Bartlett v. MUTUAL PHARMACEUTICAL CO., INC.Bartlett v. MUTUAL PHARMACEUTICAL CO., INC.
ORDER
This case presents a question currently pending before three different federal courts of appeal: whether state-law tort claims alleging the defective labeling of generic drugs are preempted by federal law.
See Morris v. Wyeth, Inc.,
No. 09-5509 (6th Cir. Apr. 27, 2009);
Demahy v. Wyeth, Inc.,
No. 08-31204 (5th Cir. Dec. 16, 2008);
Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc.,
No. 08-3850 (8th Cir. Dec. 10, 2008). The defendants, Mutual Pharmaceutical Company, Inc. and United Research Laboratories, Inc., move for judgment on the pleadings,
see
After considering the parties’ extensive briefing and oral argument, the court denies the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Bartletts’ claims do not present an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress in the HatchWaxman Amendments, nor does complying with the state law underlying those claims make it impossible to comply with the Hatch-Waxman Amendments or any other federal law identified by the defendants. The Supreme Court’s recent decision on the pre-emptive effect of federal drug regulation on state tort law. in
Wyeth v. Levine,
— U.S. -,
1. Applicable legal standard
Federal “preemption is an affirmative defense on which [the] defendant bears the burden of proof.”
Cambridge Literary Props., Ltd. v. W. Goebel Porzellanfabrik G.m.b.H. & Co. KG.,
II. Background
A. The Bartletts’ allegations
For purposes of the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court accepts the following allegations of the Bartletts’ complaint as true.
See Gray v. Evercore Restructuring L.L.C.,
Sulindac is the generic version of a drug originally approved by the FDA in 1978; the generic version at issue here was approved in 1991. The Bartletts allege that, following this approval, the defendants “had an ongoing duty to conduct post-marketing safety surveillance for any reports of serious adverse events associated with Sulindac including any such report in the medical literature” and that, had they done so, they would have uncovered information compelling them “to warn physicians about the dangers” of the drug, including associations with Stevens-Johnson syndrome and toxic epidermal necrolysis.
The Bartletts’ complaint asserts seven counts:
• strict product liability — failure to warn (count 1);
• strict product liability — defective in design or manufacture (count 2);
• fraud, in the sense that the defendants “made misrepresentations of material facts ... and omitted and/or concealed material facts” about the risks of Sulindac (count 3);
• breach of implied warranty that Sulindac was “of merchantable quality and safe and fit for [its intended] use” (count 4);
• breach of express warranty that Sulindac “was safe and well accepted by patients and was safe for long-term use” (count 5);
• negligence in failing “to use reasonable care in designing, testing, labeling, marketing, supplying, distribution [sic] and selling” Sulindac (count 6);
• gross negligence based on the same omissions (count 7).
B. The statutory and regulatory scheme
1. Overview of the FDA approval process
The FDCA prohibits the “introduction into interstate commerce [of] any new drug, unless an approval of an application filed pursuant to subsection (b) or (j) of this section is effective with respect to such drug.”
3
Subsection (b) authorizes a new drug application (“NDA”) containing certain specified data, e.g., “full reports of investigations which have been made to show whether or not such drug is safe for use and whether such drug is effective for use,” “a full list of the articles used as components of such drug,” and “specimens of the labeling proposed to be used for such drug.”
Subsection (j), the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, sets forth a process under which “[a]ny person may file with the Secretary [of HHS] an
abbreviated
application for the approval of a new drug.”
A “listed drug” is a “drug which has been approved for safety and effectiveness under subsection (c) of this section,”
The Hatch-Waxman Amendments, then, authorize the approval of a new drug without demanding the information that would otherwise be required in an application under subsection (b), i.e., the reports of safety and effectiveness investigations and the like, provided the same drug has been previously approved for the same condi
2. ANDA procedures before HatchWaxman
As this committee report also noted, the FDA had, at that point, already been approving ANDAs for generic drugs, but only insofar as such a drug was “the same as [a] pioneer [i.e., non-generic] drug” approved prior to 1962. H.R.Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 16, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2649;
see also
Abbreviated New Drug Applications, 48 Fed.Reg. 2751, 2755 (Jan. 21, 1983)
(later codified
at
To carry out the mandate of the Drug Amendments, the FDA “created the drug efficacy study (DESI) to determine if all pre-1962 [approved] drugs were effective.” H.R.Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 16, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2649. The FDA later concluded that the reports generated in that study, together with other available data, “constituted a body of information sufficient, in the case of most DESI drugs determined to be effective, to conclude that the same drug product produced by another manufacturer would also be safe and effective if properly manufactured and used under the same conditions.” Abbreviated Drug Applications, 43 Fed.Reg. 39126, 39127 (proposed Sept. 1, 1978). Thus, the FDA promulgated a rule allowing an ANDA for a particular new drug upon a finding that such an approach was “sufficient.” Abbreviated Applications, 35 Fed.Reg. 6574, 6575 (Apr. 24, 1970)
(later codified
at
After receiving ANDAs for new drugs varying from ones approved through the DESI program in ways that “pose[d] significant questions of safety or effectiveness,” however, the FDA proposed a new rule limiting the ANDA process.
The new rule also provided that such a finding, i.e., “that an [ANDA] is suitable for a drug product[,] applies only to a product that is the same in active ingredient, dosage form and strength, route of administration, and conditions of use as the drug product that was the subject of the finding.”
Id. (later codified
at
At the time it proposed this rule, the FDA announced its “inten[t] to extend the ANDA concept at a later time to post-1962 drug products by publishing criteria for making a determination about these drugs,” noting that the rationale for the ANDA concept covered drugs approved before 1962 only — since only they had been subjected to the rigors of the DESI process. 43 Fed.Reg. at 39128. The FDA never did act on its own to make the ANDA process available for drugs approved after 1962, H.R.Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 16, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2649, so Congress acted through the Hatch-Wax-man Amendments, “generally extending] the procedures used to approve generic copies of pre-62 drugs to post-62 drugs,” id., at 14,1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2647.
Doing so, the committee report recognized, would allow the FDA to approve such drugs without requiring human clinical trials, “retesting” which the FDA saw as “unnecessary and wasteful” — as well as “unethical” — “because the drug has already been determined to be safe and effective.” Id. at 16, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2649. The committee report also noted that the “approximately 150 drugs approved after 1962 that [were] off patent and for which there [was] no generic equivalent” at that time “could be approved in generic form if there was [an ANDA] procedure,” resulting in significant cost savings. Id. at 17, 1984 U.S.S.C.A.N. at 2650.
3. ANDA procedures after Hatch-Wax-man
The FDA later proposed amending its regulations to implement the ANDA procedure set forth in the Hatch-Waxman Amendments.
See
Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 54 Fed.Reg. 28872 (proposed July 10, 1989). In relevant part, the FDA proposed “to
add a new requirement
with respect to the submission of labeling as part of an ANDA” to effect Hatch-Waxman’s rule that an ANDA “show that the proposed labeling for its drug product is the same as that of the reference listed drug.”
Id.
at 28884 (emphasis added). The FDA then promulgated rules specifying that an ANDA must include “[a] statement that the applicant’s proposed labeling is the same as the labeling of the reference listed drug except for” enumerated differences not relevant here. Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 57 Fed.Reg. 17950, 17985-86 (Apr. 28, 1992)
(later codified
at
These rules also stated that the FDA would deny an ANDA if it was “insufficient to show that the labeling proposed for the drug is the same as the labeling approved for the listed drug,”
id.
at 17992 (later codified at
Consistent labeling will assure physicians, health professionals, and consumers that a generic drug is as safe and effective as its brand-name counterpart. If an ANDA applicant believes new safety information should be added to a product’s labeling, it should contact FDA, and FDA will determine whether the labeling for the generic and listed drugs should be revised. After approval of an ANDA if ANDA holder believes that new safety information should be added, it should provide adequate supporting information to FDA, and FDA will determine whether the labeling for the generic and listed drugs should be revised.
Id. (emphasis added).
Further, in response to a comment that “FDA should create a mechanism to compel ANDA holders to revise their labeling to conform to the listed drug product once the ANDA is approved,” the FDA observed that
authorizes the withdrawal of approval of an application if ‘there is a lack of substantial evidence that the drug will have the effect it purports or is represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof.’ This provision applies to both ANDA and NDA drug products. Because an ANDA must have labeling that is the same as the reference listed drug under [21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v) ], FDA believes that a generic drug product approved on the basis of studies conducted on the listed drug and whose labeling is inconsistent with the listed drug’s labeling might not be considered safe and effective for use under the conditions prescribed, suggested, or recommended in the listed drug’s labeling. FDA, therefore, has revised § 311.150 to permit the agency to withdraw approval of the ANDA if the applicant fails to maintain labeling in compliance with the requirements of the Act.
Id.
at 17968 (emphases added). In explaining this revision, the FDA noted its agreement with comments that it “should create a new provision authorizing the agency to withdraw an [ANDA] if the [ANDA] holder failed to modify its labeling to match labeling changes in the reference listed drug.”
6
Id.
at 17970. Thus, the FDA explained, “
4. Revisions to drug labeling
Revisions to drug labeling are covered under another FDA regulation,
This version of the rule was promulgated in 2004, following the passage of Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (“FDAMA”).
7
Supplements and Other Changes to an Approved Application, 69 Fed.Reg. 18728, 18764-65 (Apr. 8, 2004).
8
The Modernization Act provided that, “[w]ith respect to a drug for which there is in effect an approved application under
So, by opening the CBE process to labeling changes that added or strengthened warnings and the like under
Despite some renumbering,
see
39 Fed. Reg. 11680, 117123 (Mar. 29, 1974) (recodifying
But later, in a 2008 proposal to amend
The FDA did not, however, propose to amend any of its regulations to clarify that an ANDA holder could not avail itself of a CBE supplement.
See id.
Nor did its final version of the proposed rule contain any such provision.
See
Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs, Biologies, and Medical Devices, 73 Fed.Reg. 49603-01 (Aug. 22, 2008). And the footnote in the proposal did not acknowledge that, when the FDA promulgated its new rule on ANDA applications following Hatch-Waxman, it included a provision that “[t]he applicant shall comply with the requirements of
5. Generic manufacturers’ reporting obligations
The ANDA regulations promulgated after Hatch-Waxman require that “each applicant having an [ANDA] ... shall comply with the requirements of § 314.80 regarding the reporting and recordkeeping of adverse drug experiences.”
Id.
at 17983
(codified as amended at
Congress also addressed the ongoing responsibilities of generic drug manufacturers in the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007.
12
This law requires the Secretary to “promptly notify the responsible person” — defined as the holder of an application for a prescription drug approved under subsection (b),
see
Paragraph (4) of subsection (o) also contains a “Rule of construction” that it “shall not be construed to affect the responsibility of ... the holder of the approved application under [
The defendants argue that all of the Bartletts’ claims are pre-empted by the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the FDCA or the ANDA regulations that followed it. “A fundamental tenet of our federalist system is that constitutionally enacted federal law is supreme to state law.
See
The defendants make no express preemption argument here; indeed, nothing in the Hatch-Waxman Amendments expressly preempts state law. 14 Instead, the defendants argue for implicit preemption of the Bartletts’ state-law claims. “[FJederal law can preempt state law by implication in two ways,” as the court of appeals has explained:
First, Congress may indicate an intent to occupy an entire field to the exclusion of state law. Second, even if Congress has not occupied the field, state law is nevertheless pre-empted to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law, that is, when compliance with both state and federal law is impossible, or when the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.
Good v. Altria Group, Inc.,
The defendants invoke both kinds of conflict pre-emption, though: that complying with the state law underlying the Bartletts’ claims (1) would be impossible in light of, and (2) would frustrate the goals of, the Hatch-Waxman Amendments and the subsequent ANDA regulations. Specifically, the defendants argue that, having obtained FDA approval for their generic version of Sulindac under the ANDA procedure envisioned by Hatch-Waxman, they could not change Sulindac’s design, or the warnings included in the drug’s labeling, without running afoul of federal law (impossibility pre-emption). They further argue that, even if the FDA could approve such a change, it could come only after “substantial expense to obtain the scientific substantiation necessary to support [it],” frustrating Hatch-Waxman’s goal to “increase the availability of low-cost generic drugs” by opening the ANDA process to them (frustration-of-purpose pre-emption).
As the Supreme Court reaffirmed in
Wyeth,
“ ‘the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.’ ”
Prior to the Court’s decision in
Wyeth,
the continued validity of this so-called “presumption against pre-emption” had been in some doubt,
see, e.g., Rowe,
A. The plaintiffs’ non-failure-to-warn claims
As an initial matter, the court notes that the defendants’ arguments are directed almost entirely at the failure-to-warn aspects of the Bartletts’ claims. In addition to those claims, however, the Bartletts also allege that the defendants defectively designed or manufactured Sulindac; that they breached their express and implied warranties that Sulindac was safe and fit for its intended use; and that they negligently failed to design or test Sulindac. 15 The defendants suggest, without fully explaining, that the Hatch-Waxman Amendments still pre-empt these claims because they depend on state law mandating “a generic drug’s design to differ from that of the branded on which it is based,” which is not permitted under the Hatch-Waxman Amendments.
Assuming, without deciding, that either the letter or spirit of the amendments would prevent the defendants from changing Sulindac’s design, that would not conflict with the state law underlying the Bartletts’ non-failure-to-warn claims. Those claims allege that the defendants violated state law by distributing a product that was defectively designed or manufactured, that was not fit for its intended use, and without using due care in designing or testing it. While one way to avoid violating state law in this way would be to redesign Sulindac to remove the alleged defect before distributing the drug (or otherwise to meet the standard of care), an
The defendants have not offered an explanation of how state law requiring them to do so would conflict with Hatch-Wax-man or any other federal law.
17
At the outset, then, the defendants’ motion must be denied as to the Bartletts’ claims for defective design or manufacture, breach of express or implied warranties, and negligence.
See Kellogg v. Wyeth,
B. The plaintiffs’ failure-to-warn claims
The defendants do argue, at length, that the Hatch-Waxman Amendments and their implementing regulations pre-empt the Bartletts’ claims insofar as they arise out of the defendants’ alleged failure to warn of Sulindac’s potential to cause severe adverse reactions. This argument rests on the premise that, because the FDA approved Sulindac under a process that required the drug’s labeling to be “the same as” that of its listed predecessor, they could not have changed the labeling— to add or strengthen a warning about such a reaction, or otherwise — without breaking, or at least standing in the way of, the federal law creating that process, the Hatch-Waxman Amendments.
1. Impossibility pre-emption
To succeed with their impossibility preemption argument, the defendants must show “that it would have been impossible for [them] to comply with the state-law duty to modify [Sulindac’s] labeling without violating federal law,”
Wyeth,
a. The Hatch-Waxman Amendments
Again, the Hatch-Waxman Amendments require that an ANDA contain “information to show that the labeling proposed for the new drug is the same as the labeling approved for the listed drug,”
Rather, as noted in Part II.A,
supra,
the Bartletts allege that, after securing approval of the ANDA for generic Sulindac with the same labeling as its listed predecessor’s, the defendants failed to change the label to warn adequately of the risks of Stevens Johnson-Syndrome and toxic epidermal necrolysis, despite actual or constructive knowledge of these risks. Nothing in the text of
Impossibility pre-emption arises where federal and state law “impose directly conflicting duties,” e.g., “if the federal law said, ‘you must sell insurance,’ while the state law said, ‘you may not.’ ”
Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson,
It is also incorrect, because, as discussed in part II.B.4,
supra,
the FDAMA allows, “[w]ith respect to a drug for which there is in effect an approved application under
Because
b. FDA labeling regulations
The analysis of the defendants’ impossibility argument does not end there, because “state laws can be pre-empted by federal regulations as well as by federal statutes.”
Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc.,
These regulations, then, do not prevent post-approval changes to the label of an ANDA-approved drug any more than the Hatch-Waxman Act does, as a number of courts have recognized.
21
See Demahy v. Wyeth, Inc.,
This is not to say that generic drug manufacturers- — or any drug manufacturers, for that matter — have carte blanche to make whatever alterations they want to their labels. FDA regulations classify most “labeling changes” as “major changes,”
see
The Court in Wyeth relied on this regulation in rejecting a manufacturer’s argument that state-law failure-to-warn claims were “pre-empted because it is impossible for it to comply with both the state-law duties underlying those claims and its federal labeling duties.” Id. at 1196. The Court ruled that, once the risk of the adverse reaction experienced by the plaintiff had become “apparent,” triggering a state-law duty to warn of it, “the CBE regulation permitted [the manufacturer] to provide such a warning before receiving the FDA’s approval.” Id. at 1198. While the Court acknowledged that “the FDA retains authority to reject labeling changes made pursuant to the CBE regulation in its review of the manufacturer’s supplemental application,” the Court declined to “conclude that it was impossible for [the manufacturer] to comply with both federal and state requirements” without “clear evidence that the FDA would not have approved a change” to effect the warning at issue. Id. The defendants here have not presented any such evidence, i.e., that the FDA would not have approved a change to their labeling to Sulindac to strengthen the warning as allegedly required by state law.
In a supplemental memorandum
(Wyeth,
again, was decided after the parties here had already fully briefed the motion for judgment on the pleadings), the defendants nevertheless maintain that the Court’s decision does not foreclose their pre-emption defense. They principally argue that, because Sulindac is a generic drug approved through an ANDA, its labeling cannot be changed through the
i. FDA regulations do not forbid adding or strengthening warnings to the labeling of an ANDA-approved drug through the CBE process
a. The regulations and their commentary
Just as nothing in the text of the HatchWaxman Amendments forbids a generic manufacturer from changing its drug’s label from the listed version’s post-approval, nothing in the text of the CBE regulation forbids a generic manufacturer from using the CBE process to do so. As discussed in Part II.B.4,
supra,
the CBE regulation represents the FDA’s use of its authority, under the FDAMA, to designate labeling changes that add or strengthen warnings and such as “manufacturing changes that are not major manufacturing changes,”
“Determining a regulation’s meaning requires application of the same principles that imbue exercises in statutory construction.”
Morales v. Sociedad Española de Auxilio Mutuo y Beneficencia,
FDA received no comments on this provision, but has amended the provision to adopt references to statutory, rather than regulatory, provisions to explain what information should be provided. However, the agency wishes to remind ANDA applicants that, as noted in paragraph 4 above, the labeling for an ANDA product must, with few exceptions, correspond to that for the reference listed drug.
57 Fed.Reg. at 17955. But for the reference to “paragraph 4,” this remark might provide some arguable (if atextual) support for the defendants’ view: the remark, unlike others they cite, speaks of “the labeling for an ANDA product,” rather than the “labeling proposed” for it, and thus might be read to require the labeling to remain the same beyond the approval process.
“Paragraph 4,” though, rejects a comment that the FDA “accept ANDA’s with warnings or precautions in addition to those on the reference listed drug’s label,” pointing out that “section 505(j)(2)(A)(v) and (j)(3)(G) of the act requires
[sic]
that the applicant’s proposed labeling be the same as that of the listed reference drug” with exceptions not relevant here.
Id.
at 17953. Those provisions, again, dictate the content of the drug’s labeling at the times the ANDA is submitted and approved, not afterwards. In light of the reference to “paragraph 4” — and, in turn, that paragraph’s references to
Moreover, the only change the FDA made to the existing version of
Indeed, as discussed in Part II.B.4,
supra,
the FDA had been letting manufacturers make labeling changes to approved drugs that added or strengthened warnings and the like, without prior agency approval, for nearly 20 years prior to Hatch-Waxman, and for more than 27 years prior to the FDA’s post-Hatch-Wax-man ANDA rules.
See
30 Fed.Reg. at 993-94. And, as discussed in Part II.B.2,
supra,
the FDA had been accepting AN
What the FDA actually did was in fact markedly to the contrary: it promulgated
Had the FDA intended that, notwithstanding the clear language of
This court, like almost all of those to have considered the availability of the CBE procedure to ANDA-approved drugs in light of
That principle is particularly apt in light of what Congress had to say when it recently spoke on the labeling duties of generic drug manufacturers in the Food and Drug Amendments Act of 2007, as discussed in Part II.B.5,
supra.
Not only does that act require an ANDA holder (provided the drug is no longer marketed by its NDA holder) to submit a supplemental application proposing labeling changes to reflect new safety information identified by the Secretary, or to explain why no change was warranted,
As also discussed in Part II.B.5,
supra,
Title 21, part 201, subpart B of the Code of Federal Regulations requires that “[t]he labeling shall be revised to include a warning as soon as there is reasonable evidence of a serious hazard with a drug,”
If, as the defendants posit, the portion of
In this void, it is reasonable to read the statute as authorizing the FDA to notify an ANDA holder of necessary labeling changes to reflect new safety information, while making clear that an ANDA holder’s responsibility to make those changes on its own under
The defendants also advance an argument that
FDA may notify the applicant, and, if appropriate, all other persons who manufacturer or distribute identical, related, or similar drug products, and for a new drug afford an opportunity for a hearing on a proposal to withdraw approval of the application or the [ANDA] under [21 U.S.C. § 355(e) ] and under the procedure set forth in [21 C.F.R. § 314.200 ], if the agency finds:
(10) That the labeling for the drug product that is the subject of the [ANDA] is no longer consistent with that for the listed drug referred to in the [ANDA], except for differences approved in the ANDA....
Initially, unlike the admonition repeated throughout the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, and elsewhere in the ANDA regulations, that an ANDA must show “that the labeling proposed for the new drug is
the same as
the labeling approved for the listed drug,”
see, e.g.,
Where two provisions of the same rule “differ in that one provision uses a term, but the other provision, where it would be equally sensible to use that term if [the agency] desired it to apply,” uses a different term instead, “it is generally assumed that [the agency] acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate” wording.
United States v. Councilman,
Indeed, the FDA enacted
As these remarks suggest, then, “the purpose of [the] regulation was not to prevent a generic manufacturer from improving or strengthening its warnings. It was, instead, to ensure that the FDA could require a generic manufacturer to modify its labeling to match labeling changes in the reference listed drug.”
Barnhill,
As the emphasized language suggests, the statement draws the familiar distinction between the near-absolute ban on labeling differences when a manufacturer proposes an ANDA and their availability “after an ANDA is approved.” During that latter period, “[t]he applicant shall comply with the requirements of
Accordingly, reading
b. The FDA’s contrary amicus briefs and footnote
As the defendants emphasize, the FDA has made statements since it promulgated the current ANDA regulations to the effect that a generic manufacturer cannot utilize the CBE process to effect a labeling change. Some of these statements were in amicus briefs the FDA filed in
Colacicco, supra,
first in the district court and later in the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The brief to the Third Circuit, however, was recently withdrawn, with the explanation that “the United States does not take a position on whether plaintiffs-appellants’ claims in this case are preempted. The [FDA] has not yet conducted an examination of various preemption issues following the Supreme Court’s decision in
Wyeth
that would be necessary
The defendants also rely on the footnote in the FDA’s proposed 2008 revision to
Based on these concerns, the court in Demahy refused to accord the footnote “any significant level of deference” in deciding whether generic manufacturers can
avail themselves of the CBE process for labeling changes.
Id.
This is consistent with precedent from the court of appeals. An agency’s statements that “are neither adjudicatory nor the product of notice-and comment rulemaking ... are ... entitled to deference only to the extent they have the power to persuade,” an approach known as
“Skidmore
deference” after
Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
The FDA’s footnote-bound position that “CBE changes are not available for generic drugs approved under an [ANDA] under
The defendants nevertheless argue that because, “[i]n codifying FDA’s procedures, Congress clearly required generic drug labeling to be the ‘same as’ the pioneer drug,” the FDA’s footnote interpreting its regulations to that effect “is not only entitled to deference, but is ‘virtually conclusive.’ ” (quoting
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC,
First, while Congress did indeed “generally extend! ] the procedures used to approve generic copies of pre-62 drugs to posN62 drugs” through the Hatch-Wax-man Amendments, H.R.Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 1, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2647, those Amendments, as is clear by now, did not in fact require the generic drug’s labeling to remain the same as the pioneer’s drug’s post-approval; they required the labeling proposed in the ANDA to be the same as the pioneer drug’s. See Part III. B. l.a, supra.
Second, the defendants have pointed to nothing in the rules the FDA had in place before Hatch-Waxman indicating that the agency disallowed post-approval changes to the labeling of an ANDA-approved drug. The relevant rules, both before and after their amendment in 1983, required only that an ANDA contain “[l]abeling that is in accord with
the labeling conditions described in the finding
that an [ANDA] is sufficient.” 48 Fed.Reg. at 2756
(later codified at
As discussed in Part II.B.2,
supra,
that “finding” was the first step of the ANDA approval process prior to Hatch-Waxman, and hinged on whether the drug, based on its approval through the DESI process, could be approved in generic form without additional clinical and pre-clinical studies— not on whether the generic drug had the same labeling as its DESI-approved version.
See
48 Fed.Reg. at 2751
(later codified at
Given that, as discussed in Part II.B.2,
supra,
the FDA retained this precise language when it amended its ANDA rules in 1983, that amendment also imposed no such restriction. To the contrary, the amendment simply limited a finding that an ANDA was suitable “to a product that was the same in active ingredient, dosage form and strength, and conditions of use as the drug product that was the subject of the finding.” 48 Fed.Reg. at 2755
(later codified at
So the defendants are incorrect that, in the years prior to Hatch-Waxman, the FDA’s rules disallowed ANDAs proposing labels for generic drugs that differed from those of their DESI-approved versions; the rules merely disallowed ANDAs proposing labels not “in accord with the labeling conditions described” in the agency’s finding that an ANDA was suitable for that particular drug. Indeed, had FDA rules during that time in fact done what the defendants say, the agency would not have referred to its post Hatch-Waxman rule that an ANDA show “that the proposed labeling for its drug product is the same as that of the reference listed drug” as “a new requirement.” 54 Fed.Reg. at 28884 (emphasis added). Even if the defendants were correct, moreover, the most their assertion demonstrates is that, under the FDA’s pre-Hateh-Waxman regime, an ANDA had to propose labeling that was the same as the pioneer drug’s. As in the case of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments themselves and the FDA’s implementing regulations, it simply does not follow that the labeling had to remain the same after the ANDA had been approved.
c. The presumption against pre-emption
As just discussed in exhaustive detail, that point is clear from the text of the statute and the regulations. But even if the defendants, through the footnote and certain other portions of the FDA comments on its ANDA rules, were able to cast some doubt on whether generic manufacturers can use the CBE process to make labeling changes, that doubt could not be resolved in the defendants’ favor. As
Wyeth
makes clear, a court must “start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”
This is not to say that Congress could not have passed legislation to give the FDA, rather than state authorities or juries, the final say-so on the content of generic drug labeling, much as Congress has done in the case of medical devices.
See id.
at 1200 (citing
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.,
ii. Even read as the defendants suggest, the regulations do not make compliance with state law impossible
Finally, even if the defendants were correct that they could not use the CBE process to make unilateral changes adding or strengthening warnings to their generic drug, it does not follow that compliance with state law requiring such warnings is impossible. In
Wyeth,
the Court rejected the drug manufacturer’s argument that “if it had unilaterally added ... a warning, it would have violated federal law governing unauthorized distribution and misbranding ... on the assumption that this labeling change would have rendered [its drug] a new drug lacking an effective application.”
The Court reasoned, first, “strengthening the warning would not have rendered [the manufacturer’s drug] a new drug” (citing
Nor would this warning have rendered [the drug] misbranded. The FDCA does not provide that a drug is misbranded simply because the manufacturer has altered an FDA-approved label; instead, the misbranding provision focuses on the substance of the label and, among other things, proscribes labels that fail to include ‘adequate warnings.’21 U.S.C. § 352(f) . Moreover, because the statute contemplates that federal juries will resolve most misbranding claims, the FDA’s belief that a drug is misbranded is not conclusive.
Id. (emphasis added).
The same reasoning applies with equal force here. Even if
The upshot is that, at best, the defendants can show “a hypothetical or potential conflict ... insufficient to warrant preemption.”
Rice v. Norman Williams Co.,
2. Frustration-of-purpose pre-emption
The defendants also claim that the state law underlying the plaintiffs’ failure-to-warn claims “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress” in the Hatch-Waxman Amendments.
Good,
At the outset, the defendants do not identify anything in the statutory or regulatory provisions on manufacturing changes,
Furthermore, as also discussed in Part II.B.5,
supra,
FDA rules enacted to carry out the Hatch-Waxman Amendments specifically require ANDA holders to adhere to the agency’s rules on “the reporting and recordkeeping of adverse drug experiences,”
As discussed in Parts II.B.1-2,
supra,
Congress pursued those objectives
As the court of appeals has instructed, “it is not the fact of [federal] action on a particular subject alone — but the reasons for the action — that control its preemptive effect.”
Good,
In that vein, the defendants’ frustration-of-purpose argument (and their impossibility argument, for that matter) raises another serious difficulty: leaving those injured by drugs unaccompanied by warnings deemed adequate by state law without any remedy at all without any indication that Congress desired, or even contemplated the possibility, of such a result.
40
While Congress could have
But, as just discussed at length, Congress did not do so. Without such a clear expression of intent, this court refuses to take that step on its own. This puts this court in line with others to consider the issue.
See Stacel,
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED.
Notes
. Pub.L. 98-417, tit. I, 98 Stat.1985,
codified as amended
at
. Ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938),
codified as amended at
. The FDCA defines "new drug,” in relevant part, as "[a]ny drug ... the composition of
. There is an exception to this requirement "for changes required because of differences approved under a petition filed under [
. Though the FDA has since made slight modifications to
. The FDA had initially proposed to “retain its current regulations under
. Pub.L. 105-115, § 116(a), 111 Stat. 2296, 2313
(codified
at
. The rule was subsequently revised in ways not relevant here. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3997 (Jan. 24, 2006).
. When FDA amended the rule again in response to the Modernization Act, its only substantive edit to the CBE provision,
.
. Periodic reporting "does not apply to adverse drug experience information obtained from postmarketing studies,”
. Pub.L. 110-85 § 107, 121 Stat. 823, 841.
. As the result of a 2006 amendment to these rules, "[pjrescription drug products for which a new drug application (NDA), biologies license application (BLA), or efficacy supplement was approved ... between June 30, 2001 and June 30, 2006,” or which was pending or submitted on or after that date, are subject to "Labeling requirements for new and more recently approved prescription drug products” set forth at
. As the Bartletts point out, when Congress previously amended the FDCA, in 1962, it included a provision that “[n]othing in the amendments ... shall be construed as invalidating any provision of State law which would be valid in the absence of such amendments unless there is a direct and positive conflict between such amendments and such provision of State law.” Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub.L. 87-781, § 201, 76 Stat. 780, 793. But this provision, by its terms, applies only to the 1962 amendments (none of which is at issue here) and therefore does not on its face limit the pre-emptive effect — if any — of other provisions of the FDCA, such as the Hatch-Waxman Amendments. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has viewed this provision as one indicator among many that “Congress took care to preserve state law” while enlarging federal oversight of prescription drugs.
Wyeth,
. As discussed supra, the complaint also makes claims for failure to warn, fraud, and breach of implied warranty. Based on the allegations underlying those claims, the court has treated them as dependent, at least in part, on the defendants’ alleged failure to warn; similarly, the court has treated the Bartletts’ express warranty claim as independent of any statements in Sulindac's labeling. Ultimately, however, the proper characterization of these various claims makes no difference to the outcome of the pending motion, because the court rules that federal law does not pre-empt even those claims that are based on allegedly inadequate warnings.
. And a third way to do it would be to distribute the drug only with the allegedly necessary warnings, so, if this were the only theory encompassed by the Bartletts' defective design or manufacture, warranty, and negligence claims, then the defendants' preemption arguments would at least be implicated.
See Good,
. As the Bartletts point out, the FDA regulations do require that "[a]n applicant who is the sole manufacturer of an approved drug product" give the agency at least six months’ notice “prior to discontinuing manufacture,” but only for drugs that are "life supporting, life sustaining, or intended for use in the prevention of a serious disease or condition” and "not originally derived from human tissue and replaced by a recombinant product.”
.
Bolin ex rel. Bolin v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,
No. 08-60523,
. For this reason, the defendants are not helped by the FDA’s statement in a guidance document that ‘‘[a]ll labeling changes for ANDA drug products must be consistent with section 505(j) of the Act.” FDA, Guidance for Industry: Changes to an Approved NDA or ANDA 1 (2004), available at http://www.fda. gov/ downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/Guidances 24. Section 505© as the Act, as just discussed, requires sameness of labeling as a condition of ANDA approval; it does not restrict what happens to the label afterwards.
. In
Colacicco,
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit expressly did not decide “whether actions against generic drug manufacturers are preempted on the basis of their obligations under the Hatch-Waxman Amendments.”
. The same is true of the FDA’s remarks in proposing and promulgating these regulations.
See Demahy,
.
Wilson v. Wyeth, Inc.,
No. 07-378,
. This argument assumes, of course, that the defendants could not have satisfied their state-law duty to warn by proposing to change Sulindac’s label to correct the allegedly inadequate warning, obtaining the FDA's approval of that change, then making it.
Cf. Perry v. Novartis Pharm. Corp.,
. In their opening brief, the defendants claimed that the FDA has permitted CBE supplements seeking to add or strengthen warnings “only where the NDA holder becomes aware of newly discovered safety information” and "there is sufficient evidence of a causal association with the drug.” While the publication the defendants purport to quote for this language says nothing of the sort,
see
Supplemental New-Drug Applications, 30
. By the same reasoning, as well as that set forth in note 21 and the accompanying text,
supra,
the FDA’s remarks in revising its rules on the content and format of drug labeling say little if anything about a manufacturer's power to change its labeling after the ANDA is approved. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed.Reg. 3922, 3929 (Jan. 24, 2006) (“the labeling of a drug product
submitted for approval
under an ANDA must be the same as the labeling of the listed drug referenced in an ANDA,” referring to
. In
Monis,
the court denied the plaintiff's motion to reconsider its earlier ruling that his state-law failure to warn claims were preempted in light of, among other authorities,
Demahy.
The
Monis
court's earlier ruling had not taken
two possible interpretations of§ 314.97 . Either the Demahy court is correct that§ 314.97 requires ANDA holders to utilize§ 314.70 , in which case whether or not an ANDA holder can unilaterally change its label is an issue currently pending before the Supreme Court, or the Demahy court is incorrect and§ 314.97 merely states that when a brand manufacturer utilizes§ 314.70 , then so too must the generic manufacturer make that same change to its corresponding drug’s label.
But the court did not explain the second of these “possible interpretations” in light of either
. In explaining away
. Despite the clear language of
. In proposing the regulations, the FDA noted that it would “not accept ANDA's for products with significant changes in labeling,” on the theory that those might be necessitated by other kinds of differences from the listed drug that would "jeopardize the safe or effective use of the product.” 54 Fed.Reg. at 28885 (emphasis added).
. To like effect is the FDA's remark, in response to a comment on
. The remarks do note that
. Again, as discussed in Part II.B.4, supra, the FDA must approve all labeling changes, even those subject to the CBE process; it is just that such changes, as opposed to their "major” counterparts, are not approved until after the manufacturer has already implemented them.
. And as discussed in note 27,
supra,
an agency's statements in amicus briefs receive no particular deference from the courts of this circuit anyway.
See Rosenberg,
. As discussed in Part II.B.4, supra, the proposed (and ultimately the final) rule was "to reaffirm that a CBE supplement is appropriate to amend the labeling for an approved product only to reflect newly acquired information.” 73 Fed.Reg. at 2849.
.
Kellogg
also observed that "[tjhere is no ambiguity in the regulations,” since
. The district court’s opinion in
Colacicco, supra,
also deferred to the footnote,
. There is also the
Wyeth
Court’s point that "the very idea that the FDA would bring an enforcement action for strengthening a warning pursuant to the CBE is difficult to accept — neither [the defendants] nor the United States has identified a case in which the FDA has done so.”
. A different kind of state-law claim could theoretically have this effect: for example, a claim that a manufacturer of an ANDA-approved drug was negligent in failing to conduct clinical trials prior to its approval. But that is not this case, where the Bartletts allege that “reports of serious adverse events associated with Sulindac ... in the medical literature” — rather than independent testing — sufficed to put the defendants on notice that a stronger warning was appropriate.
. The defendants’ reliance on Justice Breyer's concurring opinion in
Wyeth
is therefore misplaced. He noted that “some have argued that state tort law can sometimes raise prices to the point where those who are sick are unable to obtain the drugs they need” and that, in such a case, the FDA may determine that state tort law serves as "a hindrance to achieving the safe drug-related medical care that Congress sought.”
. The vast majority of courts have rejected the notion that the manufacturer of the brand-name drug may be liable for defects in its generic equivalent on a theory of "innovator liability.”
See, e.g., Foster, 29
F.3d at 171;
Goldych v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
No. 04-1477,