the indictment; but the State makes a prima facie case upon it’s [sic] establishment by proof of any one of them.” Although defendant concedes that the charge as given was a correct statement of the law as it pertains to the ability of the State to withstand a motion for directed verdict, he argues it was improper to so instruct the jury, because the charge may have misled the jury as to the applicable burden of proof. Pretermitting the question of whether the trial court erred in giving the complained of portion of the charge, we find no grounds for reversal here. “The charge
Judgment affirmed.
Deen, P. J., and Beasley, J., concur.